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Abstract
This thesis analyses the effects of current and proposed pension policies for the UK, 
and critically assesses the arguments for different forms of intervention. It aims to 
contribute to the pension reform debate in four main ways. First, it presents an original 
typology of four ‘ideal type’ pension systems -  targeting, basic income, social 
insurance and compulsory saving - which allows the plethora of different reform 
proposals to be grouped into manageable bundles, and brings out the key choices facing 
pension reformers. Second, it aims to make the debate better informed by providing 
estimates of future pensioner incomes and fiscal sustainability using the relatively new 
techniques of dynamic microsimulation and generational accounting. In particular, an 
extended version of the dynamic model PENSIM is used to project pensioner incomes 
in 2066. Third, it provides an assessment of one particular pension reform - the 
replacement of the State Eamings-Related Pension Scheme by a new State Second 
Pension - through describing the rationale for and effects of the new scheme. Finally, it 
adds to broader theoretical debates about the rationale for, and effectiveness of, 
different forms of retirement income provision, supplementing the economics and 
social policy literatures on the role (if any) for compulsory eamings-related pensions 
and the trade-off between incentives and redistribution.
The analysis shows that the UK is an exceptional case. In contrast to most developed 
countries distributional concerns rather than cost dominate. The government’s reforms 
will do relatively little to improve these distributional outcomes. This reflects the fact 
that, although the government (correctly) reject compulsorily linking benefits to 
earnings, connections between entitlements and contributions have not been severed 
entirely. This thesis argues that it is this linkage which undermines current policy, and 
that future reforms should move away from the idea of pensions as insurance towards a 
more rights-based approach.
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"I have thought many times lately that a thin widespread happiness, 
commencing now, and of a piece with the days of your life, is preferable 
to an anticipated heap far away in the future, and none now."
From A Pair o f  Blue Eyes by Thomas Hardy.
1. Introduction: retirement and income risk in later life
Over the last 100 years or so retirement has become the norm in developed countries 
and, whether consequentially or causally, pensions are now a major concern of public 
policy. Indeed, in many countries pensions are the single largest item of public 
spending, and even where public provision is less to the fore state interference in 
pension arrangements is pervasive. The rise of pensioning and of retirement is therefore 
emblematic of the growth of the welfare state over the twentieth century, and more 
generally of the expansion of government involvement in individuals’ social and 
economic lives. But by the same token, pensions are currently at the centre of debate 
about how (or whether) to reform the welfare state. Apart from its intrinsic importance 
to governments and individuals, pension reform may thus act as a weather-vane for 
wider changes in the role of the state and, as such, is of particular interest to social 
scientists.
Pension reform also appears to be increasingly fashionable, and many countries are 
currently in the process of changing their pension systems1. In South America, for 
example, a number of governments have recently followed the example of Chile and 
‘privatised’ pension provision, introducing compulsory individual accounts and 
winding-down their state schemes (James, 1997, pp. 363-364). Many European 
countries similarly embarked on pension reform in the 1990s, and though the radical 
South American model has been rejected, reforms in Italy and Sweden (for example) 
have resulted in major changes to the structure of state provision. The UK has not been 
immune from this trend, introducing one major set of changes in 1988 under the then 
Conservative government, and preparing for further reform under the current Labour 
government (see Part B). With so many countries reforming their pension systems the 
need to understand the reasons for, and effect of, state intervention in this part of the 
lifecycle is clearer than ever.
1 Overviews of recent international experience with pension reform are provided by, amongst others, 
Tamburi (1995), Lloyd-Sherlock and Johnson (1996), World Bank (1994, Ch. 8), and Johnson (1999, 
Ch.2).
1
This thesis aims to add to the debate about pension reform in the UK in four main 
ways. First, it presents an original typology of ‘ideal type’ pension systems, allowing 
the plethora of different reform proposals to be grouped into manageable bundles, and 
bringing-out the key choices facing pension reformers. Second, it aims to make the 
debate better informed by providing new estimates of future pensioner incomes and 
fiscal sustainability under existing policies and under alternative regimes, using the 
relatively new techniques of dynamic microsimulation and generational accounting. 
Third, it provides an assessment of one particular pension reform - the Labour 
government’s plans to replace the current State Eamings-Related Pension Scheme 
(SERPS) with a new State Second Pension (S2P) -  through describing the rationale for 
and effects of the new scheme. Finally, it is hoped this thesis contributes to broader 
theoretical debates about pension reform and the effectiveness of different forms of 
retirement income provision, adding to the economics and social policy literatures on 
the role (if any) for compulsory eamings-related pensions and the trade-off between 
incentives and redistribution in pension policy.
The main purpose of this chapter is to set out the typology of ‘ideal type’ pension 
systems used in this thesis and to describe the various ways in which the effects of 
pensions can be analysed. These are the subjects of Sections 1.3 and 1.4. However, 
before this it is useful to go back to first principles to examine why and how the state 
has become involved in retirement income provision. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 review the 
main arguments, the former considering the nature of the income risks associated with 
retirement, and from this the rationale for state intervention, while the latter looks at the 
various mechanisms that governments can use to influence pension provision (and 
hence reduce these risks). Though Section 1.2 provides some details of the UK’s 
pension system, a full account is left to the Annex to this chapter (Chapter 1 A).
1.1 The nature of the problem
Historically men and women faced very different income risks as they grew older. For 
women the risk was that the male breadwinner would no longer be there to provide for 
the household’s needs, and that her own earning power would be insufficient to make
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ends meet. The risk which increased with age was therefore of widowhood. In contrast, 
the income risk faced by males as they grew older was connected with their position in 
the labour market - until as late as 1921 the majority of men over 65 (the current state 
retirement age for males) were economically active, and employment might thus be 
considered their standard source of income (Macnicol, 1998, p. 23). The risk which 
increased with age was therefore that earnings would unexpectedly cease, for instance 
because of ill health or unemployment.
The situation today is rather different. First, the growth in female labour force 
participation means that the risks faced by men and women have become more closely 
aligned. For both, it is loss of earned income in later life which is now the problem2. 
Second, as employment rates among older workers (particularly men) have fallen, a 
period of worklessness at the end of life has become more of a certainty and less of a 
contingency. Hence in modem society retirement in itself is not a risk - almost 
everyone now reaches old age and almost everyone now retires. Rather, the concern 
today is that retirement brings with it a number of associated risks which, to a greater 
or lesser extent, require the state to become involved in this part of the lifecycle.
The starting point for economic analyses of retirement is that, if people expect their 
income from employment to fall at some point towards the end of their life, they will 
take some form of action to build up alternative means of financing consumption 
during these years. In other words, they will attempt to smooth consumption over their 
lifecycle. However, as discussed by Barr (1998, pp. 109-113), such consumption- 
smoothing is unlikely to take place simply through individuals accumulating assets 
during working years and then gradually selling these off during retirement. Rather, 
people will seek ways of pooling risk through insurance arrangements of one kind or 
another.
Three risks are particularly important in this lifecycle model of pension provision (a 
fourth risk of having an income below a society-wide minimum standard is discussed
2 Issues connected with spouses’ (and divorcees’) pension rights are, o f course, still important. However, 
as women’s lifetime earnings converge on those of men, such transfers will become more gender-neutral, 
though it is doubtful whether they will ever be completely neutral. In general this thesis does not deal 
with such gender-related issues.
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later). First there is longevity risk -  the risk that retirement will go on longer than 
might have been expected (e.g. on the basis of life tables), and hence that assets will be 
exhausted prior to death. Second, there is investment risk -  the risk that the assets 
purchased during working life will not go up in value as much as expected (or, at the 
extreme, will go down in value). Last, there is information risk -  the risk that through 
ignorance or mis-information an individual will not save ‘enough’ for their old age 
(even assuming average longevity and investment returns).
In theory, a competitive market should naturally develop financial products capable of 
dealing with both longevity and investment risk. However, in practice the nature of 
these risks means that the free-market is unlikely to produce an efficient outcome, and 
this provides a rationale for government intervention. In the case of longevity risk the 
problem is that, while people can purchase an annuity which will provide them with an 
income until they die, it is difficult for the market to provide inflation-proofed annuities 
(due to the problem of linked risk)3. As it seems reasonable to assume that people are 
concerned about their real purchasing power as they get older, there is therefore a case 
for government intervention to make such inflation-proofed annuities possible. In a 
similar vein, while the market can reduce investment risk through various devices (such 
as with-profit policies), there will always be some variation in returns to individual 
saving pots (with variations in charges adding a further element of risk; see Cook and 
Johnson, 2000, pp. 11-17). Minimising investment risk therefore requires that saving is 
collectivised in some way, with either employers or the state offering a guarantee of 
benefits (Barr, 1998, pp. 206-207)4. This is also likely to minimise administration costs 
(and hence charges).
3 Linked risk occurs because unexpected rises in inflation affect the whole market, and hence there is no 
mechanism for insurers to lay off this risk on a secondary market. Of course, one way out of this would 
be for annuities to be financed out of investments in real assets (e.g. shares). However, this simply 
replaces inflation risk with investment risk -  if there is an economic downturn then real rates of return on 
assets may become negative, so that fully protecting against unexpected inflation is again not possible. 
Indeed, the nominal rate of return to real assets may become negative, in which case payments would 
also fall in cash terms.
4 Note that investment risk (and indeed longevity risk) can never be completely eliminated. If there is a 
severe economic downturn it may prove impossible to meet promised pension pay-outs whether this 
promise is made by the state or by employers (as occurs in private occupational schemes). In other 
words, if national income falls then pensioners’ living standards can only be protected by them receiving 
a larger slice of the cake, which for economic and political reasons may not be desirable (or feasible). 
Note also that there are separate issues connected with pension fund fraud; see in particular Goode 
(1993, Section 1.2) for an account of the Maxwell pension fund scandal and policy recommendations. 
The role (if any) for the state in compensating victims of what is, essentially, a failure of regulation is not
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Longevity and investment risk therefore both provide a rationale for government 
regulation of private pensions and (potentially) for state provision of particular 
financial products. Taken to the extreme, the comprehensive eamings-related social 
insurance systems commonplace in continental Europe might also be justified in this 
way. However, the real rationale for this kind of approach must be found in the last risk 
-  that people will not save enough for retirement due to information problems. As 
discussed further in Section 7.2, people may not only decide to save in the wrong way 
but may also make incorrect decisions about how much to save. If individuals have a 
tendency to be myopic (short-sighted) in their financial planning, the bias of these 
incorrect decisions will be for them not to save enough, so that in retirement they 
experience a bigger drop in their income than they would have wished (if planning their 
lifecycle finances with perfect foresight and knowledge). State intervention to ensure 
that workers always receive a pension worth a particular fraction of their lifetime 
earnings can set a minimum eamings-replacement rate, thus limiting (or, if the 
replacement rate is high, eliminating) information risk (Le Grand, 1995, pp. 30-31). If 
pensions are provided by the state this approach will, in addition, reduce or eliminate 
the first two risks (though note that a private compulsory saving scheme could also be a 
response to information risk).
The problem of information risk is illustrated in Figure 1.1, which shows two possible 
consumption streams for an individual with a given level of lifetime earnings. The 
highest and most hump-shaped line shows their earnings in each year between the ages 
of 20 and 65, assuming that their age-eamings profile follows the cross-sectional age 
distribution of males and that they earn (on average over their lifecycle) the average 
full-time wage5. The other two lines then show possible consumption patterns given 
this level of lifetime earnings. The flatter line shows how consumption would alter if
discussed in this thesis.
5 The figure uses the mean gross weekly wage of all full-time workers (i.e. both men and women) whose 
gross weekly earnings were not affected by absence. Estimates are taken from the New Earnings Survey 
(ONS, 1999, Table A 15) and are for April 1999 when, conveniently, average mean weekly full-time 
earnings were £400 a week. Note also that the cross-sectional profile of male earnings shown in the 
Figure is based on a ‘snapshot’ taken in April 1999 and, as discussed by Banks, Disney and Smith (2000, 
pp. 584-590), this is significantly different from the lifetime income profiles of individual cohorts. In 
particular, the pattern shown in the Figure may understate the extent to which earnings rise in the early 
years of working life and overstate the fall-off towards the end of working life.
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the individual is fully forward-looking, i.e. does not suffer from myopia. In this 
instance we might expect them to save enough during their working life to be able to 
afford a pension of two-thirds their average earnings (this being a typical target 
replacement-rate for occupational pension schemes), so that there is only a modest drop 
in consumption on retirement (at age 65, by assumption). This consumption pattern 
may be contrasted with that which would occur if the individual were myopic and 
consumed more of their income at the time it was earned. As the level of lifetime 
earnings is fixed this additional consumption during the individual’s working life will 
be reflected in a lower ‘replacement rate’ (between pension benefits and earnings) in 
retirement - the Figure assumes that retirement income is now only 40% of average 
earnings. This second consumption stream therefore shows the problem of information 
risk and why (arguably) governments should intervene to ensure something closer to 
the unmyopic consumption stream is followed.
The decline in income after retirement shown in Figure 1.1 requires some explanation. 
In line with most analyses of pensions the Figure assumes that pension benefits 
maintain their real value in retirement, i.e. it assumes there is no unexpected inflation 
or that government intervention has made full-indexation possible. However, because 
the vertical axis of the Figure is in 1999 earnings terms6, this means that pension 
income falls during retirement in relation to earnings. Following the Government 
Actuary (see, e.g., GAD, 1999, p. 33), this thesis assumes that earnings grow on 
average at 1.5% per year faster than prices.
6 As noted by the government (e.g. DSS, 1998, p. 41), putting estimates of future incomes in terms of 
their value relative to earnings gives a better idea of what sums will ‘feel like’ in the future.
Figure 1.1
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If  lifetime earnings were narrowly dispersed, and economic growth low or nil, this 
would be the end of the income risks connected with retirement. However, in reality 
neither o f these assumptions hold (at least in the UK). Some individuals have such low 
lifetime earnings that - even if they distribute their lifetime income ‘correctly’ (through 
voluntary or compulsory saving during working years) - they will end up with a 
retirement income which is below an acceptable level (the minimum income standard)7. 
Particularly if  the minimum standard rises at age 60 or 65 (and possibly again at later 
ages, as under the age-related structure o f Income Support), the ‘natural’ fall in income 
between working and retired years may well be sufficient to push some people into 
poverty. Moreover, as noted above (and in Johnson, Stears and Webb, 1998, pp. 211- 
214), for most people private pension income remains static (at best) in real terms 
during retirement, and hence even better-off members o f older cohorts can fall into 
poverty as they grow older (assuming a relative definition of poverty is used, as is the 
case throughout this thesis).
7 Note that in reality it will be difficult to tell under a voluntary system whether people have a low 
retirement income due to not saving enough or through having low lifetime earnings; arguably this 
creates a rationale for second tier provision (see Sections 7.1 and 8.3).
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Figure 1.2 shows how the two effects work. It illustrates the lifetime earnings and 
consumption of a ‘typical’ part-time worker; i.e. someone who (on average over their 
working life) earns the mean part-time wage (in fact this is a relatively unlikely
o
scenario -  people rarely work part-time throughout life) . As in Figure 1.1, it assumes 
that their age-eamings profile follows that o f male workers. The ‘unmyopic’ 
consumption stream associated with this level of earnings may then be compared with 
the level o f the minimum income standard; as throughout this thesis this is taken as the 
level o f Income Support. Note that the Figure also assumes a relative poverty standard, 
so that the minimum standard increases with average earnings (i.e. at 1.5% a year), and 
that pension benefits maintain their real value in retirement (so that they fall in relation 
to earnings, used as the scale on the vertical axis).
Figure 1.2 
Lifetime income and poverty risk
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8 More precisely, Figure 1.2 uses the New Earnings Survey (ONS, 1999, Tables F35 and F36) estimate 
for the mean gross weekly earnings o f  all part-tim e adults whose pay was not affected by absence. In 
April 1999 mean part-time earnings were £132 a week, a third o f  the mean amount received by full-time 
workers.
As can be seen, this individual ends up with an income below the minimum standard 
set by Income Support (both because their income falls in relation to earnings during 
retirement and because the level of the minimum rises with age). However, the 
important point to note is that this poverty risk is not the knock-on effect of longevity, 
investment or information risk (at least if we assume that two-thirds of earnings is the 
‘correct’ replacement rate, i.e. that people with low lifetime earnings should not save 
more in order to avoid poverty in later life)9. Poverty risk is therefore rather different 
from the other risks, in that it arises not because of market failure but because 
governments set themselves the objective of ensuring a minimum retirement income. 
This thesis assumes that this objective for policy is inevitable. All mainstream political 
ideologies accept that the state has a moral duty to prevent people who are unable to 
work from falling into destitution and, though there may be disagreement about the 
appropriate age of retirement (when any work-test for benefit receipt would logically 
cease), this implies some form of state provision for retirees10.
1.2 The policy response
The policy response to income risk in retirement takes a number of forms. The World 
Bank (1994, p. 15) provide a useful classification, distinguishing between three ‘pillars’ 
or ‘tiers’ of pension provision: a first tier of means-tested or flat-rate state benefits, a 
second tier of compulsory eamings-related benefits, and a third tier of voluntarily 
pension contributions by individuals and employers. A summary of how each 
component of pension provision in the UK fits into this classification is in Table 1.1,
9 Arguably, longevity risk is an important contributor to poverty risk. For instance, if the value of 
benefits in retirement is fixed in nominal (rather than real) terms then the end part of the 
consumption/income stream shown in Figure 1.2 would be even more downward sloping. Particularly for 
women (who tend to live longer than men), this interaction between longevity and poverty can be 
important. However, it would be possible for the government to reduce this risk through insisting that all 
pension benefits are fully price-indexed.
10 More extreme commentators such as Green (1993, pp. 144-147; 1999, pp. 97-103) suggest that people 
with very low retirement incomes but reasonable earnings over their working life should not be eligible 
for state assistance, on the basis that they should have had the foresight to save more at a younger age. 
However, in practice excluding such ‘lifetime rich/retirement poor’ individuals from eligibility to means- 
tested benefits may prove extremely problematic. Certainly, the attempt to include a ‘thrift condition’ in 
the means-tested 1908 pension scheme was not a success, and this part of the scheme was rapidly 
abandoned (Macnicol, 1998, pp. 157-161).
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while a detailed description of each element is in the Annex to this chapter (Chapter 
1 A). For the time-being this section concentrates on describing how each of the three 
tiers affects the various income risks discussed above. For convenience the tiers are 
discussed in reverse order.
Table 1.1
The three tiers of pension provision in the UK11
First tier
(compulsory flat-rate or 
means tested)
Second tier
(compulsory eamings- 
related)
Third tier
(voluntary)
Basic pension 
Income Support
SERPS/S2P
NIC rebates for private 
pension schemes and 
consequent benefit 
payments
(Tax relief on NIC rebates)
Non-statutory contributions 
to and payments from 
private schemes
Tax relief on voluntary 
contributions
Third tier provision can help to reduce both investment and information risk; 
regulation influencing the nature of voluntary provision (thereby reducing investment 
risk) and tax reliefs influencing the level of voluntary provision (and so information 
risk). Given the problems associated with personal pension schemes, in particular their 
high and variable charges, the assertion that third tier provision reduces investment risk 
may seem somewhat peculiar. However, the government’s proposed Stakeholder 
pensions give a better idea of the potential for regulation to reduce this risk: as charges 
will be capped at 1% (and will fall wholly on investment returns without an annual fee) 
the risk of low returns due to excessive costs will be smaller (see DSS, 1999, p. 7)12. 
This said, Stakeholder schemes need not have any mechanism for evening out returns 
and, though such financial products would be possible, they are therefore likely to
11 Note that the classification in the Table is open to some debate, in particular about the tier which 
SERPS should be assigned to. This typology follows Banks and Emmerson (2000, pp. 30-39) in 
assigning all parts of SERPS (i.e. state provision as well as contracted-out private provision) to the 
second tier (see DSS, 1998, pp. 57-58).
12 Stakeholder pensions may also reduce information risk, as providers of the new product will be 
obliged to present projections of likely pension income in a common format, thus (hopefully) making 
retirement planning a less daunting task, and employers will be obliged to provide an automatic pay-roll 
deduction facility (see DSS, 1999).
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remain subject to a substantial degree of investment risk. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
majority of voluntary pension saving in the UK occurs via occupational pension 
schemes, which are normally defined-benefit (i.e. the employer offers a guarantee of 
pension benefits), means that most third tier provision does not suffer from investment 
risk13.
The effect of tax reliefs is to reduce the cost of buying retirement income, hence they 
act to increase the amount people save in the form of a pension (assuming the 
‘substitution’ effect is greater than the ‘income’ effect). Such reliefs therefore reduce 
information risk, albeit in a rather haphazard way. While myopia (if it exists) will tend 
to reduce pension saving, tax reliefs will have the opposite effect; the hope is that in 
combination something like an ‘optimal’ level of saving will be achieved14. However, it 
should be noted that rather than leading to a higher pension income (and so less of a 
fall in consumption on retirement), such reliefs might equally be used to finance a 
longer (rather than a richer) retirement. In other words, tax reliefs necessarily subsidise 
early retirement as well as retirement income itself15.
As Campbell (1999, pp. 3-5) discusses, the issue of early retirement is likely to move 
up the policy agenda in coming years, as the ‘New Deals’ for younger age-groups and 
robust economic growth make worklessness at younger ages less of a problem.
13 In fact, it is possible to argue that occupational schemes do suffer from a form of investment risk, in 
that the value of the final pension earned (and hence the effective return on contributions) varies with an 
individual’s employment history. In particular, people who change jobs frequently often do rather badly 
out of occupational provision. However penalties for early leavers can be reduced through regulation 
e.g., to force pension funds to index deferred benefits. A knock-on effect o f such regulation is, however, 
that employers may be less willing to establish and maintain occupational provision as one of their chief 
motivations for remunerating their workforce in this way would now be removed (because long-stayers 
would no longer be reward for their loyalty).
14 This presentation of pension tax relief as a rational response to the problem of myopia is not 
historically accurate; as shown by Hannah (1986, pp. 47-52), the current system reflects a series of ad- 
hoc decisions - there was never any ‘grand design’.
15 Again, regulation could (potentially) avoid this problem by restricting withdrawals until official 
retirement age had been reached. However, at present the minimum age in the UK for taking a private 
pension is 50, significantly below the age at which the state pension may be claimed (60 for women, 65 
for men). The government is currently considering whether to increase the minimum age for private 
pensions to 55 (from 2010), but have run into opposition from the financial services industry who 
correctly fear that this will make pension saving less popular. But even if the government are successful 
there will still be a 10 year gap between the two ages, the retirement age for women itself rising to 65 
between 2010 and 2020, and hence the point will remain valid.
11
Moreover, as Campbell’s work shows, the fact that non-employment rates among older 
men have doubled in the last twenty years, so that two in five men between 55 and 65 
are now without work, is in any case likely to call attention to this stage of the 
lifecycle. However, while the growth of early retirement/non-employment among the 
over-50s is (at least in part) due to the existence of pension tax reliefs (both directly 
through their encouraging saving and indirectly through their effect on employment 
practices), this subject is outside the remit of this thesis.
For the same reason the subsequent analysis also sets issues connected with pension tax 
reliefs to one side. For instance, Chapter 3’s analysis of pensioner incomes under ‘ideal 
type’ pension systems effectively assumes that tax reliefs (and the extent of voluntary 
pension saving) remain as under current policy, while Part B ignores the government’s 
proposed reforms to pension tax reliefs16. Though clearly a comprehensive analysis of 
pension reform options should include tax reliefs, the links between early retirement 
and such reliefs are too strong to ignore, and including one issue would necessitate 
including the other thereby broadening the scope of the thesis to an unacceptable 
degree. The decision was therefore made to restrict analysis to changes in first and 
second tier provision.
In its current form second tier provision is concerned solely with information risk, 
which SERPS reduces by imposing a compulsory eamings-replacement rate of a fifth 
of lifetime earnings between the Lower Earnings Limit (LEL) and the Upper Earnings 
Limit (UEL); see Section 1 A.2. However, when second tier provision was first 
introduced in 1978 its aims were more extensive. Not only was the eamings- 
replacement rate higher but, as only occupational schemes were allowed to ‘contract- 
out’, all benefits produced by the scheme were defined-benefit. In addition, the original 
scheme also helped to inflation-proof occupational pensions, through the system of 
‘guaranteed minimum pensions’. Though both these aspects of the scheme were 
abolished under the 1986 and 1995 Pension Acts, the importance of investment and
16 A full analysis of the government’s original proposals in relation to pension tax reliefs, as set out in 
the pensions Green Paper (DSS,1998, pp. 62-63), is in Agulnik (1999, pp. 63-66). The government’s 
slightly revised proposals are in DSS (1999b).
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longevity risk as factors behind the introduction of a second tier should be borne in 
mind17.
However, as with tax reliefs, the issues of investment and longevity risk are generally 
ignored from here on - while important in their own right they are not the primary 
issues in pension reform. As noted earlier, the real problem with longevity risk is the 
difficulty of writing annuity contracts in real terms; the fact that unexpected inflation 
affects the whole market makes full inflation-proofing problematic (though limited 
price-indexation is feasible and practised). A potential solution is therefore for the 
government to issue indexed-linked bonds. This in fact already occurs in the UK and, 
though many annuities are still set in nominal terms, and the market is rather thin (i.e. 
lacking competition), the existence of this form of financial product should mean that 
longevity risk is no longer a major problem.
The reason for setting investment risk to one side is rather different. Though this risk is 
a major reason why the state has become involved in pension provision, recent years 
have seen increasing attention focussed on the political risk which state pension 
systems may be subject to (see, for example, Field, 1996, pp. 17-18). Any assessment 
of the risks attached to private provision would therefore have to be offset by an 
analysis of the rather different risks associated with relying on the state. Moreover, it is 
not clear that a reduction in investment risk is necessarily a good thing; for instance, 
less risky saving products will also tend to offer a lower rate of return and, while this 
will be preferred by ‘risk-hating’ individuals, some people will prefer a higher average 
return with greater variability18. Accordingly, this thesis concentrates on information
17 It is perhaps no coincidence that SERPS was introduced in the aftermath of the 1974 oil crisis, when 
inflation was higher and stock markets less bullish than in the 1990s. As explored in Part B, the rationale 
for the S2P is rather different from SERPS; it is concerned mainly with poverty risk (or with the 
incentive effects of using means-tested benefits to counter poverty risk) rather than with investment risk.
18 This is well illustrated by the debate about whether individuals should be forced to annuitise pension 
savings upon retirement or whether they should be allowed to keep them invested in stocks and shares.
In particular, it has been suggested that annuities are (or have been) poor value for money, and hence 
people should be allowed to keep their money invested in real assets from which they could ‘draw down’ 
an income. However, the claim that the decline in annuity rates in the late 1990s means that annuities are 
now poor value for money is questionable -  reductions in yields largely reflect lower (expected) 
inflation. Moreover, as noted earlier, the more important point is that even if investing in real assets 
results in higher returns on average, this must be set against the greater variability (riskiness) of returns. 
A full discussion of the role of compulsory annuitisation, particularly in preventing reliance on means- 
tested benefits, is in J. Brown (2000, pp. 14-17).
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and poverty risk -  on the accustomed living standards and minimum income objectives 
of policy. In practice it is these two risks which dominate the pension reform debate, 
and the problems of investment and longevity risk are essentially secondary, regulatory 
matters.
The final weapon in the government’s policy armoury is first tier provision. The 
purpose of this tier is to reduce poverty risk (though second tier provision can also play 
some role in relation to this objective; see Sections 7.1 and 8.3). However, the two 
elements of this tier -  Income Support and the basic pension -  do not manage to ensure 
that all pensioners receive a minimum income, and hence poverty risk is not completely 
eliminated. In the case of the basic pension gaps in entitlement reflect the design of 
National Insurance, which excludes workers not earning above the LEL and non­
workers who are ineligible for credits (see Section 1A.1). In the case of Income 
Support the gaps reflect more fundamental problems; as discussed in Section 8.2, 
means tested benefits are always likely to have less than complete take-up due to the 
difficulty of identifying eligible individuals and, more arguably, because of the social 
stigma attached to claiming such benefits.
The level of benefits offered by the first tier will also affect the extent of poverty risk. 
Though the current government’s policy is to increase Income Support for pensioners 
(though not the basic pension) in line with earnings, the previous Conservative 
administration indexed all benefits to prices. If an absolute poverty standard is used, or 
if poverty is itself defined by the level of means-tested benefits, this policy does not 
affect the number of pensioners defined as poor. But if a relative standard is used, as 
the government is now proposing, and as is assumed throughout this thesis, then the 
level of the minimum income very directly affects poverty risk. Chapters 2 and 3 
attempt to allow for this by providing two measures of poverty -  half mean and half 
median income - though both are relative rather than absolute standards (i.e. they go up 
over time in line with average income).
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1.3 A typology of pension systems
Codification of ‘welfare regimes’ is common (or, perhaps, essential) in comparative 
social policy (see, for instance, Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 26-29). While such 
divisions are clearly open to numerous objections, the attraction of this approach as a 
means to manage the complexities of welfare systems around the world is 
overwhelming. Similar arguments apply in policy analysis. There are any number of 
different ways of constructing a pension system, and a wide range of proposals for 
reforming the UK’s pension system have been put forward. But in thinking about 
pension reform, whether second tier benefits should replace (say) a fifth or a quarter of 
lifetime earnings is relatively unimportant; the bigger question is whether an 
accustomed living standards objective (i.e. a compulsory link between retirement 
incomes and earnings) makes sense at all (see Chapter 7). The point of a typology is 
that it helps to direct attention to these central questions - it highlights the big choices 
facing policy makers, and minimises the danger of getting lost in the minutiae of the 
real world.
A contribution of this thesis has been to develop such a typology for pension reform 
options; this is shown in Figure 1.3. Its starting point is to look at the underlying 
objectives which different pension systems seek to achieve. The rows of the typology 
in Figure 1.3 are therefore labelled according to the objective for pension policy: is its 
role limited to ensuring a minimum retirement income or, in addition, does it also 
concern itself with individuals’ accustomed living standards? In contrast, the columns 
in the Figure divide pension systems according to the mechanism used to deliver the 
chosen policy objective, distinguishing between those systems where the state provides 
universal benefits for all and those where public provision is limited to a residual 
‘safety-net’ role. There are therefore four possible combinations: a minimum income 
objective achieved through either universal or residual state provision, and an 
accustomed living standards objective achieved either through either the public or the 
private sector. These possible combinations are labelled in the Figure as, respectively, 
basic income, targeting, (eamings-related) social insurance and compulsory saving. 
These labels are used throughout this thesis in accordance with this definition.
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Figure 1.3
A typology of pension systems
State provision:
Objective Universal Residual
(Earnings-related)
Accustomed living Social insurance Compulsory saving
standards
Minimum income Basic income Targeting
As with any typology, this division into four categories necessarily simplifies the 
various forms pension provision can take in real life. However, it is reassuring that it 
does appear to capture the main distinguishing features of pension systems around the 
world. Figure 1.4 illustrates how a number of countries fit into the typology. The top 
left hand box - where an accustomed living standard objective is achieved through state 
provision - is represented by Germany, where eamings-related social insurance plays a 
dominant role. In the top right hand box is Chile, where an eamings-related scheme 
operates through private sector accounts into which all employees are obliged to 
contribute (‘compulsory saving’)19. Australia, in the bottom right hand box, 
traditionally operated a targeted system, with the state’s role in pension provision being 
confined to paying means tested assistance to poorer pensioners (albeit with a generous 
taper so that most pensioners benefit to some extent). Though this system has recently 
been supplemented by a compulsory saving scheme (operating on a collective rather 
than an individual basis), provision in Australia might still broadly be described as 
targeted. Last, in the bottom left hand comer is New Zealand, where a simple flat-rate 
pension is payable to everyone over retirement age subject only to a residence test; this 
is essentially the same as the basic income model.
19 Note that countries operating earnings-related pension systems (of either the social insurance or 
compulsory saving varieties) also provide assistance benefits to ensure that all pensioners receive (or are 
eligible to receive) a minimum income. However, the size of the earnings-related systems in most 
countries means that this element of provision is relatively unimportant.
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Figure 1.4 
International examples
State provision:
Objective Universal Residual
Accustomed living 
standards
Germany Chile
Minimum income New Zealand Australia
Apart from the obvious advantages of familiarity, the reason this thesis focuses on the 
UK is that, in contrast to the above-named countries, its current pension system sits 
somewhere in the middle of these four ‘ideal types’. As shown in Table 1.1, first tier 
provision in the UK includes both the flat-rate basic pension (a basic income-type 
benefit) and Income Support (targeting), while second tier provision is split between 
the public and private sectors via SERPS (social insurance) and rebates (compulsory 
saving). In essence, the reason for this diversity of provision is that, by international 
standards, the UK pension system has changed considerably over the years, with each 
new reform building on the previous one (or rather, failing to clear away the debris 
from the last structure before creating a new edifice). This is illustrated in Figure 1.5, 
which shows how this typology may also be used to describe the historical 
development of the UK’s pension system (a description of each of these legislative 
landmarks is in Chapter 5).
Figure 1.5 
Pension legislation in the UK
State provision:
Objective Universal Residual
Accustomed living 
standards
1Q75 ¥  1Q86
Minimum income
T
1925 1908
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This typology may also be used to describe the approach to pension policy taken by the 
Labour government elected in May 1997. Imagine that, as suggested above, under the 
policies Labour inherited the UK sat somewhere around the junction of the four ideal 
types. The effect of Labour’s reforms (or proposed reforms) can then be represented by 
the three movements shown in Figure 1.6. The replacement of SERPS with a new State 
Second Pension (S2P), described in detail in Part B, simultaneously moves policy in 
the direction of both compulsory saving and a basic income. This reflects the rather 
complicated structure of the new scheme -  for people earning less than £9,000 a year 
the S2P will provide flat-rate benefits administered by the state and financed on a 
PAYG basis, while for people earning more than £9,000 a year benefits will be 
eamings-related, private and funded20. Both state and private benefits will be bigger 
than under SERPS.
The Figure also shows a movement in the direction of targeting, in the form of the 
government’s decision to increase Income Support in line with earnings (and to re­
brand the benefit as a ‘minimum income guarantee’). This means that in the short-term, 
until the S2P comes in, state benefits will be more heavily focussed on the poorest, due 
to the continuing decline in the level of the basic pension relative to earnings (and 
hence to Income Support). Overall, therefore, the government’s plans will increase 
targeting for today’s pensioners but reduce it for tomorrow’s, while public spending on 
flat-rate state benefits (as under a basic income) and on contracted-out rebates (as under 
compulsory saving) will also both increase.
20 Under stage one of the reform a slightly different system will operate; see Chapter 6.
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Figure 1.6
Pension reform under New Labour
State provision:
Objective________________ Universal_________________Residual
Accustomed living 
standards
*
Larger rebates for people 
earning more than £9,000
Minimum income
AMore valuable flat-rate 
second pension for people 
earning less than £9,000
pc
Minimum income guarantee 
for poorest pensioners (i.e. 
Income Support increased 
with earnings)
Finally, specific pension reform proposals may be categorised using this typology. 
Figure 1.7 shows the proposals for the UK which are analysed in Part A, while Figure 
1.8 shows how a number of prominent proposals for the UK may be fitted into this 
framework. Though the examples chosen are by no means comprehensive, the latter 
Figure hopefully demonstrates that reform proposals can be grouped in a sensible way 
using this typology. No doubt there will be a continued flow of new proposals in the 
future but, if this typology is successful, the job of interpreting and analysing new 
schemes should now be much easier.
Figure 1.7
Reform proposals analysed in Part A of this thesis
State provision:
Objective Universal Residual
Accustomed living Restoring the 1975 SERPS The Basic Pension Plus
standards legislation (Lilley, 1997)
Minimum income A Citizen’s Pension A rapid transition to a
(Sutherland, 1998) minimum income guarantee
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Figure 1.8
Other reform proposals for the UK
State provision:
Objective Universal Residual
Accustomed living 
standards
Townsend and A. Walker 
(1995, pp. 20-25) 
Davies (1993, pp. 86-88) 
Lynes (1996, pp.28-30)
Anson (1996, pp. 26-28) 
Butler and Pirie (1995, 
pp. 17-27)
Field and Owen (1993, pp.9-10)
Minimum income
Parker (1989, Part 5) 
Jordan et al (2000, pp. 83-89) 
Salter (1997, p. 10)
R. Walker (2000) 
Dilnot, Kay and Morris (1984, 
pp. 113-130)
1.4 Analysing pension reform
Different academic disciplines have different perspectives on the effect of pensions, 
reflecting the varied concerns of those disciplines. For instance, sociologists are chiefly 
interested in how pensions affect the status of older people in society and the 
experience of ageing (see, amongst others, Fennell, Phillipson and Evers, 1988, or 
Walker and Maltby, 1997), while political scientists and historians are more concerned 
with how the development of pensions interacts with wider changes in the role of the 
state (see, for instance, Skocpol, 1995, Baldwin, 1990 or Pierson, 1994). Such 
disciplines therefore offer valuable qualitative insights into the nature of pensioning, 
and thereby into the types of pension reform which may be socially or politically 
desirable. However, this thesis is chiefly concerned with quantifying the effect of 
pensions -  the aim is to provide numbers and not just ideas (though hopefully there are 
some of these too). Therefore, while Part C is theoretical, Parts A and (to a lesser 
extent) B are largely concerned with producing numerical estimates of the effect of 
current and alternative pension policies.
The importance of numbers in the pension reform debate is that, if used properly, they 
can lead to more informed policy making and hence ‘better’ decisions. For instance,
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one of the government’s main reasons for replacing SERPS with the S2P is that the 
new scheme will reduce future reliance on Income Support -  the analysis in Chapter 6 
gives some idea of how large this reduction will be. In a similar vein, one of the main 
drivers of pension reform in continental Europe is the increase in contribution rates 
needed to keep social insurance schemes solvent - the analysis in Chapter 4 shows the 
extent to which this ‘demographic timebomb’ affects the UK (if at all). In both cases 
the point is that, in order to assess the merits of a policy, decision makers need to know 
how big its effects are, not only which direction they go in. A policy which reduces 
reliance on Income Support by half will be viewed quite differently from one which 
reduces it by a fifth; a reform which increases public spending by 0.1% of GDP should 
be distinguished from one which increases spending by 1% .'
As with all kinds of tax-benefit analysis there are two basic questions which policy 
makers (and the wider public) need to consider when assessing the relative merits of 
alternative pension systems. The first is; how does the reform affect the level and 
distribution of incomes, in this case pensioner incomes? The second is; how much does 
it cost or, more broadly, how will it affect the public finances over time? The below 
looks in turn at how each of these aspects of pension policy can be analysed.
Distributional effects
Harding (1990, pp. 9-15) identifies three distributional axes which policy makers are 
(or should be) interested in:
• the immediate distributional implications of a policy,
• how these distributional implications are likely to develop over time, and hence the 
effect of a policy on the future income distribution,
• the extent to which a policy reduces or increases inequalities in lifetime income.
Figure 1.9 describes the range of models which have been developed in the UK to look 
at these various distributional axes. It further divides models according to whether they 
are based on hypothetical (or illustrative) examples or whether they use a representative 
sample of the population.
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Figure 1.9
Ways of analysing the distributional effects of tax-benefit policies
Hypothetical examples Population
Static IFS virtual economy model 
DSS tax-benefit model tables
POLIMOD
TAXBEN
IGOTM
PSM
LIFEPEN PENSIM
Dynamic PHYLIS POPSIM (SAGE model)
MAPS PSSRU long term care model
Lifetime Woolley and Le Grand (1990) LIFEMOD
Key: see text
The models used in this thesis are in bold in the Figure. As can be seen, three kinds of 
model are used at different times. Predominantly the emphasis is on the dynamic 
population model PENSIM. However, both the dynamic hypothetical model LIFEPEN 
and the static population model POLIMOD are also used, the former in Section 6.1 and 
the latter in Section 8.4. The arguments for using each kind of model are briefly 
examined below.
The simplest model used in this thesis is LIFEPEN, the dynamic hypothetical model 
developed by the DSS21. This is a spreadsheet-based model containing a number of 
case-study examples: a ‘typical’ male, a ‘typical’ female, a ‘typical’ low earner, etc. 
The main argument in favour of this kind of model is the ease with which it can be 
comprehended and developed. For the policy analyst such models can clarify which 
sub-groups of the population will be most affected by a reform, helping to identify 
which types of people will gain or lose as a result. In particular, hypothetical models
21 The analyses of Evans and Falkingham (1997) and Johnson (1999) using the PHYLIS model also 
illustrate how dynamic hypothetical models can be used in policy analysis, particularly comparative 
analysis. Davies and Joshi (1992) is another notable example o f this kind of analysis, as is Rake (1998) 
using the MAPS model.
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allow the effect of small variations in policy to be seen easily -  changes are not 
‘buried’ within the larger picture. It is principally for this reason that hypothetical 
models such as LIFEPEN can be a useful way of understanding policy.
However, the presentational advantages of using hypothetical examples are bought at a 
cost, and it is worth appreciating what such models cannot do. First relying on 
illustrative examples to inform policy analysis can be overly-simplistic, as the 
‘representative’ examples used do not reflect the actual composition of the population, 
and hence a potentially inaccurate picture of the effect of a policy can be given (see 
Redmond, Sutherland and Wilson, 1998, pp. 4-5). For instance, in the IFS virtual 
economy model (as used by the BBC to illustrate the effect of Budget changes) the 
example pensioner couple have an income of £7,000 pa, pay rent, smoke and own a 
car. Very few (if any) pensioner couples actually have these characteristics, and hence 
the results of using this example to illustrate the situation of pensioners more generally 
may be seriously misleading. Second, the cost of a policy can only be calculated using 
a model that looks at how it affects the entire population. Where the aim is to provide 
an analysis of both costs and benefits a population model must therefore be used.
Most tax-benefit reforms can usefully (and relatively easily) be examined through static 
population models, such as the Cambridge Microsimulation Unit’s model POLIMOD 
(see Redmond, Sutherland and Wilson, 1996, for a description of the model and
Sutherland, 1998, or Atkinson and Sutherland, 1990, pp. 13-17, and 1998, pp. 4-10, for
00examples of its use) . However, in pension policy the use of this kind of model is more 
limited. Static models can certainly be used to analyse some policies, in particular 
where only first tier provision is affected by the reform. The effect of proposals which 
take immediate effect (such as the introduction of a ‘pensioner credit’, see Section 8.4) 
can therefore usefully be examined using POLIMOD. However, static models can not 
look at all pension reforms, and in the majority of cases dynamic analysis is needed . 
This reflects the fact that many changes to the pension system have little or no effect on 
the incomes of current pensioners, and hence analysis must look into the future when
22 As well as POLIMOD three other static population models have been created for the UK: TAXBEN 
run by the IFS, IGOTM (Inter-Governmental Online Tax-Benefit Model) which is operated in a number 
of central government departments, and PSM (Policy Simulation Model), the Department of Social 
Security’s specialised model.
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reform has had a chance to work through to pensioner incomes. For instance, 
‘parametric’ reform of a social insurance system (i.e. of the benefits provided by a 
scheme) will generally only alter the pension entitlements of people below retirement 
age, and it is rare for people currently receiving benefits to be affected.
The focus in this thesis is therefore on dynamic microsimulation, and a specially 
extended version of the dynamic simulation model PENSIM23 is used in Chapters 2 and 
3 to look at the distributional effect of current policy and of the four ‘ideal types’ 
described in the last section. How the model works, and how it has been extended, is 
described in Section 2.1. However, it should be noted that the underlying structure of 
the model has not been altered: its properties are basically the same as in other analyses 
using the model, such as Curry (1996) and Kumar and Ward (1999), though the 
baseline policy assumptions used are rather different.
The distributional perspective which this thesis omits is therefore the effect of a policy 
on the distribution of lifetime income. While the use of LIFEMOD -  the only model for 
the UK -  was considered, this approach was rejected24. One issue was time - not only 
would the effect of the various ideal type policies have to be modelled, the current 
version of LIFEMOD uses the 1991 tax-benefit system and this would have to have 
been updated as a first step. But more importantly, it is not clear whether this kind of 
analysis tells us something different from the information provided by PENSIM, at 
least if the object of interest is comparing policy options. While PENSIM cannot be 
used to look at the lifetime effect of current policy (as in the analysis by Falkingham 
and Hills, 1995), comparing PENSIM’s results under two different policies effectively 
shows who gains from a reform on a lifetime basis (see the distributional Figures in
23 PENSIM is the UK’s only working dynamic population model devoted to the analysis of pensioner 
incomes (strictly speaking PENSIM is actually a dynamic cohort model -  it does not attempt to model 
fertility and hence does not generate an entire population). As set out in Figure 1.9, other dynamic 
microsimulation models for the UK include the PSSRU’s model of long term care (see Wittenberg et al, 
1998, pp. 25-44) and the POPSIM model being developed by the SAGE group at the LSE (see 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/sage/). Prior to the development of microsimulation the most notable attempt 
to estimate the future distribution of pensioner incomes was Atkinson and Altmann (1989, pp. 250-254).
24 The option of using or creating a hypothetical lifetime model, as in the analysis of Woolley and Le 
Grand (1990), was also not pursued; as with LIFEMOD it is not clear how this would add to the analysis 
using PENSIM.
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Chapter 3). Although the income distribution is not calibrated in terms of lifetime 
income, this way of looking at this axis of redistribution may be good enough.
Cost
As well as the distributional effect of different pension systems, policy makers are also 
necessarily concerned with the cost of alternative policies. However, this can be 
interpreted in a number of ways: one is the public expenditure cost of policy, another is 
the policy’s cost in terms of the bills it leaves for future generations (its effect on 
‘generational equity’), and a third is its economic cost taking into account macro- 
economic general equilibrium effects.
This thesis is essentially concerned with the first issue -  the public expenditure cost of 
policy. However, the technique used to look at this issue is known as ‘generational 
accounting’ and, as its name suggests, this kind of model is more concerned with the 
second definition of cost. Nevertheless, in this thesis generational accounting is used 
solely to analyse the fiscal effects of policy, and questions of generational incidence are 
ignored; Section 4.1 explains why this stance has been taken. In effect, therefore, the 
technique of generational accounting is being used as a way of creating a ‘long term 
fiscal model’ for the UK, allowing the effects of demographic change on all areas of 
the public spending to be analysed. Such models have been developed in a number of 
countries; see, for instance, Todd (1997, Ch. 6 and Appendix) on New Zealand and 
Long-Term Issues Group (1998, Ch. 3) on Ireland25.
A different sort of approach is taken in ‘overlapping generations’ (OLG) models, or 
dynamic lifecycle models as they are also known. These have been developed by 
economists to facilitate analysis of the long run macro-economic effects of policy (see 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987 and 1995, Miles, 1999, or Pecchenino and Pollard, 1997, 
for examples of their use). Such models forecast the development of the economy over 
time by looking at the lifecycle decisions which generations make in response to the 
policy environment in which they live. To simplify analysis, lifecycles are taken to
25 The closest the UK has come to this kind of analysis are the 30-year spending projections contained 
in the 1999 and 2000 Budgets. Propper (1992, pp. 113-114) also looks at the effect o f demographic 
change on a range of public expenditure programmes, though over a rather shorter timescale.
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consist of two periods, youth and old age, corresponding respectively to the periods 
when work and saving decisions are made and when equivalent retirement and dis­
saving occurs. In Samuelson’s (1958, pp. 468-469) consumption-loan model, the 
forerunner to today’s OLG models, a number of assumptions were incorporated about, 
for instance, lifetime preferences being consistent (i.e. no myopia), the output and 
productivity of each generation being fixed, and the absence of bequests. These 
assumptions are clearly highly restrictive, and the succeeding literature has attempted 
to make the analysis more ‘realistic’ through dropping some or all of the simplifying 
assumptions. Modem OLG models are therefore built around a number of key 
relationships -  between, for instance, tax rates and labour supply, transfer payments 
and savings behaviour, and savings and investment -  which in Samuelson’s model 
were exogenous to the system.
However, the greater ‘realism’ of modem OLG models means that the precise values 
chosen for particular relationships (e.g. between investment and growth) greatly affect 
the properties of a model, and hence the policy conclusions which spring from it. The 
use of such models in policy analysis is therefore fraught with difficulty. As discussed 
further in Section 3.1, there are numerous problems with including the ‘second round’ 
effects of policy in microsimulation models (such as POLIMOD or PENSIM), and the 
same issues arise in relation to OLG models. Though estimates which include 
behavioural effects are closer to reality (i.e. no behavioural response is very unlikely), 
we know too little about how individuals react to different policy environments to 
make this a worthwhile exercise. Accordingly, behavioural responses to policy are not 
included in the numerical analysis in this thesis, though chapters 4, 7 and 8 do discuss 
the economics literature on the effect of pensions on the labour market, savings and 
growth.
1.5 Plan of thesis
This thesis is divided into three parts. Part A looks at the effects of current policy on 
pensioner incomes and the public finances and at how these estimates alter under the 
four ideal type systems described in Section 1.3. Part B then analyses one specific
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reform in detail, the replacement of SERPS with the S2P, looking at the history behind 
the introduction of the new scheme as well as setting out its effects on pensioner 
incomes and the public finances. Part C then examines the rationales for different kinds 
of pension system (as represented by the four ideal types).
The thematic framework is provided by the typology outlined in Section 1.3, which 
underlies the analysis in Part A of the effect of alternative systems and is reflected in 
Part C in the division between Chapters 7 and 8 (which discuss, respectively, the social 
insurance and compulsory saving and basic income and targeting models). The 
exception is Part B, which concerns itself with one particular pension reform rather 
than with the four ideal types. A full plan of the thesis is in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 
Plan of Thesis
Chapter Part Purpose
2 A Describes the techniques used to project forward pensioner incomes 
and presents ‘baseline’ results.
3 A Uses the techniques of Chapter 2 to analyse the effect of four ideal 
type systems on incomes in retirement.
4 A Looks at the effect of the four ideal types on the public finances using 
the technique of generational accounting.
5 B Provides historical background to, and the rationale for, the 
introduction of the State Second Pension.
6 B Describes the structure of the State Second Pension and looks at its 
effect on pensioner incomes and on the public finances.
7 C Discusses the social insurance and compulsory saving models through 
analysing the rationale for compulsory eamings-related pensions.
8 C Discusses the basic income and targeting models by analysing the 
most efficient means of ensuring a minimum retirement income.
9 C Summarises the analysis in the thesis and presents some conclusions.
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The Table shows how the four aims for the thesis stated earlier will be met. It provides 
new estimates of the effect of current policy on pensioner incomes and on fiscal 
sustainability, and compares these estimates under alternative policies (Part A). It looks 
in depth at one specific pension reform, the replacement of SERPS by the S2P (Part B). 
And it analyses theoretical issues in pension reform (Part C). Moreover, Parts A and C 
use the typology outlined in this chapter, testing the usefulness of the four ideal types 
as a means for simplifying analysis of pension reform.
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1A. Annex: the three tiers of pension provision in the UK
The World Bank distinguish between three ‘pillars’ or ‘tiers’ of pension provision: a 
first tier of tax-financed state benefits, a second tier of compulsory eamings-related 
benefits paid from private pension schemes, and a third tier of voluntarily pension 
contributions by individuals and employers. The components of each of these tiers in 
the UK are looked at below, though with minor adjustments to the World Bank’s 
classification in line with the framework of Banks and Emmerson (2000, pp. 30-39)
1A.1 First tier provision
First tier pension provision in the UK has two main elements, the vast majority of 
pensioners receiving the flat-rate basic pension but a significant minority also getting 
means-tested benefits, principally Income Support26. In April 1999 the basic pension 
was worth £66.75 a week for a single person and £106.70 a week for a couple (if one of 
the partners does not have full entitlement in their own right). This was rather below 
the level of Income Support, which was worth £75 and £116.60 a week respectively. In 
relation to mean full-time earnings (i.e. the wage of the ‘typical’ worker used in Figure 
1.1) the basic pension was worth 16.7% for single people and 26.7% for couples, while 
the equivalent figures for Income Support were 18.75% and 29.15%27. While the basic 
pension increases by a mere 25p at age 80, older claimants of Income Support receive 
more substantial increases. In 1999/2000 claimants of Income Support receive 
increments of £2.30 a week for a single person and £3.25 a week for a couple upon 
reaching age 75, with a further increment of £4.95 and £5.45 respectively becoming 
payable at age 80. Note therefore that, although it is common to equate the level of
26 Note that the government now refer to Income Support for pensioners as a ‘minimum income 
guarantee’, though no changes to the structure of the benefit, or indeed its name, have yet been proposed. 
The benefit is therefore called by its proper title in this thesis, rather than by its political moniker.
27 This calculation is based on the mean earnings in April 1999 of full-time adults whose pay was not 
affected by absence, which was £400 a week according to ONS (1999, Table A l).
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Income Support with the amount received by a single person aged 65-74 (this thesis 
being no exception), the actual structure is considerably more complex than this28.
Eligibility for the basic pension depends on an individual’s contribution record, with 44 
years of contribution being required for men to be able to claim the full pension and 39 
years being required for women. People with fewer than the requisite number of 
contribution years receive a reduced pension proportional to their years of contribution 
(except for those who fail to cross a threshold of 25% of the required years, who 
receive nothing). However, the availability of credits to cover most kinds of 
joblessness, and the fact that years in the labour market prior to the introduction of the 
current scheme are automatically credited to individuals, means that almost all 
currently retired men, though less than two-thirds of women, are eligible for the full 
payment (GAD, 1999, pp. 84-89)29. Although there are no provisions to start receiving 
the basic pension benefit prior to state retirement age (currently 60 for women and 65 
for men; 65 for everyone from 2020), people may defer receipt of the benefit and 
receive an increased level of payment in return. At the moment the increase in benefits 
is rather less than actuarially-fair (the expected lifetime value of payments being lower 
than if the pension is claimed at retirement age), but increased increments are being 
phased-in so that something closer to actuarial fairness will eventually be achieved 
(Cracknell and Strickland, 1995, p. 15)30. At present there are no plans to raise the state 
retirement age, bar the transition to gender equalisation legislated for in 1995.
28 Given that the majority of pensioner Income Support claimants are over 75 (and 40% are over 80), the 
effect of age increments may in reality be quite important.
29 Evidence from administrative data suggests that full entitlement may be rather lower than estimated 
by the Government Actuary. Looking at the working-age population, around 17% of people are currently 
not in employment and not receiving basic pension credits (Kumar, 1999, Figure 12). Despite this, it is 
likely that gaps in basic pension entitlement will generally become smaller in future years (at least for 
women), due to eligibility for credits being widened in the 1970s through the introduction of ‘Home 
Responsibilities Protection’ and due to the concurrent abolition of the married woman’s reduced rate of 
NICs (see GAD, 1999, Appendix D).
30 The concept of actuarial fairness is important in understanding pension policy. A transaction such as 
delaying claim for benefit in return for a higher level o f benefit when it is paid, or trading future rights to 
SERPS in return for a contracted-out rebate, is actuarially-fair if the trade-off between amounts given- 
up/received now are linked to future gains/losses in such a way that the expected net present value of the 
transaction is zero. In other words, a system is actuarially-fair if it presents individuals with neutral 
choices.
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The other element of first tier provision in the UK is the means-tested benefit Income 
Support. In contrast to the basic pension there are no contribution conditions for 
Income Support, with eligibility instead being determined through a test of means and 
assets31. The means test simply states that to qualify a household (in the case of 
pensioners, a couple or an individual) must have an income below the value of the 
benefit (i.e. less than £75 a week for a single 65 year-old in 1999/2000), the job of 
Income Support being to top them up to the minimum level32. The assets test is more 
complex, with the first £6,000 of savings being ignored but every £250 of capital above 
this level causing entitlement to be reduced by £1 a week, and savings of more than 
£12,000 ending eligibility altogether. It should be noted that these limits come into 
effect in April 2001 and represent a significant loosening of the assets test, which 
previously started when capital reached £3,000 with an upper limit of £8,000. How the 
future value of the limits is determined in this thesis is discussed in Section 2.2.
Nearly 30% of pensioner households are entitled to claim Income Support, though in 
practice incomplete take-up means a little over a fifth of pensioner households actually 
receive this benefit (DSS, 1999a, Table 1.1, and DSS, 2000, Table 10)33. Additional 
means-tested assistance is also available to help low income households meet the cost 
of rent (Housing Benefit) and local taxes (Council Tax Benefit), and including these 
benefits brings the total number of pensioner households receiving some form of 
means-tested support to around 3 million, just under 40% of the total (Johnson, Disney
31 Strictly speaking entitlement to means-tested benefits is determined by reference to the income and 
assets of the ‘benefit unit’, rather than the household (though the system of non-dependent deductions 
complicates the situation). This reflects the fact that, in contrast to the ‘obligation alimentaire' operated 
in France and some other countries, means testing in the UK ignores familial links across generations. 
The benefit unit can therefore only ever be a (cohabiting) couple or a single person; the existence of 
other people in the household (such as sons and daughters) is only relevant if they are classified as 
dependent (e.g. because they are under 16). It should also be noted that to be eligible for means tested 
benefits individuals must pass a residence test.
32 This thesis uses the terms ‘household’ and ‘benefit unit’ interchangeably. Though the latter is the 
correct term in the benefits system, it is often more convenient to refer to a household. The key point, 
however, is that ‘household’ only ever means a couple or a single pensioner -  situations where 
pensioners share their home with others are ignored.
33 Note that the estimate for the proportion of pensioners entitled to Income Support is rather uncertain, 
as witnessed by the fact the DSS (1999a, Table 1.1) only provide a range of possible estimates for take- 
up (between 63% and 73% of eligible households in the case of pensioners and Income Support in 
1997/8).
31
and Stears, 1996, p. 7)34. Allowing for incomplete take-up may bring the overall figure 
for eligibility to means-tested benefits closer to 50% of pensioner households, though it 
should be recognised that in many cases individuals are only eligible for very small 
payments.
A further form of state support for retirement incomes should also be mentioned, 
though it is not generally considered part of first tier provision and does not feature 
elsewhere in this thesis. Nevertheless, the additional tax allowance for people over 65 
has all the qualities of other forms of first tier provision (though with a rather different 
distributional incidence). Indeed, it is classified by the Treasury as a ‘tax expenditure’, 
denoting the fact that it is not a structural part of the tax system but provides targeted 
relief to a particular group. In this case the beneficiaries are pensioners over 65 with an 
income of more than £4,335 pa (the level of the tax allowance for working age people 
in 1999/2000) and less than £19,750 pa (the level of income in 1999/2000 at which the 
age allowance of £5,720 is fully phased-out)35. At present the maximum benefit an 
individual can receive from this source is about £400 pa, and the annual cost of the 
allowance (£1.3 billion in 1999/2000) is barely 4% of spending on the basic pension 
(HMT, 1999, Table 7; DSS, 2000, Table 6). Consequently its omission from the 
analysis in this thesis is of little empirical significance. However, if the benefits 
provided by (and cost of) this form of support were to grow its exclusion from this 
thesis, and from almost all other analyses of pension policy, would be more 
problematic36.
34 The existence of means-tested support for housing costs is largely ignored in this thesis; in effect 
means-tested assistance is taken to be synonymous with Income Support.
35 For individuals with an income of more than £16,800 (in 1999/2000) the additional age allowance is 
reduced by 50p for every extra £ of income, so that entitlement is fully extinguished at £19,750. People 
aged over 75 are entitled to a higher allowance - £5,980 in 1999/2000 -  and hence the point where the 
enhanced allowance is fully phased-out is slightly higher for this group. In addition, married couples 
where one person is aged over 65 are eligible for an increased tax allowance (£5,125 pa restricted to 
10%). However, as from April 2000 all new awards of married couples’ allowance will cease, and only 
older existing claimants will receive this special treatment.
36 In particular it should be noted that the benefits of tax allowances go predominantly to better-off 
pensioners, reflecting the fact that only 40% of people over 65 are currently liable to income tax (HMT, 
2000, paragraph 5.48). The distributional effects of this form of support are therefore ‘upside-down’ 
(Sinfield, 1999, p. 3), as poorer pensioners gain nothing from their introduction and extension. A fuller 
discussion of the role (if any) for the age allowance is in Morris (1981).
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Finally, three recent policy innovations should be described, though as with the tax 
allowance they are generally excluded from the analysis in this thesis. First is the 
recently created system of winter fuel payments. This is an annual allowance (worth 
£100 in the 1999/2000 tax year and £150 in 2000/2001) which goes to all pensioner 
households irrespective of their position in relation to the basic pension or Income 
Support, i.e. payments are based on the household rather than the individual (as under 
Income Support) but are not determined by a means test. Second, on top of the various 
concessions currently available to pensioners (such as reductions on public transport 
and free dental care), from November 2000 households with someone over 75 will be 
entitled to a free TV licence (worth £104 a year in 1999/2000)37. Last is the ‘pensioner 
credit’ announced in the March 2000 Budget. As yet it is unclear how this new system 
will work, but it seems likely that it will resemble the tapered means-test examined in 
Section 8.4.
1 A.2 Second tier provision
Second tier provision in the UK does not fit neatly into the World Bank’s classification. 
They envisage a second tier consisting of individualised personal accounts into which 
workers are forced to pay a proportion of their earnings and which, in return, pay out 
actuarially-fair pensions in retirement. Accordingly, the World Bank see the second tier 
as being provided privately and on a funded basis (i.e. with benefits financed out of 
capital assets), and view contributions to such accounts as being separate from taxation 
or social insurance contributions. Arrangements in the UK are not quite like this. While 
SERPS benefits are actuarially-fair (and wholly eamings-related), provision is split 
between the public and private sectors and, therefore, not all such provision is funded. 
Moreover, contributions to the second tier in the UK are not administered through a 
separate ‘pension contribution’ but are integrated with National Insurance 
Contributions (NICs), the revenue from which is also used to pay for the basic pension 
and more minor elements of the National Insurance scheme. Given the unusual 
structure of this system it is worth briefly setting out how it works and, in so doing,
37 The issue of whether benefits-in-kind should be included in analysis is discussed further in Section 
2.5.
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how it came to be so complex. A fuller account of the history of second tier pensions in 
the UK is in Chapter 5, while the structure of second tier provision from 2002, when 
the S2P will be introduced, is in Chapter 6.
A significant second tier of pension benefits was only introduced in the UK in 1978 
with the implementation of SERPS38. At that time a comprehensive second tier was 
ensured through compelling all employees (though not self-employed) to join SERPS 
but then allowing members of defined-benefit (DB)39 occupational pension schemes to 
‘contract-out’ of state provision. To compensate for their lost SERPS rights, members 
of occupational schemes (and their employers) paid reduced NICs, with the reduction 
reflecting the proportion of earnings which an average worker would have to pay into a 
private scheme to achieve the same benefits as SERPS. Note therefore that the 
equivalence between SERPS and the second pension entitlements earned by people in 
private pension schemes relies on the Government Actuary accurately assessing likely 
investment returns, charges and annuity rates. If these assumptions turn out to be too 
optimistic then people in private schemes will, in retrospect, have been better-off 
remaining in SERPS. Conversely, if investment and annuity rates exceed assumed 
levels people who chose to opt-out will end up with higher pension benefits than those 
who stayed in SERPS.
The original SERPS contracting-out arrangements were therefore actuarially fair (or, at 
least, may be thought of as such -  see Hemming and Kay, 1981, pp. 27-28, for a more 
critical examination). However, in 1988 this framework was altered to allow for the 
inclusion of defined-contribution (DC) schemes, in particular the newly introduced 
(appropriate) personal pensions. People contracting-out of SERPS into such schemes
38 A form of eamings-related second tier provision was in fact introduced in 1961 through the 
‘graduated pension scheme’. However, the system had no mechanism for uprating the value of benefits 
which people earned, so while contributions to the scheme were earnings-related the pensions it 
produced were not (Ellis, 1989, p. 15). Its existence is therefore ignored in this thesis.
39 Defined-benefit pension schemes pay guaranteed benefits related to an individual’s earnings. The 
benefit may be calculated with reference to lifetime earnings (as in SERPS) or earnings in the final year 
or three years of employment (final salary schemes). Most occupational schemes are of this latter type. 
Such schemes are distinguished from defined-contribution (DC) schemes by virtue of benefits not being 
dependent on the investment performance of an individual’s fund but on a pension promise, with either 
the state (for SERPS) or employers (for occupational schemes) acting as contributor of the last resort and 
hence guarantor of benefits (Dilnot et al, 1994, pp. 194-198).
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became eligible for a ‘rebate’ on their NICs (or that proportion of contributions paid in 
respect of SERPS), which was paid directly to their pension provider40. But in the case 
of personal pensions these rebates were not actuarially-fair, being paid as a set 
proportion of earnings and therefore benefiting younger people most. This anomaly 
was partially corrected in April 1997 when age-related rebates (capped at 9%) were 
introduced (see GAD, 1995, pp. 3-4)41.
The level of contracted-out rebate paid to an average-age worker (or more simply the 
NIC deduction members of occupational schemes qualify for) can therefore effectively 
be seen as the UK’s compulsory contribution rate in respect of second tier pensions. 
Given the age-related structure of rebates, SERPS’ benefit schedule similarly shows the 
retirement income which individuals can expect from the second tier (if the 
Government Actuary’s assumptions are correct). However, this story is complicated by 
the fact that the legislation which first established SERPS attempted to hasten its 
impact through including ‘accelerated accrual’ provisions, the effect of which is that 
second tier provision in the UK has yet to reach a steady-state position.
Following reforms in 1986 and 1995 the formula for calculating SERPS entitlements is 
now relatively straightforward, with the scheme providing an inflation-proofed pension 
worth a fifth of an individual’s average lifetime earnings between an upper and a lower
40 As personal pension schemes are individual accounts they can be (and mostly are) established 
independently of employers. In firms without occupational schemes contracting-out therefore operates 
through all employees paying NICs at the full contracted-in rate (with employers similarly paying the 
full rate), but then those people who have opted-out receiving a rebate paid directly to their personal 
pension. As such rebates are not counted as public expenditure there is no difference in the national 
accounts between contracted-out occupational schemes, where NICs are reduced ‘at source’ by the 
employer, and other contracted-out schemes where a cash rebate of contributions is paid. This thesis 
follows this custom in so far as that the term ‘rebates’ should also be taken to apply to the contracted-out 
deduction system for occupational schemes; though in reality people may perceive a direct deduction 
from NICs to be different from paying full NICs and then receiving back some of this money as a rebate, 
it is implicitly assumed here that individuals see through this administrative quirk. However, the 
accounting convention of excluding rebates from both revenue and expenditure is not followed. For the 
reasons set out in Chapter 4, rebates are counted as public expenditure and hence both spending and 
revenue are higher than in the government’s accounts.
41 As younger people benefit from more years of investment growth they stand to receive a higher 
pension from an investment made now than do older people. It follows that, to replicate the benefits 
provided by SERPS, individualised DC schemes (such as personal pensions) must receive rebates which 
are related to age as well as earnings. For instance, using the Government Actuary assumptions, to 
achieve a particular level of benefit in retirement the amount which would need to be paid into a DC 
scheme held by a 16 year old is under a third the amount which a 64 year old would need to pay in. Note, 
therefore, that the 9% upper limit to rebates means that, even after April 1997, the system is still not 
actuarially-fair for workers aged over 50 or so (GAD, 1995, p. 12).
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earning limit (with earnings in pre-retirement years revalued in line with increases in 
average earnings to the retirement date). But when the scheme was first introduced a 
more complex formula was used, with the scheme providing benefits equivalent to a 
quarter of an individual’s 20 best earning years (between the limits). This therefore 
meant that people retiring from the scheme after 1998 could receive full benefits 
despite the fact that they had only contributed for a portion of their working life. For 
instance, someone working up until retirement in 2003 would have spent 25 years 
contributing to SERPS, but would still be entitled to the same pension as someone 
retiring in 2027 would get after contributing for 49 years.
Because accelerated accrual applies to contracted-out schemes as well as SERPS 
(reflecting the actuarially-fair nature of these arrangements), the value of the 
contracted-out rebate has gradually declined since 1978. In the long run, after 2027 
when everyone benefiting from accelerated accrual will have retired, the average rebate 
will be around 3.5% of earnings42. However, at present the average rebate is 4.6%, 
reflecting the enduring effect of the original benefit formula. Members of occupational 
schemes therefore receive a reduction in NICs of this value (split between the 
employee and the employer), while members of personal pension schemes receive age- 
related rebates which, after allowance for administrative costs, should produce a DC 
pension of the same values as SERPS43.
The role of the earnings limits in second tier provision is also worth mentioning. 
Contributions to and payments from SERPS are calculated with reference to an 
individual’s earnings between a lower and an upper limit (the LEL and UEL); in
42 The required rebate needed to replace SERPS benefits is set on a quinquennial basis through a process 
of actuarial review. In order to do this the Government Actuary makes a number of assumptions about, 
for instance, rates of return to equities and gilts, inflation and life expectancy (see, for instance, GAD, 
1995, pp. 3-8). If these assumptions turn out to be accurate then investing 3.5% of earnings every year 
over a 49 year working life will produce a pension equivalent to SERPS, i.e. an inflation-proofed annuity 
worth a fifth of an individual’s average lifetime earnings. However, if these assumptions are wrong the 
pension provided privately will not be the same as the individual would have got from SERPS; for 
instance, if the real rate of return to equities is higher than the Government Actuary’s assumption (of 
earnings growth plus 2.25 percentage points) then rebates will produce a pension worth more than 
SERPS. Nevertheless, because Government Actuary assumptions are used throughout this thesis, the 
equivalence between rebates and second tier pension benefits always holds here.
43 Note that DC occupational schemes (of which there are relatively few) receive lower age-related 
rebates, reflecting their smaller administrative costs (see GAD, 1995, p.14).
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1999/2000 these were £66 and £500 a week respectively. This therefore means that 
people with earnings throughout life which are only just above the LEL receive very 
small second tier pension benefits, both absolutely and in relation to their earnings, 
while people with high earnings throughout life receive the maximum SERPS payment 
(of 20% of the UEL minus the LEL), though in relation to their earnings this will 
similarly be small. This effect is shown in Figure 1 A .l, which sets out the value of 
SERPS benefits earned by individuals with different lifetime earnings as a proportion 
o f their own earnings.
Figure 1A.1
Second tier pension benefits on retirement when SERPS matures44
20
V)
cnee
ro0)
</>
<TJ3■o
>
C
O
(Qtf><D
C0 </> 21 Q.
(/)Q.m
LLi(/)
0 200 30050 100 150 250
Lifetime earnings as a % of average
44 It should be noted that only cohorts retiring after 2027 (49 years after SERPS was introduced) will 
enjoy the level o f  benefits shown, and only then if  they have had a full working life - individuals with the 
same lifetime earnings but different number o f  years o f  work will earn different pension entitlements. 
Further, the Figure implicitly assumes that the LEL and UEL are increased in line with movements in 
wages in the future, so that they maintain the same position relative to average earnings; in fact current 
policy is to increase these limits in line with prices (see Section 2.2).
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1A.3 Third tier provision
Third tier provision consists of all pension contributions made by self-employed people 
(who are not covered by second tier provision) and voluntary contributions by 
employees and employers45. In the UK the bulk of third tier provision has historically 
come from employers via occupational pension schemes, but the role of individual 
contributions by employees and self-employed people is now growing (reflecting 
changes in the labour market and the introduction of personal pensions in 1988). As 
private pension provision (both occupational and personal) is still maturing, it will 
provide a greater proportion of retirement income in the future than is the case today 
(see Section 2.3).
Generous tax reliefs are available to support private pensions, and this has had a 
significant influence on the extent of contributions to the third tier (Hannah, 1986, Ch. 
3). Indeed, the very existence of third tier pension provision is predicated on the tax 
advantages which are afforded to this form of saving. For individuals these arise 
because contributions are not taxed while the tax due on pension benefits tends to be 
lower than an individual would have paid during their working life. For basic rate 
taxpayers this is largely because a quarter of the pension (or one-and-a-half times final 
salary in an occupational scheme) may be taken as a tax-free lump sum. However, for 
higher rate tax payers there is the additional (potential) advantage that they may 
become a basic rate tax payer in retirement, and hence gain through tax arbitrage (see 
Emmerson and Tanner, 2000, p. 68). Moreover, higher rate payers are more likely to 
make savings which exceed the limit on alternative investment vehicles such as 
Individual Savings Accounts (where the maximum annual contribution is currently 
£7,000), and hence may also gain from the fact that investment returns on pension 
funds are only partially taxed46.
45 Forms of saving which do not lead to an annuity might also be considered part of third tier provision, 
particularly if they are intended to provide an income in retirement.
46 Prior to July 1997 investment returns were completely free of tax. However, in July 1997 the new 
Labour government abolished Advanced Corporation Tax, so that dividend income became partially 
taxable. Note, though, that because capital gains remain tax-exempt the precise effect o f this change will 
depend on how pension fund managers adjust their investment strategies, and it is not yet clear how 
much additional tax will in fact be paid under the new regime.
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Employer contributions to their employees’ pensions receive an even more generous 
tax treatment, and it is perhaps unsurprising that most third tier pension provision 
comes from this source. As well as the above tax advantages employers do not pay 
NICs on pension contributions and, similarly, such contributions do not count towards 
employee NICs (employees’ contributions get no such NIC relief). The effect is that in 
2000/1 a pension contribution of one pound from a basic-rate-paying employee will 
reduce their take-home pay by 78p (i.e. they get relief at the basic rate of 22%), while 
one pound paid in by an employer will in effect cost them 56p (22% tax relief plus 12% 
employer NICs and 10% employee NICs). More details of the tax relief system and its 
effects are in Agulnik and Le Grand (1998, pp. 405-413), Kvist and Sinfield (1996), 
Dilnot and Johnson (1993, pp. 30-35), Knox (1990), Emmerson and Tanner (2000) and 
Agulnik (1999a, pp. 3-8). However, for the reasons set out in Section 1.2, in general 
issues related to tax relief are not explored in this thesis.
Finally, it is worth noting that tax relief also applies to second tier contributions to 
private schemes, though not to contributions to SERPS. Administratively this stems 
from the fact that occupational pension schemes do not need to distinguish between 
those contributions which are statutory (i.e. derived from the contracted-out reduction 
in NICs) and those which are voluntary. However, as SERPS is a PAYG scheme, and 
contributions are integrated with NICs, there is no way of providing equivalent relief 
on contributions to the state scheme. Because all pension benefits count as taxable 
income this quirk means that, even though the contracting-out arrangements are 
actuarially-fair, people who have access to a private scheme are in fact likely to be 
better-off outside the state scheme. Moreover, the cost of tax relief on compulsory 
contributions to private sector pensions (£2 billion a year) should really be added to the 
£8 billion net cost of contracted-out rebates. In general, though, this aspect of second 
tier provision is also ignored in this thesis.
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Part A. Analysing pension reform
This part presents estimates o f the distributional and fiscal effects o f current (baseline) 
policy and o f the four *ideal type' policies described in Section 1.3. First it uses the 
dynamic microsimulation model PENSIM to look at future pensioner incomes. Chapter 
2 describes the model and how it has been altered for this thesis, sets out the baseline 
assumptions and results, and discusses how reliable these estimates are. Chapter 3 
then uses PENSIM to analyse the distributional effects o f the ideal type policies. 
Finally, Chapter 4 turns to the effect o f current and alternative pension policies on the 
public finances, looking at the sustainability o f current policy and how this prognosis 
changes under the four ideal types.
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2. Pensioner incomes under current policy
Dynamic microsimulation models can be used both to describe the effects of current 
pension policies and to investigate potential reforms. In the former case the aim is to 
help diagnose problems in advance, by providing government and other interested 
parties with estimates of the effect of existing policies on the level and composition of 
pensioner incomes in the future. Such ‘baseline’ projections can therefore show 
whether current trends -  such as the increase in inequality among pensioners 
experienced since the late 1970s (Johnson and Stears, 1995, pp. 79-81) - are likely to 
continue into the future, and help to indicate emerging trends (such as, perhaps, 
increased reliance on Income Support). Additionally, dynamic microsimulation models 
may be used for comparative purposes, allowing the distributional effect of alternative 
policies to be illustrated and hence helping to improve analysis of reform options. In 
this instance, therefore, the concern is not with the accuracy of the projections per se 
but with the difference between two sets of policies47.
This chapter is principally concerned with the first of these functions, while the next 
chapter is intended to demonstrate the usefulness (or otherwise) of dynamic 
microsimulation in comparing policy regimes. The aim of this chapter is therefore to 
describe how the dynamic model PENSIM has been adapted for use in this thesis, to 
provide results from the ‘baseline’ projection and to interpret these results. There are 
five sections. Section 2.1 describes PENSIM and details how the projection period has 
been extended from 2025 to 2066 through re-using the data underlying the original 
model. Section 2.2 then discusses the assumptions used in the baseline (i.e. current 
policy) projection, and Section 2.3 provides results and discusses the trends indicated. 
The reliability of these estimates is then assessed in Section 2.4, which compares 
PENSIM’s results with survey-based estimates of pensioner incomes, administrative 
data and with Government Actuary spending projections. Section 2.5 concludes by 
discussing how microsimulation techniques can best be used in analysing pension 
policy.
47 Whether current or alternative policies are being analysed, it is also possible to use dynamic 
microsimulation to estimate future expenditure on state transfer payments. In particular, dynamic models 
can be used to estimate future spending on means-tested benefits (see Chapter 4).
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2.1 Projecting pensioner incomes using PENSIM
The development of PENSIM has been lengthy and improvements to it are continually 
taking place; like painting the Forth Bridge, work on the model is never complete. This 
thesis uses the version of the model current in November 1999 (version 1 lb), and 
subsequent changes to its structure and the availability of new data (on, for instance, 
the coverage of private pension schemes) have been ignored48. Early stages in 
PENSIM’s development are described by Pudney (1992, pp. 21-40) and by Hancock et 
al (1992, pp.41-43), who originally built the model on behalf of the Department of 
Social Security, while later in-house work on the model, and some results, are in Curry 
(1996, pp. 18-34) and Kumar and Ward (1999, pp.8-15). The latter publications were 
produced by DSS economists and may be thought of as providing ‘official’ estimates of 
future pensioner incomes. More general analyses of dynamic microsimulation, and of 
the problems inherent in constructing such models, are in Harding (1990) and in Krupp 
(1986) and Caldwell (1986, pp.61-65).
In general this thesis is not concerned with the mechanics of microsimulation, rather, it 
is how such models can be used to analyse pension reform options which is the object 
of interest49. However, in order to meaningfully compare policy options it is necessary 
to look into the distant future, and the fact that PENSIM only projects until 2025 is a 
significant limitation to its usefulness in this respect (see PIU, 2000, p39). As well as 
using PENSIM in novel ways, an additional contribution of this thesis has therefore
48 Though improvements to PENSIM will continue to be made, the DSS have recently started work on 
developing a completely new model ( ‘Pensim2’). This will improve upon the current version through 
using far richer (and more up-to-date) data sources, the aim being to combine information from the 
Lifetime Labour Market Database, DSS administrative data and the Family Resources Survey. At the 
time of writing work on the new model had only just begun; more information will be available in due 
course from the DSS.
49 Though improving the way PENSIM worked was not the object of the exercise, the process of using 
the model revealed a number of errors ( ‘bugs’) in the computer code. In practice a very substantial 
amount of time was devoted to identifying and rectifying such bugs, and an important (if unintended) 
output from the work for this thesis has been to improve the model in this way. As such, the exercise has 
also served to illustrate the benefits of ‘road-testing’ simulation models thoroughly (or rather, of using 
models which have already been passed road-worthy by someone else). See also Section 2.5.
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been to extend the model’s projection range to 2066. How this was done is set out 
below, but it is helpful first to provide a brief description of the workings of the model.
Structure o f the model and assumptions
As it stands PENSIM is very much a ‘black box’: assumptions about the parameters of 
the pension system and other variables are fed into it and, in turn, it produces results 
showing the distribution and composition of pensioner incomes in selected future 
years50. However, as set out in Kumar and Ward (pp. 6/7), conceptually it is useful to 
think of the model as having three distinct components. First is the process of 
projecting forward model individuals’ working lives through estimating the likelihood 
that they will experience particular labour market events (such as changing job, 
becoming unemployed, etc) and their future earnings. This stage of the model therefore 
operates by applying a series of duration and transition probabilities to each model 
individual, so that whether a particular event affects an individual depends on their 
characteristics and past life-history and on the assumed correlation between these and 
the event in question. The second stage of the model is then to simulate how 
individuals accumulate pension rights and savings over their working lives, so that their 
assets on retirement (including pension entitlements) may be calculated. Last is the 
process of estimating incomes during retirement, which in turn involves simulating the 
flow of income from pension assets and from state benefits (which may change because 
of varying entitlement to means-tested benefits). PENSIM’s output is a ‘snapshot’ of 
this final process, capturing the incomes of individuals at different stages of retirement 
in a particular year (2066 in most of the analysis below).
These various stages all require a wide range of assumptions to be made and, in the 
same way as the modelling process may be sub-divided, it is useful to arrange the 
assumptions needed into a number of categories. Accordingly, the analysis below 
divides the assumptions used in PENSIM into four types:
• labour market,
• macro-economic,
50 This means there is little intermediate data that can be used to audit the reasonableness of the results 
produced -  to some extent PENSIM’s estimates must be taken in good faith (though see later and Section 
2.4). The DSS envisage that the proposed Pensim2 will be explicitly based on a modular structure (along 
similar lines to the framework described here), allowing analysts to look into the ‘black box’.
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• pension, and
• policy assumptions.
First are the assumptions PENSIM makes about the labour market, e.g., about the 
relationship between occupation and unemployment, in order to project forward model 
individuals’ future working lives. As described in Hancock et al (1992, pp. 44-47), 
these assumptions are based on equations modelled econometrically from the post-1970 
work-history data in the Retirement Survey and the Social Change and Economic Lives 
Initiative (SCELI) survey, two of the datasets used by PENSIM to create model 
individuals (see Table 2.1 later). Hence the model should generate future working lives 
which are similar to those experienced over the period 1970-1987/88 (when the 
Retirement Survey and SCELI interviews were conducted). Clearly one problem with 
the model is therefore that these labour market assumptions are now rather out of date; 
as highlighted by a recent Cabinet Office report into government modelling (PIU, 2000, 
p. 38), the fact that PENSIM relies on such old data means that “the model does not 
capture labour market changes such as increased earnings inequalities, increased 
female participation, increased part-time and temporary working etc., or the impact o f 
recent Government policies on these”51. However, unlike in the other categories, where 
variables are inputted via spreadsheets, the labour market assumptions in the model are 
hard-coded in C (the computer language used by PENSIM), and hence alterations can 
only be made by DSS computing staff. Accordingly, analysing the effect of changing 
these assumptions is a complex task -  there is no simple mechanism for setting (say) 
the future path for earnings inequality. Moreover, the DSS are currently attempting to 
improve this aspect of the model through the development of ‘Pensim2’, which will be 
based on the continuously-updated Lifetime Labour Market Database (see Ball, 1997, 
pp. 6-9). For both reasons, therefore, no attempt is made here to alter the labour market 
assumptions in the model52.
51 It should also be borne in mind that data drawn from the Retirement Survey and SCELI are recall 
data, i.e. survey respondents were asked about their previous labour market activity rather than being 
followed over time (as would be the case in a panel dataset). There is evidence that individuals tend to 
omit short periods of unemployment when recalling their employment history (Pauli, 1997), hence an 
additional problem is that the data itself may be less than fully representative of labour market conditions 
between 1970 and 1988.
52 A further problem relating to the way PENSIM models the labour market is that it works on the 
assumption that retirement will occur when individuals reach state pension age (currently 65 for men and 
60 for women, rising to 65 for everyone by 2020). Though non-employment is one of the labour market
44
The second kind of assumption relates to macro-economic variables such as inflation, 
unemployment, earnings growth and rates of return to private savings. These are used 
in all stages of the model: in the process of projecting forward future working lives 
assumptions about unemployment and earnings growth determine average labour 
market conditions (with the labour market assumptions determining how individual 
histories vary around this average); in calculating private pension entitlements an 
assumption about the rate of return to capital is required; and the modelling of incomes 
post-retirement uses assumptions about investment returns, inflation and earnings 
growth.
The macro-economic assumptions are therefore extremely important in determining the 
properties of the model, and the results reported below would look rather different if 
(for instance) earnings growth were assumed to be significantly higher. Indeed, one of 
the main reasons for using dynamic microsimulation models to look at pension policy 
is that they allow the effect of ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ macro-economic 
assumptions to be illustrated. However, no attempt is made here to conduct this kind of 
sensitivity analysis, first because it has already been done (see Curry, p31-33 and 
Kumar and Ward, p i5) and, second, because the comparison of the effects of 
alternative policies presented in Chapter 3 is already complex enough without 
including a number of variants on the baseline projection. The macro-economic 
assumptions used in Kumar and Ward’s central projection (which are generally the 
same as those used by the Government Actuary) are therefore retained throughout the 
analysis below. For the record, the most important of these are:
• cyclical inflation with six years of low inflation followed by four years of high 
inflation, giving an overall average of 3.8% per year53;
states modelled (alongside full- and part-time employment, self-employment and unemployment), this 
state implies that the individual might return to work, whereas retirement implies a more permanent 
withdrawal. Moreover, participation rates for older men were significantly higher two decades ago than 
they are now (Campbell, 1999, Table 2), and hence the likelihood is that PENSIM significantly over­
estimates the extent to which people continue working in the years immediately prior to retirement age. 
As discussed in Section 2.4, this may be one of the reasons why PENSIM’s estimates for the size of a 
second tier provision appear to be too high.
53 This assumption is something of an historical anomaly. When originally set at the beginning of the 
1990s it appeared a reasonable approximation of macro-economic conditions at the time. However, given
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• average earnings growth of 1.5% per year above inflation (though, as noted, in 
any one year individuals in the sample may have earnings growth above or below 
this);
• unemployment of 1 -1.25 million;
• a real rate of return (above inflation) on investments (e.g. personal pension funds) 
of 3.5 % per year.
A third type of assumption used in PENSIM relates to the level and nature of private 
pension provision. For instance, assumptions are required about the coverage of 
occupational pension schemes (by occupation, sex and employment status), how such 
schemes work (e.g. final salary or money-purchase), rates of contribution to personal 
pensions, and the number of people contracted-out of SERPS. For modelling the effects 
of existing policy these assumptions are set in line with current rates, so that changes in 
pension provision in the recent past can be incorporated when new data becomes 
available, and in all future years the blanket assumption is made that current rates will 
remain unchanged. It should be noted, therefore, that this approach involves the 
implicit assumption that private pensioning will not alter in response to economic 
circumstances or changes in benefit levels. For instance, current policy of uprating the 
basic pension with prices will result in the value of this benefit declining over time 
relative to earnings, yet the model does not compensate for this shift through any 
increase in the rate of voluntary savings (as economic theory predicts would occur).
The implications of this lack of behavioural response for using PENSIM to look at 
reform options are discussed further in Section 3.1. But short of making voluntary 
saving fully endogenous in the model (an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task), it 
is difficult to see what other assumption could be made. Accordingly, the only 
assumption which is in fact changed in the analysis in Chapter 3 is the level of 
contracting-out (under the social insurance and compulsory saving options), and 
otherwise the pension assumptions in Kumar and Ward are used throughout this 
thesis54.
the government’s inflation target of 2.5% (and its success in meeting this target), it now seems rather 
out-of-date. Nevertheless, it was not changed by Curry or by Kumar and Ward, and it is similarly left 
unchanged here. This means successive analyses are consistent with each other (a particularly important 
consideration here), at the expense of their ‘realism’.
54 Note that the model is therefore based on data available in November 1999, and subsequent updates,
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The final type of assumption relates to the parameters of state pension provision 
(including second as well as first tier provision) and, more generally, the tax and 
benefit rules in operation during individuals’ retirement. It is these assumptions which 
are the main focus of attention in this thesis, both in relation to producing a baseline 
projection and to the analysis of reforms in Chapter 3. Accordingly, the main policy 
assumptions used in the baseline are described in full in Section 2.2.
Data sources and extending the model
According to their age, model individuals are drawn from one of three separate surveys 
(all of which took place in 1987 or 1988), so that in aggregate something 
approximating a representative sample of the entire adult population is built up. The 
oldest cohorts - those aged over 70 in 1988 -  are taken from the 1988 Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES), where data on 1232 benefit units (1535 individuals) are 
available, those aged between 55 and 69 (in 1988) are taken from the 1988 Retirement 
Survey, providing information on 2361 benefit units (3781 individuals); and 
individuals between 20 and 54 in 1988 are taken from the Social Change and Economic 
Life Initiative (SCELI) survey, providing data on a further 1638 benefit units (2699 
individuals). PENSIM’s job in relation to cases drawn from the FES is therefore limited 
to projecting individuals’ retirement income, while for Retirement Survey and SCELI 
cases it must also complete work and pension accumulation histories. Table 2.1 
summarises.
Table 2.1 
Data sources for PENSIM
Data source Year of birth Year reach age 65 Age in 1988
FES Before 1918 Before 1983 70+
Retirement Survey 1919-1933 1984-1998 55-69
SCELI 1924-1968 1989-2033 20-64
Note: There is some overlap between the SCELI and the Retirement Survey data. However, as
the tails of the SCELI data are rather thin, SCELI individuals older than 54 are ignored.
e.g. from surveys of occupational scheme membership, are not incorporated.
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The Table shows why, as it currently stands, PENSIM is only able to predict pensioner 
incomes until 2025. As the youngest individuals in the SCELI survey were aged 20 in 
1988 they will be approaching 60 at the end of this projection period, when under pre- 
1995 legislation women reached state pension age. Hence on the basis of the existing 
data it would not have been possible to produce projections into the more distant future 
- as the model moved further forward it would run out of newly-retired individuals, so 
estimates of the pensioner income distribution produced for after 2025 would fail to be 
representative of all pensioners alive at that time55. In other words, this date is not 
distant enough to allow the full effects of a pension system to work their way through 
to pensioner incomes -  for what is referred to in DSS (2000a, p. 34) as the ‘maturing’ 
(build up of pension rights) and ‘replacement’ (older cohorts die off) transition phases 
to be complete. Instead of a 25-year projection period something more like 70 or 80 
years would be preferable, so that there is time for model individuals to start work, 
build up pension rights, retire and die all within the timeframe of the model56. It is only 
by going so far forward that people with pension rights accumulated under past systems 
will all die off, allowing the ‘pure’ effect of a policy on pensioner incomes to be seen57.
A major challenge for this thesis was therefore to find a way of looking further into the 
future. In the absence of any workable alternative, other than building a new model 
from scratch (which on the evidence of the plans for Pensim2 would require an input of 
at least five person-years from start to finish), the solution adopted here has therefore
55 The Cabinet Office report on modelling in government (PIU, 2000, p. 39) criticised PENSIM for 
being “only able to project to 2025. It cannot therefore examine the effect o f changes in pension policy 
over the whole working life o f people starting work today (which would require a model that extended at 
least to 2050). This means the impact o f policy changes, once fully implemented, cannot be easily gauged 
from the model”.
56 It is worth noting that the US Social Security Administration use a 75 year horizon in their long term 
spending forecasts (see, for instance, Goss, 1997, Table 1). Bearing in mind that a working life in the UK 
is defined as 49 years (at least for the purposes of second tier pension provision), and that on average 
retirement now lasts nearly 20 years, this might represent a good benchmark for future dynamic models, 
allowing sufficient time for both the ‘maturing’ and ‘replacement’ stages.
57 Dynamic models may also be used to look at transitions between pension systems: PENSIM can 
easily produce results for each year of its projection range, and these could be used to show how 
pensioner incomes alter during the period between the introduction of a reform and the point when it 
becomes fully mature (i.e. when all pensioners have spent the whole of their working life under the 
reformed system). As noted, full maturity may not occur until 70 or 80 years after the reform is 
introduced, so the transition phase can not be captured by looking at one year only. This thesis therefore 
looks mostly at simple ‘before’ and ‘after’ pictures of the effect of different policies on pensioner 
incomes.
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been to keep ‘feeding’ the model with new individuals through re-using the SCELI 
data. In other words, the process through which PENSIM generates estimates of 
pensioner incomes is the same as in the shorter version of the model, but the 
individuals in the original data have been replicated so that the model now runs-on for 
longer.
Two ways of extending the model have been tried. The first method involved adding all 
individuals in the SCELI survey on to the bottom of the original dataset, with the new 
model individuals being 41 years younger than in the original data58. Under this 
variant, therefore, people in the extended dataset ‘bom’ in 1970 are identical to 
individuals bom in 1929 -  the same data is used for both. However, while this method 
maximises the number of different types of individual that are projected, reflecting the 
fact that (more-or-less) the entire SCELI survey is re-used, it has the obvious 
disadvantage that the characteristics of the ‘new’ model individuals are very dated. 
PENSIM’s tendency to produce working lives which reflect labour market experiences 
in the past will therefore be re-enforced. Accordingly a second method was also tried, 
whereby only the youngest benefit units in SCELI were re-used but, to extend the 
projection far enough forward, were re-used a number of times. While clearly this task 
could have been performed in a number of ways, it was felt that re-using benefit units 
containing individuals who were under 30 in SCELI (i.e. the youngest 10 years) four 
times offered the best balance between their characteristics being up-to-date and not 
making the data too ‘narrow’59.
It is not obvious which of these two techniques should be preferred; on the one hand it 
is important to have a broad range of individuals in the model so that more unusual 
cases are picked up, while on the other hand the up-to-dateness of data is clearly also a
58 To ensure that the model’s results for 2025 were the same as those produced by Kumar and Ward 
(given the same input assumptions), 51 years were added to SCELI cases where an individual was born 
before 1926. A total o f 1638 benefit units (2699 individuals) were therefore added to the model under 
this variant, though the ordering of the cases was not precisely the same as in the original SCELI data.
59 As under variant 1, this technique therefore results in around 1600 benefit units being added to the 
bottom of the original SCELI data. However, in this instance it is best to think of this as adding four sets 
of data each containing 400 benefit units. Note also that under this variant it would be possible to extend 
the projection period indefinitely through constantly re-feeding the model with the same 10 years of data. 
However, as official population projections are only available until 2066 no attempt was made to extend 
the model more than forty years further forward. This is just about sufficient time for the full effects of 
pension reform to work through.
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factor. However, in the event PENSIM results were not vastly different under the two 
variants, the mean income of single pensioners in 2066 being just £7 a week (4%) 
higher in variant one than in variant two. This in turn reflects the fact that, by the time 
PENSIM has completed individuals’ working lives, the work histories generated under 
each variant were quite similar. For instance, the median number of years worked by 
heads of household was 36 years in variant one compared to 38 years in variant two, 
while for spouses the difference was even smaller at 35 and 36 years respectively60. 
The decision was therefore made to base this choice upon which variant needed the 
least re-weighting - in order to ensure that there is the right number of pensioners, and 
the correct mix between singles and couples and between younger (under 75) and older 
(over 75) age groups, PENSIM’s raw output is weighted according to official 
population projections produced by the Government Actuary (see Table 2.3 below)61.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics on the weights required in 2066 under each 
variant. It shows that a substantial amount of weighting is required under both. 
However, in general it is clear that variant two involves less re-weighting than variant 
one. For instance, the largest weight applied to any model individual is 24.5 in variant 
one, compared to 17.2 under variant two. Ignoring these outliers variant two also 
performs best -  excluding the worst tenth the smallest weight applied in variant two is 
0.49 (i.e. these model individuals are weighted to half their former importance) while 
under variant one this statistic is 0.38. Hence variant two was chosen as the preferred 
method for extending PENSIM’s projection period. The analysis in the rest of this 
thesis relates solely to this version of the model.
60 Perhaps more noteworthy than the relatively small difference between the two estimates is the fact 
that working lives are predicted to be so long under both variants. As noted earlier, this may be because 
PENSIM assumes that individuals generally retire at state pension age.
61 A major issue in the development of PENSIM was how to weight model data to population 
projections, and in particular whether weights should be applied as future lives are projected or at the end 
of the modelling process. Though Pudney (1992, pp. 5-10) favoured the former technique, and the 
original model was constructed incorporating such dynamic re-weighting, this proved too difficult to 
operate in practice. The current version of the model therefore uses a simpler technique which separates 
out the weighting process from the main model (see Curry, 1996, pp. 23-24). It should also be noted that 
the Government Actuary’s projections only distinguish between singles and couples up to 2020, and that 
beyond this date the split has been estimated by the author.
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Table 2.2
Weights needed under variants one and two
Maximum
weight
Minimum
weight
Highest weight 
excluding top 
10%
Lowest weight 
excluding 
bottom 10%
Inter-quartile 
range of 
weights
Variant 1 24.5 0.38 2.3 0.38 0.76
Variant 2 17.2 0.39 1.8 0.49 0.23
It is worth briefly describing the characteristics of the weighted dataset of pensioners in 
2066 created at the end of this process. As noted above, the overall number of 
pensioners, and the split between singles and couples and younger and older age 
groups, is determined by the weighting programme. However, this only weights by 
broad categories: under or over 75 and in a couple or single. Therefore, though these 
aggregate groups are the correct size in the weighted data (i.e. they are in line with the 
Government Actuary’s projection for 2066), within each group there is no attempt to 
achieve a particular distribution by age. As Figure 2.1 shows, this means the 
distribution of singles and couples broken-down by individual age-bands is rather 
lumpy. Though overall the estimates are reasonably sensible, e.g. single pensioners 
dominate at older ages, there is a considerable amount of variation from year-to-year -  
for instance, the number of couple pensioners with a male aged 69 is twice as high as 
the number with a male aged 70.
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Figure 2.1
Number of singles and couples in weighted data for 2066, by age
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There are a number of possible reasons why PENSIM’s output jumps around so much 
when broken down in this way. First, the fact that the model works through random 
probabilities means its output will always exhibit a degree o f stochastic variation. 
Second, the lumpiness of the output reflects the lumpiness o f the data fed into the 
model: the cases taken from SCELI are not evenly spread between the ages o f 20 and 
30, and this unevenness is amplified through the process o f replication. Last, the 
weighting process can also amplify variations. In particular, as Table 2.3 shows, the 
discrepancy between PENSIM’s unweighted ‘raw’ output and the final weighted data is 
much larger for couples than for singles (most noticeably for couples with a male under 
75). This might explain the smoother age-profile of single pensioners shown in Figure
2.1 -  singles require less weighting and hence there is less distortion to the original 
data.
52
Table 2.3
Comparison of number of cases in weighted and unweighted data
Weighting category No. of cases in weighted 
data
No. o f cases in unweighted 
PENSIM output
Couples, male <75 2498 700
Couples, male >75 1963 1350
Singles, <75 2572 2960
Singles, >75 3683 3200
Finally, the gender make-up of the pseudo-sample of pensioners in 2066 should be 
discussed. As the weighting programme does not take gender into account (only 
individuals age-group and couple status), the gender-composition of the weighted data 
reflects that in PENSIM’s unweighted output. The result is that there are too many 
male pensioners in the pseudo-sample -  rather than single pensioners being 
predominantly female (at present more than three-quarters of single pensioners are 
women), the split between male and female single pensioners is roughly equal. As men 
tend to earn more and build-up bigger private pension rights than women, this over­
representation of males in the model may lead to PENSIM’s estimates for future 
pensioner incomes being too high. Moreover, as Figure 2.2 shows, the distribution of 
male and female single pensioners by age is somewhat peculiar, with there being very 
few single females aged under 75. This may also distort PENSIM’s results.
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Figure 2.2
Gender of single pensioners in weighted data for 2066, by age
300
250
c  200
150
|  100
50  - -
■  Single males 
a  Single fem ales
, H . n ,  11, □ n,
V  V <& <§> 
Age
2.2 Baseline policy assumptions
Though the extended version of PENSIM used in this thesis was constructed mostly for 
comparative purposes (see Chapter 3), a natural starting point is to look at its projection 
for pensioner incomes under current policy. This section therefore describes the 
assumptions used in the baseline projection, i.e. how current policy is represented, 
while Section 2.3 provides baseline results for a number o f years. Section 2.4 then goes 
on to give some idea o f the confidence bounds surrounding these estimates by 
comparing them with survey and administrative data and with Government Actuary 
projections.
Determining the correct assumptions to use in the baseline is not a wholly mechanistic 
process. Although policy in relation to some parts of the pension system is clear, there
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are also a number of areas where the modeller must come to their own judgement as to 
the best assumptions to use62. Some particularly difficult issues are highlighted below.
One important issue is how the earnings limits for National Insurance benefits (and 
contributions) should be modelled. As set out in Section 1 A.2, SERPS entitlements and 
contracted-out rebates are calculated with reference to an individual’s earnings between 
a lower and an upper limit (the LEL and the UEL), and under current legislation these 
earning limits are linked to the value of the basic pension. However this means that, 
because current policy is to uprate the basic pension in line with prices, the earning 
limits are gradually falling relative to average earnings. An almost hidden knock-on 
effect of price-linking the basic pension is therefore to gradually change the nature of 
second tier pension provision, with more and more workers only accumulating SERPS 
on a portion of their earnings63. Although this may be the deliberate aim of policy, it 
could also be argued that the connection between the basic pension and the earning 
limits legislated for when SERPS was first introduced implicitly assumed that the basic 
pension would rise with earnings, and the fact that this has turned out not to be the case 
makes it necessary to model the LEL and UEL separately. Nevertheless, while the 
interaction between the basic pension and the earning limits should be borne in mind, 
assuming away current legislation seems too big a change to be included automatically 
in the baseline. Hence the baseline estimates presented below assume that the LEL and 
the UEL are both price-uprated.
A second issue relates to whether existing legislation should be taken as including 
Home Responsibilities Protection (HRP; the system of credits in SERPS which reduces 
the number of years carers must work to get a full pension). The somewhat hazy status 
of this element of SERPS reflects the way the scheme was originally intended to 
operate and the legislative device used to effect its introduction. In its first incarnation 
SERPS was based on a formula where benefits were calculated with reference to an
62 Though one way out of this would simply be to present a number of baselines, so that all judgements 
are left to the reader, this risks curing the disease through killing the patient.
63 In other words, as the UEL falls further down the earnings distribution more workers will accrue the 
maximum entitlement to SERPS. For this increasing proportion of the workforce SERPS therefore 
effectively provides flat-rate benefits. A similar effect can be seen in Canada, where the ceiling on 
earnings-related benefits is already around half average earnings.
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individual’s 20 best years of earning. Hence, though HRP was part of the 1975 
legislation which brought in SERPS, this part of the scheme would only become 
relevant from April 1999 after the initial phasing-in period was complete. The 1975 
legislation therefore prescribed that regulations should be brought in at a future date to 
bring HRP into effect. However, regulations were not in fact introduced by the relevant 
date, as by that time the government was already planning to replace SERPS with the 
S2P (see Part B). It is therefore not clear whether HRP should be included in ‘current 
policy’ as it does not, and never will, exist on anything more than paper. Against this, 
the Government Actuary (GAD, 1999, p44) argues that “[though] the regulations 
applying home responsibilities protection to SERPS... have not been introduced, 
nevertheless there is a commitment on the part o f government to introduce some form  
o f extra second pension... it would not be appropriate, therefore, to exclude allowance 
fo r the extra costs”. This argument is persuasive, and HRP is therefore also included in 
the baseline here.
In a similar vein, there is also a question mark over whether the recent move to linking 
the value of Income Support to earnings should be in or out of the baseline. Reflecting 
government policy until 1998, early analysis using PENSIM assumed that all benefits 
(including Income Support) would increase in line with prices, and the results in Curry 
(1996, pp. 26-34) are on this basis. However, Kumar and Ward (1999, p. 8) amended 
this assumption to take account of the Labour government’s commitment to increasing 
Income Support in line with earnings (see Section 5.4). Their baseline analysis 
therefore includes one part of Labour’s reforms but ignores the other main proposed 
change, the introduction of the S2P. Potentially this could be misleading -  the baseline 
does not represent ‘pre-Labour’ policy but rather ‘pre-S2P’ policy. Even so, given the 
fact that Income Support has increased in line with earnings since the new government 
came to power, while the S2P will not come in until 2002, the decision was taken to 
include the eamings-link as part of the baseline64.
64 Ross (1998, p. 102) argues that a policy of price-uprating Income Support forever is not politically 
credible, as it will lead to the living standards of the poorest pensioners falling ever further behind the 
rest of the population. This is a further reason for assuming earnings-uprating of this benefit. Indeed, as 
Section 3.1 sets out, this thesis in fact assumes earnings-uprating of Income Support in all the policy 
options looked at in the next chapter. This means that the estimates presented can more easily be 
compared. The alternative of presenting the results both under price- and earnings-uprating of Income 
Support was rejected due to space constraints.
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The above issues are essentially about how legislation should be interpreted and how 
the ‘before’ and ‘after’ line should be drawn in constructing a baseline. They involve 
the modeller making a choice between two alternative positions. However, in relation 
to other parts of the tax-benefit system the modeller is faced with a wider range of 
options about what assumptions are most appropriate. Particular difficulties are posed 
by the capital limit in Income Support, the part of the means test which prevents 
individuals or couples with assets over a certain amount from receiving benefit (see 
Section 1A.1). As one of the main objectives of PENSIM is to provide a way of 
modelling future receipt of means-tested benefits it is clearly important to get this 
assumption right.
In Curry (1996) and Kumar and Ward (1999) the capital limit is not indexed at all, 
reflecting the absence of any statutory indexation requirement and the fact the assets 
test remained at the same level (£3,000) throughout the 1990s. However, the March 
2000 Budget changed the prognosis for the capital limit, as it doubled the allowance to 
£6,000. Though no move was made to explicit indexation, this change suggests that 
periodic updating could become the norm, and hence that freezing the limit throughout 
the projection period may not be a good representation of future policy. More 
technically, if the modeller assumes that the level of the limit is fixed in nominal terms 
then their estimate for Income Support receipt will be lower than would otherwise be 
the case, as over time more pensioners would be excluded from entitlement on asset 
grounds. Even if the capital limit had not been increased in March 2000, there would 
therefore still be a case for indexing the limit in order to remove the downward bias to 
PENSIM’s Income Support projection (i.e. so that this ‘hidden’ effect does not affect 
the results).
This then leaves the question of what index the capital limit should be linked to. One 
option would be to assume that the level of the limit will stay the same in real terms, 
and hence that it will increase in line with prices. However, under this assumption the 
assets test would still become more stringent as the model moved forward in time -  the 
proportion of pensioners affected by the assets test would continue to grow. Moreover, 
the increase in the capital limit in Budget 2000 was considerably larger than that
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needed to return the limit to its real 1990 value, suggesting that this assumption under­
shoots political expectations of the appropriate level for the assets test. A higher 
indexation basis is therefore needed. One possibility would be to model the limit as 
increasing with earnings, so that it kept pace with the main rate of Income Support. If 
the excess of investment returns over earnings is seen as representing a genuine 
increase in well-being (the economist’s view) then this would be the appropriate index 
to use. But if the objective is to take out any effect from the capital limits, so that the 
proportion of pensioners excluded from entitlement to benefit on capital grounds 
remains constant over time, then this is insufficient. As the model assumes that 
investments grow two percentage points faster than earnings, pensioners with capital 
will still tend to creep over the limit if it is modelled as increasing with earnings. Hence 
the uprating base adopted here is to increase the capital limits in line with investment 
growth, i.e. at 3.5% per year above inflation65.
The assumption for take-up of Income Support should also be briefly mentioned. As 
noted in Section 1A.1, official estimates suggest that on a caseload basis take-up of 
Income Support is between 63 and 73% (DSS, 1999a, Table 1.1). Nevertheless, the 
analysis here is based on a take-up assumption of 81%. This is clearly too high, causing 
the model to over-estimate income from Income Support. However, as with the rather 
idiosyncratic assumption for cyclical inflation discussed in Section 2.1, in the interests 
of compatibility with the assumptions underlying Kumar and Ward (1999) it was 
decided not to reduce this assumption to a level closer to survey estimates.
In conclusion, the main policy assumptions used in the baseline were as follows:
• the basic pension and the National Insurance earnings limits increase in line with 
prices;
• the structure of second tier provision is set by SERPS, and includes Home 
Responsibilities Protection;
65 It should be noted that this assumption has a substantial effect on PENSIM’s estimate for Income 
Support receipt in 2066, its importance as a component of pensioners’ income nearly doubling compared 
to if the limit is fixed in nominal terms.
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• Income Support rates increase in line with earnings (i.e. the move to a ‘minimum 
income guarantee’ is in the baseline);
• the capital limit for Income Support increases in line with investment growth;
• take-up of Income Support remains constant at 81 %.
2.3 Baseline results
PENSIM provides information to the policy analyst about the overall level of pensioner 
incomes in the future, the distribution of this income, and the relative importance of 
different components of income. As shown later in this chapter (and in Chapter 3), it is 
easiest to look at these dimensions of PENSIM’s projection individually. However, as 
the baseline run will be referred back to frequently, it is appropriate to set out the 
estimates here in a more comprehensive manner. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 therefore present 
the baseline results in full for three years: 1997, the latest year for which survey data is 
available; 2025, the final year estimated by the original model, and 2066, the final year 
of the extended projection. The income distribution is divided into quintiles in both 
instances. The estimates in the Tables are then illustrated in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, which 
use a more detailed breakdown of the income distribution based on twentieths 
(‘vingtiles’) rather than fifths.
A few notes on the Tables and Figures are required. First, it should be noted that 
estimates are shown separately for singles and couples, thereby avoiding the need for 
equivalisation and making it possible to compare the results with survey and 
administrative data (see Section 2.4). Second, all estimates are deflated by earnings 
rather than prices, i.e. they are in real earnings rather than real price terms66. As the 
government have recognised (see DSS, 1998, p. 41) presenting projections of pensioner 
incomes in earnings terms gives a better idea of what these sums will ‘feel like’ in the 
future. Third, the estimates ignore income from state benefits related to housing 
(principally Housing and Council Tax Benefits); even though PENSIM does attempt to
66 This is analogous to looking at estimates of future public spending in relation to the size of GDP, 
which grows over time, rather than in real price terms. As PENSIM assumes that earnings rise by 1.5% a 
year faster than prices (the Government Actuary’s assumption) this is the rate of increase used to deflate 
the estimates.
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model entitlement to these benefits it is very doubtful whether it does so successfully 
(see PIU, 2000, p39)67. Fourth, though the Table shows the composition of gross 
income, the income distribution used to derive the quintiles was ranked according to 
net (i.e. after tax) income, and also includes housing-related benefits. Though this 
means the Tables and Figures are not fully internally consistent, the advantage of 
ranking by net income is that it allows greater comparability with other sources: both 
Kumar and Ward (1999, paragraph 4.14) and DSS (1999c, p. 44) rank by net income 
even when illustrating differences in gross income.
67 Note though that the estimates for net (i.e. post-tax) incomes shown in Table 2.6 later do include 
Housing Benefit.
Table 2.4
Income of single pensioners under baseline assumptions 
(£ per week, 1999 earnings terms)
1997
Income Support 
Basic state pension 
SERPS
Occupational pensions 
Personal pensions 
Investment income 
Earnings/other 
Gross income
2025
Income Support 
Basic state pension 
SERPS
Occupational pensions 
Personal pensions 
Investment income 
Earnings/other 
Gross income
2066
Income Support 
Basic state pension 
SERPS
Occupational pensions 
Personal pensions 
Investment income 
Earnings/other 
Gross income
Q l Q2 Q3
9.5 15.4 11.4
42.5 55.5 56.8
2.7 3.8 7.8
1.9 4.6 9.0
0.1 0.1 0.0
5.7 3.4 5.6
0.1 0.2 0.5
53.0 67.5 79.8
10.9 15.8 12.7
32.0 35.2 37.5
10.9 16.9 20.8
3.4 6.1 9.0
1.0 1.4 1.9
6.5 5.7 7.1
0.0 0.0 0.0
53.9 65.4 76.3
11.9 22.0 13.1
22.7 22.9 23.2
15.1 14.9 18.4
8.6 10.7 18.9
7.7 8.7 12.2
4.3 5.1 10.2
0.0 0.0 0.0
58.3 62.4 82.8
Q4 Q5 Mean
9.1 1.0 9.3
59.6 62.2 55.3
9.7 18.0 8.4
19.8 66.0 20.3
0.2 0.6 0.2
8.5 69.0 18.4
0.7 12.2 2.7
98.6 228.0 114.7
0.8 0.0 8.0
40.7 41.0 37.3
32.3 32.6 22.7
26.4 68.4 22.6
5.7 16.3 5.3
19.2 96.6 27.0
0.8 13.6 2.9
125.0 268.4 125.8
0.0 0.0 9.4
24.0 23.8 23.3
24.1 23.3 19.2
48.1 203.6 58.0
20.2 22.5 14.3
22.2 130.8 34.5
0.5 11.5 2.4
139.2 415.5 161.1
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Table 2.5
Income of couple pensioners under baseline assumptions 
(£ per week, 1999 earnings terms)
1997
Income Support 
Basic state pension 
SERPS
Occupational pensions 
Personal pensions 
Investment income 
Earnings/other 
Gross income
2025
Income Support 
Basic state pension 
SERPS
Occupational pensions 
Personal pensions 
Investment income 
Earnings/other 
Gross income
2066
Income Support 
Basic state pension 
SERPS
Occupational pensions 
Personal pensions 
Investment income 
Earnings/other 
Gross income
Q l Q2 Q3
1.8 0.9 0.1
108.1 115.0 115.5
9.2 15.9 24.3
7.1 21.9 44.6
0.3 0.1 0.4
7.1 12.8 24.1
0.1 1.1 2.2
131.8 166.8 211.2
8.0 1.0 0.0
68.5 72.4 74.3
22.1 33.3 39.0
9.6 27.9 55.4
3.1 7.5 11.5
7.8 12.7 20.5
0.0 0.7 2.1
111.1 154.6 202.9
14.2 1.6 0.0
43.7 44.8 45.6
28.7 32.9 38.7
15.8 36.6 60.7
13.7 21.8 31.3
5.9 14.7 22.7
0.6 0.4 3.0
108.2 151.2 202.1
Q4 Q5 Mean
0.0 0.0 0.6
119.3 116.2 114.8
25.4 26.3 20.2
65.7 112.7 50.4
0.9 1.2 0.6
54.5 140.8 47.9
12.4 208.0 44.8
278.2 605.2 278.7
0.0 0.0 1.8
75.6 74.5 73.1
39.2 40.3 34.8
83.6 92.6 53.8
18.4 27.0 13.5
48.1 179.2 53.7
10.6 227.3 48.2
275.5 640.9 277.0
0.0 0.0 3.1
46.8 46.2 45.4
41.4 41.6 36.7
95.5 276.4 97.2
29.7 32.1 25.8
56.3 192.3 58.5
7.1 205.2 43.4
276.8 793.7 306.9
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Figure 2.3
Income of single pensioners under baseline assumptions
(£ per week, 1999 earnings terms)
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Figure 2.3 cont. 
C :2066
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Figure 2.4
income of couple pensioners under baseline assumptions
(£ per week, 1999 earnings terms)
A. 1997
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Figure 2.4 cont. 
B :2025
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As can be seen, PENSIM provides a wealth of information about pensioner incomes in 
the future. However, in order to bring out the ‘story’ underlying these results it is useful 
to present estimates for different years alongside each other, so that they may be 
directly compared in the same table or figure. This is difficult to achieve while 
simultaneously attempting to show the composition and distribution of pensioner 
incomes (as in Figures 2.3 and 2.4). Figures 2.5 and 2.6 therefore split the analysis, 
with the former concentrating on composition and the latter on distribution.
However, before this it is useful to clarify the rather surprising pattern for Income 
Support receipt among single pensioners shown in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.3. As can be 
seen most clearly in Figure 2.3, PENSIM’s projection suggests that the amount 
received from Income Support tails off towards the bottom of the income distribution. 
Though the purpose of means-tested benefits is to provide support for the least well-off, 
this result is not in fact as counter-intuitive as it might seem. First, there is the problem 
of incomplete take-up: PENSIM assumes that just under a fifth of eligible pensioners 
fail to take-up their Income Support entitlement (and this is still probably too 
optimistic; see previous section). Second, those who are excluded from eligibility for 
Income Support solely because of the assets test will be counted among the poorest on 
the basis of their income. Third, the provision of disability premia in Income Support 
can lift recipients into middling-income bands. Last, the Figures show the income 
distribution after including Income Support, and the picture would look rather different 
if original income were used.
Figure 2.5 shows PENSIM’s baseline estimates for pensioners’ mean gross income in 
1997, 2025 and 2066. It shows that, on average, pensioner incomes will rise relative to 
average earnings, i.e. as a group pensioners’ living standards will increase more than 
workers’ (though not coming close to reaching parity). However, perhaps more 
noteworthy are the changes in the components of income which PENSIM predicts -  the 
decreasing contribution made by the basic pension due to the policy of price uprating is 
one outstanding feature, as is the rise of occupational income and, to a lesser extent, 
private pension and investment income. Weighting the estimates according to the share 
of singles and couples in the pensioner population, PENSIM’s projection suggests that 
the ratio of public to private sources of income will shift from roughly 50:50 in 1997 to
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30:70 in 2066. This is broadly in line with the government’s estimate that, after the 
introduction o f the S2P, and between 1998 and 2050, the public:private ratio would 
change from 60:40 to 40:60.
Figure 2.5
Components of mean gross income in 1997, 2025 and 2066 under baseline 
assumptions (£ per week, 1999 earnings terms)
A. Singles
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Figure 2.5 cont.
B: Couples
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Figure 2.6 turns to the distributional aspects o f PENSIM’s results, showing for singles 
and couples the distribution of gross pensioner incomes in 1997, 2025 and 2066. In 
order to emphasise the bottom end of the distribution a logarithmic scale is used on the 
vertical axis, which, as in previous Figures, is also in 1999 earnings terms. The Figure 
also shows a ‘poverty line’ taken from the Households Below Average Income survey 
(HBAI; DSS, 2000b) which, to take into account differences in need between singles 
and couples this standard, is equivalised (i.e. it is lower for single people than for 
couples, reflecting their lower needs). Although a number o f definitions o f ‘poverty’ 
could have been used (and two are shown in Table 2.6), the Figure shows the 
frequently-used yardstick of half mean household income. It is important to realise, 
therefore, that the poverty standard is super-imposed onto the Figure - it is not 
generated internally by the model -  and that it is derived from data on incomes
ASthroughout the population (not just pensioners) . Further, it is also assumed that mean
68 It should also be noted that the HBAI estimates include income from housing-related benefits and are
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population-wide household income grows precisely in line with earnings (i.e. at 1.5% 
above inflation), so that the poverty line stays constant over time (relative to the 
eamings-deflated vertical axis). In other words, the Figure effectively assumes that the 
1998/9 HBAI estimates o f half mean household income, o f £102 and £167 a week for 
singles and couples respectively (before housing costs and including the self-employed, 
see DSS 2000b, Table C), are permanently fixed relative to average earnings69.
Figure 2.6
Distribution of gross pensioner incomes in 1997, 2025 and 2066 under baseline 
assumptions (£ per week, 1999 earnings terms, log scale)
A: Singles
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on a net (after-tax) basis. In contrast, PENSIM ’s estimates are gross and omit housing-related benefits 
(though the ranking variable is net and includes all benefits). The income definition used to derive the 
poverty standard is therefore different from the one underlying PENSIM ’s estimates. O f the two 
discrepancies, the more important is probably the absence o f  income from housing-related benefits in 
PENSIM ’s estimates -  few pensioners in the bottom half o f  the income distribution pay tax and hence 
there is little difference between their gross and net incomes. The likelihood is therefore that there would 
be fewer pensioners with incomes under the poverty line if fully consistent income definitions were used.
69 Though the HBAI figures are for 1998/9 they are also in February 2000 prices, and hence may be a 
reasonable approximation o f the 1999 earnings base used in the Figure.
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Figure 2.6 cont.
B: Couples
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Table 2.6 finishes this presentation o f the baseline results by providing a number o f 
summary measures. The first two rows show two inequality statistics, the Gini 
coefficient and the 90/10 ratio (i.e. the income at the 90th percentile divided by that at 
the 10th). Both these measures therefore summarise the income distribution, but the 
90/10 ratio reduces the importance o f more outlying households by ignoring estimates 
for the top and bottom deciles. The next three rows then give alternative measures of 
poverty. Row three shows the proportion of pensioners with incomes below half 
population-wide mean household income (i.e. below the HBAI poverty lines shown in 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4), while row four shows the proportion below half population-wide 
median household income70; due to the concentration o f pensioner incomes around this 
point relatively small changes in how poverty is defined have a significant impact, and 
hence it is instructive to show two measures. Row five then shows the proportion o f 
pensioners claiming Income Support, which in practice is a matter o f considerable
70 The half-mean and half-median poverty standards are both taken from DSS (2000b) and are assumed 
to grow in line with average earnings (see earlier). In 1998/9 half population-wide median household 
income was £82 and £135 a week for singles and couples respectively (before housing costs and 
including the self-employed; see DSS, 2000b, Table A2). The caveats set out earlier regarding 
inconsistencies between the income concept used for PENSIM ’s estimates and that used in the HBAI 
should again be borne in mind.
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policy concern. Finally rows five and six provide PENSIM’s estimates for pensioners’ 
mean and median net income. Note that for greater comparability with DSS estimates 
these final two statistics are based on pensioners’ net rather than gross income, and also 
include income from Housing and Council Tax Benefits. They cannot therefore be 
related directly to the gross income estimates presented in earlier Tables and Figures.
Table 2.6
Summary statistics under baseline assumptions
Singles Couples
1997 2025 2066 1997 2025 2066
90:10 ratio 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.0 3.6 4.0
Gini coefficient 0.24 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.36
% below half mean 
income
47% 56% 54% 27% 36% 37%
% below half median 
income
21% 26% 14% 9% 20% 20%
% claiming Income 
Support
35% 30% 34% 4% 9% 13%
Mean net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£117 £121 £145 £256 £249 £272
Median net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£100 £97 £97 £196 £195 £197
As can be seen, under the baseline policy assumptions described in Section 2.2, the 
broad picture painted by PENSIM is that between now and 2066:
• pensioner inequality will increase;
• the proportion of pensioners ‘in poverty’ (i.e. below half-mean and half-median 
population-wide household income) will rise;
• the proportion of pensioner benefit units claiming Income Support is expected to 
fall very slightly before rising;
• mean pensioner income will increase faster than average earnings, though median 
income will fall slightly (relative to earnings).
Chapter 3 examines how these results alter under alternative policy assumptions, but 
before this the next section looks at the reliability of the extended model by comparing 
the results presented above with other sources.
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2.4 How reliable are the results?
Caldwell and Morrison (1998, pp. 2-4) suggest that as dynamic microsimulation 
models become more established policy tools the credibility of their results will 
become an increasingly important issue71. This section therefore takes three of the 
validity tests used by Caldwell and Morrison in their work on CORSIM and 
DYNACAN (dynamic models for the US and Canada) and adapts them for PENSIM 
and the UK.
The first validation exercise carried out was to compare the model’s results for 1997 
with survey data on pensioner incomes in that year (because PENSIM relies on data 
collected in 1988 its estimate for 1997 already relies on nearly 10 years of simulation). 
Figure 2.7 sets out the difference between the baseline estimates for gross incomes in 
1997 and survey estimates from the 1997/8 Pensioner Income (PI) series (DSS, 1999c, 
Table 14), showing for each quintile the excess (or deficit) in the PI series estimate 
relative to PENSIM (i.e. the Figure shows the PI series estimate minus the PENSIM 
estimate)72. For consistency with other figures in this chapter all estimates are scaled to 
1999. Note also that income from the basic pension, SERPS, Income Support and 
Housing Benefit is all included under ‘benefit income’; this is in line with the way the 
PI series groups sources of income but different from the categorisation used in earlier 
Figures.
71 Redmond, Sutherland and Wilson (1998, Part 4) also highlight the importance o f validation in relation 
to static microsimulation models.
72 As explained earlier, though the Figures presented in this thesis generally show gross income, the 
variable used to rank pensioners in the income distribution is their net income. This is the same as in the 
PI series, which also ranks by net income throughout (see DSS, 1999c, p. 44). The comparison between 
the two estimates is therefore reasonably precise.
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Figure 2.7
Comparison with survey data: difference in components of income in 1997 
between the Pensioner Income series and PENSIM (£ per week, 1999 prices)
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Figure 2.7 cont.
B: Couples
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As can be seen, PENSIM underestimates pensioner incomes across the board -  the PI 
series estimates are higher for all quintiles. However, probably more important is the 
fact that PENSIM’s estimates are much worse for the top quintile (and to a lesser extent 
the fourth quintile) than for the rest o f the income distribution. This in turn largely 
reflects the fact that the model’s estimates for income from occupational pensions are 
too low (at least for 1997). Note, therefore, that though PENSIM underestimates mean 
pensioner income and pensioner inequality (see Table 2.7 below), it does so because it 
fails to assign enough income to the richest pensioners. In comparison errors in its 
projection for poorer pensioners, who derive most o f their income from state benefits, 
are not too bad (though admittedly benefit income for single pensioners is too low).
In general this thesis has not been concerned with improving PENSIM (though some 
bugs in the computer code were corrected, see later), and similarly no attempt has been 
made analyse the cause o f these errors in depth. However, it is possible to speculate 
about the factors that might be responsible. In terms of the discrepancy in the estimates 
for the top quintile, the fact that higher incomes are generally under-reported in survey 
data may be important. The PI series gets round this problem through using the Inland
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Revenue’s Survey of Personal Incomes to estimate incomes at the very top of the 
distribution (DSS, 1999c, p. 8). In contrast, PENSIM uses data taken directly from the 
Family Expenditure Survey (and other surveys) without any attempt to boost higher 
incomes. Hence it is perhaps not suprising that its estimates for the richest pensioners 
are below those in the PI series. More speculatively, the discrepancy in the estimates 
for benefit income going to single pensioners may be due to the fact that PENSIM does 
not include estimates for disability-related benefits.
The next type of validation exercise involved comparing PENSIM’s estimates with 
administrative data on the characteristics of actual benefit claimants in 1997. Any 
number of different types of comparison would have been possible. However, given the 
importance of the model’s estimate for Income Support it was decided to investigate 
this area in particular. Figure 2.8 therefore presents PENSIM’s estimates for how the 
proportion of single pensioners claiming Income Support varies with age alongside 
estimates based on DSS administrative data (taken from DSS, 1997). Two lines are 
shown for PENSIM, one taken from the projection for 1997 and the other from the 
projection for 2066. Though the first of these is clearly more relevant to the comparison 
with administrative data, the latter estimate acts as a check on PENSIM’s consistency 
over time.
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Figure 2.8
Comparison with administrative data: percentage of single pensioners claiming
Income Support by age
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The Figure shows that PENSIM appears to be modelling the age of Income Support 
recipients reasonably well. The heavy tilt towards older age groups fits the 
administrative data quite closely, as well as according with what we know about 
income dynamics in retirement from other sources (such as, for instance, from Johnson, 
Stears and Webb 1998, p. 214). Moreover, the shape o f PENSIM’s estimate stays fairly 
constant over time (as does, in this case, the overall proportion o f pensioners claiming 
Income Support; see Table 2.4). However, given what we know about the way 
PENSIM works, the fact that the modelled estimates turn out to be quite close to 
administrative records is more worrying. In particular, the omission of any modelling 
of disability status means that this route onto Income Support is closed-off (the 
existence o f disability premia in means-tested benefits, and generally lower lifetime 
incomes, makes receipt o f Income Support much more prevalent among disabled 
pensioners). Moreover, the model completely ignores older people in residential care 
and, as noted earlier, uses a take-up assumption (81%) that is rather higher than official 
estimates. In the light o f this the good fit between PENSIM’s estimates and the 
administrative data looks more like a product o f good luck than o f good model design.
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A comparison of PENSIM’s results and survey and administrative data from a number 
of sources is in Table 2.7. This gives some indication of the discrepancies in the 
various summary statistics used in Section 2.3 and in Chapter 3. In particular, the Table 
shows that PENSIM significantly over-estimates the proportion of single pensioners 
below the half-mean and half-median income HBAI poverty standards. This may be 
due to the fact that PENSIM’s estimates exclude income from housing-related benefits. 
However, as shown in Figure 2.6, the projected income distribution for single 
pensioners is rather flat around the relevant income levels, and hence the number of 
single pensioners recorded as being ‘in poverty’ is sensitive to the precise poverty line 
chosen.
Table 2.7
Comparison with survey and administrative data: summary statistics
Survey and 
admin, data 
1997: Singles
PENSIM  
1997: Singles
Survey and 
admin, data 
1997: Couples
PENSIM  
1997: Couples
90:10 ratio1 3.0 2.5 3.4 3.0
Gini coefficient11 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.28
% below half mean 
income,v
24% 47% 22% 27%
% below half median 
incomelv
14% 21% 9% 9%
% claiming Income 
Support111
30% 35% 6% 4%
Mlean net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)1
£146 £117 £285 £256
Median net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)1
£125 £100 £224 £196
Source of administrative estimates
i. Pensioner Income Series 1997/8 (DSS, 1999c, Table 13).
ii. The Changing Welfare State: Pensioner Incomes (DSS, 2000a, p. 26).
iii. Income Support Quarterly Enquiry August 1997 (DSS, 1997, Table 2.1).
iv. Households Below Average Income 1998/9 (DSS, 2000b, Table FI BHC).
The final validation exercise involved comparing PENSIM’s output with Government 
Actuary projections for future expenditure on National Insurance benefits. As these 
projections end in 2060, and results are not published for 2025, the baseline projection 
was re-run for 2020, 2040 and 2060. Estimates were then grossed-up in proportion to 
the number of single and couple pensioners using Government Actuary population
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projections. The results are set out in Figure 2.9, alongside the Government Actuary’s 
projection for each year. To fit with the Government Actuary’s method of presenting 
expenditure projections all estimates are in 1999/2000 prices.
Figure 2.9
Comparison with Government Actuary: future spending on National Insurance
benefits (£ billion, 1999/2000 prices)
■  Basic Pension
PEN 2000 GAO 2000 PEN 2020 GAD 2020 PEN 2040 GAD 2040 PEN 2060 GAD 2060
The Figure shows that PENSIM’s estimates for future spending on National Insurance 
benefits are significantly different from the Government Actuary’s. However, in the 
case o f the basic pension differences in each year are fairly constant - though PENSIM 
consistently underestimates spending, the trend it indicates accords reasonably well 
with the Government Actuary. This is not surprising - the basic pension is gradually 
becoming more like a basic income-type benefit, the system of credits introduced in the 
1970s ensuring that the vast majority o f future retirees will be fully entitled (Johnson 
and Stears, 1996, pp. 109-111). Hence expenditure estimates depend largely on 
population projections.
More troubling is the estimate for spending on SERPS, where the trend shown by 
PENSIM is radically different from that estimated by the Government Actuary. The 
reasons for this discrepancy are difficult to divine, as spending on SERPS is affected
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not only by the gross entitlements individuals build-up (which varies with their 
earnings history) but also the extent to which SERPS benefits are pre-funded through 
rebates. However, the long median number of years worked reported in Section 2.1 (38 
years for heads of household and 36 for spouses) suggests that the former problem is 
important -  PENSIM probably over-estimates the number of years people work and 
hence the gross SERPS entitlements they earn. Evidence from Chapter 3 also tends to 
confirm this: changes in the structure of SERPS have a large effect on income from 
private pension schemes, indicating that the level of contracted-out rebates in the model 
is substantial. The probability, therefore, is that PENSIM over-estimates the size of all 
second tier pension provision, i.e. gross as well as net SERPS entitlements are too 
large73.
However, it should also be bome in mind that the Government Actuary’s projections 
for spending on SERPS are themselves potentially quite inaccurate. They have 
certainly been subject to significant variations over the years. An example is in Table 
2.8, which compares the Government Actuary’s 1994 and 1999 estimates for spending 
on SERPS (see GAD, 1994, Table 1 and GAD, 1999, Table 15.1). As there were no 
changes in policy between these two projections (the 1994 projection anticipates the 
effect of the 1995 Pension Act) they should be identical, save for the difference 
between 1994/5 and 1999/2000 prices. This is clearly not the case. Although the short­
term projections are similar, the 1999 estimates for 2040 and 2050 are half as large 
again as the 1994 estimates. Moreover, the trend is also different -  rather than peaking 
in 2030, as under the 1994 projection, the 1999 estimates suggest that expenditure will 
continue to grow throughout the next century (reaching £17.9 billion in 2060, the last 
year of projection in 1999)74. The conclusion is that SERPS is a very difficult benefit to 
model, and while PENSIM’s projections are markedly different from those of the 
Government Actuary it is much less clear that one is ‘right’ and the other ‘wrong’.
73 Recall that PENSIM assumes individuals will retire at state pension age, while in reality less than 
60% of men aged 55-64 are currently in work (see Campbell, 1999, Table 3). This factor was highlighted 
by the Government Actuary (1999, p41) in explaining why actual SERPS awards for 1999/00 were 
around half the level which would be expected if everyone had full employment records.
74 Note that all estimates are in real price terms -  the modest increases after 2030 which the Government 
Actuary now predicts still implies that SERPS expenditure will fall significantly as a proportion of GDP.
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Table 2.8
Government Actuary projections of spending on SERPS: comparison of 1994 and 
1999 estimates (£ billion, contemporaneous prices)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
1994 projection 4.2 8.4 10.9 12.0 10.2 9.9
1999 projection 5.0 9.8 12.5 14.8 14.9 15.7
2.5 Conclusion
There are a number of reasons why the estimates produced by PENSIM should be 
treated with considerable caution. Two problems common to all dynamic models - 
behavioural response and whether benefits-in-kind should be included -  are discussed 
later. However, specific problems with PENSIM should first be mentioned.
One problem with the model is that, to say the least, it did not pass the validation 
exercises with flying colours. In particular, its estimates for pensioners at the top of the 
distribution are open to significant doubt. Moreover, as changes at the top can make a 
big difference to pensioners’ mean (though not median) income, there are also wide 
margins of error attached to this summary statistic. Given the bunching of the income 
distribution for single pensioners, the sensitivity of the results to the poverty standard 
chosen should also be noted.
Second, there is the problem that it is not clear that PENSIM is working correctly 
technically. Although this thesis did not set out to improve the way the model works, a 
number of errors in the computer code (‘bugs’) were detected en route. These have all 
now been corrected by DSS computer programmers, and the results set out above and 
in the next chapter use this corrected version of the model. But nevertheless, the fact 
that any bugs were found at all should be of concern, as it suggests there may be some 
as-yet-undetected errors remaining75. As a cautionary tale, it is worth briefly describing
75 It is worth noting that one advantage of extending the model to 2066 was that it made the effect of 
bugs more obvious. Even in 2025 the majority of the model’s projection is based on pension entitlements 
recorded in the original 1988 survey data, rather than on estimates produced internally by the model. 
Hence it is difficult to detect bugs in the pre-retirement modelling process ‘by eye’, as large changes in
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the two most important bugs found during the preparation of this thesis. One of these 
(also recorded in paragraph 3.6 of Kumar and Ward, 1999) related to an error in the 
random numbers used in the model: rather than being random they were grouped 
around 0.97. The other was a simple error in the code determining whether individuals 
without occupational pensions were contracted-out into a personal pension: the 
probabilities read-in by the model (from user-defined spreadsheet files) were the wrong 
way round, so that individuals were allocated to personal pensions in inverse 
proportion to the intended split. As it happens neither bug made a significant difference 
to the overall results -  mean pensioner income remained within 10% of the previous 
projection - but in itself this may be a cause for concern. The description of PENSIM as 
a ‘black box’ is only too accurate; though the model may appear to be working (e.g. 
the results presented in the next chapter accord with common-sense reasoning about the 
direction of effects associated with the various options analysed), it is difficult to be 
sure that it is bug-free.
Third, the fact that the model does not include behavioural response should again be 
noted. As discussed further in the next chapter, while this is probably the least-worst 
option, it means PENSIM does not capture the interaction between compulsory and 
voluntary provision and, in particular, ignores the incentive effects of means-tested 
benefits.
Finally, a fourth reason for being cautious in interpreting PENSIM’s results is that the 
model’s estimates are about income only -  they do not show pensioners’ well-being 
which, presumably, is the underlying subject of concern. Conceptual issues in the 
analysis of poverty and inequality are legion, and no attempt to cover the full range of
7 ( \issues is made here . However, it is worth briefly highlighting the issue of whether 
benefits-in-kind should be included in the analysis.
There are a number of reasons for including benefits-in-kind in analyses of well-being, 
particularly when the focus of attention is older people. The first is that non-cash
income would not be expected by 2025 in any event.
76 Comprehensive surveys of the issues involved in analysing poverty and inequality are in Amiel and 
Cowell (1999), Hills (1995, pp. 106-115) and Atkinson (1975, Ch. 3; 1987; 1998, Lecture 1).
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benefits are a more important component of pensioners’ incomes than is the case for 
the rest of the population (Sefton, 1997, Figure 2.5), hence ignoring such benefits gives
77a partial view of the income security ‘package’ provided by the welfare state . The 
second reason for incorporating benefits-in-kind is that the value of state-provided 
health-care (on a per capita basis) is likely to rise in the future due to the effect of 
improved medical technology (and, possibly, health’s status as a luxury good; see 
Section 4.4). Ignoring such benefits therefore disguises the growth of in-kind transfers, 
so that predicted falls in the amount pensioners receive in the form of benefits may be 
offset by increases in the support provided via the NHS. In other words, there may be a 
shift in the composition of state support -  from cash to care - but not in its level78. Last, 
without the inclusion of such benefits the effect of some policy changes will be lost. 
For instance, suppose a government decided to ‘nationalise’ finance of long term care, 
so that it was provided free to anyone in need. This would clearly improve the well­
being of people needing care and their partner/family (and, moreover, would probably 
also add to the general well-being of pensioners, in that fear of having to pay for long 
term care may have psychological costs). However, greater state funding of long term 
care would not affect their income, and hence would be excluded from income-based 
measures of pensioners’ living standards. In a similar way, the government’s recent 
announcement of free television licences for the over-75s will not affect income data, 
and hence official indicators of well-being.
In conclusion, in spite of all the caveats listed above, in the final analysis PENSIM (or 
rather, dynamic microsimulation) is the only way getting at certain issues, in particular 
the relationship between changes in the structure of second tier provision and means- 
tested benefit payments. Given this it is probably better than nothing - a rough idea of 
what the future might look like as better than no idea at all. It is worth again quoting
77 This was the reason Whiteford and Kennedy’s (1995, Ch. 5) comparative analysis o f the living 
standards of older people included benefits-in-kind. They put the argument for taking into account 
services as well as cash as follows: “Social policy outcomes should not be measured only in terms o f the 
distribution o f cash disposable incomes. Rather it is the level and distribution o f the total package o f  
resources available to groups such as older people which should be o f concern’' (Whiteford and 
Kennedy, 1995, p98).
78 If it is assumed that health-care benefits completely cover need then inclusion of such benefits-in-kind 
will not affect well-being. However, if care only covers a proportion of need then changes in the value of 
health-care supplied will affect well-being (as well as the size of state transfers).
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the Cabinet Office report on modelling in government (PIU, 2000, p. 38), which under 
‘strengths’ commented that:
“PENSIM provides a consistent way o f looking at information on future 
pension provision. It is a ground-breaking model which, despite its 
acknowledged limitations... has allowed policy to be based more firmly on 
analysis than was the case before its development".
The limitations of the version of PENSIM used here are undoubtedly larger than apply 
to the version discussed by the Cabinet Office, as this thesis has attempted to project 
pension incomes through to 2066, forty years beyond the original projection period. 
Doubts about the reliability of PENSIM’s projection to 2025 are therefore amplified. 
However, even if estimates of the distant future must by their very nature be rather 
uncertain, setting a shorter timescale simply ignores the way pensions work. Indeed, as 
shown by Hemming and Kay’s (1982) study of the long term costs of SERPS, analyses 
of pensions which fail to look into the more distant future can be seriously 
misleading79.
79 Hemming and Kay’s bete noir in this respect were the projections produced by the Government 
Actuary for the 1975 SERPS legislation, which failed to look at expenditure in the period when the 
scheme would be fully mature and when baby-boom cohorts would be retiring.
3. Pensioner incomes under four ideal type’ pension systems
This chapter uses PENSIM to look at the effect of a range of reform options on 
pensioner incomes. The reforms chosen are both archetypal, in that they illustrate each 
of the four ‘ideal type’ pension systems described in the introductory chapter, and 
specific, in that they are based on the UK and (in three of the four cases) on actual 
proposals (see Figure 1.7). Therefore, though the estimates presented below show the 
effect of proposals from the recent past, the lessons which can be learnt from each 
should be more widely applicable (see Figure 1.8). To the extent that future reform 
proposals slot into the categorisation used in this thesis, the broad direction of their 
effect on pensioner incomes can be deduced from the examples in this chapter.
The order of analysis in the chapter reflects the history of the UK pension system (as 
summarised in Figure 1.5. The middle four sections therefore look respectively at the 
targeting, basic income, social insurance and compulsory saving models for pension 
provision (or rather, at examples which are representative of each model), comparing 
the effect of each with the baseline projection described in the last chapter. These 
sections are then topped and tailed by an introductory section which examines 
problems in comparing policy options and a concluding section which compares the 
various reforms with each other. The effect of the State Second Pension is examined 
separately in Chapter 6 while the effect of each ideal type on the public finances (i.e. 
their cost) is analysed in Section 4.3.
3.1 Problems in comparing policy options
In looking at the effect of alternative policies it is clearly important to ensure that like is 
being compared with like, i.e. that the difference between two projections reflects 
explicit changes in policy rather than ‘back-door’ changes in assumptions. On one level 
this simply implies that the same labour market and macro-economic assumptions 
should be used in each case, and that the assumptions made are not biased in favour of 
particular kinds of policy. For instance, the assumed rate of investment growth should
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be uniform throughout and based on non-partisan estimates (such as those produced by 
the Government Actuary). The set-up of PENSIM makes it easy to ensure that this is 
the case, and the analysis below follows these strictures. However, more difficult issues 
also arise in comparing policy options.
One problem is how the minimum income standard should be defined. The analysis in 
this chapter assumes that the minimum is the same in all options, and the current (post 
-  1998) policy of uprating Income Support with earnings is assumed throughout. The 
reasoning is that unless this objective is fixed at the outset comparisons between 
options will not be fair. In particular, if the minimum standard were allowed to vary 
between options PENSIM’s estimate for the number of people receiving Income 
Support under the alternatives would be difficult to interpret, as it would reflect 
differences in the level of the minimum standard as well as differences in policy. By 
holding this part of the system constant in all four options their relative success in 
reducing Income Support payments can be meaningfully compared80. However, it 
should be noted that this also means policy towards Income Support is super-imposed 
on the examples looked at, i.e. eamings-uprating is assumed whether or not this formed 
part of the original proposals. This is particularly problematic for Section 3.5, which 
uses the Basic Pension Plus proposals outlined by the Conservative Party in the run-up 
to the 1997 general election (see Lilley, 1997) to illustrate the compulsory saving 
model for pension provision. As Conservative policy for their 17 years in office was to 
increase Income Support with prices (though in practice there was a small increase in 
its real value, see Section 5.3), the assumption here of eamings-uprating does not, in all 
probability, represent the true intentions of the proponents. Nevertheless, without this 
assumption it would not be possible to compare reliance on Income Support, and 
consistency between the options is the over-riding analytical concern.
A second problem relates to whether the analysis should take into account ‘offset’ 
between different forms of pension provision (i.e. how to include the ‘income effect’ 
resulting from changes in the level of state transfers). The effect of changes in first and 
second tier provision on voluntary (third-tier) provision is an important topic in pension
80 Given the emphasis on reducing means testing in pension reform in the UK (see Part B) it is 
particularly important that the projection for reliance on Income Support can be easily interpreted.
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reform. Most notably in the US, there is an on-going debate among economists about 
the extent to which public pension systems reduce voluntary private saving and, in a 
slightly different way, whether moving towards the compulsory saving model would 
increase total national saving or merely alter its composition81. In terms of the macro- 
economic impact of pension reform this is clearly an important issue. However, it is 
also important in the context of estimating the effect of alternative polices on pensioner 
incomes. On the one hand, if individuals are perfectly rational and have perfect 
knowledge and foresight we would expect their behaviour to adapt to government 
policy, so that whatever happens they achieve their target retirement income. In this 
instance, therefore, changes in government policy make no difference to gross 
pensioner incomes - their only effect is on the composition of the total (more from 
second tier sources and less from the third tier)82. At the other extreme, analysis might 
assume that people go on saving the same amount whatever the policy regime in place, 
so that changes in second tier provision feed through to pensioner incomes on a one-to- 
one basis.
It is this latter assumption which has been adopted here, i.e. it is assumed that there is 
zero offset between compulsory and voluntary saving. In this respect, therefore, the 
comparisons provided below over-estimate the extent to which the different polices 
will affect pensioner incomes; in reality people will (to some extent) adjust to a new 
policy regime through changing the amount they save voluntarily. However this 
assumption has the analytical advantage that the changes in income shown in Sections
3.2 -  3.5 all reflect variations in the level and distribution of publicly-financed (though 
not necessarily publicly-provided) pension benefits. Moreover, it is worth appreciating 
the problems involved in including offset within PENSIM (and hence why the simpler 
solution of assuming no offset was used here). One problem is that, though it would be
81 For an account of the arguments in this debate and a survey and interpretation of the various studies 
which have looked at the extent of offset see Gale (1998, pp. 719-721). Section 4.5 also discusses this 
issue.
82 This position in fact involves a rather restrictive set of assumptions. In order for there to be no change 
whatsoever in total pension incomes then not only must individuals be perfectly rational and forward 
looking, but:
a) the different tiers of pension provision must be perfect substitutes (e.g. individuals must perceive 
state-provided second tier benefits as being the same as private third tier benefits), and
b) the reform must have no effect on individuals’ lifetime budget constraints, or
c) there must be ‘Ricardian equivalence’ i.e. inter-generational (inter-familial) transfers must fully 
compensate for public transfers between generations.
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relatively easy to change voluntary saving rates ‘by eye’ through over-writing existing 
assumptions, it would not be possible at present to make cohort-specific adjustments in 
the model83. In a similar vein, if a reform affects some individuals more than others 
(e.g. high earners more than low earners) then income-specific adjustments would be 
needed and, again, this is not possible in the current version of PENSIM. Finally, and 
most importantly, even if PENSIM did model savings behaviour in a more 
sophisticated way it is not clear precisely how much offset should be assumed. Until 
there are better estimates of the importance of offset it makes most sense to exclude it 
from the model - assuming ‘no change’ is the safest option84.
Finally there is the vexed issue of whether analysis should include allowance for the 
incentive effects of policy (i.e. the ‘substitution effect’ resulting from changes in the 
margined return to saving). This issue has been discussed extensively in relation to 
static microsimulation models, where the effect of changes in marginal tax rates on 
labour supply is a particular focus for attention85. In the case of dynamic 
microsimulation the importance of incentive effects is, if anything, even more 
important. Unlike the ‘before’ and ‘after’ snapshots presented by static models, the 
whole point of dynamic modelling is that it looks at the effect of policies over entire 
lifetimes. Hence there is ample time for people to respond to the incentives created by 
policy, and it cannot be argued that the model is only intended to capture the ‘morning 
after’ effects of policy change (as can reasonably be argued for static microsimulation).
83 PENSIM does not model voluntary saving behaviour as such. Rather, third tier provision is allocated 
according to the type of pension scheme an individual is a member of, which in turn is mostly 
determined by their occupational status. To over-simplify, PENSIM’s assumptions about saving 
behaviour result in most members of SERPS or personal pension schemes making low or no voluntary 
pension contributions (with additional savings being allocated randomly), while members of 
occupational schemes are assumed to build up quite large non-statutory entitlements, reflecting the fact 
that the majority of such schemes provide a generous pension of two-thirds final salary.
84 Despite the fact that the UK offers a number of ‘natural experiments’, with the level of second tier 
pension provision fluctuating considerably from zero prior to 1961 to a substantial and comprehensive 
second tier in 1978 (subsequently cut-back), as yet there has been no analysis o f whether contributions to 
different types of pension responded in any systematic way.
85 At present none of the UK’s static microsimulation models -  POLIMOD (the Cambridge University 
model), TAXBEN (the IFS model), IGOTM (the central government model) and PSM (the DSS model) - 
incorporate incentive effects directly within their analysis. However, attempts have been made to link 
TAXBEN to a labour market simulation model (see, for example, Bingley and Walker, 1996 or Gregg, 
Johnson and Reed, 1999), and models have been developed in other countries which explicitly include 
behavioural change within their analysis (see, for example, Gardes, Lhommeau and Starzec, 1998). The 
merits and demerits of introducing incentive effects into static microsimulation are discussed by 
Hancock and Sutherland (1992, pp. 188-190) and by Redmond, Sutherland and Wilson (1998, pp. 7-9).
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However, as with the ‘offset’ problem discussed above, there are major difficulties in 
incorporating incentive effects into the modelling process. For one it is technically 
impossible within the current structure of the model, and attempting to incorporate such 
effects into PENSIM would have been too large a task for this thesis. But perhaps more 
importantly, there are no reliable estimates of how voluntary saving is affected by 
different incentive structures, and hence again assuming ‘no change’ is probably the 
safest option.
Most notably, the fact that the model ignores incentives means it makes no allowance 
for the effect of means testing on saving behaviour. In this respect it therefore under­
estimates the extent to which alternative policies affect pensioner incomes. As is 
discussed extensively in Parts B and C, means testing inevitably creates a problem of 
‘moral hazard’ -  it provides an incentive for people to consume more during their 
working lives (or to save via owner-occupied housing rather than pensions) in order to 
maximise state income in retirement. It is therefore likely to cause a substantial fall in 
voluntary pension saving, as individuals who expect to have a retirement income close 
to or below the level of Income Support have little or no incentive to save. However, 
PENSIM does not capture this effect and hence under-estimates the (downward) effect 
of means testing on pensioner incomes (and, equivalently, under-estimates the extent to 
which receipt of Income Support will rise).
Arguably this problem already invalidates the estimates presented in the last chapter of 
the effects of baseline policy. As set out in Section 2.2, the baseline projection is based 
on the assumption that the basic pension and Income Support will be uprated at 
different rates, causing the gap between the two to steadily widen. This means saving 
disincentives are likely to grow in the future. However, the importance of such 
incentive effect should not be exaggerated, and in reality there are a number of reasons 
why behaviour may not alter too greatly in response to increased means-testing (or will 
only change after a long time-lag):
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• people may disregard, or lack information on, how the benefits system works , or 
may systematically over-estimate their pension rights (and hence ignore means 
tested benefits when they might in fact be relevant);
• couples (who are much less likely to have an income below the level of the means
test; see Table 2.5) may not consider the position of dependants after 
widow(er)hood and their potential eligibility for means-tested benefits;
• more generally individuals may be myopic, and hence ignore the fact that they 
might qualify for additional benefits in the later stages of their retirement (recall the 
tilt towards older pensioners in the pattern for Income Support receipt shown in 
Figure 2.7);
• workers may be unable to adjust the amount they save voluntarily if this operates 
on a collective basis (as is the case with occupational pensions);
• the existence of pension tax reliefs may create counter-incentives which favour 
pension saving87.
In conclusion, PENSIM cannot model incentive effects and hence misses out a 
potentially important influence on incomes in retirement. However, there are few 
reliable estimates of the extent to which real-world saving behaviour responds to 
incentives, and there are good reasons for expecting the response to vary with an 
individual’s circumstances88. It is therefore very difficult to know the magnitude of 
incentive effects, and hence how wrong the baseline is. As Hancock and Sutherland
86 In fact there may be an agency relationship in voluntary pension provision, with individuals relying 
on financial advisers to guide them in their choices. Hence it may be advisers’ knowledge of the benefits 
system which is crucial, in which case there is less (but not no) chance that lack of information will be a 
problem. The guidance from the Financial Services Authority quoted in Section 8.5 suggests that the 
importance of the benefits system is at least recognised by the regulator.
87 The incentive effects of pension tax reliefs on voluntary saving is a topic in its own right, and has 
been analysed extensively (for example in the UK by Dilnot and Johnson, 1993, pp. 20-22; and by Hills, 
1984, Ch. 4; and in the US by Wise, 1987, Section 1.1; Auerbach, 1996, pp. 51-61; and Engen and Gale, 
1996, pp. 104-108). There is not space here to do justice to the various theoretical and empirical issues 
raised, but the conclusion of the most recent OECD review of the evidence is worth quoting in full: “to 
summarise, econometric studies using large micro-data sets on individual households find strong 
evidence that marginal tax rates affect the decision to hold certain assets and liabilities... Governments 
are therefore likely to be able to influence the composition o f household saving by choice o f tax policy, 
even if  there is no clear evidence (which there is not from these studies) that the overall level o f saving 
will be affected” [OECD (1994), p62].
88 Any attempt to incorporate incentive effects into dynamic microsimulation would therefore have to be 
very sophisticated, taking into account numerous factors which are likely to affect how individuals 
respond to means testing. Such a model is not in prospect.
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(1992, p. 189) conclude in the case of static models, assuming no behavioural response 
is probably the safest option. Nevertheless, the problem of incentives should be bome 
in mind, particularly in the next section which looks at a policy of deliberately 
increasing the role of means-tested benefits.
3.2 Targeting: A rapid transition to a ‘minimum income guarantee’
The first model looked at is targeting - a policy of relying on means-tested benefits to 
achieve a minimum retirement income. This was the strategy adopted in 1908 when 
state pension provision was first introduced in the UK, with benefits under Asquith’s 
scheme being limited to people over the age of 70 with incomes below a minimum 
level (see Section 5.1). The equivalent form of provision today is the ‘minimum 
income guarantee’, the government’s term for the means-tested assistance provided to 
pensioners through Income Support89. However, while in 1908 such benefits were the 
only form of state support for pensioners, the development of first and second tier 
provision since then means Income Support now co-exists with the basic pension, 
SERPS and contracted-out rebates. Hence though the current policy regime contains an 
element of targeting, this is far less than would be the case if these other forms of 
provision were abolished or reduced.
This section looks at the effect of deliberately placing more weight on means-tested 
benefits through gradually phasing-out the basic pension. As set out in Section 1A.1, 
because earnings grow faster than prices (by 1.5% a year on average according to the 
Government Actuary), the current policy of uprating the basic pension with prices but 
uprating Income Support with earnings means that something similar to this is already 
taking place. The level of the basic pension is steadily falling relative to earnings, so 
that eventually its value will be ‘nugatory’ (as Michael Portillo once famously put it). 
Even so, as shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 earlier, increases in other sources of income 
mean that the growing gap between the basic pension and the minimum income is not 
projected to result in dramatically increased receipt of Income Support, at least over
89 For clarity, this thesis generally refers to Income Support rather than the minimum income guarantee. 
Their meanings are identical (for pensioners).
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PENSIM’s projection period. Indeed, Income Support’s contribution to pensioners’ 
incomes in 2025 is predicted to be lower than in 1997, and even in 2066 PENSIM’s 
projection suggests that average payments will be only marginally higher than today 
(averaging between couples and singles). If the baseline assumptions were used to 
represent a policy of targeting the (rather counter-intuitive) conclusion that getting rid 
of the basic pension would not increase means-testing could easily be drawn.
However, the important point about the baseline results is that Income Support 
payments are on an upward trend at the end of the projection period, suggesting that if 
the period of analysis were extended even further into the future there would be more 
substantial rises (as the relative value of the basic pension grew ever smaller). Any 
conclusion drawn from the baseline results about the long-run impact of targeting must 
therefore be tentative. Accordingly, this section attempts to get closer to this final 
position by looking at a more radical move in the direction of targeting. Rather than the 
basic pension being slowly phased-out through the policy of price-uprating, as under 
the baseline, the targeting policy looked at here assumes that its nominal (i.e. cash) 
value is frozen, so that the level of benefit provided falls in real terms as well as in 
relation to earnings90. In effect, therefore, this anticipates the eventual position under 
current policies through speeding up the basic pension’s demise, its value declining to 
less than 0.5% of average earnings by 2066 under this policy (assuming inflation 
averages 3.8% p.a., see Section 2.1), compared to around 6% in the baseline. As such 
the results here may give a better idea of the effect of current policies in the very long 
term.
Results for the level and composition of mean pensioner incomes under this policy are 
given in Table 3.1. For convenience the Table misses out earned (and other) income 
and investment income -  income from these sources does not alter under any of the 
options looked at, and hence they do not need to be listed. Income from both sources is, 
though, included in the total income estimates. Note also that results for SERPS, 
occupational and personal pension schemes are reported here even though there is no
90 Note that although the level of the basic pension is frozen in this option, no change to the National 
Insurance earnings limits is assumed i.e. they remain linked to prices. Implicitly, therefore, the analysis 
assumes that the current link between the basic pension and the earnings limits is broken (see also 
Section 2.2).
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change under this policy option; the effect of changes in second tier provision are 
explored in Sections 3.4. and 3.5, and for greater comparability the same format for 
results is used throughout this chapter. Results are only shown for 2066, the final year 
of PENSIM’s expected projection; though it would be possible to provide results for 
other years, focusing on the final year is as close as it is possible to get to looking at the 
full post-reform effects of policy. As with all the other policy options looked at, it is 
assumed that reform takes place in the year 2000 and that pension rights accumulated 
prior to this date are unaffected.
Table 3.1
Effect of targeting on mean pensioner incomes in 2066 
(£ per week, 1999 earnings terms)
Mean weekly 
income: 
singles
Mean weekly 
income: 
couples
Change from  
baseline: 
singles
Change from  
baseline: 
couples
Income Support 17.7 11.8 8.3 8.7
Basic state pension 1.9 3.7 -21.4 -41.7
SERPS 19.2 36.7 0.0 0.0
Personal pensions 14.3 25.8 0.0 0.0
Occupational pensions 58.0 97.2 0.0 0.0
Total (inc. earnings and 
investment income) 148.0 277.1 -13.1 -33.0
As can be seen, the policy of holding the level of the basic pension fixed in nominal 
terms results in a substantial rise in Income Support payments relative to the baseline, 
with average receipt almost doubling among single pensioners and almost trebling 
among couples (the proportion of pensioners claiming Income Support is in Table 3.2). 
Even so, the reduction in the value of the basic pension means that total incomes fall 
considerably under this policy. Couples in particular will be worse-off; this reflects the 
fact that far fewer of them become eligible for Income Support (or increase their 
entitlement) and hence there is less of a compensating increase in means-tested 
payments. But even for single pensioners the rise in Income Support is considerably 
less than the fall in the basic pension; averaging between single and couple pensioners 
the increase in Income Support is around a quarter the decrease in the basic pension.
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The distributional effect o f the policy is illustrated in Figure 3.1, which shows the gross 
incomes in 2066 o f single and couple pensioners under targeting and under baseline 
policy (so that the two distributions may be compared more easily). As with Figure 2.6 
earlier a logarithmic scale is used to emphasise differences at the bottom end.
£ 1 0   , , , , . 1 , . ,------------------------
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
V ingtiles (tw en tie th s  of th e  d istr ib u tio n )
The Figure shows that targeting will have somewhat unusual effects on the pensioner 
income distribution. It is easiest to discuss these effects by focussing solely on single 
pensioners. For the very poorest single pensioners (vingtiles 1-3) the policy results in 
substantial falls in income; as discussed in Section 2.3, the very low incomes estimated 
at the bottom of distribution are accounted for largely by incomplete take-up o f Income 
Support, and the (practical) abolition o f the basic pension under this policy option 
means that pensioners who fail to claim means-tested benefits now have further to fall. 
In contrast, targeting will have very little effect on the incomes o f the next portion of 
the distribution (vingtiles 4-10), where the situation is very similar to baseline policy. 
These are single pensioners who were already eligible for and claiming Income Support 
under baseline policy, and hence who are unaffected by the reduced value o f the basic 
pension (the only change being in the composition o f their income). However, above
Figure 3.1
Distribution of pensioner incomes in 2066 under targeting 
(1999 earnings terms, log scale)
- -  Couples, targeting
Couples, baseline
Singles, targeting
Singles, baseline
£100
£ 1,000
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vingtile 11 individuals remain ineligible for Income Support, and hence the virtual 
abolition of the basic pension results in falls in their gross income. Because the loss is 
the same for all pensioners in absolute terms (practically everyone having full 
entitlement to the basic pension), proportionately losses are smaller at the top of the 
distribution. The pattern for couples is essentially the same, though the fact that 
reliance on Income Support was smaller under baseline policy means that the 
unchanged portion of the income distribution is narrower (vingtiles 2-4).
A number of summary statistics are presented in Table 3.2; for ease of comparison the 
difference with the summary estimates under baseline policy (Table 2.6) are in the last 
two columns. As can be seen, targeting significantly alters both the distribution and 
average level of pensioner incomes. Bearing in mind the fact that the analysis excludes 
any behavioural response to policy change, and hence probably under-estimates receipt 
of Income Support (see section 3.1), the main points arising from the Table are:
• mean and median income is projected to be lower than under baseline policy, 
particularly for couples;
• inequality is projected to be higher; very slightly so on the basis of the 90:10 ratio 
but by rather more if the Gini coefficient is used as a measure;
• the number of people claiming Income Support is projected to rise substantially, 
though remaining below 50% even in the case of single households;
• as measured by both the half mean and half median income standards, pensioner 
poverty is projected to rise.
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Table 3.2
Summary statistics on income distribution in 2066 under targeting
Singles Couples Change from  
baseline: 
singles
Change from  
baseline: 
couples
90:10 ratio 3.4 4.0 +0.2 0.0
Gini coefficient 0.37 0.38 +0.02 +0.03
% below half mean 
income
65% 55% +11% +18%
% below half median 
income
21% 37% +7% +17%
% claiming Income 
Support
44% 28% +10% +15%
Mean net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£134 £242 -£11 -£30
Median net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£91 £157 -£6 -£40
3.3 Basic Income: a Citizen’s Pension
The targeting strategy discussed above can be contrasted with the basic income model 
for pension provision. This ‘ideal type’ moves in the opposite direction to targeting, 
strengthening flat-rate first tier provision in order to reduce (or eradicate) the need for 
means-tested benefits. Though there are currently considerable gaps in the coverage of 
the basic pension (see Section 1A.1), in the future this benefit will conform reasonably 
closely to a basic income as eligibility will approach 100% (Johnson and Stears, 
1996)91. One way of thinking about the basic income model is therefore simply to 
equate it with linking the value of the basic pension to earnings. If the contribution side 
of National Insurance is ignored, which was wholly flat-rate until the late 1950s and 
mostly flat-rate for the following 15 years, this is more-or-less the policy operated in 
the UK between 1925 and 1975.
91 Johnson and Stear’s conclusion is challenged by the fact that eligibility to the full basic pension 
among men has declined slightly in recent years. However, though the Government Actuary predicts that 
the mean basic pension award to men will fall from 98.5 % to 96.5% of the full rate, the predicted 
increase in awards to women, with the mean payment rising from 69% to 89% of the full rate, is the 
more important factor (see GAD, 1999, pp88/9).
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Basic income-type policies have been advocated by a wide variety of authors, including 
Parker (1989, pp. 121-124, and 1996), Salter (1997, p. 10), Vinson (1998), Birch etal 
(1999, pp. 50-51) and Jordan et al (2000, pp. 83-89). The specific policy looked at here 
is the ‘Citizen’s Pension’ proposal put forward by Sutherland (1998). She investigates a 
number of possible schemes: one variant (‘An Adequate Citizen’s Pension’) envisages 
an immediate increase in the level of the basic pension to £90 a week, while another 
(an ‘Age-Related Citizen’s Pension’) increases the basic pension to the level of Income 
Support (the immediate effects of which are analysed using POLIMOD in Section 8.4). 
However, the analysis here is confined to the least generous of Sutherland’s options - 
a ‘Minimal Citizen’s Pension’. Under this variant the current value of the basic pension 
remains unchanged, i.e. the scheme does not attempt to close the existing gap between 
the level of the basic pension and Income Support (which in 1999 was about £10 a 
week at age 65, for a single person with full entitlement) . It does though stop this gap 
from growing over time through linking the value of the basic pension to earnings (so 
that it increases at the same rate as Income Support). Moreover, it also eliminates the 
residual problem that, even in 2066, some people will not qualify for the basic pension 
in full. Rather than benefits being conditioned on individuals’ National Insurance 
record (and hence to a certain extent on their employment history), under the basic 
income model entitlement is based solely on citizenship (or residence). Though 
Sutherland envisages that this move to full entitlement takes place immediately, in the 
analysis below the citizenship principle is introduced slowly through providing 
comprehensive credits for all future years.
The effects of this policy are outlined in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 and Figure 3.2. However, 
before this it is worth emphasising the fact that the analysis assumes second tier 
provision will be unchanged from the baseline. As argued in Jordan et al (2000, pp. ST- 
89), the move to a basic income system could in fact be accompanied by the 
abandonment of compulsory eamings-related provision, so that above the minimum 
provided by the basic pension individuals were free to decide for themselves how much 
to save for retirement. As well as the liberal arguments for this stance (as outlined by 
Beveridge, 1942), phasing-out second tier provision also offers an attractive source of
92 Note also that the scheme makes no attempt to alter the structure of the basic pension to reflect the
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funds for meeting the substantial cost of increasing the basic pension with earnings. 
Indeed, depending on the precise nature of the scheme (a household basic income being 
considerably cheaper than the individualised scheme looked at here), such a policy 
might be self-financing as a package (see Section 8.5). Even so, this possibility is 
ignored -  for greater comparability with the other options (and in accordance with 
Sutherland) second tier provision is left unchanged.
Table 3.3 provides PENSIM’s estimates for the level and composition of mean 
pensioner incomes in 2066 under a basic income (in the same way as Table 3.1 earlier, 
earned/other income and investment income are only shown in the total income row). 
The Table shows that the basic income policy is projected to result in mean pensioner 
income rising substantially, though the increase is rather larger for couples than for 
singles. There are two reasons for this. First is the fact that widow(er)s inherit their 
spouses’ entitlement to the basic pension (if it is higher than their entitlement), causing 
the problem of partial eligibility to be more prevalent amongst women in couples. 
Hence couples gain more from the move to a citizenship basis for eligibility. The 
second and more important reason for the relatively lower gain enjoyed by single 
households is the fact that they have higher eligibility for Income Support under 
baseline policy, and hence more of the additional income from the increased value of 
the basic pension is ‘clawed back’ through reductions in Income Support.
Table 3.3
Effect of a basic income on mean pensioner incomes in 2066 (£ per week, 1999
earnings terms)
Mean weekly 
income: 
singles
Mean weekly 
income: 
couples
Change from  
baseline: 
singles
Change from  
baseline: 
couples
Income Support 0.4 0.0 -9.0 -3.1
Basic state pension 66.7 132.2 43.4 86.9
SERPS 19.2 36.7 0.0 0.0
Personal pensions 14.3 25.8 0.0 0.0
Occupational pensions 58.0 97.2 0.0 0.0
Total (inc. earnings and 
investment income)
195.5 393.8 34.4 83.8
age increments in Income Support, e.g. the 25p increase at age 80 is not assumed to increase.
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The distributional effect of the policy is illustrated in Figure 3.2, which shows the gross 
incomes in 2066 of single and couple pensioners under a basic income and under 
baseline policy. It reiterates the importance of the interaction between Income Support 
and the basic pension. For couples the policy results in all households receiving 
roughly the same absolute increase in income, so that proportionately those at the 
bottom of the income distribution do best while the increase at the top of the 
distribution is negligible. In contrast, for single households the gainers divide into two 
groups. The first group are those pensioners who fail to take-up their Income Support 
entitlement, or who are disqualified on asset grounds, where a basic income results in 
very large gains. The second group are those further up the income distribution who 
failed to qualify for Income Support under the baseline projection, and hence who 
similarly enjoy the full gain from the increase in the basic pension. In between these 
two groups are pensioners receiving Income Support under baseline policy, where 
increases in the basic pension are to a greater-or-lesser extent offset by reduced income 
from means-tested benefits. This effect is at its most acute for vingtiles 3 and 4, but 
more generally it accounts for the fact that the difference between a basic income and 
baseline policy widens between vingtiles 4 and 10 of the single pensioner distribution 
but narrows throughout the distribution for couples (remembering that the Figure uses a 
log scale on the vertical axis).
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Figure 3.2
Distribution of pensioner incomes in 2066 under basic income 
(1999 earnings terms, log scale)
■ ■ — Couples, basic income
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Singles, basic income
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Summary statistics on the effects o f a basic income are presented in Table 3.4. It shows 
that under this policy:
• mean and median income is projected to be substantially higher, particularly for 
couples;
• reliance on Income Support is projected to be more-or-less eliminated;
• poverty is projected to fall dramatically, though a fifth o f single pensioners are 
projected to remain below the half-mean income standard;
• inequality is projected to fall, particularly amongst couple pensioners.
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Table 3.4
Summary statistics on income distribution in 2066 under basic income
Singles Couples Change from  
baseline: 
singles
Change from  
baseline: 
couples
90:10 ratio 3.0 2.9 -0.2 -1.1
Gini coefficient 0.31 0.28 -0.04 -0.08
% below half mean 
income
22% 2% -32% -35%
% below half median 
income
1% 1% -13% -19%
% claiming Income 
Support
6% 0% -29% -13%
Mean net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£175 £348 +£30 +£76
Median net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£135 £277 +£38 +£80
3.4 Social Insurance: restoring the 1975 SERPS legislation
The next ‘ideal type’ is (eamings-related) social insurance. This model for pension 
provision was introduced in the UK in 1975 with the passage of the legislation 
establishing SERPS (prior to this date National Insurance benefits were flat-rate, 
excepting the minor additional benefits provided by the graduated pension scheme; see 
section 1A.2 and 5.2). However, large changes were made to the scheme during the 
1979-1997 Conservative administration, reducing the benefits it provided and shifting 
provision towards the private sector (through introducing the facility to contract-out 
into personal pension schemes). As such, the SERPS scheme currently in operation is a 
scaled-down and partially-privatised version of its former self. Accordingly, this 
section looks at the effect of returning SERPS to its original incarnation. With minor 
variations this is the strategy put forward by Townsend and Walker (1995, pp. 20-25), 
Lynes (1996, pp.28-30), Davies (1993, pp. 86-88) and many others.
On its own modelling the effect of restoring SERPS would not, however, be sufficient 
to capture the full intent of the 1975 legislation. The then Labour government saw the
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new scheme as part of a package, of which a central element was a commitment to
Q -J
increasing the basic pension with earnings (see Section 5.2) . It was never intended 
that the benefits provided by SERPS would operate in conjunction with a price-linked 
basic pension as is currently the case. As well as restoring SERPS to its original 
formulation the analysis below also links the value of the basic pension to earnings (as 
in the last section, though with no move to full eligibility).
Modelling the effects of the original SERPS scheme is no easy matter. In particular, as 
PENSIM was constructed after the 1986 Pension Act was passed, there is no facility 
within the model for capturing the effect of the 20 best years formula contained in the 
1975 legislation (see Section 1 A.2). However, it is possible to mimic the effect of this 
simply through raising the accrual rate -  though these provisions were intended to 
assist people with intermittent employment histories (mostly women), it is just as likely 
that higher earners with steeper earning trajectories over their careers would have 
benefited. The Government Actuary (1982, pp 36-37) estimated that the effect of the 20 
best years rule would be to increase the average SERPS entitlement of men by 35% and 
of women by 65%. Hence rather than increasing the SERPS accrual rate from 20% to 
25% (its ‘headline’ rate under the 1975 legislation), the original scheme was modelled 
through continuing to calculate benefits on the basis of average lifetime earnings but 
using an accrual rate of 35%. Note therefore that this assumption is on the low side -  it 
assumes that the majority of SERPS benefits go to men and hence that the effect of the 
20 best years formula is to increase benefits by 40% on average (25% x 1.4 = 35%). 
Other changes to SERPS’ benefit formula are, however, not included94.
93 In fact the policy which the 1974-79 government eventually adopted, after the passing of the ‘Rooker- 
Wise’ amendment, was to uprate benefits in line with the higher of earnings or prices. However, though 
the macro-economic assumptions used in PENSIM mimic the business cycle through varying the rate of 
inflation (see Section 2.1), at no point do earnings grow slower than prices. Hence there is no way of 
modelling the effect of the ‘higher of earnings or prices’ formula. Moreover, it is unlikely that this 
formula would have been sustainable due to its (upward) ratchet effect on the value of benefits, and at 
some point a move to an alternative formula was in any case likely (see Bradshaw and Lynes, 1995, pp. 
37-51, for a discussion of some possibilities).
94 Note in particular that provision for widows is unchanged from the baseline where, in accordance 
with the Conservatives' 1986 legislation, entitlement to a spouse’s additional pension is halved from 
April 2000. Though the timing of the reform has since been altered, with introduction now expected in 
October 2002 (see DSS, 2000c, p2), the reform essentially remains in place and the computer code 
underlying the model has not been altered to reflect this small delay. No attempt has been made to 
change the code to look at the effect of returning to the level of generosity originally envisaged.
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An additional change to SERPS was also made. Though the 1975 legislation included 
contracting-out this was restricted to defined-benefit occupational schemes (which 
could match SERPS’ promise of guaranteed benefits). The analysis therefore assumes 
that under this reform contracting-out into personal pensions is abolished and, in 
consequence, the number of people contracted-in to SERPS rises.
Finally the earning limits need to be considered. Under the 1975 legislation the level of 
basic pension and the National Insurance earning limits were linked (see Section 1 A.2), 
hence the change in policy to eamings-uprating the basic pension should mean the 
contribution limits also rising at this rate. But in the analysis in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 it 
was assumed that the earning limits were not affected by changes in the uprating basis 
for the basic pension. The main estimates of the effect of social insurance in Table 3.5 
follow this convention. However, some proposals based on the social insurance model, 
e.g. the plan put forward by Lynes (1996, p. 19), explicitly envisage the LEL and UEL 
also being re-linked to earnings (indeed Lynes suggests that the UEL should be 
returned to its 1975 level of 150% of average earnings). So that the effect of the full 
eamings-link could be examined the policy was therefore run again with all parts of the 
National Insurance system rising with earnings. Results for this variant are in Table 3.6
Table 3.5
Effect of social insurance on mean pensioner incomes in 2066 (£ per week, 1999
earnings terms)
Mean weekly 
income: 
singles
Mean weekly 
income: 
couples
Change from  
baseline: 
singles
Change from  
baseline: 
couples
Income Support 1.3 0.1 -8.1 -3.0
Basic state pension 63.2 123.7 39.9 78.3
SERPS 34.2 72.5 15.0 35.8
Personal pensions 8.0 13.7 -6.3 -12.0
Occupational pensions 76.8 127.8 18.8 30.6
Total (inc. earnings and 
investment income)
220.4 439.7 59.3 129.7
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Table 3.6
Effect of social insurance plus earnings-linked LEL and UEL on mean pensioner 
incomes in 2066 (£ per week, 1999 earnings terms)
Mean weekly 
income: 
singles
Mean weekly 
income: 
couples
Change from  
price-linked 
UEL and 
LEL: singles
Change from  
price-linked 
UEL and 
LEL: couples
Income Support 1.7 0.1 0.4 0.0
Basic state pension 62.1 120.9 -1.1 -2.8
SERPS 33.3 70.5 -0.9 -2.0
Personal pensions 8.0 13.7 0.0 0.0
Occupational pensions 92.2 150.1 15.4 22.2
Total (inc. earnings and 
investment income)
234.3 457.2 13.9 17.5
The Tables show that the effect of social insurance on first tier provision is similar to 
the basic income model looked at in the last section -  income from the basic pension 
goes up (but not by quite as much as there is no increase in eligibility) and there is a 
compensating reduction in Income Support (though again not by quite as much in this 
case). It is also worth noting that when the full eamings-link is modelled (i.e. when the 
LEL and UEL are also linked to earnings) income from the basic pension is one step 
lower again, and the compensating reduction in Income Support is similarly slightly 
smaller. This reflects the effect of the qualifying conditions for the basic pension - 
people who do not qualify for credits but are earning less than the LEL miss out on 
entitlement.
The changes in income from SERPS, occupational and personal pensions shown in the 
Tables demonstrate how the split between public and private provision works in a 
rather different way under social insurance. Income from personal pensions declines 
dramatically, not only because contracted-out rebates are no longer paid into such 
schemes but also because it is impossible to model an increase in the number of people 
opted-in to SERPS without also assuming that these individuals give up their personal 
pensions95. However, this does not mean that overall income from private pensions
95 The reduction in income from personal pensions therefore reflects an implied fall in voluntary third- 
tier provision. It is impossible to know whether, in reality, individuals would continue contributing to 
personal pensions if they were no longer contracted-out.
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falls, as the decline in personal pensions is more than outweighed by the growth in 
occupational pension income (reflecting the higher rebates individuals in these schemes 
now receive). Note also that occupational pension income goes up considerably when 
the earning limits rise with earnings (Table 3.6), reflecting the fact that most people 
with above average earnings are in such schemes.
The distributional effect of social insurance (with no change in the earning limits) is 
shown in Figure 3.3. The picture it presents is also similar to that described in the last 
section for a basic income (see Figure 3.5 later). The main difference is at the top of the 
income distribution, where the effects of the increase in second tier provision can be 
seen most clearly. This is illustrated again in Table 3.7, which presents summary 
statistics. It shows that under social insurance mean income will rise by more than 
median income, the inverse of the pattern under a basic income. Indeed, mean income 
for both singles and couples increases by around 50% more under social insurance than 
under a basic income, and the cost of this model is therefore equivalently larger (see 
Section 4.3). However, comparing Tables 3.7 and 3.4 shows that this extra spending 
produces almost no gain in terms of reduced reliance on Income Support or lower 
pensioner poverty, but does result in higher inequality amongst pensioners (though as 
with a basic income it should be noted that the effect of the higher taxes needed to 
finance benefits is ignored).
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Figure 3.3
Distribution of pensioner incomes in 2066 under social insurance (with no change
in the LEL and UEL)
(1999 earnings terms, log scale)
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Table 3.7
Summary statistics on income distribution in 2066 under social insurance (with no
change in the LEL and UEL)
Singles Couples Change from 
baseline: 
singles
Change from 
baseline: 
couples
90:10 ratio 3.2 3.1 0.0 -0.9
Gini coefficient 0.31 0.35 -0.04 -0.01
% below half mean 
income
20% 3% -34% -34%
% below half median 
income
2% 1% -12% -19%
% claiming Income 
Support
7% 0% -27%) -13%
Mean net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£191 £376 +£46 +£104
Median net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£142 £288 +£45 +£91
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3.5 Compulsory Saving: the Basic Pension Plus proposals
Just before losing office in May 1997 the outgoing Conservative government put 
forward radical proposals to fund the basic pension and to replace SERPS with a 5% 
compulsory contribution to a private pension scheme (see Lilley, 1997, for a full 
description of the proposals). This section looks at the effect of the plan to replace 
SERPS with compulsory saving (at the rate of 5%). Because the proposal to fund the 
basic pension was concerned solely with financing, its aim being to move the scheme 
onto a funded rather than a PAYG basis, there is no need to model this part of the 
proposals -  we can simply assume that income from the basic pension remains the 
same as in the baseline96.
These ‘Basic Pension Plus’ proposals are representative of the view that public pension 
schemes should be replaced by compulsory payments into individual accounts. The 
World Bank (1994, pp. 201-231) endorses a version of this approach, and it has also 
featured prominently in the US debate on pension reform (see, for instance, Feldstein, 
1996, pp. 11-13). A key decision in such compulsory saving schemes is what level of 
mandatory contributions is appropriate. In many countries (e.g. the US) it is generally 
assumed that the object of the exercise is to replace the benefits provided by the 
existing state scheme, and the contribution rate therefore largely depends on what 
interest rate is assumed97. However, in the UK the debate has been framed without 
reference to a particular level of benefits to be achieved. Jupp (1998, pp. 16-17) 
investigates the effect of different levels of compulsory saving and, in particular, the 
extent to which higher rates of compulsion reduce reliance on means tested benefits. He 
finds that unless the compulsory saving rate is high (10% or over) there will still be 
continued reliance on means testing. This reflects the fact that the pensions produced
96 The proposal in the Conservative’s September 2000 ‘pre-manifesto’ to allow people to receive basic 
pension rebates bears some similarity to this element of the Basic Pension Plus. In the new plans, 
however, rather than everyone under a certain age being forced to opt-out of the basic pension 
individuals will be free to decide between public and private provision.
97 The reform plan put forward by Governor Bush as part of his 2000 election campaign well illustrates 
this point. Essentially the plan aims to maintain current benefits without increasing contributions through 
diverting 2% of the payroll tax to individual accounts. Economic opinion on whether this will work is 
divided: see Feldstein and Samwick (2000, p. 20) for a supporting view and Aaron, Blinder, Munnell and 
Orszag (2000, p. 12) for a contrary view. However, the key point for the analysis here is that both sides 
take it as read that current benefits should be maintained.
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by compulsory saving directly reflect individuals’ lifetime earnings, as contributions 
are a fixed proportion of earnings, and hence low lifetime earners only receive small 
pension benefits.
The results in Table 3.8 broadly confirm Jupp’s finding - there is very little reduction 
in Income Support as a result of the change to compulsory saving at a level of 5%. But 
even more noticeable is the fact that compulsory saving at this level has very little 
effect on overall incomes. In fact this is not surprising -  as set out in Section 1 A.2, 
contracted-out rebates under SERPS are currently equivalent to 4.6% of earnings, so 
the change in the size of second tier provision is small. The real effect of compulsory 
saving is therefore not on the level of pensioner incomes but on their composition. 
Income from SERPS will be very nearly zero by 2066 while income from personal 
pensions rises commensurately, reflecting the fact that from the year 2000 (the chosen 
reform date) everyone is assumed to be contracted out. The additional increase in 
income from personal pensions is accounted for by the increase in the compulsory 
contribution rate to 5%.
Table 3.8
Effect of compulsory saving on mean pensioner incomes in 2066 (£ per week, 1999
earnings terms)
Mean weekly 
income: 
singles
Mean weekly 
income: 
couples
Change from  
baseline: 
singles
Change from  
baseline: 
couples
Income Support 7.6 2.2 -1.8 -0.9
Basic state pension 23.3 45.4 0.0 0.0
SERPS 3.3 3.9 -15.9 -32.8
Personal pensions 36.1 63.7 21.9 38.0
Occupational pensions 58.0 97.3 0.0 0.0
Total (inc. earnings and 
investment income)
165.3 314.5 4.3 4.4
The distributional effect of compulsory saving is shown in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.9. 
They show that there is very little difference between baseline policy and compulsory 
saving: mean and median income go up slightly while the proportion of pensioners 
claiming Income Support falls slightly, as does the proportion living below half mean 
income. The changes in inequality are too small to be significant. Overall the
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conclusion is that this kind o f reform is more concerned with altering the timing o f 
public expenditure, bringing forward spending through ensuring that everyone is 
contracted-out, than with altering pensioner incomes (see Section 4.3).
Figure 3.4
Distribution of pensioner incomes in 2066 under compulsory saving 
(1999 earnings terms, log scale)
• • — Couples, compulsory saving
£1,000
Couples, baseline
Singles, compulsory savings
Singles, baseline
£100
£10
10 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 201 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11
V ingtiles (tw en tie th s  of th e  d istribu tion)
Table 3.9
Summary statistics on income distribution in 2066 under compulsory saving
Singles Couples Change from 
baseline: 
singles
Change from 
baseline: 
couples
90:10 ratio 3.1 4.0 -0.1 0.0
Gini coefficient 0.35 0.35 -0.01 -0.01
% below half mean 
income
49% 34% -5% -3%
% below half median 
income
11% 16% -3% -4%
% claiming Income 
Support
29% 11% -5% -2%
Mean net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£149 £276 +£4 +£4
Median net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£104 £202 +£7 +£4
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3.6 Conclusion
This section gathers together the information presented earlier so that the four options 
may be compared with each other. Results are in Tables 3.10 and 3.11 and Figure 3.5. 
In all cases estimates are shown separately for singles and couples and are for 2066.
Table 3.10
Components of mean pensioner income in 2066 under different options (£ per
week, 1999 earnings terms)
Singles Baseline Targeting Basic
income
Social
insurance
Compulsory
saving
Earnings/other 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
Investment income 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5 34.5
Occupational pensions 58.0 58.0 58.0 76.8 58.0
Personal pensions 14.3 14.3 14.3 8.0 36.1
SERPS 19.2 19.2 19.2 34.2 3.3
Basic state pension 23.3 1.9 66.7 63.2 23.3
Income Support 9.4 17.7 0.4 1.3 7.6
Gross income 161.1 148.0 195.5 220.4 165.3
Couples
Eamings/other 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4 43.4
Investment income 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5
Personal pensions 25.8 25.8 25.8 13.7 63.7
Occupational pensions 97.2 97.2 97.2 127.8 97.2
SERPS 36.7 36.7 36.7 72.5 3.9
Basic state pension 45.4 3.7 132.2 123.7 45.4
Income Support 3.1 11.8 0.0 0.1 2.2
Gross income 310.1 277.1 393.8 439.7 314.5
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Figure 3.5 
Distributional effects of reform options 
A. Single households
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B. Couple households
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Table 3.11
Summary income distribution statistics in 2066 under different options
Singles Baseline Targeting Basic
income
Social
insurance
Compulsory
saving
90:10 ratio 3.2 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.1
Gini coefficient 0.35 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.35
% below half mean 
income
54% 65% 22% 20% 49%
% below half median 
income
14% 21% 1% 2% 11%
% claiming Income 
Support
34% 44% 6% 7% 29%
Mean net income ( per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£145 £134 £175 £191 £149
Median net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£97 £91 £135 £142 £104
Couples
90:10 ratio 4.0 4.0 2.9 3.1 4.0
Gini coefficient 0.36 0.38 0.28 0.35 0.35
% below half mean 
income
37% 55% 2% 3% 34%
% below half median 
income
20% 37% 1% 1% 16%
% claiming Income 
Support
13% 28% 0% 0% 11%
Mean net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£272 £242 £348 £376 £276
Median net income (per 
week, 1999 earnings)
£197 £157 £277 £288 £202
The effects of each policy have already been summarised in earlier sections. However, 
it is worth re-capping the main results in the light of the Tables above:
• Targeting significantly reduces mean pensioner income but protects the position of 
poorer pensioners claiming Income Support (though not the very poorest -  those 
who fail to take up their entitlement to means-tested benefits).
• A basic income eradicates means testing, alleviates most pensioner poverty, and 
reduces inequality amongst pensioners to some extent (though failing to reverse 
completely the increase in inequality since 2000, see Table 2.6).
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• Social insurance has similar effects to a basic income, through it gives more money 
to richer pensioners and hence results in a larger increase in mean income and a 
smaller reduction in inequality.
• Compulsory saving (at a rate of 5%) has a large effect on the composition of 
pensioner incomes (less income from SERPS and more from personal pensions) but 
very little effect on the overall level and distribution of gross incomes.
A final point on the various comparisons should also be made. This chapter has looked 
at the effect of policies on pensioner incomes; it has been an analysis of the distribution 
of benefits. However, it has not in any sense provided a cost-benefit analysis of the 
options. Indeed, cost has not even been mentioned. This means a skewed picture has 
been presented. For instance, targeting looks like the ‘worst’ option -  it does least to 
limit pensioner poverty, reduce inequality etc. However, in terms of value-for-money it 
could be argued that targeting represents the best deal on offer -  it costs very little 
(additional income from Income Support amounts to only a quarter of reduced income 
from the basic pension) but manages to ensure that almost all pensioners have an 
income at or above the minimum standard (the exception being those who fail to take 
up their entitlement to benefit). The converse of this is that, in value-for-money terms, 
the basic income and social insurance models are much less effective than they appear 
to be in the Tables. Though both achieve substantial reductions in pensioner poverty 
they only do so by ‘throwing money at the problem’. Social insurance, in particular, is 
very expensive -  it costs 50% more than the basic income model to achieve roughly the 
same fall in poverty and a smaller decrease in inequality.
Why, it might be asked, would governments choose to spend so much on pension 
provision when targeted benefits can more-or-less achieve their minimum income 
objective, and at far lower expense? One reason is that governments do not only aim to 
prevent poverty in retirement -  they may also intervene in pension provision to protect 
individuals’ accustomed living standards (see Section 1.3 and Chapter 7). Another is 
that though targeted benefits are cheap in public spending terms, they may have serious 
economic repercussions (see Section 8.1). A third is that while targeting may alleviate 
most poverty, the problem of incomplete take-up means that it still leaves pockets of 
extreme poverty. But perhaps most of all, though, pension reform is not a mechanistic,
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technical process but a live political debate where ideologies, voter preferences, 
economics and social policy all mix (see Chapter 9). To give a better idea of the value- 
for-money of each option the next chapter therefore analyses the public finance effects 
of each option.
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4. A generational accounting perspective
This chapter turns to the other aspect of pension reform evaluated in this thesis, namely 
how current and alternative pension policies affect the public finances. As the title of 
this chapter indicates, this question is closely related to the issue of how pensions affect 
the distribution of resources between generations (indeed, the estimates presented in 
this chapter are based on a technique known as ‘generational accounting’). However, as 
Section 4.1 discusses, the idea that policy should attempt to achieve generational 
equality is problematic, and it is not clear why so much of the pension reform debate 
(particularly in the US) has taken a generational standpoint. Far more attractive is the 
idea that policy should be sustainable, in the sense that tax revenue should be 
sufficient to finance long term expenditure plans rather them rising (or falling) in line 
with spending. In contrast to generational equality, this policy goal may be justified on 
efficiency grounds, without appealing to equity concerns (see below for why). After 
Section 4.1 this chapter is therefore solely concerned with fiscal sustainability, and 
issues connected with the distribution of resources between generations are ignored.
As with the analysis of future pensioner incomes in Chapters 2 and 3, the starting point 
for looking at the public finance effects of pension reform options is to develop a 
baseline projection for current policy. This is the job of Section 4.2. Confirming the 
analyses of Hills (1997, Figure 3.6) and Ross (1998, p. 54), it shows that the current 
policy of linking the basic pension to prices will cause public spending on pensions to 
fall over the course of the next half century (as a proportion of GDP), despite the fact 
that the pensioner population will grow. However, this will be offset by the rising cost 
of health-care, so that taking into account all the costs of demographic change current 
tax rates are broadly in line with the ‘sustainable tax burden’ needed to balance the 
government’s books in the long term. The baseline estimate against which the ‘ideal 
type’ policies can be measured is therefore that current fiscal policy is about right -  if 
taxes are held constant there will be just enough revenue to meet expected future 
expenditure. Section 4.3 then turns to the public finance effects of the four ‘ideal 
types’: targeting, basic income, social insurance and compulsory saving98.
98 As the object of interest here is one number -  the sustainable tax burden -  it is possible to look at all
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However, as Section 4.4 discusses, there are numerous problems with generational 
accounting which suggest they should be “handled with great care”, as Buiter (1995, 
abstract) puts it. For convenience these problems are arranged into eight sub-headings. 
Section 4.5 then turns to the policy issue with which generational accounting is most 
closely associated, namely whether public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions should be 
moved onto a funded basis (‘privatised’), with pension benefits being financed out of 
accumulated assets rather than by transfers from workers. It concludes that while there 
are arguments in favour of funded provision, it is not clear that the benefits of funding 
will be larger than alternative policy options (such as reducing public debt). A 
summary of the analysis in this chapter is in Section 4.6.
4.1  What is generational accounting?
As first set out by Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) and Kotlikoff (1992), 
generational accounting is a technique which allows analysts to measure the solvency 
of the public finances and the extent of redistribution between different generations. 
This chapter is based on the February 2000 version of the National Institute for Social 
and Economic Research’s (NIESR) generational accounting model, the only such 
model for the UK, available at www.generationalaccounting.com and described in 
Cardarelli, Sefton and Kotlikoff (2000, pp. 550-561, CSK hereafter).
The model works through constructing a set of ‘generational accounts’, defined as the 
present value of net taxes (taxes paid minus transfer payments or services received) that 
different age cohorts are expected to pay over their remaining lifetimes". These 
accounts can then be used to investigate the fiscal and generational effects of policy. As 
their name suggests, most obviously generational accounts can be used to investigate
four options in one section; a lengthy discussion of their effects (as in Chapter 3) is not required.
99 The computational methods and data used in the model are described in full in CSK. However, in 
brief the model works through apportioning taxes and benefits by age on the basis o f survey data, and 
then using demographic projections to calculate how much each cohort will pay in and receive back. 
These future flows of receipts and payments are then discounted to present value terms so that the 
position of each cohort can be compared (the importance of this discount rate assumption is highlighted 
in Section 4.4).
115
whether existing policy implies future generations will end up ‘paying for’ current 
generations, in the sense that they will face a higher lifetime net tax burden (in present 
value terms), or whether there is something closer to generational balance (i.e. equal 
net payments from each cohort). However, it should be noted that the issue in hand is 
not whether there is a cohort of ‘winners’ amongst currently alive generations100. 
Rather, the focus of attention is on the (complete) generational account of current new­
borns and the (complete) accounts of future (yet-to-be-bom) cohorts, the notional 
‘future new-born’ representing the discounted accounts of infinite future generations. 
The difference between the accounts of current and future newborns is known as the 
intergenerational balance gap (IGG)101.
Estimates of the generational effect of policy therefore rely on projections of future 
spending and revenue and on how both are apportioned by cohort. However, it is also 
possible to ignore the generational incidence of policy and focus solely on the estimates 
for aggregate spending and revenue, which can be combined to produce a measure of 
the fiscal sustainability of policy. In other words, instead of analysing generational 
(im)balance, the technique of generational accounting can be used to look at a rather 
different question: whether, at current tax rates, the government will be able to meet 
expected future spending demands. The object of attention in this instance is therefore 
the intertemporal budget gap (IBG), the present value of the difference between the 
government’s expected revenue and spending streams. As shown below, this measure 
can usefully be expressed in terms of the immediate and permanent change in taxation 
necessary to close the gap, this being the smallest change in taxation needed for the 
state to remain solvent over the long term102. Under a set of fairly weak assumptions it
100 For attempts to calculate the generational accounts of currently alive cohorts in the UK see Hills 
(1995, pp. 43-60) or, for a rather different kind of assessment, Johnson and Falkingham (1988, pp. 140- 
144). It should be noted that the concerns in these papers were rather different from those in Kotlikoff 
(1992) - the interest sprang from the desire to calculate whether there was a ‘selfish generation’ in the 
UK, in the same way as Thomson (1989, pp. 38-47) argues there is in New Zealand (the big winners 
being the cohorts bom in the immediate post-war era). Both studies found little evidence that such a 
generation exists in the UK.
101 Formally, the intergenerational balance gap is defined by CSK (p. 553) as “the difference between 
the government’s bills and the present value o f net taxes it would collect from current and future 
generations assuming that future generations are treated exactly like the current new-born”. Note, 
therefore, that this definition means policy could be such that future and current new-borns are in balance 
with each other (i.e. a zero IGG) but out of balance with generations alive today.
102 As shown in CSK, if action is delayed then the required increase in taxation needed to close any 
(positive) IBG will be larger. This simply reflects the fact that by delaying the point at which higher
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can also be shown that moving immediately to this sustainable tax rate (i.e. the tax rate 
which just closes the IBG) is also the most efficient means for the government to 
finance any given expenditure stream, as it will minimise the labour-leisure distortions 
associated with raising revenue.
Nevertheless, in most exercises in generational accounting it is the IGG which is used 
as the main summary measure of ‘the problem’. Implicitly, therefore, such analysis is 
based on the idea that governments have a duty to promote generational equality 
(‘balance’), and hence should adopt policies which rectify the ‘unfairness’ of some 
generations making larger net contributions to the state than others. However, it is not 
clear that this objective is sensible.
Objections to the IGG
One objection to focusing on the IGG is philosophical: why should generational 
equality be favoured over some other distribution of resources between the 
generations? At one extreme it might be argued that, because in an era of economic 
growth later generations have more resources than earlier generations, it is fair for 
future generations to bear a larger burden of costs (proportionately, as well as
tabsolutely) . According to this point of view an imbalance in the generational 
accounts is therefore welfare-enhancing, and hence to be welcomed. Conversely, as 
Rawls (1972) points out, a utilitarian conception would lead to transfers from old to 
young, as maximising aggregate welfare over all generations requires maximising
revenues start coming in more revenue must be raised in every post-reform year to pay for a given 
pattern of future spending. Procrastination therefore raises the required tax increase by shortening the 
number of years over which extra revenue can be raised.
103 This sort of reasoning is well illustrated by Labour’s 1957 policy document National 
Superannuation (see Section 5.2, esp. quote). However, as highlighted by Disney (1996, pp. 41 and 60), 
there is clearly a danger here of creating a ‘Ponzi game’ (i.e. a pyramid banking scheme), where 
successive generations pass on an ever-growing burden of debt (in the form of PAYG pension promises). 
By definition, such games are unsustainable. Less dramatically, there is also a question of political 
sustainability. If it is possible for future generations to renege on pension promises (i.e. to cut benefits) 
then unfair generational contracts may be self-defeating, and it might be in the best interests of each 
generation to limit the burden they pass on to future generations (e.g. to the same level as they inherited 
from past generations). Hence it can be argued that generational equality is desirable because it is an 
optimal political strategy, even if there is no moral imperative to achieve such an outcome.
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investment and hence demanding “heavy sacrifices o f the poorer generations fo r  the 
sake o f greater advantages for later ones that are far better off” (Rawls 1972 p287)104.
One difficulty with looking at the accounts in generational terms is therefore that 
generational equity cannot automatically be equated with generational equality. On top 
of this, however, there is also the problem that generations’ life experiences vary, and 
hence discrimination in favour of particular cohorts might be justified as 
‘compensation’ for other factors or events. For instance, in his analysis of the 
generational accounts of currently alive cohorts Hills (1995a, p61) comments:
“In the case o f the British welfare state, those bom in the early years o f the 
century... end up as clear net gainers. Given that they lived through the 
Depression o f the 1930s and were the generation who had to fight the Second 
World War, it might be thought churlish to begrudge them this gain; after all, 
inter-generational equity is not just about the welfare state. ”
Admittedly, because by definition we cannot predict shocks (such as wars), this type of 
factor does not affect analysis of new-born and future cohorts, and hence does not 
affect the kind of generational accounts produced by CSK. But even so, the notion that 
generations are ‘bom equal’ is inherently unprovable, and hence the IGG will always 
be a rather loaded measure. In particular, by putting the emphasis on differences in the 
treatment of generations it creates the false impression that generational equality is an 
accepted objective for policy, and/or accords with well-worn principles of 
distributional justice. Though generational equality may be one interpretation of 
Rawls’s ‘just savings’ principle, it is far from being the only possible interpretation 
(Daniels, 1989, pp. 69-70). Moreover, intentionally or otherwise, focusing on the IGG 
shifts attention onto the extent of redistribution from young to old and away from the 
more obvious (and more important) issue of how policy affects redistribution between 
rich and poor105.
104 More generally Rawls questions the assertion that in making a decision to sacrifice current 
consumption for the benefit o f future generations it is the financial wealth of society in the future, rather 
than the social or physical environment which they will inherit, which should be the focus of attention: 
“The just savings principle can be regarded as an understanding between generations to carry their fa ir  
share o f the burden o f realising and preserving a just society.... Justice does not require that earlier 
generations save so that later ones are simply more wealthy ” (Rawls, 1972, pp. 289-290). See also 
Attias-Donfut and Arber (2000, pp. 11-16) and Daniels (1989).
105 Barr (2000, p l7) raises a further objection to focusing on the IGG: “a definition o f equity based on 
generations rather than individuals opens an ambiguity; with generations o f varying sizes, equal treatment 
of generations by definition means unequal treatment o f individuals, and vice versa".
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Uses for the IBG
In contrast, there is a clear rationale for using the IBG to look at issues surrounding 
fiscal sustainability. On one level this simply reflects the fact if spending is going to 
rise in the future it is better to know about it now, either so that individuals and 
government’s can become used to the idea that taxes will need to go up, or so that 
policy makers can take action to avoid increases (for instance through cutting benefits). 
In this sense therefore the purpose of calculating the IBG is to help planning, through 
providing a summary measure of how demographic change and other long-term trends 
will affect spending. However, as well as being a useful tool for describing policy, the 
IBG can also be used more directly in the formation of fiscal policy. In particular, it can 
be used to derive the ‘sustainable tax burden’ -  the level of taxation which, if held 
constant, will just cover future expenditure demands. Hence the IBG not only shows 
how far taxes are below/ above their long run level, it also has a more direct message: 
to minimise the distortionary effects of raising revenue (equivalently, to optimise the 
welfare effects of policy) the tax burden should be set at the sustainable level 
immediately106.
Explaining why this is so requires a quick digression onto optimal tax theory. Assume 
that all spending is financed from a tax on earnings, so that the effect of raising revenue 
is to alter the choice between labour and leisure, and that this wage tax is proportional 
to income (i.e. flat)107. As shown by Browning (1987, following Harberger, 1964), 
given standard assumptions about labour supply etc., the deadweight cost (D) of a wage 
tax may be computed by
D = 0.5 e (t2/l-t)wL
106 Focussing on the sustainable tax rate also has the important analytical advantage of allowing the 
fiscal effects of alternative policies to be described through one number, rather than through a schedule 
of how costs and savings evolve over time. Moreover, it also reflects actuarial practice for describing the 
cost of alterations to funded or notionally funded pension schemes (see, e.g., Goss, 1997, Table 1).
107 This is in order to simplify the analysis; in fact the argument holds under the less restrictive 
assumption that the structure of taxation remains constant over time.
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where 8 represents the compensated elasticity of labour supply evaluated at the net-of- 
tax wage rate (w), and L is the amount of labour supplied at tax rate (t). If reliable 
estimates of L and (far more problematically) e are available than this formula may be 
used to estimate the overall efficiency cost of taxation (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, 
pp. 454-456). However, for these purposes the important point is that the deadweight 
cost of taxation is related to the square of the tax rate, i.e. the distortion in the
i n&labour/leisure choice rises more than proportionately with increases in tax . It 
follows, therefore, that the deadweight cost of meeting any particular spending stream 
through varying the tax rate over time (for instance, in line with spending patterns) will 
be greater than the deadweight cost associated with holding it constant at its sustainable 
level109. Accordingly, to minimise the deadweight cost of taxation (equivalently, to 
maximise the welfare-enhancing effects of policy) governments should seek to smooth 
tax rates by holding them constant at the sustainable rate and using changes in public 
debt (and hence in the future cost of debt interest payments) to compensate for 
variations in spending around this level (Barro, 1979, p. 944; Flemming, 1987, pp. 380- 
384).
Figure 4.1 illustrates how such an optimal policy would work. It shows a stylised 
pattern for future public expenditure where in period one (the next 20 years) spending 
remains constant, in period 2 (the following 30 years) there is a large rise in spending, 
and in period 3 (50 years hence and beyond) a steady-state is reached. The revenue 
streams associated with two alternative frameworks for fiscal policy are illustrated: a 
‘sustainable tax’ regime where revenue is constant throughout, and a ‘PAYG’ regime 
where revenue follows spending110. Though both of these keep the state solvent, the 
argument here is that the sustainable tax regime is to be preferred because, measured 
across the entire period, it minimises the overall deadweight cost of raising revenue111.
108 By way of example, if 8  =1 and WL =200, then for values of t of 0 .3 ,0 .4 , 0.5 and 0.6, D =13, 27, 50 
and 90; i.e. D rises more than proportionately with increases in t.
109 Intuitively, this is because the additional deadweight cost associated with the period when taxes are 
above the sustainable rate is greater than the gain during the period in which they are below it.
110 Note that in order for debt to be a constant proportion of GDP tax revenue need not equal spending -  
because of GDP growth operating a balanced-budget reduces the relative size of the public debt over 
time, and hence a constant debt/GDP ratio implies continued (modest) borrowing.
111 This is a slight simplification. Holding tax revenue constant over time will only be the optimal
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However, as can be seen, in order for this to be possible very large changes in the stock 
of public debt are required, with debt falling from 80% to just 3% of GDP under the 
stylised example shown in the Figure. This will in turn mean that the cost o f debt 
interest payments is reduced to close to zero, thereby offsetting demographically- 
induced increases in spending on benefits and services. The next section goes on to 
look at whether the prognosis for the UK accords with the Figure.
Figure 4.1
Stylised comparison of optimal tax policy and PAYG policy
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4.2 Baseline results
The only existing analysis o f the UK’s generational accounts is provided by CSK, and 
the baseline assumptions used here are identical to those adopted in their exercise, save 
in three respects. By far and away the most important o f these exceptions relates to the
policy if  the size o f the tax base and structure o f  taxation are fixed -  the analysis o f optimal taxation 
relates to tax rates, not revenue. The fact that, in reality, demographic change also affects the tax system, 
and hence constant tax rate implies variations in tax revenue, is illustrated in the next section when the 
sustainable tax burden for the UK is calculated.
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way in which future revenue is estimated -  it is assumed here that revenue from 
National Insurance Contributions (NICs) will grow at the same rate as income tax (i.e.
119in line with GDP) , while CSK assume that revenue from NICs will grow in line with 
benefit spending. The reasons behind this change are discussed further below. Before 
this, though, the two other changes should be set out. Both of these are relatively minor 
and only affect the way the model analyses the pension system.
Spending
The first change is that the analysis here is based on the assumption that Income 
Support for pensioners will be uprated in line with earnings (as in the baseline 
described in Section 2.2), while CSK’s baseline assumed that all benefits would be 
uprated with prices. Accordingly, the projection for spending on Income Support here 
is rather higher than that incorporated in CSK’s analysis. However, it should also be 
noted that CSK’s projection for Income Support is itself slightly different from the one 
used in an earlier version of their paper (Cardarelli, Sefton and Kotlikoff, 1998). This 
reflects the fact that the more recent version of CSK’s paper uses PENSIM to calculate 
spending on this benefit113, rather than the standard technique where estimates are 
generated from within the model (on the basis of predicted changes in demography, 
profiles for spending by age and an assumed rate of growth in spending per capita). 
Because the interaction between entitlement to Income Support and pensioner incomes 
is complex, the results produced by PENSIM should (at least in theory) be a more 
accurate way of forecasting spending on this benefit. Though this has little effect on the 
overall results which CSK report in their earlier and later papers (spending on Income 
Support for pensioners is a small proportion of total public spending), this link between 
dynamic microsimulation and generational accounting shows that there is some 
synergy between the two types of analysis used in this thesis114.
112 In fact this is tautological; CSK’s estimates for future GDP have been derived by assuming that GDP 
grows in line with income tax revenue.
113 The method used to derive an estimate for aggregate spending is the same as that described in 
Section 2.4 in relation to SERPS: PENSIM’s estimates for mean receipt o f Income Support were 
averaged between single and couple households and grossed-up using population projections. For 
consistency with the other estimates in CSK the results were then scaled to official estimates for 
expenditure on Income Support for pensioners in 2000. The discrepancy between the two estimates is 
largely accounted for by the fact that the DSS include payments to people in residential care while such 
individuals are ignored in PENSIM (see Agulnik, Cardarelli and Sefton, 2000, Section A.III).
114 A contribution o f this thesis has been to make this link. Bonnet and Mahieu’s (1998) work on France
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The second change relates to the way the model treats contracted-out rebates paid to 
people who have opted-out of SERPS into personal or occupational pension schemes. 
At present the model follows public accounting conventions in counting rebates as a 
reduction in tax rather than as a transfer payment (and hence part of public spending). 
Rebates are therefore excluded from both the spending and revenue sides of the model. 
However, as argued by (amongst others) Surrey (1973), Howard (1997) and Kvist and 
Sinfield (1996), this distinction between ‘tax expenditure’ and public expenditure is not 
helpful, as it does not reflect any fundamental economic difference between the two, 
and often leads to tax-based programmes being favoured over direct public spending 
for little reason other than labelling. Moreover, in analysing pension reform it is helpful 
to model changes in rebates alongside changes in SERPS, so that the entirety of second 
tier provision is captured in the same way. The modelling here therefore includes 
rebates in both the spending and revenue sides of the model.
Figure 4.2 shows the projections for state pension spending used in the model. All the 
four main components of public provision set out in Chapter 1A are included: Income 
Support and the basic pension (first tier) and SERPS benefit payments and rebates 
(second tier). Future spending is shown as a proportion of projected GDP, so that like 
the eamings-deflated estimates used in Chapter 2, the estimates show what these levels 
of expenditure will ‘feel like’ in the future. However, it is important to realise that the 
assumed rate of GDP growth has an enormous impact on the shape of the spending 
lines. This reflects the fact that expenditure on each item is not computed from within 
the model (using the relevant assumptions) but is super-imposed on it from outside 
sources, PENSIM in the case of Income Support and the Government Actuary’s 
estimates in the case of National Insurance benefits (the basic pension and SERPS) and 
rebates115. Hence changes in the growth assumption do not automatically feed through
shows how the generational accounts and future pensioner incomes may be calculated simultaneously 
through microsimulation techniques.
115 It would in fact have been possible to use PENSIM’s estimates to calculate all four elements o f  
spending. However, as shown in Section 2.4, there is a very large discrepancy between PENSIM’s 
estimates for SERPS and those o f the Government Actuary. More generally, the Government Actuary’s 
estimates are the common currency in most analyses o f UK pensions, and it is these estimates which are 
used by CSK. Accordingly PENSIM is only used where there are no other projections available, as is the 
case for Income Support.
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into the numerator (spending), as is the case with health for instance, but do affect the 
denominator (the size o f future GDP). This is particularly relevant given that the model 
(and the Figure) assume earnings will grow at roughly 2% per year until 2003 (in line 
with Treasury projections) and in line with income tax revenues thereafter (i.e. at 
roughly 1.75% per year, though with some variation due to demographic change; see 
below). This is different from the Government Actuary, the main source o f long term 
spending estimates, who assumes 1.5% earnings growth in all future years116. The 
estimates in Figure 4.2 are therefore not comparable with the Government Actuary’s 
estimates for the cost o f National Insurance benefits, not only because Income Support 
spending and rebates are included (and other non- pension contributory benefits are 
excluded), but also because the earnings/GDP growth assumptions are different.
Figure 4.2
Expenditure on first and second tier pensions under baseline policy; % GDP
9.00% --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 .00 % ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 .0 0 % ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q. 6.00%
2 .0 0 %  - 
1 .0 0 %  -
1997 2002 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 2032 2037 2042 2047 2052 2057
■  In co m e  s u p p o r t  for P e n s io n e r s  D B a s ic  P e n s io n  D S E R P S  ■ R e b a t e s
116 The effect o f changing assumptions can be analysed using the electronic version o f  the model, 
available at www.generationalaccounting.com. While it would have been possible to run the model here 
using an assumption o f 1.5% earnings growth, thus making the baseline assumptions fully consistent 
with those used in relation to PENSIM (see Section 2.2), it was decided that making as few changes as 
possible to CSK ’s work was the more important analytical imperative. Moreover, the Treasury’s analysis 
o f public spending trends over the next 30 years also uses an assumption o f 1.75% GDP growth (see 
HMT 2000, Annex A), and this can equally be thought o f as an ‘official’ estimate.
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The Figure shows that, in terms of pension spending, the UK does not face an ‘old age 
crisis’, as the World Bank (1994, Title) describes the fate which awaits many other 
countries. Indeed, under current polices pension spending in the UK will fall quite 
dramatically over the next sixty years, in spite of the increasing number of pensioners 
(see Figure 9.2). However, generational accounting is not concerned exclusively with 
the pension system, and these estimates need to be put into the context of other long 
term trends in public spending. In particular, the effect of demographic change on 
health-care spending must be taken into account; because per capita spending rises with 
age (see Le Grand and Vizard, 1998, pp. 90-94) the greying of the population also has 
large implications for expenditure on the NHS. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3, which 
shows the baseline projection for total public spending (as a proportion of GDP) broken 
down into pensions (taken from Figure 4.2), social security benefits for non-retirees, 
public employees’ unfunded occupational pensions, health, education and ‘other’
117expenditure on pure public goods (e.g. defence) . As can be seen, spending on 
pensions and other personal transfers is expected to fall dramatically under baseline 
policy (due to the policy of price indexing most benefits)118, while aggregate health 
spending will grow considerably until 2050 before stabilising at around 10% of GDP. 
Total spending is therefore expected to remain fairly constant over the next 20 years 
before rising between 2020 and 2030 and falling after this date.
117 The baseline projection assumes that per capita spending will rise in line with earnings growth 
(1.75%), except in the case o f social security for non-retirees where it is assumed that per capita 
spending growth will be zero (reflecting the policy o f price-uprating benefits), and in the case o f pension 
spending where estimates are superimposed (see above). Spending for the period 1998-2001 is based on 
the July 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review - the results o f the 2001-2004 spending review 
(announced in July 2000) have not been incorporated and spending in these years is projected internally 
by the model.
118 The projections for pensions and social security for non-retirees may be combined and compared 
with the estimates for total social security spending produced for the government’s long-term (30 year) 
expenditure forecasting exercise (see HMT, 2000, Annex A, and DSS, 2000d, Ch. 4). The government’s 
central estimate is that social security spending will rise at an average rate o f 1.3% a year in real terms 
between 2000 and 2030, and hence on the basis o f the earnings growth assumption used here (1.75%) 
this implies social security spending will fall as a proportion o f GDP by about one and half percentage 
points. This is almost exactly the same fall as presented in Figure 4.3, suggesting the two estimates are 
reasonably consistent.
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Figure 4.3
Total public expenditure by component under baseline policy; % GDP
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The projections for individual components of spending require some explanation. In 
particular, at first sight it is surprising that ‘other’ spending (on pure public goods and 
other non-allocable expenditure) is predicted to rise: because such spending is 
unrelated to age a flat spending projection might have been expected. However, this 
does not take into account the way in which the NIESR model goes about its task. As 
discussed more fully in CSK, the model is based on profiles for how the various 
components o f spending and revenue vary by age (derived by analysing survey data, 
principally the Family Resources Survey), from which projections are produced on the 
basis o f demographic forecasts and an assumption for growth in average per capita 
spending. The distribution of receipts/payments by age is therefore a key variable in 
determining the model’s projections.
The issue is illustrated in Figure 4.4, which compares the age profiles o f income tax 
(and hence GDP) and o f international co-operation (i.e. spending on aid programmes), 
which forms part o f the ‘other’ category of spending in Figure 4.3. As can be seen, the 
age-incidence o f income tax (estimated from survey data) is hump-shaped around 
prime earning years (which are shown as occurring rather earlier for women than for
1 2 6
men, though see the criticisms in Banks, Disney and Smith, 2000, pp. 584-590). In 
contrast, the age profile for international co-operation is flat -  it is not possible to 
apportion spending by age and hence a uniform distribution is assumed. Consequently 
the projections for spending on international co-operation and GDP (income tax 
revenue) are different; in spite o f the fact that the same assumption for growth in per 
capita spending is used (1.75%), their different age-profiles mean they are affected by 
demographic change in different ways.
Figure 4.4
Age profiles of income tax/GDP and international co-operation
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The next stage in the process is then to derive an equivalent projection for future 
revenue. This is where the most fundamental change to the assumptions used in CSK is 
made. As highlighted by Banks, Disney and Smith (2000, p. 580), revenue to the 
National Insurance Fund can be projected as the amount necessary to balance spending 
on a PAYG basis or as a constant per capita take from each member o f the population 
(i.e. in the same way as income tax revenue is modelled). CSK use the first assumption, 
reflecting the fact that, without changes in legislation, this would automatically occur 
under current policy. This means, though, that they project a substantial reduction in
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revenue from NICs, reflecting the declining cost of National Insurance benefits (see 
Figure 4.2). The analysis here therefore uses the second assumption; this is equivalent 
to assuming that henceforth NIC rates are fixed at their current level and that the LEL 
and UEL rise in line with earnings.
The model’s projection for tax revenue from various sources is shown in Figure 4.5. 
Again, despite the fact that all components are assumed to grow at the same per capita 
rate (1.75%), only income tax and NICs grow precisely in line with GDP (after 2005). 
The reason is the same as that just given for ‘other’ spending - differences in the age- 
profile of revenue from each source mean that demographic change impacts on them 
differently. For instance, relative to income tax the age-profile of VAT receipts is more 
heavily tilted towards older ages, causing the projection to be more influenced by the 
greying of the population. Hence, because GDP is assumed to grow at the same rate as 
income tax, VAT is predicted to yield more revenue in the future relative to GDP even 
if there is no change in the rate and structure of the tax (as is implicitly assumed here). 
Seen in this light, therefore, the rise in VAT shown in Figure 4.5 is not so surprising -  
just as spending will be affected by demographic change, so too will revenue. Note 
though that this means total tax revenue (the tax burden) will rise in the future even if 
tax rates are held constant; conversely, holding tax revenue at a constant proportion of 
GDP (such as 40%) implies that there will be scope in the future for reducing tax rates.
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Figure 4.5
Total tax revenue by component under baseline policy; % GDP
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The information in Figures 4.3 and 4.5 can now be used to calculate whether, overall, 
future revenue will be sufficient to meet future spending, i.e. whether under baseline 
policy there is an intertemporal budget gap (IBG). This can be done through 
discounting the estimates for revenue and spending in each future year to present value 
terms; in keeping with CSK’s analysis the discount rate used here is 5% (in real 
terms)119. These discounted payment and revenue streams can then be added to an 
estimate of government debt to give a complete picture of the government’s 
intertemporal liabilities (i.e. the IBG). Results for the analysis described above and the 
results reported by CSK are in Table 4.1. The first column shows the IBG (as a 
proportion o f GDP) under the two exercises, while the following three columns express 
the IBG in terms of the immediate and permanent change in tax needed to close it. In 
other words, columns 2-4 show the difference between current tax revenue and the 
sustainable tax burden. To avoid any danger of presentational bias the required change
119 As highlighted in Section 4.4, it is not entirely clear how the assumption for the discount rate should 
be derived, and this uncertainty is one o f  the main reasons why the results o f generational accounting 
models will always be open to challenge. In particular, contrary to CSK ’s method, there is a strong 
intuitive argument for using identical assumptions for GDP growth and for the discount rate. Indeed, 
unless this is the case the generational effect o f  policy may appear excessively adverse simply because 
benefits (received at the end o f  life) have a lower present value than taxes (paid predominantly during 
working years).
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in taxation is shown on a number of bases: column three shows the change in absolute 
terms, column four shows the change as a proportion of GDP and column five shows 
the change as a proportion of income tax revenue (the measure preferred by CSK).
Table 4.1
Intertemporal budget gap and required change in taxes under baseline policy
Intertemporal 
Budget Gap; % 
of GDP
Change in annual tax revenue needed to close the 
IBG
Absolute terms; 
£ billion
% GDP % Income Tax 
revenue
This analysis (see 
text)
-11.4% -2.3 -0.3% -3.2%
Cardarelli, Sefton 
and Kotlikoff 
(2000, Table 6)
20.2% 4.1 0.5% 5.7%
As can be seen, CSK’s exercise concluded that under baseline policy the deficit in the
IBG was equivalent to 20% of GDP, hence they estimated that an increase in tax
revenue of around £4 billion (0.5% of GDP or 6% of income tax revenue) was required
to ensure long term fiscal solvency. In contrast, the analysis here suggests there is a
slight surplus in the IBG, and hence that taxes should be modestly reduced (or spending
1
increased) to avoid the government building-up an ever-growing surplus . These 
rather different conclusions reflect the different assumptions used in the two exercises, 
most importantly the fact that the analysis here assumes revenue from NICs will be 
constant (or a constant per capita take by age) while CSK assume that NIC revenue will 
fall as a proportion of GDP (reflecting the declining projection for benefit spending). 
This is acknowledged by CSK (p. 571), who note that “under the baseline scenario... 
the income tax rise approximately compensates for the fa ll in forecasted NIC payments, 
leaving the overall tax burden roughly constant’.
Whether more broadly the results produced by generational accounting models should 
be believed is discussed in Section 4.4. However, first the NIESR model will be used to
120 For all intents and purposes this modest surplus can be ignored -  given the inaccuracies in the model 
(see Section 4.4) it is simplest to interpret this estimate as a zero IBG.
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look at the public finance effects of the four ‘ideal type’ policies described in Section 
1.3.
4. 3 Results under four ideal type9 pension systems
Just as Chapter 3 used PENSIM to look at the effect of the four ‘ideal type’ pension 
systems on pensioners incomes, this section uses the NIESR generational accounting 
model to look at the effects of each reform on the public finances. As (naturally 
enough) these options only affect the pension system, all other parts of the model are 
left the same as in the baseline, i.e. the changes in the IBG reported below all reflect 
changes in the shape of Figure 4.2. The analysis below looks first at the effect of the 
targeting, basic income and social insurance options, where the model’s results are 
fairly obvious (though the fact that the cost of each policy is now quantified is helpful), 
before turning to the more interesting case of compulsory saving.
In each case the expenditure projections for Income Support are based on the estimates 
from PENSIM presented in Chapter 3, and use the grossing-up method described for 
the baseline. In the case of National Insurance benefits (SERPS and the basic pension) 
PENSIM’s estimates have not been used directly but instead have been used to scale up 
or down the Government Actuary projection used in the baseline (see last section). The 
estimates in Tables 3.1, 3.3, 3.5 and 3.8 therefore do not simply feed through to this 
chapter; rather, it is the comparison between these Tables and the baseline estimates in 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 which is important. A similar technique has been used for projecting 
the cost of contracted-out rebates, with Government Actuary estimates being scaled as 
appropriate to each option. However, under the targeting and basic income ideal types 
it is assumed that second tier SERPS benefits and rebates are the same as in the 
baseline, and hence in these cases differences are accounted for wholly by changes in 
first tier provision.
Targeting, basic income and social insurance
The effects of the basic income and targeting options on the future cost of public 
pension provision are shown in Figure 4.6 and 4.7, using the estimates from Tables 3.1 
and 3.3 respectively. Unsurprisingly, the total cost of such provision declines
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dramatically under the targeting option but rises broadly in line with demographics 
under a basic income (i.e. in line with the change in the number o f pensioners shown in 
Figure 9.2). Note though that the composition o f spending under the two options is 
radically different. Under targeting most expenditure comes in the form of Income 
Support by the end o f the period, and the cost o f the basic pension by 2066 is negligible 
(due to the assumed policy o f freezing its cash value). In contrast under a basic income 
the situation is reversed, with the basic pension accounting for the vast majority o f 
spending and Income Support being wiped-out. The effect o f both policies on the IBG, 
and on the tax change needed to close the IBG (the sustainable tax burden), is shown 
later in Table 4.2 alongside the other options.
Figure 4.6
Expenditure on first and second tier pensions under targeting; % GDP
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Figure 4.7
Expenditure on first and second tier pensions under basic income; % GDP
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The expenditure effects o f social insurance are set out in Figure 4.8. As can be seen, the 
effects o f this ideal type are more complex than the previous two models, as the cost of 
both first and second tier provision alters. The changes in first tier provision are 
essentially the same as under a basic income, though the cost of the basic pension is 
fractionally smaller due to the fact that it is not quite universal under this option (due to 
the retention o f contribution conditions). Similarly, spending on Income Support is 
fractionally higher than under a basic income (see Table 3.10), though still not very far 
from zero. However, the real difference between this policy and a basic income relates 
to the changes social insurance would bring about in second tier provision, with both 
benefit payments and rebates rising substantially121. The effect o f this policy on the 
IBG and on the sustainable tax burden is again shown in Table 4.2 later.
121 Note that the reform is assumed to take place in the year 2000, and hence the cost o f  rebates jum ps 
upwards in this year in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.8
Expenditure on first and second tier pensions under social insurance; % GDP
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It is worth briefly setting out why the Figure shows the cost o f both elements o f second 
tier provision increasing. As discussed in Section 3.4, returning to the original structure 
o f SERPS (i.e. the 1975 legislation) will have two major effects. First it will increase 
gross SERPS entitlements; this was modelled through increasing the accrual rate from 
20% (of earnings between the limits) under the current scheme to 35% under social 
insurance. Second, returning to the 1975 legislation will affect the split between public 
and private provision, as under this option contracted-out rebates will only be payable 
to members of occupational schemes, and people who are currently opted-out via 
personal pensions will no longer have this choice. The cost o f the state scheme will 
therefore rise for two reasons: a) gross SERPS entitlements will be higher, and b) a 
larger proportion o f total benefits will be provided by the state. However, perhaps more 
surprisingly, the cost o f rebates will also rise, reflecting the fact that the increase in the 
value of rebates paid to occupational schemes (from 20 to 35% o f earnings between the 
limits) outweighs the reduction (to zero) in rebates paid to personal pensions.
Under PAYG finance a move in the direction o f social insurance would therefore not 
only increase spending (and hence contributions) in the future but would also reduce 
net revenue from NICs from the moment it is introduced. Accordingly, a return to the
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1975 legislation would be accompanied by an increase in the contribution rate even at
197the outset . However, the key point is that this increase is far smaller than necessary 
to bring revenue into line with the sustainable tax burden associated with this policy 
(see Table 4.2). In other words, though SERPS is partially funded via contracting-out, 
this does not come close to fully offsetting the increase in contributions necessary to 
finance increased benefits. In contrast, the compulsory saving option discussed below 
illustrates how changes in benefits feed through directly and immediately to 
contributions in funded pension schemes.
Compulsory saving
It is helpful to look at compulsory saving by considering first the effect of fully funding 
SERPS without any increase in the compulsory contribution rate. The current SERPS 
scheme could be moved onto a funded basis by extending contracted-out rebates to all 
employees, so that the option of accruing future benefits via the state was no longer 
available123. As already-accrued benefits under SERPS ran-out this would cause the 
direct cost of SERPS benefit payments to gradually decline towards zero. However, in 
the short-term this policy would cause the cost of rebates to jump upwards, as everyone 
previously in SERPS would now be in a personal pension and hence receiving rebates. 
Figure 4.9 illustrates, showing the total cost of second tier provision (i.e. SERPS 
benefit payments and contracted-out rebates) under the current SERPS scheme and 
under full funding.
122 This sort o f effect was precisely what occurred when SERPS was first introduced, with the 
(contracted-in) NIC rate rising to compensate for the introduction o f contracting-out.
123 As noted in Section 1 A.2, the level o f rebate is calculated with reference to SERPS’s benefit 
formula, so that contracted-out schemes receive just sufficient money to pay individuals exactly the same 
pension as they would have got from the state scheme (given the Government Actuary’s assumptions 
about interest rates, investment returns, etc.).
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Figure 4.9
Expenditure on second tier provision (benefit payments and rebates) under 
baseline policy and under a fully-funded SERPS scheme; % GDP
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The Figure shows that when the move to a fully-funded system takes place (by 
assumption in 2000) the overall cost o f second tier provision will rise by about 0.4% of 
GDP (£3.2bn) to pay for both previously-accrued SERPS benefits (on a PAYG basis) 
and for the increase in rebates124. However, as pension entitlements accrued before the 
change become less important this ‘double-funding’ burden will decline, with the 
combined cost of rebates and benefit payments falling below those expected under 
baseline policy in 2030 or thereabouts.
Funding all second tier pension provision therefore results in higher costs in the short- 
run but lower costs in the long run, and if contributions are set so as to equal spending 
(i.e. on a PAYG basis) it is not clear whether such a policy should be interpreted as 
increasing or decreasing the cost o f pensioning. However, under the sustainable tax 
framework adopted here - where it is in any case assumed that NIC revenue rises in line 
with income tax (i.e. with GDP) - the effect of fully-funding SERPS becomes more
124 This estimate for the cost o f  full contracting-out has been derived by the author from GAD (1999, 
Table 7.3) by comparing column 1 (current policy) and column 4 (all members o f  SERPS contract-out 
into a personal pension scheme).
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transparent. In itself funding does not affect the IBG (benefits are the same as under 
current policy) but because it brings forward expenditure the relationship between 
current spending and the sustainable tax rate alters, causing the optimal debt profile to 
alter in turn. Figure 4.10 illustrates, using the example set out at the end o f Section 4.1 
to show the effect o f fully-funding all compulsory pension provision (i.e. both first and 
second tier pensions). For the sake of illustration it is assumed that moving onto a fully- 
funded basis would initially cost 6% o f GDP.
Figure 4.10
Stylised effect of funding pensions under a sustainable tax regime
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The Figure shows that, assuming rebates are actuarially-fair, funding does not alter the 
sustainable tax burden. Rather, its effect is to change the shape o f spending, in the 
example shown reversing the previous low-to-high trend. In turn this means that, in this 
example, when the full-funding policy is implemented current spending (including 
rebates) is above the sustainable tax rate, and hence in the short-term the government 
will need to borrow in order to hold taxes at the sustainable level. Consequently the 
optimal policy is now to increase public debt rather than rapidly reducing it (as was
1 *yc
optimal when there was a PAYG pension system, see Figure 4.1) . The arguments for
and against such a such a ‘borrow and fund’ policy are discussed in Section 4.5.
The effect of the Basic Pension Plus proposals put forward by the Conservative Party in 
the run-up to the 1997 election (see Lilley, 1997 and Section 3.5) is set out in Figure 
4.11. Under this policy, as well as everyone receiving rebates (i.e. full contracting-out), 
the value of rebates is increased to 5% of earnings126. The policy therefore results in an 
increase in the compulsory pension benefits paid to retirees and hence in their total cost 
(i.e. the sustainable tax burden is higher than under baseline policy; see Table 4.2). The 
Figure shows that, in accordance with the analysis above, because the scheme is fully 
funded these additional costs are weighted towards the near future, when there is little 
(or no in the first year) reduction in SERPS payments to compensate for the extra cost 
of rebates. Note also that, because rebates are larger under this option (as well as more 
numerous), the ‘break-even’ point is now more like 2040, as opposed to around 2030 
when benefits are left unchanged (see Figure 4.9).
125 In a similar vein, Belan and Pestieau (1999, p. 118) comment that "privatisation which involves 
moving from an unfunded to a fully funded scheme is neutral ifpublic borrowing is used to finance the 
retirement o f  the transition generation. In other words, a pension privatisation that leaves the mandatory 
contribution rate equal to the payroll tax o f  the former public system, and that does not alter the terms o f  
eligibility or magnitude o f  retirement benefits under the old system, will have no impact on the 
disposable income and wealth o f  individuals who move from the old system to the new.... In effect, the 
privatisation simply converts an implicit government obligation to future retirees into explicit debt".
126 As set out in Section 1 A.2, under SERPS the effective compulsory contribution rate is currently 
4.6%, though this is steadily falling to 3.5% as the scheme matures. Note also that as originally set out 
the Basic Pension Plus envisaged moving the basic pension on to a funded basis; as in Section 3.5 this 
part o f the plans is ignored here.
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Figure 4.11
Expenditure on first and second tier pensions under compulsory saving; % GDP
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Finally, the effect o f each of the four ideal types on the intertemporal budget gap (IBG) 
is set out in Table 4.2. As with Table 4.1 earlier, the IBG under each option is 
expressed in terms o f the immediate and permanent change in tax needed to close it on 
a number o f different bases. The Table complements Table 3.11 at the end o f the last 
chapter, which summarised the distributional effects o f the four options. In effect 
together the two Tables create something like a ‘menu with prices’ for pension policy, 
PENSIM’s analysis providing a description o f what is being bought and generational 
accounting putting a price to each dish. The arguments for and against each policy are 
discussed further in Section 9.4.
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Table 4.2
Intertemporal budget gap and required change in taxes under ‘ideal type’ policies
Intertemporal 
Budget Gap; % 
of GDP
Change in annual tax revenue needed to close 
IBG
Absolute terms; 
£ billion
% GDP % Income Tax 
revenue
Baseline (see Table 4.1) -11% -2 -0.3% -3%
Targeting -43% -10 -1% -11%
Basic income 39% 6 1% 10%
Social insurance 62% 11 1.6% 16%
Compulsory saving 3% 1 0.1% 1%
Focusing on the absolute cost of closing the IBG (column 3), and accepting the analysis 
in Section 4.2 that under current policy there is a slight surplus (i.e. tax revenues are 
just above the sustainable tax burden), the Table may be summarised as follows:
• under targeting taxes could be cut or spending increased by £10 billion;
• under a basic income taxes should be increased (or spending reduced) by £6 billion 
and under social insurance by £11 billion;
• under compulsory saving a small increase of £1 billion in the overall level of tax 
and contributions is required, but if compulsory pension payments are seen as being 
distinct from general taxation then this will appear as a reduction in tax combined 
with a more than offsetting increase in compulsory pension contributions.
4.4 How reliable are the results?
As with all forecasts of the distant future CSK’s projections are based on numerous 
assumptions, changes in which would significantly alter the results. Moreover, though 
their exercise is already data-intensive, arguably it should be even more all- 
encompassing in terms of the elements of public spending and tax revenue modelled. 
Listed below are some of the most important problems with generational accounting in 
general, and with the NIESR model in particular.
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1. Generational accounting models are only as good as the demographic projections on 
which they are based. Though the official population forecasts for the UK produced by 
the Government Actuary provide point estimates for the population in future years, 
they are in fact subject to a high degree of uncertainty127. This reflects the fact that 
population projections are based on a range of assumptions about demographic 
variables (such as mortality, fertility and migration) which inevitably we cannot know 
with any great precision. By way of example, the mid-1996 population projections used 
in GAD (1999) are based on the assumption that net immigration to the UK will cause 
the population to grow by 68,500 people a year (see GAD, 1999, p29); in fact net 
immigration in 1998 was 178,000 (though this may reflect temporary factors such as 
the break-up of former Yugoslavia). More important, however, are the fertility and 
mortality assumptions, which are particularly difficult to forecast accurately. For 
instance, the mid-1996 estimates are based throughout on the current fertility rate of 1.8 
children per female, rather below the replacement rate of 2.1 and substantially below 
the fertility rates experienced during the immediate post-war years and in the 1960s 
(see Falkingham, 1997, pp. 18-19). The projection would look very different if it was 
assumed that fertility eventually returns to replacement rates or, alternatively, if a trend 
decline towards very low rates (as seen in, e.g., Italy) were assumed.
2. Projections of the future cost of public services are subject to wide uncertainty about 
the relationship between demography and spending, and projections are therefore 
subject to an expanding ‘funnel of doubt’ as they attempt to forecast ever more distant 
periods (Richards, Wilsdon and Lyons, 1996, Ch. 3). This issue is particularly 
important in relation to forecasting health spending, where there is great uncertainty 
about whether the increased years of life brought about through improved medical 
technology and nutrition will be healthy or unhealthy. One view holds that better 
health-care will lead to a compression of morbidity, with death being preceded by less 
years of disability or ill-health (on average). Against this it is argued that the main 
effect of modem health-care is to keep unhealthy people alive, prolonging the years in 
which state health services must be provided for them. The jury is still out on this issue. 
However, it should be noted that the NDESR model tends towards the latter view -  it
127 The discrepancy between the Government Actuary’s 1994 and 1999 projections for spending on 
SERPS shown in Table 2.8 earlier also demonstrates the fallibility of actuarial estimates.
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assumes that the age-proflle of spending on health-care will be the same in the future as 
it is today, despite the fact that the life expectancy will be greater.
Nevertheless, even with this pessimistic assumption, the baseline results suggest that 
health spending will rise at an average real rate of only 2.7% per year from 2000 to 
2030 (i.e. just under one percentage point higher than earnings growth). This 
significantly underestimates increases in spending over the past two decades: as shown 
by Le Grand and Vizard (1998, p. 86), health spending in fact grew at an annual real 
rate of 3.3% pa between 1978/9 and 1995/6 (throughout which time Conservative 
governments were in power)128. It is also far lower than the 5% real annual increases 
provided under the July 2000 Comprehensive Spending Review (see HMT, 2000a, Ch. 
8). Given this there is a strong argument for using CSK’s ‘looser policy’ scenario, 
which envisages health spending rising from 6.8% to 8% of GDP by 2005 (in line with 
the Prime Minister’s announcement in January 2000 that UK health spending would 
rise to the European average), and growing at 0.25% faster than earnings after this 
date129. Under this scenario CSK’s estimate for the IBG jumps from 20% to nearly 60% 
of GDP, and this change would certainly be sufficient to put the baseline estimate 
firmly into the red (see Table 4.1).
3. It is difficult to be sure that the data used in generational accounting models are 
genuinely complete. Public spending programmes are enormously complex, and 
obtaining estimates for some areas may involve using data which is difficult to obtain 
or beset with definitional problems. For instance, the NIESR model makes no attempt 
to model the inter-temporal effects of the student loans scheme, where part of today’s 
outlays (recorded in the model) will be matched by repayments in future years (not 
recorded). Similarly, the effects of the Private Finance Initiative are not included in the 
model, despite the fact that the cost of payments to private contractors will grow in the
128 Harrison’s (1998) analysis of health spending since the inception of the NHS in 1948 compares 
more favourably with CSK’s baseline estimates. He suggests (slide 2) that the trend (average) increase in 
the proportion of GDP devoted to the NHS is 0.062% per year, so that we might expect the NHS to grow 
by 1.86% of GDP over the next 30 years and 3.1% of GDP over the next 50 years; CSK project growth 
of 2.1 and 3.3% of GDP over these periods.
129 In fact this increase in health spending is only one half of CSK’s ‘looser’ policy scenario, which also 
envisages that after 2004 all benefits will be indexed in line with earnings. A break-down of the 
additional costs is provided in Table 6 of CSK.
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future130. However, these problems are at least potentially resolvable (at least if 
sufficient resources are devoted to the modelling process). More difficult are the 
‘implicit liabilities’ of the government, for instance to protect individuals in the case of 
major financial scandals (such as the collapse of Saving and Loans institutions in the 
US). Casey (1998, pp. 64-69) argues that in the case of private pension provision these 
implicit liabilities are substantial. Putting a precise cost on them is, though, an 
extremely difficult (if not impossible) task.
4. More generally, generational accounting models do not look at whether tax revenue 
is used to pay for consumption or investment. For instance, the model does not attempt 
to include asset depreciation, though if deprecation is constant this omission may not 
make a big difference to the results. The key point though is that generational 
accounting models are far better at analysing flows than stocks. This can create 
difficulties when (for instance) the government has the choice between auctioning 
property rights (as occurred with mobile phones) or granting licences and then taxing 
profits (as occurs under the North Sea Oil regime). The revenue effects of privatisation 
similarly illustrate the problem. As discussed in Hills (1989, pp. 79-83), an alternative, 
and potentially preferable, way of looking at the government’s fiscal position is 
through compiling a balance sheet of its assets and liabilities, from which an estimate 
of its net worth can be deduced. Such a framework therefore avoids the problem that, in 
selling assets (such as nationalised industries or council houses), the state is essentially 
swapping equity for cash.
5. On the revenue side, generational accounting models do not at present deal 
adequately with tax reliefs. As Banks and Emmerson (2000, Table 5) show, the gross 
cost of tax expenditures related to pensions is nearly half the direct cost of state 
provision131. Moreover, as occupational and (particularly) personal pension schemes
130 The private finance initiative in fact well illustrates the problem which generational accounts are 
meant to tackle. A quote from a Treasury mandarin captures the issue: "We are building up liabilities 
[under the private finance initiative] and, assuming ministers want a given level o f tax, projects in the 
future will have to be displaced” (Lipsey, 2000, p201).
131 Presenting estimates in this way can be criticised for ignoring the tax paid on benefit payments (i.e. 
for being ‘gross’ rather than ‘net’). However, in fact the official estimates understate the true cost of tax 
reliefs, as they ignore NIC relief (on employers’ contributions; see Section 1 A.3). The estimates in 
Agulnik (1999a, p. 4) suggest that, in aggregate, these under-and over-estimates may roughly balance.
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are still maturing, the cost of these tax reliefs is likely to grow further in the future, as 
the size of funds grows pushing up the cost of relief on the capital gains they realise. 
While the changes to the treatment of dividend income introduced in July 1997 will 
attenuate these gains (see Section 1 A.3), given the falling cost of state pension 
provision it is not inconceivable that tax expenditures related to pensions will one day 
exceed the cost of direct provision (particularly if Individual Saving Accounts are 
bracketed with pensions as retirement saving vehicles). If such an event came to pass 
the usefulness of generational accounts which excluded tax expenditures would have to 
be seriously doubted132.
6. It is very difficult to pin-down what assumptions should be made for earnings (and 
hence GDP) growth and, even more problematically, for the discount rate (Haveman, 
1994, pp. 101-104). The earnings growth assumption might be derived from averaging 
past growth rates, or from official assumptions about trend rates of increase. While 
CSK’s specific assumption of 1.75% productivity growth might be objected to, the 
range of disagreement is relatively narrow; somewhere between 1.5 and 2.5 percent 
would seem reasonable to most people. However, more problematic is the discount rate 
assumption needed to calculate the present value of future payments and receipts. In 
particular, Hills (1995a, p. 37) argues that the discount rate should be identical to the 
growth rate as, without this equivalence, in a steady-state future benefits will always be 
valued less than current taxes, causing an automatic loss for current generations . 
Nevertheless, CSK use a discount rate of 5%.
7. The NIESR model does not include any allowance for future environmental costs. 
The notion of cost here has (at least) two interpretations. First there is the direct public 
expenditure cost of, for instance, nuclear decommissioning or building sea walls to 
protect against rising sea levels. Second, there are resource depletion costs, in the sense
132 The role of tax reliefs in the arguments put forward in the 1950s debate on pension reform is 
highlighted in Chapter 5. As shown by Titmuss (1955, p. 73), the (gross) cost of tax expenditures at that 
time was substantially greater than the cost to the Exchequer of grants to the National Insurance Fund.
133 While the 5% assumption is also important in relation to the IBG, the effect of having a discount rate 
assumption which is higher than the assumed rate of earnings growth is less problematic, as it does not 
create any systematic bias. Instead, the effect of the discount rate being 5% rather than some smaller 
figure is that the importance of future years is lower than would otherwise be the case, so that changes in 
the balance between speeding and revenue in the immediate future are particularly important in 
determining the size of the IBG.
144
that finite resources are being used up which, as they become more scarce, will tend to 
rise in price. Neither of these effects are included in the generational accounts. More 
generally, the numerical techniques employed in generational accounting make no 
attempt to assess the true legacy which current generations are leaving for their heirs in 
terms of progress towards a just and environmentally-sustainable society (see Rawls, 
1972, pp. 284-293 or Beckerman, 1997, pp. 403-404).
8. Last, like PENSIM it is possible that the NIESR generational accounting model 
suffers from computational errors (‘bugs’), though none were found in the course of 
this analysis.
4.5 The funding debate
Section 4.2 showed that under the baseline policy assumptions used in this thesis, and 
in particular under the assumption that NIC revenue will grow at the same rate as 
income tax revenue, the IBG is more-or-less zero (i.e. as modelled, existing policy is 
sustainable). However, as noted in the last section, the assumptions on which this 
conclusion is based are (at the very least) open to question. Suppose therefore that there 
is in fact a deficit in the IBG, for instance because health spending is assumed to grow 
more quickly than in the baseline projection (the ‘looser policy’ scenario). What then 
would be the available policy options? Essentially they may be divided into two broad 
strategies. Under one strategy future spending would be reduced, for instance by 
increasing state pension age134. Alternatively, spending might be kept the same but 
advance action taken to offset increases in other ways. The first policy therefore levels- 
down public spending, so that taxes can be held constant at existing levels, while the 
other policy brings forward spending, so that the tax burden is ievelled-up’ to a point 
between present and projected levels.
One way of implementing the latter strategy is to fund pension provision, i.e. to move 
from PAYG (as under social insurance) to an asset-based strategy (as under
134 Note that this will save money irrespective of whether people actually retire later. As only a minority 
of households are entitled to benefits on the basis of having a low income or being disabled, increases in 
expenditure on benefits for working-age people will be less than the saving on pension benefits.
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compulsory saving). As funding does not in itself affect benefit levels this policy may 
be bracketed with other ‘levelling-up’ strategies. Consider the following three 
alternative ‘levelling-up’ policies: reducing the national debt, funding public 
employees’ pension provision, or investing in public infrastructure. The first of these 
can be thought of as the default policy for achieving the sustainable tax burden, as 
illustrated by Figure 4.1. However, the other two policies are equally valid ways of 
closing a deficit in the IBG -  they both improve fiscal sustainability by ‘spending to 
save’. Moreover, a case can be made for each in its own right:
• Reducing public debt could help to boost confidence in the government’s ability to 
sustain economic growth in the face of demographic change or an unexpected 
shock.
• Funding the pensions of public employees may promote a more transparent 
remuneration structure for such workers, and might make it easier to compare 
value-for-money in the public and private sectors.
• Improvements in public infra-structure, such as school buildings, hospitals and 
railways, may have macro-economic and social benefits.
Given these alternatives, the question is whether analogous advantages can be claimed 
for a move towards funding. The below examines the two main arguments for this form 
of provision -  that rates of return in funded systems are higher (and hence contributions 
lower) and that funding pensions boosts economic growth. A fuller discussion of the 
various issues is in Barr (2000, pp. 7-31), and in (amongst others) Aaron (1982, Ch. 4), 
Thompson (1998, Ch.s 3 and 4), Orszag and Stiglitz (1999, pp. 9-23), Feldstein (1996, 
pp. 5-11), Gale (1998, pp. 719-721), Mackenzie, Gerson and Cuevas (1997, pp.26-34) 
and Agulnik and Barr (2000, pp. 70-74).
Funding and rates o f return
One argument used by advocates of funding is that, for any given level of pension 
benefits, contributions will be lower under a funded regime than under PAYG finance 
(i.e. funded pensions are better because they are cheaper). As shown by Samuelson 
(1958, pp. 471-474), the long-run (steady-state) rate of return in a mature PAYG 
pension system is equal to the rate of growth of the contribution base (i.e. earnings
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growth plus any population increase). In other words, even if any net inter-generational 
transfers within the system have worked their way through, in countries with steady 
populations workers will earn a real rate of return on their social security contributions 
of between 1 and 3%, depending on the rate of earnings/productivity growth. This may 
be compared to rates of return in funded pension schemes, which most evidence 
suggests have been consistently higher since 1945 (if not before). Feldstein (1996, p3) 
puts the argument as follows:
“In contrast to the 2.6-percent equilibrium return on Social Security 
contributions, the real pre-tax return on non-financial corporate capital 
averaged 9.3percent... [As a result] forcing individuals to use the unfunded 
system dramatically increases their cost o f buying retirement income”.
However, picking a number for the private rate of return (9.3% according to Feldstein) 
is a hazardous business, as the different risk characteristics of PAYG and funded 
schemes must also be taken into account (if returns are higher but more variable then 
the risk-adjusted return may be the same -  see Daniels, 1989, pp. 62-64 for a discussion 
of the case for risk-pooling via social insurance). Moreover, Feldstein’s assumption 
excludes administrative costs. However, most important is the fact that a simple 
comparison between long-run rates of return ignores the costs of the transition from 
PAYG to funding. Even if it were proven that long-run real rates of return to funded 
schemes are higher than those which PAYG systems can attain (after adjusting for risk 
and administration costs), the assertion that this automatically means state pension 
schemes should move to a funded basis is incorrect. Diamond (1999, p. 10) puts the 
argument as follows:
“there is a transition cost in order to generate funding. Once one includes the 
cost o f financing the funding, then a funded system overall does not have a 
higher rate o f return. What is true is that eventually there can be a higher rate 
o f return, but that comes at a cost o f a lower rate o f return while the funding is 
being built up. So one must consider both the cost o f funding and the return 
from funding. It is wrong to consider just the return without considering the 
cost”.
A different way of thinking about this issue is to consider whether a Pareto-improving 
reform of a PAYG pension system is possible. If rates of return to funded and PAYG 
pensions differ then, it would appear, there is a possibility of creating a self-funding 
reform through borrowing during a transition phase. In other words, a policy of
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‘borrow and fund’ could be Pareto-improving. However the adverse knock-on 
consequences of expanding debt may exceed the benefits of a more efficient contribution 
system. It is for this reason that Miles (1998) argues that it may not be possible to design a 
reform which would be Pareto improving, in that any reform which fully compensated 
losing generations would have such adverse consequences that all of the economic gains 
from funding would be cancelled out. In a similar vein, Chand and Jaeger (1996, pp. 32- 
3) comment that:
“ ... the fiscal costs o f undertaking such a shift [to a fully funded scheme] may 
be very high, and ... meeting those costs may require, in many cases, an amount 
o f fiscal adjustment that is substantially higher than what would be needed to 
fix  the PAYG system
This ‘equivalence proposition’ (as Barr, 2000, p. 27, terms it) therefore means that 
differences in rates of return are not, on their own, sufficient to justify moving from 
PAYG to funded pensions systems (see also Belan and Pestieau, 1999, pp. 123-127, 
and Geanakoplos, Mitchell and Zeldes, 1999, Section 3).
Funding and growth
The other main argument for funding is that it will raise the capital stock and hence 
economic growth rates. In order for this to be the case two conditions must hold. First, 
expanding private pension provision must increase national saving and, second, such 
increases must lead to higher investment.
It is the first of these propositions which is generally more contentious; as discussed in 
Section 3.1, the effect of changes in first and second tier pensions on voluntary third 
tier provision is contentious and, similarly, estimates of the extent of ‘offset’ between 
funded and unfunded provision vary widely135. However, many economists also dispute 
whether the second proposition is as axiomatic as politicians and others often assume. 
For instance, Atkinson (1995, pp. 41-45) questions whether higher saving will always 
lead to higher investment, arguing that in some instances higher saving will reduce 
consumer demand and cause firms to scale-back investment as their expectations
135 Barr (2000, p i4) sums up the evidence as follows: “though there is some empirical evidence that 
funding contributes to higher savings in the US, there is no robust evidence of a similar effect 
elsewhere”.
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become more pessimistic. This ‘paradox of thrift’ means that, in certain circumstances, 
higher saving can reduce growth (Keynes, 1936, pp. 211-213).
A further argument is also relevant to many European countries. In small, open 
economies (such as the UK) there is no direct connection between the amount saved 
and the amount invested - any paucity or superfluity of savings relative to investment 
will be reflected in international capital flows. Therefore, in an open economy the 
effect of increased saving on investment is indirect, with higher savings reducing 
interest rates and hence inducing firms to invest more. But where interest rates are not 
determined domestically, for instance because of monetary union with other countries, 
or as a result of fixed exchange rates, then an increase in savings will not affect the cost 
of borrowing. Accordingly, in such economies saving rates will have no effect on 
investment (Ruggeri and Fougere, 1997, pp. 39-40).
Other arguments fo r  funding
The two main arguments in favour of funding pensions are therefore highly 
controversial. However, there are also a number of other arguments which should be 
considered. One is that funded pensions are better-insulated from political pressures, 
i.e. that such a policy severely restricts governments’ ability to renege on earlier 
commitments to provide a certain level of state pension. Ultimately this is an empirical 
question: it can equally plausibly be argued that funded schemes are more vulnerable 
because they face a greater range of non-transparent assault, e.g. withdrawal of tax 
privileges such as the change in ACT introduced in June 1997 (see Section 1 A.3).
Another argument is that multiple modes of finance diversify the risks facing 
pensioners. For instance, Holzmann (2000, p. 21) argues that “the principal advantage 
o f a multi-pillar pension scheme lies in risk diversification. Not all o f the population’s 
retirement portfolio will be held hostage to political and demographic risk”. However, 
this is only true if the risks associated with public and private pensions are negatively 
correlated or, at a minimum, unrelated. While it may be the case that political risk and 
investment/management risk are independent, again this is ultimately an empirical 
question.
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Finally there is a practical argument for funding, which may be relevant if swings in 
government expenditure are too large to be absorbed wholly by changes in public debt. 
For instance, if public spending is projected to grow rapidly in the future (perhaps 
because of a decision to link the basic pension to earnings) then the sustainable tax 
burden might be so far above current revenue that all public debt would quickly be paid 
off. At this point some kind of national trust fund (as recently created in Ireland, for 
example, and as proposed by A1 Gore in the run-up to the November 2000 US 
elections), would need to be created to allow tax rates to be smoothed. However, this is 
rather more problematic than paying off debt, as it requires a new institutional 
framework to be established, and potentially runs the risk of state interference in 
investment decisions (Greenspan, 1999). In this case funding part of the state’s pension 
obligations may be seen as a way to offset some of the necessary reduction in public 
debt, thus avoiding the need to create a public fund invested in equities. In the UK this 
is perhaps the strongest argument for funding pensions - by bringing forward this part 
of public spending funding will create room for increases in spending on other benefits 
or, if 5% real increases are kept up in perpetuity, in spending on the NHS.
4.6 Conclusion
Banks, Disney and Smith’s (2000, p. 595) analysis of the lessons which can be drawn 
from generational accounting concluded that “generational accounts are at best a first 
order approximation o f the object o f interest -  contemporaneous and lifetime living 
standards”. Though this criticism is perhaps too harsh - generational accounting does 
not claim to be a way of analysing living standards - it does point towards the lack of 
clarity about why policy should be looked at in this way. What generational accounting 
is not, and can never be, is a measure of ‘generational equity’. If the concept means 
anything at all it should surely take into account wider considerations such as 
environmental damage, resource depletion, etc. The real role for generational 
accounting is therefore as a means of calculating whether existing tax revenue will be 
sufficient to cover future bills -  it is the ‘inter-temporal budget gap’ (as CSK call it) 
which should be the focus for attention.
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However, even on this level the generational accounts miss out important influences on 
the government’s fiscal position; for instance, no account is taken of the effects of 
changes in the level of public investment or the implicit debts accumulated under the 
private finance initiative. Nevertheless, with the advent of resource accounting, and if 
sufficient time is invested in constructing models, there is some hope that such 
techniques will offer a useful way of assessing the state of the public finances. In 
particular, if models become sufficiently sophisticated, the inter-temporal budget gap 
might replace the ‘golden rule’ as a guide to whether fiscal policy is sustainable in the 
long run, and hence what level of public borrowing (debt repayment) is optimal. In 
other words, generational accounts may provide the compass through which tax rates 
can be smoothed over time, thus minimising the distortionary effects of taxation (Barro, 
1979, p. 944). But continuing this metaphor, no matter how much generational 
accounts are improved there will inevitably be a need for ‘in-flight’ corrections: 
looking into the future is an enormously difficult business, and small changes in 
assumptions can make a large difference to final estimates.
Some ‘down-side’ risks in relation to health spending were discussed in Section 4.4, 
suggesting that the estimates presented in Section 4.2 were too optimistic. However, 
there are also significant ‘up-side’ risks to future public spending. In terms of health­
care, it is possible that improved technology will result in a compression of morbidity 
(i.e. people will live relatively healthy lives before dying suddenly in very old age), so 
that changes in demography overstate future demands on the NHS. At the extreme, 
advances in genetic engineering could result in (for instance) a cure for cancer, with 
dramatic reductions in health costs ensuing. Moreover, the projection for productivity 
growth used in the generational accounts (1.75%) may prove to be too cautious.
Though economic analysis has traditionally suggested that productivity improvements 
slow down as societies grow richer (due to diminishing marginal returns from capital 
accumulation), commentators such as Castells (2000) point to the potential for 
information technology to transform productivity and economic growth rates.
If the government is successful in its aims to increase the UK’s long run rate of 
productivity growth then the UK generational accounts would record a very substantial 
surplus. The best guess, however, is that this position has not been reached. Moreover,
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as Part B discusses, the problems facing the UK pension system in any case imply that 
future public spending will probably need to rise. Hence even if the baseline 
assumptions and projection outlined earlier are accepted, a modest fiscal tightening 
would then be required.
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Part B. Pension reform in practice: the State Second Pension
This part looks at one specific pension reform: the proposal to replace SERPS with a 
new State Second Pension outlined in the Green Paper ‘A New Contract for Welfare: 
Partnership in Pensions' (DSS, 1998, Ch. 6). Chapter 5 sets out the background to the 
reform by providing a brief history o f pension policy in the UK, focusing in particular 
on the origins o f SERPS ( the pension reform introduced by the 1974-1979 Labour 
administration), and by outlining the rationale fo r  the new scheme. Chapter 6 then 
describes the reform in detail and analyses its effects on pensioner incomes and on the 
public finances.
153
5. The origins of the State Second Pension: a brief history of state
pension provision in the UK
This Chapter and Chapter 6 look at one particular pension reform: the replacement of 
SERPS by the State Second Pension (S2P) legislated for in the 2000 Child Support, 
Pensions and Social Security Act (and first set out in the Green Paper A new contract 
for welfare: Partnership in Pensions, DSS, 1998, pp. Ch. 6) . The details of the
reform are in Chapter 6, which also sets out its effect on pensioner incomes and on the 
public finances. However, this chapter first describes the historical background to the 
introduction of the S2P, tracing the development of pension provision in the UK from 
its inception in 1908 through to the present day (Sections 5.1 -  5.3), and the rationale 
for the new scheme (Section 5.4).
The historical analysis concentrates on the period after 1955, and, after this date, on the 
policy debate within the Labour Party (rather than in government or in Parliament). As 
we shall see, the roots of Labour’s current pension policies lie in the document 
National Superannuation, which was approved at the Party’s 1957 conference. The 
introduction of SERPS over twenty years later stems directly from the policies adopted 
then, and, in turn, the introduction of the S2P can be seen as a pragmatic response to 
the inherent flaws in SERPS. Understanding the S2P therefore requires an explanation 
of why ‘Old’ Labour came to enthuse about eamings-related social insurance, in spite 
its lack of clear redistributive qualities, and in the face of the more progressive ideas 
put forward (at least initially) by Richard Titmuss. This is the job of Section 5.2. 
However, before looking at Labour’s Damascene conversion to the principle of
136 At the time of writing the government’s plan is to introduce the S2P in April 2002, though there is 
some doubt as to whether the necessary administrative changes can be made by this date. The move to 
the full ‘stage 2 ’ scheme (see Section 6.3) would then take place some five years later, i.e. not until 2006 
or 2007. It should also be noted that two other changes were included in the Green Paper. First, is the 
move to linking the level of Income Support for pensioners to earnings rather than prices (the policy of 
the previous Conservative government), and to re-brand it as a ‘minimum income guarantee’. However, 
this change was in fact announced in the March 1998 Budget, six months before the Green Paper, and 
hence is included in baseline policy here (see Section 2.2). Second, the Green Paper heralded the 
introduction of ‘Stakeholder’ pensions, a new form of personal pension for low and moderate earners. 
Though this reform will have some implications for pensioner incomes, through reducing costs and 
charges and hence leaving a bigger sum to be annuitised on retirement, these effects are not sufficiently 
large to be considered in the analysis in this thesis. This element of Labour’s reforms is therefore 
ignored.
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eamings-relation, it is first necessary to describe the development of pensions in the 
UK in the years prior to National Superannuation.
5.1 From the Poor Law to flat-rate social insurance
The earliest form of state pension provision in the UK was the means tested scheme 
introduced in 1908 by the Liberal government of H. H. Asquith. As set out 
comprehensively in Macnicol (1998, esp. Parts I and II), from which the analysis in this 
section is largely drawn, the 1908 scheme grew out of the system of outdoor relief 
which had developed under the Poor Law, whereby assistance payments were made to 
the ‘deserving’ elderly poor without them being forced to endure the harsh conditions 
of the workhouse. In both structure and purpose the 1908 scheme was therefore similar 
to the means-tested assistance provided through Income Support -  it was a mechanism 
for keeping older people out of extreme poverty (and thereby out of the reach of the 
Poor Law; see Gilbert, 1966, pp. 228-230). As such, from its earliest beginnings the 
UK’s pension system differed markedly from the kind of comprehensive social 
insurance systems which, following Bismarck’s landmark legislation of 1889, came to 
dominate pension provision in continental Europe.
Moreover, the reason for the introduction of state pensions in the UK was quite 
different from that in Germany and elsewhere. While Bismarck had seen his scheme as 
a means of tying-in workers to the market economy through enlarging the social 
functions of the state, the development of public pension provision in the UK cannot be 
seen simply as an attempt to ‘buy off’ the proletariat. Macnicol suggests that a number 
of factors were at work. One, certainly, was the prospect that the newly enfranchised 
working classes would vote for more radically redistributive programmes, as espoused 
by the Independent Labour Party and other socialist groups, unless their interests were 
accommodated (see Gilbert, 1966, pp. 202-203, for evidence of the effect of Labour’s 
growing parliamentary representation on the Liberal government’s post-1906 
programme). But more prosaic factors were as, if not more, important in persuading 
Asquith’s government of the need to introduce state pensions. Macnicol (Ch. 2) 
highlights in particular the arguments of industrial efficiency which favoured such a 
reform: state pensions might promote a shake-out of older workers and boost
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productivity; they would relieve firms of their (moral) duty to look after ‘worn-out’ 
workers; by reducing Poor Law expenditure on the elderly a national pension scheme 
would reduce the burden of local taxes on business (who were obliged to finance local 
poverty relief); and, by removing the oldest from the Poor Law, pensions would help to 
maintain the tough benefit conditionality applied to the working-age population, thus 
(in their terms) improving the operation of the labour market.
That some form of state pension provision should have been introduced at the start of 
the twentieth century is therefore unsurprising. However, the fact that the 1908 scheme 
was tax-financed and means-tested is more of a puzzle. The first of these meant that the 
effect of the scheme was to redistribute income directly from the rich to the (older) 
poor (Gilbert, 1966, p. 159); as the vast majority of manual workers had insufficient 
earnings to pay tax, the benefits provided by the scheme were paid for by the 
professional and upper classes. Arguably, rather than satiating demands for broader 
redistributive measures, the scheme therefore acted as the thin edge of a highly-populist 
wedge (Thane, 1982, p. 84). Moreover, the fact that the scheme was means-tested gave 
those calling for universal tax-financed pensions a further argument for expanding state 
provision. As documented by Macnicol ( pp. 171-175), and by Hannah (1986, p. 29), 
under the 1908 legislation large sections of the working classes had little or no 
incentive to save for old age: the means test applied to the state pension meant that if 
they contributed to a savings scheme (as many trade unions and friendly societies had 
started to run), or if their employer set up an occupational pension scheme, 
consumption during their working lives would be reduced for little or no gain in terms 
of an enhanced income later in life137. Hence, given the consensus that self-provision 
by the working class should be encouraged, and the adverse effect of the means test on 
the development of voluntary pensions (including occupational schemes), some move 
towards a more universal basis for entitlement was probably inevitable.
The key question which post-1908 reformers faced was therefore whether universal (or 
near-universal) pensions should be tax-financed or ‘contributory’, i.e. on a social
137 This is the problem of moral hazard discussed in detail in Section 7.1. For examples of the practical 
effect of means testing on the development of private pensions in the UK at the start of the twentieth 
century see Hannah (1986, Ch.s 2 and 3). Walley (1972, pp. 132-134) also highlights the problem of 
additions to means-tested benefits to cover housing costs, arguing that the gap between the basic pension 
and Supplementary Benefit (now Income Support) was a key issue for reformers in the 1960s and 1970s.
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insurance basis. With heavy backing from the Treasury, the latter view won the day, 
and in 1925 Neville Chamberlain introduced a new Act to extend National Insurance 
from sickness and unemployment to provision for old age. The UK’s peculiar system of 
flat-rate social insurance, variations on which were in operation throughout the 
following half-century, originates with this legislation.
In essence the new scheme obliged manual workers (and others earning below £250 a 
year) to pay a weekly flat-rate insurance ‘stamp’, in return for which they would 
receive flat-rate pension benefits in retirement. Even though this meant take-home pay 
was reduced, the benefits offered by the scheme were sufficient to overcome objections 
from the labour movement. For one, employers also paid the stamp and, together with 
the Exchequer contribution, this meant that employees met less than half the cost of the 
scheme138. And in contrast to the means-tested scheme, which applied only to people 
over the age of 70, contributors would become eligible for the National Insurance 
pension at 65, and women would qualify for pensions in their own right (see Thane, 
1982, p. 198, for a detailed description of the scheme). But the most important factor in 
securing popular support for the new scheme was that the level of benefits it promised 
would be significantly above existing benefit levels under the 1908 scheme. Hence, 
from the labour movement’s point-of-view, not only did the scheme appear to be a 
good deal (due to the Exchequer and employer contributions), it also lent support to 
voluntary savings schemes and to the growing number of occupational pension 
schemes (which were concentrated in highly unionised industries).
However, in practice the scheme failed to live up to the hopes of its supporters. In 
particular, the pensions it produced failed to keep up with rising expectations about the 
level of income which should be provided for the poorest, and increasingly during the 
1930s local Poor Law authorities paid supplements to those who relied wholly on their 
National Insurance pension (Hannah, 1986, p. 53). While materially such payments
138 While in general it is a fallacy that employee, employer and Exchequer contributions are 
economically distinct (in that they are all ultimately paid by individuals), the distributional incidence of 
each type of contribution can vary significantly. In the pre-war era, when employee contributions were 
flat-rate, and when highly progressive income and estate taxes accounted for a greater proportion of 
government revenue, the Exchequer contribution effectively redistributed income from richer taxpayers 
to poorer National Insurance contributors and benefit recipients. It was therefore an important 
redistributive element within the scheme.
157
were minor, they cut to the heart of the problem with the scheme: unless benefits were 
set high enough, and were adjusted to take account of rising prosperity, the scheme 
would fail to relegate means tested benefits to a subsidiary role. But increasing the 
level of benefits would mean higher contributions from employees, unless the balance 
of contributions was altered. Given the straitened economic circumstances of the 1930s 
reducing take-home pay was not seen as feasible, and the government was also 
unwilling or unable to increase its own contribution, or that of employers. Hence 
contribution income, and therefore benefit levels, were severely constrained.
The failings of the existing social insurance scheme were set out explicitly by 
Beveridge (1942, paragraph 237). However, his proposals for reforming the system did 
not fundamentally alter Chamberlain’s scheme139. Flat-rate contributions for flat-rate 
benefits remained a central feature of National Insurance, though a somewhat larger 
Exchequer contribution was envisaged140. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the constraining 
effect of flat-rate contributions on the level of benefits once again soon became 
apparent. Almost immediately after the new scheme was introduced benefit levels fell 
in relation to average wages, and in fact the level of benefits it provided never greatly 
exceeded that of assistance benefits. Given that such benefits also made provision for 
meeting housing costs, the extent of means testing among pensioners remained 
substantial. Hence the scheme achieved neither its objective of alleviating poverty 
among the elderly without recourse to a means test, nor of encouraging voluntary 
saving amongst all those of working age (Evans and Glennerster, 1993, pp. 60-62; 
Lowe, 1994, pp. 120-122). The Beveridge report does not therefore mark a 
fundamental turning point in the history of UK pension provision (though the same 
could not be said of social policy more generally); its proposals built on existing 
policies and did relatively little to tackle the underlying problems with flat-rate social
139 The essential continuity between his proposals for financing social security and earlier schemes is 
acknowledged in paragraph 277 of the Report. Ellis (1989, paragraph 5) similarly comments that
“Beveridge’s proposals fo r  pensions largely retained the structure o f the 1925 scheme”.
140 The increasing proportion of costs to be borne by the Exchequer are discussed in paragraphs 287 to 
293 of the Report. However, though his long run aim was to iincrease the proportion of expenditure met 
through taxation, in the short run Beveridge proposed that moist of the immediate cost of his scheme 
should be met by employees and employers (due to the other burdens which would face the government 
in the aftermath of the war). In fact, as discussed by Titmuss ((1955, pp. 65-66), by 1955 the Exchequer 
bore a smaller proportion of the cost of social insurance than iit had under the pre-war scheme. For a 
detailed description of how this came about see Labour Party (1957, p59).
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insurance which had already surfaced (Thane, 1982, p. 254). More important in terms 
of understanding the development of the UK’s social insurance system, and the move 
to eamings-relation in particular, is the policy document National Superannuation 
(Labour Party 1957).
5.2 Unpicking Beveridge: the move to earnings-related social insurance
The ideas in National Superannuation were largely based on the arguments of three 
LSE academics: Richard Titmuss, Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend. Indeed, 
somewhat over half of the document is taken up by a memorandum by the three who, 
reporting as a ‘technical sub-committee’, set out how an earnings-related pension 
scheme might work in practice, and its financial effects on individuals and the 
Exchequer. Along with the writings of Richard Crossman, the politician most 
associated with the scheme at its outset, and the one who first sought to see it 
implemented in 1969, it is the analyses of these three authors which provides the best 
guide to why flat-rate social insurance was abandoned.
The first important attack on the existing model came in a 1955 Fabian pamphlet by 
Abel-Smith and Townsend. Rather than tinkering with the flat-rate benefit/flat-rate 
contribution model of Chamberlain and Beveridge, they argued that far more radical 
change was needed, proposing instead that both pensions and contributions should be 
related to earnings. Their reasons were fourfold. First, they noted the regressive effect 
of flat-rate contributions, which acted as a ‘poll tax’ and discouraged part-time work. 
They suggested that proportionate contributions could raise more revenue while 
reducing the cost of National Insurance Contributions for low-paid workers. Second, 
they argued that Beveridge’s insistence on flat-rate benefits was ill-suited to the 
growing prosperity of the post-war years, and that true security in the modem era must 
take account of the “habits and standards o f life to which people have become 
accustomed’(Abel-Smith and Townsend 1955, p. 5). Third, they saw earnings-related 
pensions as the only way to ensure that National Insurance benefit scales (and indeed 
other benefit rates) could be ‘dynamised’, so that their value kept up with increases in
159
national prosperity/eamings141. Last, they suggested that it was only if the flat-rate 
pension kept pace with increases in earnings that reliance on means tested assistance 
could be reduced, and that, even then, compulsory additional pension provision might 
play a further important part in minimising the number of pensioners on assistance 
benefits. In sum, earnings-related benefits would simultaneously reduce reliance on 
means tested benefits (through additional pensions forming a wedge between the basic 
pension and National Assistance), dynamise the flat-rate pension so that annual 
increases occurred automatically, and ease the path to earnings-related contributions. 
Moreover, in their analysis the provision of earnings-related pensions was right in 
principle, and was a necessary part of any modem conception of ‘social security’.
Though writing in the same year as Abel-Smith and Townsend, Titmuss (1955, pp. 68- 
73)142 offered a rather different perspective on the problems with existing 
arrangements. For him the real issue was the way that private pensions were organised 
and, in effect, subsidised by the state via tax relief (see Section 1 A.3). In terms of social 
policy it was the way this ‘division of welfare’ was determined which was important, 
not the structure of National Insurance per se. Titmuss’s analysis was largely based on 
two official reports produced in 1954 -  the Millard Tucker committee’s inquiry into the 
tax treatment of pensions (Cm. 9063) and the more general report of the Phillips 
committee (Cm. 9333) -  which had highlighted the extent to which private pension 
provision was supported by tax reliefs. According to the latter report the cost of such 
reliefs was around £100 million, rather more than the £45 million cost of the Exchequer 
contribution to the National Insurance Fund and the additional £34 million lost through 
exempting NI contributions from income tax143. Though both reports argued in favour 
of retaining, or even extending, the tax privileges given to private pension schemes,
141 As discussed by Griindger (1994, pp. 149-150), the concept of dynamisation was “decisive” in the 
concurrent debate in Germany on pension reform, and Abel-Smith and Townsend may have benefited 
from contact with German colleagues in 1953.
142 In order to show the course of the debate during the 1950s Titmuss’s contribution, in the form of his 
essay Pension Systems and Population Change, is attributed to 1955, the year it was first published in the 
form of an article. However, references here are in fact to the third (1976) edition of Essays on the 
Welfare State, the collection it was subsequently published in.
143 All figures taken from Titmuss (1955, p. 69). Note that the estimated cost of tax reliefs shows the 
gross loss o f revenue resulting from exempting pension contributions and pension scheme revenue from 
the tax base. As discussed in Agulnik and Le Grand (1998, pp. 407-408), the more relevant figure is the 
net cost of tax (and National Insurance) relief. Nevertheless, Titmuss’s argument that the cost o f such 
reliefs was substantial, and their impact highly regressive, holds true.
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Titmuss concluded that a radical re-balancing of priorities was required. Tax reliefs on 
private pension schemes should be reduced or abolished, thus simultaneously widening 
the tax base and making it more progressive, while the “long term and foreseeable 
dependencies o f old age should be shouldered by general taxation just as the long term 
dependencies o f children are” (Titmuss, 1955, p.67). While stopping short of 
recommending a wholly non-contributory scheme, the thrust of Titmuss’s proposals 
was clear: increases in employee contributions should be minimised, more of the 
burden of paying for higher flat-rate pensions should come from the Exchequer, and 
some if not all of the additional revenue needed to pay for this contribution should 
come from curtailing tax reliefs provided to private pensions.
Titmuss’s highlighting of the cost of tax relief was not simply a device to persuade 
workers that better pensions could be paid for without hitting their pay packet. Rather, 
he saw a reduction in state support for private pensions as part and parcel of a 
deliberate attempt to diminish their extent and influence144. He had two principal 
objections to occupational provision. First, the fact that (at that time) people changing 
jobs had to forfeit all employers’ contributions was grossly unfair to contributors and, 
by limiting labour mobility, would lead to “a gradual hardening in the economic 
arteries o f the nation” (Titmuss, 1955, p.73). Second, he thought that the existence of 
occupational pensions would tend to exacerbate inequalities in later life, arguing that 
“the outlines o f a dangerous social schism are clear, and they are enlarging... Already 
it is possible to see two nations in old age” (Titmuss, 1955, pp.73-74).
While many of Titmuss’s criticisms were shared by Abel-Smith and Townsend, who 
similarly devoted a good deal of attention to the cost of tax reliefs, it would have been 
possible for their analyses to lead in different directions. Titmuss did not attack the 
principle of flat-rate benefits145, nor indeed of flat-rate contributions, but argued that if
144 Hannah (1986, p.51) concurs with Titmuss in suggesting that the post-war growth in occupational 
pension provision was largely driven by the tax advantages they were afforded.
145 In a later piece, The Social Division of Welfare,Titmuss does though comment that if (as he 
suggests) the role of ‘occupational welfare’ is reduced, there naturally arises a question as to “whether 
and to what extent social service dependency benefits should be proportionately related to occupational 
and income achievement” (Titmuss 1957, p52/3). He does not answer his rhetorical question, but this 
does at least indicate that he saw room for disagreement with Beveridge’s dictum that: ‘in establishing a 
national minimum, it (the state) should leave room and encouragement fo r  voluntary action by each 
individual to provide more than the minimum for himself and his family” (Beveridge 1942, p 6/7).
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the value of benefits was to be improved then higher Exchequer contributions were 
needed. The ‘two nations in old age’ which he forecast could just as easily have been 
averted through reducing eamings-related (i.e. occupational) provision and bolstering 
the finances of the NI scheme.
In contrast, Abel-Smith and Townsend argued that eamings-related provision was right 
in principle, but that the structure of the labour market was such that many people were 
excluded from occupational provision, and that, moreover, many of these schemes had 
undesirable features (such as the lack of preserved rights for leavers and the problems 
surrounding inflation-proofing). As described by Crossman (1972, p. 10), in place of the 
‘levelling-down’ strategy which might logically follow from Titmuss’s analysis, they 
believed that the state should set itself the more ambitious objective of ensuring that 
“what is now the privilege o f a small minority... shall become the rule”. It was this 
latter course which the Labour Party was to pursue, first in opposition and then in 
government.
The proposals in National Superannuation therefore set out a radically different agenda 
for pension policy. Beveridge’s scheme, which Labour had legislated for only a decade 
earlier, was to be ditched. In place of the earlier emphasis on securing a universal 
subsistence income without recourse to the means test, Labour now proposed that ‘half 
pay on retirement’ should be the nation’s goal. Beveridge’s flat-rate benefits and 
contributions were to be largely replaced by eamings-related pensions and eamings- 
related contributions. The scheme, as outlined in 1957, was to work as follows. 
Everyone not in an ‘approved’ occupational scheme was to become a member of the 
new social insurance scheme, into which contributions proportionate to their income 
would be paid. To avoid very high earners accming extremely large pension 
entitlements there would be a ceiling on the amount payable, as well as a floor below 
which no contributions were required. All workers would earn entitlement to a flat-rate 
pension, at a rather higher level than the existing basic pension, and to an eamings- 
related additional pension. The latter component would be calculated on the basis of an 
individual’s earnings in each year, revalued in line with changes in average earnings, 
and the number of years that they had contributed for over their lifetime. A rather 
complicated formula (which varied accrual rates with the age of the worker) was
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designed to ensure an eamings-replacement rate of around 30% so that, in combination 
with the basic pension, a worker on average earnings throughout life would retire on a 
pension equivalent to half pay. Poorer workers would enjoy a rather higher replacement 
rate (due to the flat-rate element) and richer workers would see a somewhat larger drop 
in their income on retirement. Widows would inherit full rights to the basic pension 
(unless they qualified on the basis of their own contribution) and half rights to the 
additional pension.
But for the existence of occupational schemes, the proposals in National 
Superannuation would have largely replicated the social insurance systems operated in 
other countries. However, the spread of occupational provision, and the importance 
within the Labour Party of unions with members in such schemes, made it politically 
impossible to simply impose a national scheme and expect occupational pensions to 
amend their benefits accordingly. The 1957 plans therefore contained an important 
development from Abel-Smith and Townsend’s earlier work: members of occupational 
schemes would not be obliged to join the new scheme so long as their schemes 
afforded at least equivalent pension benefits. Instead, in a new addition to the pensions' 
vocabulary, members of such schemes would be able to ‘contract-out’, paying less into 
the state scheme and receiving less back in return. Though the authors may not have 
appreciated it at the time, by ceding this principle they had effectively placed a 
straitjacket on any ambitions to use the new scheme as an instrument of redistribution 
(see next section).
It is also worth noting two points which were left out of Labour’s new proposals. First 
Titmuss’s suggestion that the burden of the NI scheme borne by the Exchequer should 
be increased was explicitly rejected. Mimicking the sentiments expressed by Beveridge 
(1942, pp 107/8), National Superannuation put the argument as follows:
“I f  pensions became non-contributory and were financed directly by the 
Exchequer, a Labour Chancellor would be theoretically free to raise the 
pension scale immediately to a real subsistence level. In fact, however, this 
change might well make it more difficult to achieve a subsistence pension.
There is a very real limit to the amount which the taxpayer -  and that includes 
the working-class taxpayer -  is prepared to pay in taxes...Moreover,...there is a 
legitimate fear among trade unionists that, if  the State took over the whole 
responsibility fo r  financing social security benefits, then the State might one day
163
slash those benefits in order to weather an economic storm. As long as benefits 
are ‘earned* by payment o f contribution and financed out o f an Insurance 
Fund, they are fe lt to be something which the worker receives as o f right and 
which no politician can take away from h im ” (Labour Party, 1957, pp 9/10)
Second, though the inequity of the tax relief system is discussed in National 
Superannuation (pp 15/16), no mention is made of any new restrictions which Labour 
would impose on the availability of such reliefs. Titmuss’s escape route for the flat-rate 
scheme -  whereby increased benefits would be paid for through reduced tax reliefs -  
had fallen by the wayside in the rush to develop and popularise the new ‘dynamic’ 
pension scheme.
Opposition within the Labour Party to this radical change in policy was muted.
Though, as Hannah (1986, p56) records, “Aneurin Bevan and others on the left were 
less than enthusiastic about a scheme which appeared to perpetuate inequalities from  
working life into old age”, raising benefit levels through increasing the flat-rate 
contribution would have been even more inegalitarian and, as noted above, Titmuss’s 
ideas for increasing the Exchequer contribution were seen as a political non-starter.
And while the union movement was initially sceptical (Glennerster, 1995, p. 105), trade 
unionists eventually became the enthusiastic backers of the plan (though Fawcett, 1999, 
pp. 167-168, suggests that Jack Jones and other trade unionists remained more 
committed to flat-rate pensions, leading to a dilution of Labour’s final plans for 
SERPS). By offering contracting-out and new rights for people without access to 
occupational schemes the proposals in National Superannuation seemed to provide 
something for everyone. Existing pension schemes would be protected while the new 
scheme would provide equivalent benefits for those outside such provision. Because 
the shift to proportionate contributions was progressive the initial impact of the scheme 
was redistributive and, moreover, the change to proportionate contributions would 
simultaneously boost revenue so that higher benefits for today’s pensioners could be 
afforded. Though, on the document’s own admission, the initial contribution rates 
would need to be increased in the future, it was generally felt that “if a small increase 
in contributions is needed in the nineteen-eighties, it is likely to be well within the 
earning capacity o f the individual to pay at that date” (Labour Party, 1957, p60)146.
146 Note that this meant future workers were expected to be willing to pay higher proportionate 
contributions, not just higher absolute contributions. In other words, though (in these original plans) the
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How the 1957 policy paper finally came to be enacted, nearly two decades later, is 
described in detail in Ellis (1989) and in Fawcett (1999), as well as in Glennerster 
(1995, pp. 105-115), Walley (1972, pp. 168-176) and Timmins (1995, pp. 347-350)147. 
Though between its adoption and implementation the scheme proposed by Titmuss, 
Abel-Smith and Townsend changed significantly, the State Eamings-Related Pension 
Scheme (SERPS) which was finally enacted in 1975 (with a start date of April 1978)
1 A O
bears many similarities to the proposals in National Superannuation . Indeed, the 
vicissitudes of the policy development process were such that the legislation introduced 
by Barbara Castle (following on from the 1974 ‘Better Pensions for All* White Paper) 
was rather closer to the original 1957 blue-print than either Labour’s 1969 proposals or 
the Conservatives’ subsequent attempt to establish a ‘national reserve pension’ scheme. 
However it should be noted that two of the changes commonly attributed to the Castle 
scheme were in fact introduced prior to that legislation. First, the move to fully 
eamings-related contributions had been completed by the 1973 Pensions Act which, but 
for the fall of the Heath government in 1974, would have brought in the Conservative’s 
preferred pension scheme. The incoming Labour government merely retained this 
element of the legislation while abandoning the rest (Fawcett, 1999, p. 177). Second,
move to earnings-relation was to be partially funded (i.e. initial contribution rates would be above those 
implied by pure PAYG finance), a funding gap would still remain in the future. As it turned out, NIC 
rates in the 1980s were much higher than National Superannuation envisaged, though this was due 
mostly to the decline in Exchequer contributions.
147 The existence of the ‘graduated pension’ scheme, which operated between 1961 and 1975, should 
particularly be noted. Superficially, this scheme might be seen to mark the beginning of eamings-related 
social insurance in the UK. However, the system had no mechanism for uprating the value of benefits 
which people earned, so that, in an era of high inflation, the real value of the pensions produced by the 
scheme were very low, and most people saw it largely as a means of justifying the addition of a 
graduated element to NICs (over and above the flat-rate ‘stamp’ which continued in existence).
148 The most significant modifications to Labour’s earlier plans were as follows. First, rather then 
letting the scheme mature naturally over a 50-year period (as envisaged under the original proposals), 
‘accelerated accrual’ provisions meant that people could start drawing full benefits after only 20 years. 
Second, rather than pensions being calculated on the basis of average lifetime earnings, with accrual 
rates varying by age, benefits were to be calculated by reference to an individual’s best 20 years of 
employment. Third, the abolition of the retirement condition for the basic pension, which had been 
anticipated in National Superannuation, was not pursued. Fourth, provision for widows, and indeed 
widowers, was further improved, with both the additional and basic elements of the pension being 
transferred in full to a surviving spouse. Fifth, the self-employed would continue to only qualify for the 
basic pension, paying lower contributions in return for the lack of earnings-related provision. Last, the 
objective of providing half pay on retirement for the average worker was slightly downgraded, the final 
scheme providing a basic pension of around a fifth of average earnings with an earnings-related 
supplement which, for someone with a full contribution record, would provide a pension of a quarter of 
their earnings.
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the link between the basic pension and earnings in fact already formed part of the 
government’s programme and, arguably, the ‘dynamisation’ of this element of 
provision was not reliant on the creation of SERPS (see Fawcett, 1999, pp. 173-175, for 
a discussion of how, through the abandonment of ‘crediting-in’, SERPS became 
uncoupled from increases in the basic pension). Hence two of the major problems 
which had led Labour to abandon flat-rate benefits two decades earlier had, apparently, 
been solved without the ornate structure of an eamings-related pension scheme.
5.3 The failure of SERPS and pension policy under the Conservatives
The history of SERPS since its introduction in 1978 has not been a happy one. Not only 
has it been cut back twice, under the Conservative’s Pension Acts of 1986 and 1995, 
the Party responsible for its birth has now seen fit to abolish it altogether. Rather than 
restoring the Conservative’s cuts and rebuilding SERPS (as proposed most notably by 
Townsend and Walker, 1995), the Labour government elected in May 1997 instead 
chose to replace the scheme with the S2P. The structure of the new scheme is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 6. It is useful first, however, to look at the elements within 
SERPS which made its ultimate demise unsurprising, and, inter-alia, at the reasons 
why state pension provision has failed to gain the same kind of status in the UK as in 
the US or continental Europe149.
Two structural features of eamings-related social insurance in the UK are particularly 
important. First is the fact that people with occupational pensions (joined after 1988 by 
people with personal pensions) are allowed to contract-out of SERPS, a feature of the 
scheme which, as discussed in the last section, was made almost inevitable by its late 
introduction. Therefore, unlike most other countries where the state scheme provides 
pensions for all, SERPS splits eamings-related provision between the public and 
private sectors. Wholly predictably, this means SERPS provides pensions 
predominantly for low earners and (often synonymously) women, while higher earners 
are catered for by private schemes. A broad political constituency supporting the
149 Arguably, the National Health Service occupies the same position in the political firmament of the 
UK as social insurance pension schemes do in other countries.
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scheme has therefore failed to emerge, as witnessed by the comparative ease with 
which the Conservatives implemented cuts to the scheme.
Second, and more important in explaining the weakness of state pensions as a whole in 
the UK, is the fact that eamings-related provision was introduced alongside the older 
flat-rate scheme, so that a clear dividing line between the minimum income and 
accustomed living standards objectives of policy was built into the scheme. As such, 
there was no synergy between SERPS and the basic pension, most importantly in terms 
of ‘dynamising’ the level of the minimum (Fawcett, 1999, p. 180). This, in turn, meant 
that it was technically feasible for the Conservatives to announce (in 1980) that the 
basic pension would no longer automatically increase in line with earnings, something 
that could only have been implemented through lengthy legislation in a fully-integrated 
social insurance scheme. Particularly as prices were rising faster than earnings at the 
time the announcement was made, this meant that rallying opposition to the ‘cut’ (in 
and out of parliament) proved difficult. By the time that real earnings started rising 
again the policy had become firmly established (alongside Mrs Thatcher’s 
premiership).
The subsequent history of pension policy in the UK therefore lends some support to 
Abel-Smith and Townsend’s assertion that eamings-related social insurance is the best 
way of protecting the living standards of poorer pensioners. In the absence of any 
mechanism for linking benefits to earnings, consecutive Conservative governments 
adopted a policy of uprating all benefits in line with prices, so that their real level 
remained constant. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1, which shows how the real level of 
the basic pension, Income Support for pensioners and average earnings altered between 
1979 and 1997, setting the value of each in 1979 equal to 100. As can be seen, the 
policy of price uprating was not rigidly adhered to, and the real value of Income 
Support for pensioners increased by around 17% between 1979 and 1997 (in 
comparison the real value of the basic pension increased by only 2.5% over this 
period). However, changes in the structure of benefits brought in under the ‘Fowler 
reforms’ of the late 1980s explain much of the increase. Though these reforms 
increased the real value of Income Support for pensioners they also reduced eligibility 
to special payments for, e.g., large heating costs or to cover ‘lumpy’ expenditures on
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necessities such as cookers. The effect o f such payments is not captured in the analysis 
of headline benefit rates presented in Figure 5.1, and hence it does not provide an 
entirely accurate picture (Evans, Piachaud and Sutherland, 1994, pp. 10-17). In any 
event, whether or not allowance is made for changes in the micro-structure o f support, 
overall benefit rates clearly failed to keep pace with average earnings, which increased 
by nearly 40% between 1979 and 1997.
Figure 5.1
Real levels of benefits and earnings 1979-1997
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The Figure shows that the Conservatives did not pursue a policy o f targeting state 
transfers. Though there was some increase in the (headline) rate of means-tested 
assistance, the far more important trend was the decline in the level o f benefits relative 
to average earnings. The result was that, as shown by Evans (1998, Table 7.15), the 
number o f households over retirement age claiming means-tested benefits fell under the 
Conservatives (from 1.7 to 1.6 million between 1979 and 1994), in contrast to the 
working population and despite the increase in the pensioner population. Though both 
the Thatcher and Major governments frequently espoused the rhetoric o f targeting to 
defend their policies, in practical terms any desire to target resources on the poorest 
was subsumed by their concurrent attempts to re-define poverty as an absolute rather
-  Income Support lot pensioners
168
than a relative standard. Parsimony was achieved through reducing the value of all 
benefits (relative to earnings), rather than through targeting benefits on the most needy 
via means testing.
Nevertheless, in some ways the Conservative years can be seen as marking a period of 
unprecedented prosperity for pensioners in the UK. In spite of the fact that benefit rates 
were linked to prices, average pensioner incomes increased by 64% in real terms 
between 1979 and 1997/8 (averaging between single and couple households and after 
tax), nearly twice as fast as the 38% real growth in average earnings (DSS, 2000a, 
p22). Consequently the gap between pensioners’ and workers’ living standards 
narrowed, with average pensioner income rising from 49 to 57% of average earnings 
over this period. At the same time, the proportion of the poorest quintile of the 
population accounted for by pensioners fell from 37% in 1979 to 20% in 1998/9, so 
that in the most recent estimates pensioners are only barely over-represented among the 
poorest (DSS, 1995 and 2000b, Table D1 BHC including the self-employed). The link 
between old age and poverty described by Rowntree (1902, Ch. 5) and Booth (1894) 
would, on the basis of these figures, appear to have been broken.
Such an interpretation of the Conservative years would, however, be rather Panglossian 
- the benign picture painted above only tells part of the story. Increased prosperity did 
not benefit all pensioners equally. As shown by Johnson and Stears (1995, pp. 79-81) 
and DSS (2000a, pp. 24-25), income inequality among pensioners grew rapidly during 
the 1980s and 1990s, even more so than amongst the non-pensioner population. And 
the fact that pensioners now make up a smaller fraction of the poorest members of 
society largely reflects the declining fortunes of other household types, in particular 
lone parents and workless households under pension age. If half mean income is taken 
as a measure of poverty there were over one-and-a-half times as many poor pensioners 
in 1998/9 as in 1979, the proportion of single and couple pensioners with incomes 
below this threshold growing from 16% in both cases in 1979 to 26% and 25% 
respectively in 1998/9 (DSS, 1995 and 2000b, Table FI BHC including the self- 
employed). On this reading of the figures, therefore, the increased average prosperity of 
pensioners since 1979 has been associated with increased pensioner inequality, 
deepening pensioner poverty (relative to the half mean income standard), and, due to
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the policy of price-uprating benefits, reduced (or downward) income mobility during 
retirement.
5.4 Conclusion: rationale for the S2P
The situation facing the new (or ‘New’) Labour government which took office in May 
1997 was mixed. In terms of pensioner incomes there were three dominant themes:
• increased average incomes (relative to the working population),
• increased inequality,
• increased poverty (relative to the half mean income standard).
However these trends in inequality and poverty need to be put into context. The 1980s 
and 1990s saw remarkable changes in the UK income distribution, with inequality 
among the working population growing rapidly (see amongst others, Hills, 1998, Ch. 1, 
or Goodman, Johnson and Webb, 1997, pp. 91-105). This meant that though the 
percentage of pensioners under half mean income grew substantially under the 
Conservatives, by 1997 pensioners were no longer predominantly poor, in the sense 
that they now had a better-than-evens chance of not being in the bottom quintile of the 
entire population. Hence, seen from the point of view of maximising poverty 
alleviation, the case for increasing universal/categorical benefits for pensioners was 
weak.
Nevertheless, there was also clearly a need to ‘stop the rot’ in the living standards of 
the poorest pensioners. It is therefore in relation to the level of the minimum income 
standard that Labour makes its most significant break with pension policy under the 
Conservatives. While the basic pension will remain tied to prices, the government has 
declared that its “long term aim is that the new minimum income guarantee [Income 
Support for pensioners] should rise in line with earnings” (DSS, 1998, p4)150. New 
Labour therefore shares one of the main ambitions of earlier reformers such as Abel-
150 As discussed in Ross (1998, p. 102) such a change may in any case have been inevitable -  it is 
difficult to believe that the living standards of the poorest pensioners would have been allowed to 
constantly decline relative to the rest of the population.
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Smith, Townsend and Titmuss - to protect the living standards of the poorest - but 
envisages a quite different means for achieving these ends. Rather than the minimum 
income being provided automatically to (nearly) everyone through the basic pension, 
Labour now places its faith in the ability of means-tested benefits to effectively relieve 
poverty.
However, there are numerous objections to relying on such benefits. These are 
discussed at greater length in Sections 8.1 and 8.2 but, in brief, the main arguments 
against means-tested benefits are that they:
• do not secure a minimum income for all pensioners as, possibly due to social 
stigma, take-up is less than complete;
• may have an adverse effect in terms of horizontal equity -  they are ‘unfair’ to 
people who, having worked and saved in earlier life, might expect a higher 
retirement income than more spendthrift peers;
• reduce the incentive for individuals to save voluntarily (the same criticism as was 
levelled against Asquith’s 1908 scheme).
In terms of the importance the government attaches to each problem this list is probably 
in the correct order. It is clear that the government are either blase about the first 
problem or, more charitably, are confident that stigma can be reduced and take-up 
increased through administrative reforms - as in other areas of policy (see Jordan et al, 
2000, p. 91), the government is confident that new technology and/or bureaucratic 
incentives can overcome problems of benefit administration. Similarly, as indicated by 
its reforms for other client groups (e.g. the move towards targeting benefits for sick and 
disabled people, widows and, to a lesser extent, children), the government are also little 
concerned with horizontal (as opposed to vertical) equity. Neither pensioner poverty 
per se, nor equity, are the real reasons for the introduction of the S2P. Instead, it is the 
last problem -  the potential effect of means testing (or the prospect of means testing) 
on saving behaviour during individuals’ working lives -  which is the chief motivation 
for the replacement of SERPS with the S2P.
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The role of the new scheme is therefore fundamentally different to SERPS, in that 
rather than protecting accustomed livings standards its objective is to bridge the gap 
between the basic pension (rising with prices) and Income Support (rising with 
earnings). SERPS is essentially a means for individuals to redistribute resources across 
their lifecycle - it does not, by and large, redistribute between members of the same 
cohort. Consequently, it is of little help in achieving the government’s minimum 
income objective; as the Green Paper (DSS, 1998, p. 2) puts it: “SERPS, being 
eamings-related, gives least to those in greatest need*151. In contrast, the benefits 
provided by the S2P will not be proportional to lifetime earnings but will be partially 
flat-rate (see next chapter).
In conclusion, the S2P marks a partial return to Beveridge’s principle that the state 
should only concern itself with minimum (as opposed to accustomed) living standards. 
However, because the proposals do not envisage an equivalent return to flat-rate 
contributions (as in the pre-1975 National Insurance scheme) they mark a break from 
the insurance/actuarial principle that benefits should reflect contributions. What has not 
been abandoned, however is the idea that benefit rights must be earned. While some 
non-workers will receive S2P rights for periods spent out of employment (e.g. for time 
spent caring for a child under six), eligibility for S2P credits will be tightly drawn in 
comparison to the rules surrounding the basic pension (see Section 6.2). As such, the 
introduction of the scheme marks a movement not only away from the principle that 
benefits should be related to earnings, but also towards the principle that benefit rights 
should be conditioned on people working if they are able to. Despite the fact that the 
main effect of such eligibility conditions is to exclude precisely those groups who are 
most likely to be affected by saving disincentives, it appears that the political 
arguments which persuaded Labour to drop its opposition to social insurance remain as 
strong today as ever (see Macnicol, 1998, pp. 301-308, and Section 7.4).
151 The Green Paper’s real criticism of SERPS is therefore not that it doesn’t do what it set out to, but 
that what it set out to do is not worth doing. Note also that, as well as being an inefficient way of 
securing a minimum retirement income, in a revenue-neutral reform raising flat-rate benefits would be 
more redistributive than improving earnings-related benefits (Creedy, Disney and Whitehouse, 1993; 
Schluter,1997, pp. 61-69).
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6. The effects of the State Second Pension
According to Tony Blair’s introduction to the Green Paper A new contract fo r  welfare: 
Partnership in Pensions (DSS, 1998), the government’s aim for pension policy is to 
ensure “a secure and decent income in retirement for all”. As discussed at the end of 
the last chapter, in the short term this is to be achieved through increasing the level of 
Income Support for pensioners (the ‘minimum income guarantee’) with earnings, so 
that all pensioners have an entitlement to a “decent” minimum income. However, the 
government recognise that there are problems with this strategy, in particular with its 
effect on saving incentives. In the longer term the strategy is therefore to boost the 
second tier pension entitlements of low earners through the introduction of the State 
Second Pension (S2P). According to the Green Paper (pp. 2-3) this will reduce reliance 
on Income Support by providing “dramatically better pension provision for those 
earning less than £9,000 a year”, as well as providing “extra help to those on middle 
incomes (£9,000 - £18,500 a year)”. Nevertheless, though the S2P will increase 
expenditure on benefits and on contracted-out rebates (see Section 6.4), even after the 
reform the government expect that “public spending on pensions will decline as a 
share o f GDP” (DSS, 1998, p. 8). Overall, therefore, the government claim that their 
proposals will create a pension system which is “both fair and affordable” (DSS, 1998,
p. 8).
This chapter assesses whether the government’s claims for the S2P are justified by 
analysing the distributional and fiscal effects of the new scheme. Section 6.1 starts by 
setting out how the benefits provided by the S2P differ from SERPS and how, at least 
in theory, it should ensure that people have automatic pension rights above the level of 
Income Support. The analysis shows that in 2051 (when the scheme first becomes fully 
mature) someone with a full working life will receive first and second tier pension 
benefits worth slightly more than the minimum standard, at least at the point of 
retirement. Hence the S2P appears to provide extra benefits which are just sufficient to 
achieve its objective of keeping people off Income Support. However, as Section 6.2 
discusses, this kind of analysis is too simplistic and misses out a number of factors, 
such as income dynamics in retirement and household structure, which affect eligibility
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for means-tested assistance. Accordingly, microsimulation techniques are needed to 
assess the effectiveness of the S2P in practice, and Section 6.3 uses PENSIM to analyse 
its distributional effects. Section 6.4 then turns to the effect of the S2P on the public 
finances, using the NIESR generational accounting model described in Chapter 4 to see 
how the S2P affects the ‘sustainable tax burden’. Section 6.5 concludes through 
looking at the policy implications of this analysis.
6.1 Benefits under the S2P
As set out in Section 1 A.2, the benefits provided by SERPS are proportional to 
earnings -  following the reforms in the Conservative’s 1986 and 1995 Pension Acts the 
scheme provides all employees with a second pension worth 20% of their average 
lifetime earnings between the LEL and UEL. The key innovation in the S2P is to move 
away from this proportionate structure to one which is tilted in favour of low earners 
(reflecting the fact that the objective of the new scheme is to reduce reliance on Income 
Support rather than to protect accustomed living standards). It will do this through 
altering the structure of SERPS in four ways.
First, the S2P introduces a new lower threshold (set at £9,500 a year in 1999/2000), 
below which an individual’s actual earnings will be discounted for the purposes of 
calculating benefits, i.e. anyone earning below the lower threshold (but above the LEL) 
in any year will be treated as if they had earnings in that year at the threshold. This will 
provide a huge boost to the pension entitlements of people who spend much of their 
working life with earnings just above the LEL and, indeed, anyone who has a year of
|  M
low earnings, however transitory . Table 6.1 illustrates, showing the ‘reckonable 
earnings’ (i.e. the earnings on which benefits are calculated) under SERPS and under 
the S2P. For illustrative purposes the Table uses the LEL in 1999/2000 of £67 a week 
(£3480 a year); how the earnings limits and thresholds will alter in future years is 
discussed further below.
152 Note that the scheme affects benefit entitlements earned in a year -  it works on an annual rather than 
a lifetime basis. The S2P is therefore different from the minimum pension guarantee systems outlined by 
Atkinson (1995b, pp. 317-323), Hills (1997a) and Falkingham and Johnson (1995, pp. 207-213), all of 
which in effect create a ‘lifetime means-test’ (see Section 8.3).
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Table 6.1
‘Reckonable earnings’ under SERPS and the S2P for people earning less than the
lower threshold (in 1999/2000)
Earnings Earnings above 
the LEL
‘Reckonable 
earnings’ under 
SERPS
‘Reckonable 
earnings’ under 
the S2P
Increase in 
‘reckonable 
earnings’
£3500 £20 £20 £6020 £6000
£6500 £3020 £3020 £6020 £3000
£9500 £6020 £6020 £6020 0
The second difference between SERPS and the S2P relates to the relationship between 
benefits and earnings (the ‘accrual structure’ of the scheme). In place of SERPS’ 
uniform accrual rate of 20%, benefits under the S2P will accrue at different rates on 
different bands of earnings. Between the LEL and a lower threshold benefits will 
accrue at 40%, so that someone earning £9,500 a year (in 1999/2000) would qualify for 
twice the level of benefits they would have got under SERPS153. However, this extra 
generosity for lower earners will be tapered-away through reducing the marginal rate 
of accrual on the next tranche of earnings to 10%, half the rate of SERPS. It follows 
that the average rate of accrual for people earning more than the lower threshold will 
therefore gradually fall from 40%, as more and more of their earnings only count for 
benefit at the 10% rate. Eventually, though, this would result in the average rate falling 
below 20%, causing higher earners to receive lower benefits than they would have got 
under SERPS. To prevent this happening the accrual rate on earnings above an upper 
threshold therefore remains the same as under SERPS, (i.e. 20%)154. Accordingly the
153 Note that people earning less than £9,500 but more than the LEL will see their benefits more than 
doubled because, in addition, under the S2P they are treated as if they had earnings at the lower 
threshold. In effect, therefore, low earners do not face a marginal accrual rate of 40% despite the way 
the scheme is structured, as they receive the same pension benefits whatever their earnings (so long as 
they do not cross the lower threshold). Their marginal accrual rate is therefore zero (see Figure 6.1).
154 Presumably the government have decided to have a higher marginal accrual rate for people earning 
more than the upper threshold in order to ensure that there are no losers from the reform (see Figure 6.2). 
However, it is not quite true that this structure ensures everyone gets at least the same pension benefits as 
under SERPS - some women will lose out through missing the entitlements they would have got under 
Home Responsibilities Protection (see later in this section). Moreover, it should also be appreciated that 
such a ‘no losers’ reform is an arithmetical impossibility (resources must come from somewhere), and 
under the National Insurance system the cost of additional benefits is met directly by additional 
contributions. Hence higher earners will ultimately end up losing from the scheme as they will pay the
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upper threshold is set at the point where the gain from doubling the accrual rate on the 
first tranche of earnings equals the loss from the 10% accrual band; in 1999/2000 this 
point was £21,6000.
Table 6.2 illustrates, showing the marginal and average accrual rate facing individuals 
with earnings above the lower threshold (‘moderate and high earners’ according to the 
Green Paper). Figure 6.1 then presents a diagrammatic representation of marginal and 
average accrual rates under the S2P, including the first change (treating low earners as 
if they earned at the lower threshold), as well as the change to a 40/10/20 accrual 
structure. Note that the 40% band is shown by a dashed line to indicate that while 
people earning more than £9,500 will accrue benefits at the rate of 40% on this portion 
of their earnings, people with earnings below this amount in fact face a zero marginal 
accrual rate as they get the same pension benefit whatever their true level of earnings.
Table 6.2
Marginal and average accrual rates under the S2P for moderate and high earners
(under 1999/2000 thresholds)
Earnings Marginal and 
average accrual 
rate under 
SERPS
Marginal accrual 
rate under the 
S2P
Average accrual 
rate under the 
S2P
£9,500 20 10 40
£12,500 20 10 35
£15,500 20 10 30
£18,500 20 10 25
£21,600 20 20 20
£24,600 20 20 20
£26,000 (UEL) 20 20 20
majority of extra contributions for relatively few additional pension benefits (see Agulnik, 1999b, p. 
419).
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Figure 6.1
Marginal and average accrual rates under the S2P (under 1999/2000 earnings
thresholds)
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The third change under the S2P is that the new three-band accrual structure will be 
partially dynamised. As set out in Sections 1 A.2 and 2.2, under current (baseline) 
policy the National Insurance earning limits are linked to prices, and hence are falling 
relative to earnings. The S2P will not affect this prognosis for the LEL and UEL -  the 
total band of earnings on which second tier benefits accrue will continue to shrink. 
However, it will compensate for this by increasing the newly created lower and upper 
thresholds (£9,500 and 21,600 in 1999/2000) in line with earnings. This means that 
over time the band of earnings with a 40% accrual rate will widen, as the gap between 
the LEL (rising with prices) and the lower threshold (rising with earnings) becomes 
bigger. Moreover, the decline in the UEL relative to the upper threshold means that 
beyond 2011 (or thereabouts) the upper threshold will only increase with prices (i.e. the 
UEL takes precedence), and hence the gain from the 40% accrual band will not be fully 
clawed-back. In other words, after 2011 the average accrual rate for people earning at 
the UEL will exceed 20%. The result is that in years beyond this date everyone, 
including people earning more than the UEL, will gain a little relative to their
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entitlements under SERPS (with the exception of people who care full-time for school- 
age children.
Last, the S2P expands the system of credits for people who are not in employment 
(under SERPS such credits are provided by ‘home responsibilities protection’, HRP). It 
does this in two ways. First, and most important, the value of credits will be larger 
under the S2P than under SERPS, as for the purposes of calculating benefits individuals 
with a qualifying year of credits will be treated as if they had earnings equivalent to the 
lower threshold (see above)155. Second, more people will qualify for credits under the 
S2P than would have been the case under SERPS. However, the importance of this 
change should not be over-stated. Though the Green Paper (p. 43) boasts that “at least 
4 million people, mostly women, will gain from this aspect o f the State Second 
Pension”, it fails to mention that around three million people would have qualified for 
HRP under SERPS (DSS, 1998a). Ignoring the get-out clause that the regulations to 
implement HRP were never in fact introduced (see Section 2.2), the net gain from the 
S2P relative to SERPS is therefore that around one million extra people will qualify for 
credits156.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the combined effect of all four of these changes using LIFEPEN, 
one of the dynamic hypothetical models discussed in Section 1.4. It shows the value of 
the pension provided by the S2P and SERPS for people with different lifetime earnings 
and how this relates to the level of Income Support for a single 65 year old. More 
specifically, the Figure shows the first and second tier pension benefits received in 
2051157 by individuals with complete (49 year) work histories and constant earnings
155 A precise comparison of the value of credits under the S2P and under SERPS is not possible; while 
S2P credits work on an annual basis the effect of HRP can only be calculated at the end of an 
individual’s working life. This reflects the fact that HRP works through reducing the denominator of the 
pension formula (the number of years an individual has worked) rather than increasing the numerator 
(lifetime reckonable earnings).
156 Note in particular that people caring for children aged six or over will lose relative to SERPS as, 
unlike HRP, credits under the S2P will only be payable in respect of periods spent caring for pre-school- 
age children. However, the numbers losing from this restriction will be less than the numbers gaining 
from the extension of credits to long-term disabled people (who have worked for at least 10% of their 
working life).
157 As the S2P will be introduced in 2002, the first cohort to have spent a full 49-year working life 
under it will retire in 2051.
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throughout life (as a percentage of the average). Hence the effect of earnings mobility, 
interruptions in earnings and household-status are ignored -  the Figure is very 
simplified. Note also that though the Figure is in 1999 earnings terms (as used in 
Chapters 2 and 3), it would look slightly different under alternative assumptions for 
average earnings growth. In particular, if earnings grew faster than the 1.5% annual 
increase assumed here (in line with the Government Actuary’s main assumption) then 
the level of the basic pension in relation to earnings would be even lower than shown in 
the Figure.
Figure 6.2
Expected first and second tier pension in 2051 under the S2P and SERPS, by 
lifetime weekly earnings (1999 earnings terms)
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The Figure shows that benefits under the S2P will be higher for all employees than
1 SRwould have been the case under SERPS . However, as can be seen, low earners - 
particularly those earning just above the LEL - will receive a much larger boost than 
people further up the earnings distribution. The Figure also shows that the S2P fills the
158 Note therefore that, in contrast to the impression given by Figure 6.1, people earning more than the 
upper threshold will gain from the S2P. This reflects the fact that after 2011 (or so) the upper threshold 
will only rise in line with prices, so that all workers will have an average accrual rate o f more than 20% 
after this time.
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gap between the basic pension and Income Support much more effectively than 
SERPS. Indeed, it suggests that under the S2P everyone will retire with a state pension 
above the level of the minimum income. As such the scheme appears to meet the 
government’s objective that “people who work all their lives should not have to rely on 
means-tested benefits when they retire” (DSS, 1998, p. 29). However, as the next 
section shows in theory, and Section 6.3 shows in practice, this conclusion is not robust 
to changes in the assumptions underlying the Figure.
6.2 The S2P and reliance on Income Support
The analysis of the S2P presented in Figure 6.2 is very simplified, being based on the 
assumption that all individuals work for a full 49-year working life at a constant wage 
relative to the average. Moreover, it only illustrates the income individuals can expect 
on retirement, and applies only to the cohort retiring in 2051. In effect, therefore, the 
Figure provides a stylised illustration of the effects of the S2P. A more accurate picture 
should be provided by dynamic microsimulation (at least potentially), and estimates 
from PENSIM are presented in the next section. However, this section first sets out the 
theoretical reasons why the S2P will have a more varied effect on retirement incomes 
(and their adequacy relative to the minimum standard) than indicated in Figure 6.2.
First, it is worth thinking about income dynamics during retirement and, in particular, 
the fact that while Income Support increases each year in line with earnings S2P 
benefits rise with prices once in payment. Hence after retirement pension benefits lose 
value relative to Income Support159. Moreover, on top of this effect the value of Income 
Support increases at age 75 and at age 80, while there are no age increments in the S2P 
and an addition of only 25p in the basic pension (at age 80). As discussed in Section 
1.1, the result is that even if an individual retires with an income above the level of 
Income Support they may become eligible for means-tested assistance during 
retirement. Figure 6.3 illustrates, showing the income during retirement of a 
hypothetical low earner retiring in 2051 who worked for 49 years and earned between
159 As discussed in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, private pension payments may not in fact be fully indexed to 
inflation. A more detailed analysis o f income dynamics in retirement is in Johnson, Stears and Webb 
(1998).
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the LEL and the lower threshold (£9,500 in 1999/2000) throughout their working life. 
It shows that, using the Government Actuary’s assumption of 1.5% real earnings 
growth, it would take approximately 8 years for this person’s income to fall below the 
level of Income Support.
Figure 6.3
Value after retirement of the pension of a lifetime low earner retiring in 2051 (£
per week, 1999 earning terms)
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The second theoretical reason why the S2P may not be fully effective in eliminating 
reliance on Income Support is that the gap between the level of the basic pension and 
the minimum income standard will grow after 2051. Figure 6.2 showed that when the 
scheme first matures it will provide just enough extra benefits to lift a low earner with a 
full working life above the level of Income Support. However, the seeming elegance of 
this outcome is just that - a fortuitous feature of the date chosen to illustrate the scheme 
rather than an inherent property of its design. Peering into the more distant future it can 
already be predicted that the gap between the combined value of first and second tier 
pension benefits and Income Support will re-emerge. In other words, as the basic 
pension declines even further relative to earnings, at some point the S2P will no longer 
ensure that even someone with a full working life will automatically accumulate
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pension rights which exceed the level of Income Support at the point of retirement. 
However, this effect only operates slowly, and individuals with full S2P rights will not 
retire with incomes below the level of Income Support until the 22nd century.
The third problem with Figure 6.2 is that, in practice, individuals experience 
considerable variations in employment and earnings over their lifetime (see Gardiner 
and Hills, 1999, Jarvis and Jenkins, 1996, or the contributions to Gregg, 1997)160. 
Moreover, because eligibility for S2P credits is limited, and second tier provision does 
not include the self-employed, many people will not be covered for part of their 
working life. Hence people with interrupted earnings may accumulate automatic S2P 
and private pension rights worth less than the amounts shown in Figure 6.2. This 
problem in particular was highlighted by the Social Security Select Committee in their 
review of the government’s policies to reduce pensioner poverty. They comment that:
“[an individual] will require a 49 year contribution record to achieve a full 
state second pension and although there is provision for credits, these are not 
as comprehensive as for the basic state pension. Mr Ross [Chair of the Pension 
Provision Group] explained that ‘there are going to be many people o f modest 
means who will not qualify fo r  the full state second pension because it does not 
have the same level o f credits. It is much more work-based than the basic 
pension is and the people we are talking about will have breaks in employment 
and they will not have 49 years o f employmenf'> (HoC, 2000, paragraph 71).
However, there are also a number of reasons to be more optimistic about the 
effectiveness of the S2P in reducing reliance on Income Support.
First, Figure 6.2 understates the level of benefits provided by the S2P because the effect 
of earning dynamics (variability) is omitted. This means the asymmetrical effect of the 
S2P’s benefit structure is not captured in the analysis. Under SERPS the assumption 
that everyone has constant earnings throughout life is relatively unproblematic -  as 
benefits accrue at the same rate on all earnings the inclusion of earnings variability 
makes little difference (the only effect coming through the LEL and UEL). In contrast, 
the 40/10/20 accrual structure of the S2P means that earning dynamics matter a lot. For 
instance, consider the second pension benefits earned by two individuals: A who has
160 As noted in Section 1.4, this is one of the main motivations for analysing future pensioner incomes 
through dynamic microsimulation.
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constant earnings of half the workforce-wide average throughout a full 49-year 
working life, and B who similarly works for 49 years but spends half the time earning a 
quarter of the average and the other half earning three-quarters the average. A and B 
therefore have the same lifetime earnings, and under SERPS would be entitled to the 
same second pension benefits (ignoring the effect of the LEL). In contrast, under the 
S2P individual B will receive rather higher benefits than A, as the increase in the 
average accrual rate on earnings below £9,500 is greater than the reduced average 
accrual rate on earnings above this level (see Figure 6.1).
Second, Figure 6.2 looks at the situation facing a single person, i.e. it refers to the first 
and second tier pension entitlements which an individual will accumulate in their own 
right, and ignores the existence of any spouse. Because the level of Income Support for 
a single pensioner is significantly more than half that provided to couple households 
(see Section 1A.1) this difference is important. For instance, even if both individuals in 
a couple earned less than the lower threshold throughout their (full) working lives, their 
combined S2P entitlements would lift them substantially above the level of Income 
Support for couples. Hence for couples the margin for error (i.e. for interruptions in 
earnings/credits) before the benefits provided by the S2P fall below the minimum 
standard is rather larger than shown in Figure 6.2.
Third, even if analysis is restricted to single households, Figure 6.2 ignores the fact that 
many single pensioners will have had a spouse in the past, and hence will acquire S2P 
rights from them. In effect it looks only at the retirement income of someone who is 
single throughout life, and pension rights gained on divorce or bereavement are 
ignored. But, particularly for women such rights can be an important determinant of 
retirement incomes. In the case of inherited rights, where the S2P will follow SERPS 
(and most occupational pensions) in providing widow(er)s with half the pension of 
their deceased spouse161, this reflects the fact that women live longer than men on 
average (and tend to marry men older than themselves). In the case of divorce, where 
the government intends to introduce ‘pension splitting’ for SERPS benefits (and 
presumably also for the S2P), women gain most because men have larger earnings and
161 At present widows stand to inherit full SERPS rights. Though the 1986 Pension Act legislated for 
inherited SERPS rights to be reduced to 50% in April 2000, in fact the government delayed 
implementation until October 2002 due to its failure to publicise this legislation (see DSS, 2000c, p. 2).
183
work for longer (equivalently, spend less time caring), and hence accumulate larger 
pension rights. On divorce wives therefore tend to have a larger claim against their 
husband’s pension than vice-versa (see Joshi and Davies, 1991).
Last, Figure 6.2 makes no allowance for any voluntary third tier provision individuals 
might make, including periods of entitlement built-up in occupational schemes. In 
reality voluntary provision is the most important determinant of retirement incomes 
(see Section 2.3), and hence Figure 6.2 vastly understates the actual pension income 
most people will accumulate. It is particularly for this reason that analysis using 
PENSIM is required to establish the true extent of reliance on Income Support under 
the S2P.
6.3 Analysing the S2P using PENSIM
PENSIM’s estimates for the effect of the S2P on pensioner incomes are set out below 
in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 and Figures 6.4 and 6.5. However, before this the fact that the 
S2P reform comes in two stages should be mentioned.
Hitherto the analysis in this chapter has ignored the peculiarities of contracting-out, 
whereby second tier pension provision is divided between the public and private 
sectors. As discussed in Section 1 A.2, under SERPS the contracted-out NIC rate - 
currently 4.6 percentage points less than the full rate - reflects the actuarial value of the 
pension which individuals would have enjoyed had they remained in the state scheme. 
Hence the choice between opting-in and opting-out is neutral. However, under stage 
two of the S2P, which the government intends to introduce in 2006 or so, this split 
between the public and private sectors will take a somewhat different form. Rather than 
the incentive to opt-out of state provision being actuarially-fair there will be a built-in 
incentive for younger people to stay with the state scheme if their earnings are below 
the lower threshold (£9,500 a year in 1999/2000) but to opt-out if their earnings are 
above this level. This is because under the second stage of the scheme state-provided 
benefits will become flat-rate (at the level earned by someone earning at the lower 
threshold) for people under a certain yet-to-be-determined age. Hence anyone who is
184
below the given age and earns more than the lower threshold will have a strong 
incentive to opt-out, as above this level of earnings the value of contracted-out rebates 
will exceed the actuarial value of the benefit provided by the state scheme . The 
effect of stage two is therefore not to alter the benefits provided by the scheme, which 
remain the same as the description in Section 6.1, but to change how benefits are 
provided (i.e. more private and less public provision).
Under stage two of the S2P, some increase in the number of people contracted-out can 
therefore be expected. However, estimating precisely how many people will in fact 
follow the incentive structure described above is difficult to estimate; projections in the 
1980s for how many people would contract-out into personal pensions were wildly 
wrong, and estimating the effect of the new scheme is equally difficult (see GAD,
2000, pp. 11-13). Accordingly, the analysis of the S2P in this section using PENSIM, 
and in the next section using the NIESR generational accounting model, assumes that 
the proportion of people contracted-out will remain at its current rate. In effect, 
therefore, the analysis is of stage one of the reform where, like today, the decision to 
contract-out will be neutral163. But even with this assumption it should be appreciated 
that one effect of the S2P will be to increase the size of rebates provided to members of 
private pension schemes; because contracting-out is actuarially fair the value of rebates 
must rise to match the increased benefit promise of the S2P.
The effect of both extra rebates and extra benefits can be seen in Table 6.3, which 
provides PENSIM’s estimates for the level and composition of mean pensioner 
incomes in 2066 under the S2P. In the same way as in the tables in Chapter 3, 
earned/other income and investment income are only shown in the total income row. 
The Table shows that the S2P will result in mean pensioner income rising substantially, 
with large increases in income from occupational and personal pensions, as well as 
from state sources.
162 Assuming the level of rebates adjusts fully for the age of the recipient (see Section 1 A.2).
163 This is a slight simplification -  in fact the decision whether to contract-out of the S2P will be more 
complex than this even under stage one of the scheme. In particular, the fact that tax relief is payable on 
rebates means that, save for the transaction costs associated with private pensions, everyone should 
really contract-out. However, this situation already applies under SERPS, and it is not clear what 
difference the introduction of the S2P and Stakeholder pensions will make.
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Table 6.3
Effect of the S2P on mean pensioner incomes in 2066 (£ per week, 1999 earnings
terms)
Mean weekly 
income: 
singles
Mean weekly 
income: 
couples
Change from  
baseline: 
singles
Change from  
baseline: 
couples
Income Support 5.2 1.0 -4.2 -2.1
Basic state pension 23.3 45.4 0.0 0.0
S2P/SERPS 29.8 59.0 10.7 22.3
Personal pensions 17.0 30.4 2.7 4.6
Occupational pensions 69.5 114.5 11.5 17.2
Total (inc. earnings and 
investment income)
181.7 352.1 20.6 42.1
In terms of the overall change in pensioner incomes, the Table shows that the S2P lies 
roughly halfway between the baseline and the basic income policy (see Table 3.3). 
Moreover, as was the case under a basic income, couples gain rather more (per member 
of the household) than single people. This reflects the fact that single pensioners are far 
more likely than couples to rely on Income Support, and that for eligible households 
the main effect of the S2P is not to increase total income but to alter the composition of 
income. This effect is shown more clearly in Figure 6.4, which presents PENSIM’s 
estimates for the distribution of gross incomes in 2066 under the S2P and under 
baseline policy. As with the figures in Chapter 3, it uses a log scale on the vertical axis 
to highlight the lower end of the income distribution.
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Figure 6.4
Distribution of pensioner incomes in 2066 under the S2P 
(1999 earnings terms, log scale)
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The importance o f the interaction between Income Support and second tier pensions, 
particularly for single households, can again be seen in Figure 6.5. In the same way as 
Figure 2.3 it shows the distribution o f gross pensioner incomes by component under the 
S2P (panel A) and under SERPS (panel B). For convenience the analysis is restricted to 
single households and to 2066. The Figure demonstrates that for single pensioners in 
the bottom third o f the income distribution the effect o f the S2P is chiefly to alter the 
form of state support -  they get more as second pension benefits and less as means- 
tested assistance. Hence the ‘depth’ o f reliance on Income Support is reduced.
It is also worth noting what the Figure suggests about the distribution o f gains from the 
S2P by income source. In particular, it shows that the increase in income from the 
state-provided part o f the scheme will be fairly evenly spread across all single 
pensioners while the increase in income from occupational pensions (due to higher 
rebates) is concentrated on the top half o f the distribution. This reflects the fact that the 
majority o f low income single pensioners are modelled as having few or no periods 
during their working life when they are in an occupational pension scheme, so that they
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are little affected by the change in rebates. The change in personal pension income is 
too small to be visible.
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Figure 6.5
Income of single pensioners in 2066 by component
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Finally, summary statistics on the effects of the S2P are presented in Table 6.4. It
shows that under this policy:
• mean and median net income will be substantially higher, particularly for couples 
(note that these estimates are different from those for gross income presented in 
Table 6.3 -  see Section 2.3 for notes on how PENSIM’s estimates are presented);
• reliance on Income Support will be reduced by a little over a third relative to 
baseline policy164;
• poverty will fall, though over two-fifths of single pensioners will remain below the 
half-mean population-wide household income standard;
• inequality will be little affected.
Table 6.4
Summary statistics on income distribution under the S2P
Singles Couples Change from  
baseline: 
singles
Change from  
baseline: 
couples
90:10 ratio 3.2 3.8 0.0 -0.2
Gini coefficient 0.37 0.35 0.01 -0.01
% below half mean income 44% 22% -10% -15%
% below half median income 9% 7% -5% -13%
% claiming Income Support 24% 5% -10% -8%
Mean net income ( per week, 
1999 earnings)
£160 £305 £15 £34
Median net income (per week, 
1999 earnings)
£108 £223 £11 £25
In conclusion, PENSIM’s analysis shows that the S2P will be only partially successful 
in reducing reliance on Income Support, and that the additional benefits it provides will 
be spread thinly over the pensioner income distribution rather than concentrated at the 
bottom. The impression is therefore that the scheme is not particularly redistributive. 
However this is not an entirely fair picture. PENSIM’s analysis looks only at the 
benefits of the scheme and ignores the other side of the redistributive coin -  who pays 
for the extra benefits it provides. As shown in Agulnik (1999b, p. 419), if the S2P is
164 Restricting analysis solely to single pensioners PENSIM’s estimate for the reduction in means 
testing brought about by the S2P is broadly in line with the DSS estimate that under SERPS 
approximately 1 in 3 pensioners would have been entitled to Income Support and that the S2P will 
reduce this proportion to 1 in 4 (see Hansard, 22 February 1999, Col 160).
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financed on a PAYG basis, with NIC rates adjusting to benefit spending, then people 
earning more than around £12,000 a year will lose out overall. This reflects the fact 
that for higher earners the increase in contribution rates is more important than the 
change in the value of benefits/rebates.
6.4 The public finance effects of the S2P
The effect of the S2P on the public finances can be analysed through the generational 
accounting techniques described in Chapter 4. This allows the fiscal effect of a reform 
to be assessed by looking at the size the intertemporal budget gap (IBG) which it is 
associated with, and the immediate and permanent change in tax needed to close this 
gap. As in Section 4.3, the below calculates the IBG associated with the S2P under the 
assumption that all other spending remains the same as in the baseline (see Section 
4.2).
Projected spending under the S2P on first and second tier provision (including rebates) 
is shown in Figure 6.6. In the same way as in Chapter 4 the projection for spending on 
Income Support is derived from PENSIM (i.e. from Table 6.3) through grossing-up to 
population totals, while the projections for spending on second tier benefits and rebates 
are taken directly from the Government Actuary (GAD, 2000, Tables 2.1, 2.3 and 3.1); 
the availability of recent official estimates means that PENSIM’s role can be confined 
to estimating Income Support spending165.
It should be noted again that, as with Section 6.3, these estimates do not include 
allowance for any change in the number of people contracting out; i.e. they do not 
include the likely behavioural response to stage two of the S2P, when eamings-related 
benefits for people earning more than £9,500 will only be available through rebates. 
Though the Government Actuary provides estimates for the effect of increased
165 More precisely, the Figure shows spending on S2P benefits and rebates under the Government 
Actuary’s second assumption for how the scheme will work (see GAD, 2000, Table 2.1). This assumes 
that additional benefits (over and above SERPS) for members o f  occupational schemes will be provided 
on a PAYG basis rather than through rebates. In fact this is the option which the government eventually 
chose.
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contracting-out on rebates and benefit spending (see GAD, 2000, Table 3.1), as with all 
official projections they end in 2060. This is insufficient time for the reduction in future 
benefit spending caused by higher contracting-out to fully flow through, and hence 
these estimates do not provide a complete picture o f the effects of stage two (i.e. they 
capture the increase in rebates but not the full decrease in future benefit spending). 
Moreover, the extent o f the increase in contracting-out under stage two is extremely 
difficult to estimate, and the Government Actuary presents three alternative 
assumptions, none o f which allow for the differential effect o f stage two on people 
earning above and below the lower threshold166. Modelling the effect o f increased 
contracting-out is therefore extremely difficult, and would require a number of 
variations to be looked at. Such analysis has not been attempted here.
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166 The Government Actuary’s third assumption for the effect o f Stakeholder pension schemes comes 
close to capturing the effect o f stage 2 o f the S2P, but assumes that everyone earning more than the LEL 
(and under 40) is contracted-out (see GAD, 2000, Section 3). To some extent it therefore over-estimates 
the effect o f  stage 2. Against this, however, the Government A ctuary’s estimates assume that even under 
Stage 2 the state will continue to provide eamings-related top-ups for members o f occupational schemes, 
thus under-estimating the effect o f  this stage.
Figure 6.6
Expenditure on first and second tier pensions under the S2P (% GDP)
192
The Figure shows that relative to the baseline projection under SERPS (see Figure 4.2) 
the S2P will increase spending on both elements of second tier provision and reduce 
spending on Income Support. However, as was also shown in Table 6.3, though the 
importance of Income Support will be reduced it will still be very far from zero167.
The projections in Figure 6.6 can then be used to calculate the effect of the S2P on the 
inter-temporal budget gap (IBG). Estimates are reported in Table 6.5, which like Tables
4.1 and 4.2 expresses the IBG in terms of the immediate and permanent change in tax 
needed to close it on a number of different bases. It shows that after the S2P has been 
implemented there will be still be a slight surplus in the IBG of around 4% of GDP. 
However, as noted in Chapter 4, the overall results from the model are open to 
numerous objections, for instance about the way health spending is projected, and 
probably more useful is what the Table tells us about the cost of the S2P relative to the 
baseline. Comparing the two rows produces the result that the cost of the S2P is
16Requivalent to an increase in tax revenue of around £1.5 billion or 0.2% of GDP .
Table 6.5
Intertemporal budget gap and required change in taxes under the S2P
Intertemporal 
Budget Gap; % 
of GDP
Change in annual tax revenue needed to close the 
IBG
Absolute terms; 
£ billion
% GDP % Income Tax 
revenue
Baseline -11% -2.3 -0.3% -3.2%
With S2P -4% -0.8 -0.1% -1.1%
It is also worth thinking about the effect of the S2P under the scenario that it is paid for 
out of changes in NICs; i.e. under the assumption that revenue to the National
167 These estimates for the effect of the S2P on Income Support spending can be compared with the 
government’s own estimates. In one sense the analysis here confirms the government’s estimate that 
savings on Income Support will reduce the net public expenditure cost of the S2P by about a third. 
However, this is only if the increase in the cost of rebates is ignored. As shown in Table 6.3, if rebates 
are also included then the decline in income from (and hence spending on) Income Support is much less 
than a third of the increase in income from all second tier pensions as a result of the introduction of the 
S2P.
168 This is broadly in line with the estimate in Agulnik, Cardarelli and Sefton (2000, p. 606), though the 
modelling technique used here to look at the cost of rebates differs from this earlier analysis. Note also 
that the baseline in the two exercises is different.
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Insurance Fund is set so as to balance expenditure on a PAYG basis (the assumption 
made by CSK), rather than under the assumption that NICs work in the same way as 
income tax.
The effect of this assumption on the IBG is surprising, but essentially meaningless. 
Because under this scenario an increase in contributions is, in effect, legislated for 
alongside the increase in benefits, the only change in spending not matched by a 
change in contributions is the decrease in the projection for Income Support. Hence the 
scheme appears to improve the public finances under this assumption. This is obviously 
not a good representation of its true effects, and illustrates the dangers in incorporating 
projections for NIC revenue into generational accounting. Instead, therefore, the effect 
of the S2P under the scenario that NICs adjust to benefit spending is shown in Table 
6.6 through a schedule of changes. Though the projections for benefit spending and 
rebates used in the Table are taken from the Government Actuary (GAD, 2000, Table 
2.1), it should be noted that the estimates in the final two rows for spending as a 
proportion of GDP are different from the Government Actuary’s due to the slightly 
higher growth assumption used here (1.75% against 1.5%). Note also that unlike 
previous Tables in this thesis the estimates are in 1999 prices rather than 1999 earnings 
terms, and that Income Support for pensioners is omitted (the Table looks only at 
National Insurance benefits).
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Table 6.6
Effect of the S2P on expenditure from the National Insurance Fund 
(£ billion in 1999 prices, unless otherwise indicated)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Extra cost of benefits under 
the S2P
0 0.6 2.0 5.4 10.2 16.9 25.9
Extra cost of rebates under the 
S2P
0 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.3
Total extra spending under the 
S2P
0 1.3 2.7 6.2 11.0 17.9 27.2
Total extra spending under the 
S2P as a % o f GDP
0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.2
Total spending on S2P 
benefits, rebates and the basic 
pension as a % o f GDP
5.3 5.1 4.8 5.1 4.9 4.5 4.4
Source: GAD (1999, Tables 15.1 and 1.3; 200C), Tables 2.1 and 2.3)
The Table shows that the introduction of the S2P will cause spending from the National 
Insurance Fund to be a little over 1% of GDP higher in 2060 than would have been the 
case under SERPS. However, because a fairly rapid decline in NICs was expected 
under SERPS (particularly after 2030), overall spending from the National Insurance 
Fund will still goes down under the S2P (as a proportion of GDP). The S2P will 
therefore not cause people to ‘lose’ in the sense of paying more NICs than is currently 
the case; rather, they will fail to gain through the NIC reductions which would have 
taken place under existing policy.
6.5 Conclusion: policy implications
The analysis above focussed predominantly on the effectiveness of the S2P in 
achieving a minimum retirement income without means testing (the government’s main 
aim for the scheme). It showed that it will be only partially successful in eliminating 
reliance on Income Support. The most important criticism of the scheme is therefore 
that it is inadequate -  it fails to provide sufficient benefits to lift pensioners above the 
minimum income standard. As set out in Section 6.2, one reason for this is the
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‘tightrope’ of declining pension income during retirement relative to earnings. 
However, more important is the ‘tripwire’ of periods not in employment but not 
covered by S2P credits (these terms are borrowed from Rake, Falkingham and Evans, 
1999, abstract).
Although the new scheme brings carers and other groups deemed to be ‘participating’ 
into the ambit of second tier pensions, entitlement is very far from universal. Estimates 
from the DSS Lifetime Labour Market Database suggest that something like 30% of 
the working-age population will fail to qualify for S2P benefits in any particular year. 
This may be compared to the estimate in Kumar (1999, Figure 12) that roughly 17% of 
the working population failed to qualify for the basic pension in 1995/6169. Hence holes 
in the S2P are likely to be much larger than is the case for the basic pension. At root 
this reflects the fact that, though both the basic pension and the S2P are both National 
Insurance benefits, the latter is more firmly rooted in the idea that ‘rights’ to benefit 
must be ‘earned’ through particular kinds of activity (principally working).
The S2P and the basic pension therefore exemplify the dichotomy at the heart of the 
‘contributory principle’ which underlies National Insurance. Though less so than under 
SERPS, the S2P views this principle as meaning that benefits and contributions should 
be connected -  in New Labour’s language, the principle is about ensuring ‘no rights 
without responsibilities’. In contrast, following a series of reforms to widen entitlement 
(and the move to eamings-related contributions in 1975), the basic pension now 
represents the view that the contributory principle is about ‘people getting something 
back for what they have put in’. Under this view the contributory principle has almost 
no implications for the structure of benefits and eligibility conditions; rather, it is just a 
way of hypothecating revenue from taxes on labour to pension benefits170.
169 This gap is comprised of the following groups, who will receive credits for the basic pension but not 
for the S2P:
• the unemployed or sick;
•  women entitled to Maternity Allowance or Statutory Maternity Pay;
•  people taking a course of approved training;
• men not in employment aged 60 or over;
• people receiving Working Families or Disabled Persons Tax Credit,
•  people (mostly women) not in employment caring for a child over the age of 5.
170 Note also that this looser definition of the contributory principle may also hold sway in other areas, 
such as health-care. Indeed, support for automatic (as opposed to means-tested) entitlement to long term 
care is often argued for in terms of people having ‘paid in’ during their working lives, despite the fact
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Setting aside the numerous other problems with the ‘rights for responsibilities’ view, 
the problem with limiting benefits to a narrowly defined set of contributors is that it is 
not possible to secure a minimum income through benefits which are closely linked to 
previous labour market activity. For instance, even when, as in the 1970s, the basic 
pension was set at or above the level of Supplementary Benefit (as Income Support 
then was), reliance on means-tested benefits continued to be significant due to the 
incomplete contribution records of many women (their working lives having preceded 
the extension of credits; see Evans, 1998, p.274). Glennerster (1995, p. 221) comments:
‘The Beveridge design fo r  social security was flawed from the outset... what 
Britain in the end came to develop, by incremental stages, was an extremely 
complex system o f means-tested support. It went a long way towards achieving 
Beveridge's national minimum but by a quite different route from the one he 
envisaged. ’
In contrast, if universal benefits paid for out of taxation were given to all then this 
problem would not arise. However, this creates a dilemma for (left) reformers, as 
popular mythology holds that it is more difficult to raise general taxes than other forms 
of compulsory contribution such as National Insurance (see Section 7.3). If this is so 
then the contributory system is likely to end up being more redistributive simply 
because it is bigger171. If this view is accepted, therefore, the ‘solution’ to many of the 
problems with the S2P described in this chapter would simply be to provide credits for 
non-workers on a more universal basis (a more radical alternative of abolishing second 
tier provision and increasing the basic pension is discussed at the end of Chapter 8). 
Though there are other ways of ensuring that the S2P succeeds in its objective of 
preventing pensioners from relying on Income Support, this is the most obvious way in 
which to improve the adequacy of the scheme172.
that health-care in the UK is (almost) wholly funded out of general taxation and does not have the 
contributory trappings of National Insurance.
171 In other words, if a switch from NICs to income tax reduced politicians’ willingness to raise 
revenue, thereby constraining benefit levels, the distributional advantages of tax-finance would be less 
clear-cut.
172 A number of other possibilities are listed in the Social Security Select Committee’s examination of 
pensioner poverty (HoC, 2000, paragraphs 131-143). Rather than extending credits the effect of the S2P 
on the poorest pensioners could be enhanced by:
a) reducing the number of qualifying years (e.g. from 49 to 44);
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If it is accepted that benefits under the S2P are too low then the next question is how 
such additional benefits should be funded. One way would be to use up the ‘headroom’ 
in NICs shown in Table 6.6, so that rather than benefits/revenue going down as a 
proportion of GDP, National Insurance resumed its upward path (thus creating a ‘rising 
tide’ of state transfers; see Section 7.3). However, it would also be possible to pay for 
extending S2P credits by reducing the benefits provided to higher earners. In particular, 
it is anomalous (and regressive) that benefits accrue at a rate of 10% between the lower 
and the upper threshold but at a faster rate of 20% above this. A two-tier accrual 
structure of 40/10 (or 50/10 if the savings were re-cycled in this way) would be fairer, 
simpler and more redistributive.
b) reducing the ‘shadow’ LEL, thus widening the band of earnings below the lower threshold and 
increasing the number of part-time workers qualifying;
c) increasing the accrual rate below the lower threshold to, e.g., 50%.
Part C. Weighing the alternatives
This concluding part o f the thesis looks at some theoretical issues in pension reform. 
The first two chapters follow the typology set out in Section 1.3. Chapter 7 examines 
the two eamings-related models -  social insurance and compulsory saving - by 
discussing whether the compulsory eamings-related benefits they give rise to can be 
justified on economic, social or political grounds. Chapter 8 then analyses the 
arguments for and against the two minimum income models, basic income and 
targeting, and compares them with two ‘hybrid’ models. Chapter 9 summarises the 
entire thesis and concludes.
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7. Social insurance and compulsory saving: do compulsory earnings
related pensions make sense?
Much of the recent pension reform debate has focussed on the extent to which benefits 
should be provided publicly via eamings-related social insurance or privately via 
compulsory saving. Following the example of Chile, a number of countries have moved 
towards the latter model, cutting-back future payments from their pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) state pension schemes and obliging workers to contribute a proportion of their 
earnings to private pension schemes. The result, therefore, has been that one form of 
eamings-related pension provision (social insurance)173 has been replaced by another 
(compulsory saving), the principal difference between the two being their method of 
financing (PAYG or funded). Though considerable attention has been devoted to the 
merits (or otherwise) of funding pension provision (for a review of the arguments see 
Section 4.5), relatively little attention has been devoted to the rationale for providing 
any form of compulsory eamings-related pensions, public or private. This chapter 
attempts to make up for this gap by critically assessing the arguments for compulsorily 
linking individuals’ retirement incomes to their previous earnings. In effect, therefore, 
it assesses the theoretical argument for the social insurance and compulsory saving 
‘ideal types’ analysed in Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 4.3.
Eamings-related pension schemes are ostensibly concerned with protecting individuals’ 
accustomed living standards in retirement. They may be contrasted with flat-rate or 
means-tested pensions, where the level of an individual’s previous earnings is 
irrelevant and the objective of policy is simply to ensure a universal minimum income 
standard (in the former case by giving all pensioners the required minimum and in the 
latter case by targeting benefits on those in need)174. The rationale for state intervention
173 It is not quite true that all social insurance systems are earnings-related -  traditionally the UK 
operated a flat-rate system, where both benefits and contributions were invariant to earnings (see Section 
5.2). To emphasise this this chapter generally refers to earnings-related social insurance.
174 Though under the basic income policy analysed in Part A benefits go to all pensioners, in fact the 
basic pension (the closest the UK pension system comes to a basic income) is a contributory benefit, and 
entitlement is based on the number of years an individual has worked or received credits. Hence while 
there is no link between the level of an individual’s lifetime earnings and the amount of basic pension 
they receive (assuming they always earn more than the LEL, £66 a week in 1999/2000), there is a 
connection between basic pension entitlements and number of years worked (see Section 1A.1).
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to ensure such a minimum standard is clear: as only the state has the power 
systematically to redistribute income between people (via taxes and benefits) it must 
take direct responsibility for preventing poverty in retirement175. However, the rationale 
for state intervention to maintain accustomed living standards is more opaque. In 
particular, though it might readily be accepted that most people would prefer to smooth 
consumption over their lifecycle (i.e. to follow the flatter consumption profile 
illustrated in Figure 1.1), it is not altogether clear why the state should force them so to 
do. So long as there are no implications for other people, whether or not an individual’s 
retirement income is a particular proportion of their previous earnings is a matter for 
them, not the government (Jupp, 1998, pp. 6-7).
Nevertheless, in spite of this reasoning support for compulsory eamings-related 
pensions is widespread throughout the political spectrum, and both the ‘left’ and the 
‘right’ favour schemes where, on top of the responsibility to ensure a minimum income 
standard, the state is also in the business of protecting accustomed living standards.
This is a paradox. The left’s traditional concern with equality suggests that the 
minimum income should be the focus for attention - on the face of it there is little 
reason why they should support eamings-related social insurance schemes which tend 
to “perpetuate inequalities from working life into old age” (Hannah, 1986, p. 56). And 
the position of the (libertarian) right is, if anything, even more puzzling. In spite of 
their rhetoric about paring down the role of the state, free-marketeers have emerged as 
one of the main supporters of the compulsory saving model. As, in effect, this model 
forces people to accumulate an eamings-related pension (reflecting the fact that 
contributions are proportional to earnings), it again extends the state’s ambit into 
protecting accustomed living standards. This mns counter to the minimalist, laissez- 
faire stance one might have expected, where the state’s role would be confined to 
ensuring a minimum income.
This chapter attempts to shed light on this paradox through critically examining various 
rationales for compulsory eamings-related pension provision. In so doing it also 
questions whether the current emphasis on compulsory saving as the alternative to
175 As noted in Section 1.1, more extreme commentators might disagree with this assertion. In 
particular, it might be objected that individuals with high lifetime earnings but a low retirement income 
should not be supported by the state.
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existing (eamings-related) social insurance schemes is helpful. It concludes that, rather 
than the mechanism used to finance benefits (funded or PAYG) being the focus for 
attention, the pension reform debate should concentrate more on the most appropriate 
shape for compulsory benefits.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The three main rationales for compulsory 
eamings-related pensions are examined in Sections 7.1 to 7.3. Section 7.1 looks at the 
‘moral hazard’ argument for this type of provision - that unless eamings-related 
pensions are compulsory people will change their behaviour to increase their income 
from the state. Section 7.2 then discuses the argument that because people are myopic, 
i.e. do not take sufficient account of their future needs, governments should 
(patemalistically) force them to increase the amount they save for retirement. Last, 
Section 7.3 looks at the willingness to pay argument for compulsory eamings-relation: 
that this type of pension scheme is likely to be more popular than alternatives because 
contributions are meaningfully distinct from taxation. The conclusion reached is that, 
though the last of these rationales may provide a political explanation for why 
eamings-related social insurance schemes were first introduced, it is difficult to find an 
economic rationale for government intervention to protect accustomed living standards. 
Hence the argument for compulsory saving must be made on other grounds; Section 7.4 
examines whether such grounds exist. Section 7.5 then turns to the main argument 
against compulsory eamings-related pensions, namely their effect on labour market 
efficiency, while Section 7.6 provides a brief conclusion.
7.1 M oral hazard
The problem of moral hazard - the saving disincentive associated with means tested 
benefits - has already been discussed extensively in Sections 3.3, 5.1 and 5.4. This 
section gives a more formal analysis of the problem.
As defined by Barr (1992, p. 752), moral hazard is “the problem [which] arises when 
the insured person can influence the expected loss... at a cost lower than the expected 
gain from so doing’'. In the case of pension provision moral hazard can arise because of
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the existence of targeted (i.e. means-tested) state benefits, where the size of transfer an 
individual (or household) is entitled to is inversely related to their retirement income. 
This means there is an incentive for people to change their saving behaviour; if they 
consume more now they will not pay the price in terms of reduced consumption later, 
as their means-tested benefit entitlement will rise to compensate. Barr’s condition 
therefore holds: the expected loss from not saving is lower than the gain, in terms of 
current consumption, of this course of action. Apart from the direct cost to the state of 
encouraging such ‘knavish’ behaviour (Le Grand, 1997, pp. 159-163), and the moral 
issues it raises, the reduction in private savings which means-tested schemes can bring 
about may also have adverse macro-economic consequences.
Avoiding moral hazard therefore appears to provide a rationale for compulsory 
eamings-related provision, as this will ensure people automatically build up pension 
entitlements which reflect their lifetime earnings, thus limiting individuals’ ability to 
manipulate their retirement income so that they receive additional benefits from the 
state. If there is sufficient compulsory eamings-related provision the existence of 
means-tested benefits will, in effect, cease to be relevant for the majority, and their 
savings behaviour will be unaffected. Indeed, moral hazard might be eradicated entirely 
through putting a floor (set at the level of the minimum income) to the benefits which 
the scheme provides (for a proposal for the UK along these lines see Section 8.3).
However, while it is true that reducing moral hazard may be a knock-on effect of 
compulsory eamings-related provision, this argument does not in itself provide a 
rationale for this type of pensioning. For instance, Figure 7.1 illustrates the effect of a 
compulsory pension scheme which provides individuals with a pension worth 40% of 
their average lifetime earnings -  twice the level of eamings-replacement provided by 
SERPS. To simplify analysis the Figure ignores the fact that under National Insurance 
an initial portion of earnings does not count for benefit entitlement due to the LEL (see 
Section 1 A.2). It also assumes that the minimum retirement income is set at 20% of 
average earnings, slightly above the current level of Income Support for a single 65 
year old (see Section 1A.1).
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Figure 7.1
Compulsory earnings-related provision and moral hazard
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As the Figure shows, under the hypothesised scheme someone on half average lifetime 
earnings would accumulate a compulsory pension worth precisely the same as the 
minimum income (0.4*0.5 = 0.2). In this particular case, therefore, the system will be 
efficient. However, below this level of lifetime earnings the scheme only contributes 
to achieving the minimum income; the pension rights o f low lifetime earners (Area 1 in 
the Figure) will need topping-up. Perhaps more importantly for the argument being 
made here, above half average lifetime earnings the system will be ‘too generous’, 
providing pension rights worth more than the minimum (Area 2 in the Figure). As these 
additional rights do not reduce moral hazard their existence cannot be justified in terms 
of contributing to the minimum retirement income -  the benefits in Area 3 are 
sufficient to ensure this176. Hence a different rationale for the portion o f benefits above 
the minimum, i.e. the eamings-related element, is needed.
176 This is perhaps a little too strong. The fact that benefits in retirement are linked to prices while the 
minimum income rises with earnings means that the bottom left-hand com er o f Area 2 could be justified 
on moral hazard grounds. Earnings variability might also be used to justify this part o f  Area 2.
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In general, the moral hazard argument for compulsory eamings-related benefits may 
therefore be rejected177. The exception, potentially, relates to the question of housing 
costs and the existence of means-tested housing benefits for retirees (Housing and 
Council Tax Benefits, see Section 1A.1). However, it is precisely the people who are 
most likely to qualify for such benefits, elderly women tenants living alone, who are 
least likely to build up pension rights based on previous labour market activity. 
Moreover, at least in the near future, each new cohort of pensioners will contain a 
higher proportion of owner-occupiers than earlier generations (Hancock et al 1999, p. 
5). As most of these will already have paid off their mortgage they will be ineligible for 
housing-related benefits, hence over time this problem is likely to diminish. In any 
event, compulsory eamings-related pension provision seems a rather circuitous, and 
somewhat heavy-handed, method of cracking this particular nut178.
7.2 Myopia/Paternalism
The second argument for compulsory eamings-related pensions relates to the problem 
of ‘information failure’ discussed in Section 1.1. In brief, the idea here is that people 
are myopic, and hence do not save ‘enough’ for their needs in later life, i.e. they 
experience too large a fall in income on retirement. Of course, this immediately raises 
the question of who should decide what constitutes ‘enough’, and it is not obvious that 
the state is better placed to do this than individuals themselves. Nevertheless, Le Grand 
(1995, pp. 29-30) puts forward a sophisticated argument for why the state should 
intervene in this area. In outline his argument is that our present selves are only
177 Note that this is slightly different from arguing that there should be no second tier provision 
whatsoever. As discussed in Section 8.3, it is possible to use second tier pensions in a limited way, with 
individuals only being required to accumulate sufficient pension entitlements to cover the minimum. 
Under a funded (compulsory saving) system this would take the form of a requirement to contribute a 
fraction of earnings to a pension fund until a ‘minimum sum’ had been reached. Under a PAYG (social 
insurance) system a very similar effect can be achieved by having a low ceiling on 
contributions/entitlements, so that for most workers second tier benefits are essentially flat-rate (as in 
Canada). The key point is that in both systems there would only be a small proportion of people who 
would receive genuinely eamings-related benefits, as most moderate and high earners would receive the 
maximum second tier benefit. The S2P can be seen as an attempt to move second tier provision in this 
direction (see Part B).
178 Much the same conclusion was reached in Chapters 3 and 4; the social insurance model successfully 
eliminates reliance on Income Support and greatly reduces pensioner poverty but is much more 
expensive than the basic income model (see Tables 3.11 and 4.2).
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imperfectly connected to our future selves, and consequently future needs suffer as, 
selfishly, current selves devote too many resources to current needs. Therefore, Le 
Grand suggests, justice demands that our future selves are protected from this 
selfishness, and hence it is legitimate for governments to intervene to ensure that
1 7 0incomes in retirement reflect accustomed living standards . Compulsory eamings- 
related pensions are one way of doing this, thus their existence may be justified as a 
response to the problem of myopia.
However, while ingenious, Le Grand’s argument may be pushing social policy too far 
into the realm of metaphysics. If our future selves really do need to be protected from 
our current selves then this has far wider implications; for instance, smoking would be 
illegal (as opposed to heavily taxed) and obesity would be a punishable offence. In a 
liberal, democratic society such authoritarian behaviour is rarely countenanced; faith in 
individuals’ ability to decide for themselves (and their future selves) usually prevails180, 
Moreover, if governments were genuinely concerned about myopia a number of 
features of existing pension systems - such as the ability to take lump-sum payouts or 
purchase non-indexed annuities - would not exist. The fact that these practices are 
tolerated (or even encouraged by the tax system) suggests that in reality governments 
do not take myopia too seriously.
Even so, paternalistic arguments for intervention to relate retirement incomes to those 
in work can be persuasive. Hedges (1998, pp. 23-24) shows that many retirees wish 
they had saved more during their working life, and many workers similarly regret not 
saving more at a younger age. The reasons they gave for not doing so at the time are 
varied; though myopia was often a factor, ignorance about the true level of state 
provision and uncertainty about the benefits which additional pension contributions 
might provide were also important. In short, pensions were something which people
179 It is also the case that, if  myopia is important, forcing people to take more of their income at the end 
of their lives will raise efficiency: the aggregate lifetime welfare of an individual will be raised by the 
state preventing their younger selves from adopting a ‘carpe diem ’ strategy and, instead, forcing them to 
take more account of their future needs.
180 It was this liberal argument against compulsory earnings-related benefits which led Beveridge to 
reject such provision, famously arguing that “m establishing a national minimum, it (the state) should 
leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to provide more than the 
minimum fo r himself and his family" (Beveridge 1942, p 6/7).
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didn’t think about when young -  both because retirement was a long way off (myopia) 
and because the whole area is so complex and uncertain -  but which became of
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increasing concern as retirement approached . However, the older one is the more 
must be contributed to a pension to achieve a particular retirement income, and hence 
action at an earlier stage in life may, in retrospect, have been preferable.
This therefore provides a straightforward argument for compulsory eamings-related 
pensions: left to themselves individuals will make ‘wrong’ decisions about provision 
for old age (i.e. decisions which they later regret), and hence government should take 
on responsibility for organising how finances are managed over the lifecycle. By 
forcing people to save the state circumvents individuals’ lack of understanding of 
pensions and, moreover, relieves them of the ‘burden’ of having to make decisions for 
themselves.
The paternalistic argument for eamings-relation cannot, therefore, be entirely 
discounted. However, hard evidence that the majority of people would prefer less 
liberty is always likely to be hard to come by and, even then, the infringement of the 
freedom of those who prefer to organise their own finances must be taken into account. 
As with myopia, if the government were to go into the business of intervening to ensure 
people avoid regrets there would be far wider implications for public policy. Though 
clearly some recent legislation has been paternalistic -  forcing people to wear seat 
belts, for instance -  in general the tide of history appears to be moving away from such 
an all-encompassing role for the state182. Certainly, as the general level of education 
rises, with upwards of half the working population having degrees, lack of 
understanding of financial products may become less of a problem (though 
simplification certainly also has a part to play, see Jupp, 1997, p. 53). But perhaps most 
importantly, particularly if low earners are worse than others at planning their lifetime
181 Myopia may be explained by both genuine information failures (e.g. about the rate of return to 
pension investments and the costs and risks attached to such schemes) and by ‘optimism bias’ - 
individuals’ tendency to overestimate their future pension rights, for example by underestimating the 
extent to which job changes adversely affect occupational pension rights.
182 Note though that there is an externality associated with car accidents, in that they create extra work 
for the NHS. There are no analogous externalities associated with earnings-related social insurance (if 
the argument made in the previous section is accepted).
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finances, paternalistic arguments (though of a slightly different kind) could just as 
easily be used to justify increases in flat-rate benefits.
7.3 Willingness to pay
The final argument for compulsory eamings-related pensions is that people are more 
willing to pay for such pension schemes than for flat-rate or means-tested schemes paid
•I Q 'J
for out of taxation . One argument here is that (psychologically) people prefer paying 
contributions which are not designated as general taxation but are in some way 
assigned to a specific purpose (Mulgan and Murray, 1993, p. 19; Wilkinson, 1994, p. 
120). Hence to secure electoral support for state transfer payments contributions/taxes 
must be allocated to particular areas of spending, such as support for the elderly. As 
eamings-related pensions are naturally hypothecated (as this sort of tax-linkage is 
called), they may therefore be preferable to tax-financed pensions. However, as will be 
apparent, under this argument the tail is wagging the dog -  the reason for eamings- 
relation is that this allows contributions to be labelled as other than taxation; the 
resulting shape for benefits is merely a by-product. At least in theory, an hypothecated 
flat-rate scheme would do just as well in convincing people that they weren’t simply 
being obliged to pay another tax (see Section 6.5).
The hypothecation argument for eamings-relation does not therefore bear close 
analysis. However, there are two other willingness to pay arguments which we should 
take more seriously. The first of these relates to the supposed advantages of ‘back­
door’ income redistribution. Under social insurance benefits do not need to be linked to 
contributions in an actuarially-fair way, and this can allow pensions to be tilted in 
favour of low lifetime earners. So long as benefits reflect earnings to some extent then, 
the argument mns, the precise rate of return for different individuals is neither here nor 
there; the main thing is that people should believe they are getting something back for
183 The willingness to pay argument for earnings-related social insurance is closely related to the idea 
that corporatist, all-encompassing welfare states are more successful than other models in engendering 
social stability, and are to be preferred on this basis (see Goodin et al, 1999, pp.160-174). In particular 
both arguments hinge on the ability of earnings-related schemes to institutionalise protection of 
retirement incomes.
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paying in (see Section 5.2, in particular the quote from Labour Party, 1957). Even if 
(tax-financed) flat-rate pension schemes are a more efficient way of reducing poverty 
(as shown in Figure 7.1 and illustrated by the results in Section 3.3 and 3.4), they too 
clearly redistribute from rich to poor, and hence will be difficult to sustain politically.
In other words, the politics of redistribution make it necessary to disguise who wins 
and who loses - obfuscation is an (unfortunate) necessity.
This sort of argument may hold considerable force in relation to, for instance, the US 
social insurance scheme, where redistribution is achieved through varying accrual rates 
within an integrated system of eamings-related pensions . Arguably, as this type of 
system makes it possible to redistribute by lifetime rather than annual income (as 
occurs in the tax and benefit system), it is also more efficient than other available 
policy tools (Diamond, 1999, p. 8). However, whether or not this is the case (with the 
answer being highly sensitive to the specifics of the scheme in question), this reasoning 
can not be applied to the UK. In particular, the fact that it is possible to opt-out of 
SERPS means that benefits must be actuarially-fair. Admittedly, as originally 
envisaged, the state-provided part of the scheme did contain some redistributive, non- 
actuarial elements (principally Home Responsibilities Protection), but these have 
proved the least durable politically. Moreover, the fact that there is a ceiling on 
National Insurance Contributions means that what ‘back-door’ redistribution is 
achieved is generally from middle rather than high earners (Agulnik, 1999b, pp. 419- 
420). This is further shown by the estimates from PENSIM reported in Section 3.4, 
which suggest that even if the system envisaged under the 1975 SERPS legislation 
were restored in full there would be only a modest fall in pensioner inequality relative 
to the baseline (see Table 3.7).
184 In the US social insurance system the first segment of contributions accrues benefits at the rate of 
90% (i.e. if an individual’s earnings were always in this band they would receive a pension worth 90% of 
their contributions), but above this level contributions accrue benefits at a rate of 32% at first, and then 
15% on the final segment (Johnson, 1999, p.7). In some ways the S2P can be seen as a variant on this 
kind of scheme; in particular a higher accrual rate (40%) applies on earnings below the lower threshold 
than above it (10%). However, the jump upwards to 20% once the upper threshold is crossed is 
anomalous in this context. Moreover, in so far as the S2P is a replacement for the (flat-rate) basic 
pension it is a regressive rather than a progressive step (see Section 6.5). But even if it is compared to 
SERPS the estimates from PENSIM reported in Section 6.3 do not support the notion that the S2P 
achieves much by way of ‘back-door’ redistribution.
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If the willingness to pay argument holds for the UK at all it must therefore be made in 
relation to broader ideas about how eamings-related schemes can institutionalise 
protection of retirement incomes. In a mature system the provision of eamings-related 
benefits requires higher contributions than would otherwise be the case, reflecting the 
fact that as well as ensuring a minimum standard the pension system is also protecting 
accustomed living standards. However, at the inception of compulsory eamings-related 
provision this trade-off between the size of contributions and the extent to which 
benefits are eamings-related may not be apparent. This is because social insurance 
(which is normally how compulsory eamings-related pensions are first introduced) is 
financed on a PAYG basis, hence the link between the benefits offered by a scheme 
and contributions to it may vary by cohort185. Higher benefits than those merited by 
individuals’ contribution records can be offered to early generations - indeed, at the 
start of social insurance schemes it is possible for the value of benefits earned by 
contributions to be so far from actuarially fair that, in effect, introduction of the scheme 
increases the net wage (in present value terms). In the short term, therefore, the 
willingness to pay argument for social insurance can be very attractive to governments, 
appearing to offer a painless way to overcome the political and economic problems 
associated with taxation.
Of course, in the long run it is inevitable that this ‘win-win’ situation will come to an 
end; eventually the true cost of providing eamings-related benefits must become 
apparent. However, it would appear that in many countries such considerations did 
little to undermine the political attractions of establishing eamings-related social 
insurance. No doubt this partly reflected the fact that those who stood to lose - younger 
and unborn generations - had little or no voting power. But a more sophisticated line of 
argument may also have been important. Rates of return to social insurance 
contributions can remain high for many decades after the inception of a scheme, and 
full maturity can also be delayed by demographic change. Such schemes therefore have 
plenty of time to become embedded in the economic and social fabric of a nation 
before the trade-off between contribution levels and redistribution must be faced.
185 In other words, PAYG pension schemes can bring about inter-generational redistribution from future 
(richer) generations; see Section 4.1 for a discussion of whether the generational inequality this creates is 
problematic.
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Hence social insurance may institutionalise protection of incomes in later life in a way 
in which taxation fails to do.
An additional factor should also be mentioned. Because under eamings-related social 
insurance the state’s role is comprehensive, helping individuals to maintain their 
accustomed living standards in retirement as well as ensuring a minimum income, 
demand for private pensions is likely to be low . Therefore, even when rates of return 
fall as schemes reach maturity, there will appear to be little alternative but to continue 
to rely on state provision: private pensions will have had little opportunity to establish 
their own role and constituency of supporters. Similarly, individuals will have made 
plans on the basis that they will receive a particular level of pension benefits from the 
state, and as their working life progresses it will become gradually more difficult for 
them to switch to private provision. In particular, the defined-benefit nature of social 
insurance schemes means that private alternatives, which are typically defined- 
contribution, grow increasingly unattractive as individuals approach retirement, (see 
also the explanation for the introduction of age-related rebates in Section 1 A.2). 
Governments and individuals may therefore become iocked-in’ to eamings-related 
state provision, unwilling to countenance a reduction in benefits and therefore forced to
1 R7rely on increasing contribution rates to bring schemes into balance . As such, social 
insurance is less vulnerable to welfare state ‘retrenchment’ under conservative 
administrations (Pierson, 1994, pp. 171-175). The analysis in Section 5.2 suggested that 
this idea was very much part of the thinking which motivated Labour’s conversion to 
eamings-related social insurance in the 1950s.
The main argument for eamings-related social insurance is therefore essentially 
political, and, as such, must be examined in the particular context of the country 
concerned. In the US, for instance, the Clinton administration’s plans to shore-up social 
insurance demonstrate the political strength which this form of pension provision can 
possess (see Clinton, 1999, pp. 6-7). In contrast, Labour’s reform proposals (the
186 As shown by Johnson (1999, p. 43), if the state already provides a high standard of living in 
retirement there is little reason for people to further transfer resources to later life through voluntary 
(private) saving.
187 The widespread popular opposition to reform of the German pension system may illustrate this 
point.
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historical background to which is discussed in Chapter 5) illustrate SERPS’ failure to 
gain a foothold in the popular psyche and, more generally, public ambivalence towards 
making accustomed living standards an objective of policy (see Hedges, 1998, pp. 92- 
94).
The above has mostly related to the social insurance ‘ideal type’. However, much of the 
recent debate on pension reform has focussed on compulsory saving, the other ‘ideal 
type’ system providing eamings-related benefits. In particular, a number of countries 
have followed the example of Chile and moved to replace their PAYG social insurance 
schemes with compulsory funded schemes with workers being obliged to contribute a 
proportion of their earnings to a private pension scheme (James, 1997, pp. 363-364). 
The result, therefore, has been that one form of eamings-related pension provision has 
been replaced by another, the principal difference between the two being their method 
of financing (PAYG or funded). The next section therefore examines how (or whether) 
the arguments for compulsory saving differ from those outlined above (see also Section 
4.5). The following section then goes on to discuss the main argument against 
compulsory eamings-related pensions, namely their effect on labour market efficiency.
7.4 Are the arguments for compulsory saving different?
Proponents of compulsory saving generally believe that the contributions required to 
sustain mature social insurance systems are too large; political or economic realities, 
they argue, make reductions inevitable (see, for instance, Feldstein, 1996, p. 13). 
However, the idea that social insurance is in some way unsustainable does not, in itself, 
make the case for compulsory saving. If social insurance contributions are ‘too large’ 
then the simplest path for reform would simply be to reduce the benefits such schemes 
provide -  parametric reform (i.e. of the mles governing benefit entitlements) is all that 
is required (Willmore, 1998, p.16)188. Accordingly compulsory saving should be seen
188 This might involve, for instance, raising the retirement age or, where such provisions exist, 
removing the possibility of early retirement. Alternatively, the parameters of the system could be left the 
same for low lifetime earners but cut back for the better off, for instance through imposing a maximum 
pension or through reducing accrual rates (but not contributions) as earnings increase. In any event, the 
key point is that social insurance contributions can only be reduced (or increases curtailed) through 
benefit cuts; whether these cuts should fall on everyone or be concentrated on the lifetime rich is a 
political question.
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as a combination of two distinct policies. First is reforming (cutting) social insurance 
benefits, so that the expected cost of state transfers to future pensioners is reduced 
(parametric reform). Second is the imposition of a layer of compulsory funded 
pensions, so that the benefits once provided by social insurance are instead provided by
• i onprivate pension schemes .
There is little doubt that in many continental European countries some variant of the 
first policy is required (Roseveare et al, 1996, Section II; Disney, 2000, pp. 6-8) 19°. 
Their social insurance schemes provide such generous benefits, both in terms of 
eamings-replacement levels and length of retirement, that maintaining existing 
entitlement rules is not an option; the rates of contribution required to fully finance 
such benefits are unlikely to be economically sustainable. However, the need for the 
second policy is more open to doubt; as with social insurance, a convincing rationale 
for forcing people to have an eamings-related pension is needed. Three possible 
arguments - presentational, macro-economic and fiscal - are examined in turn below.
The presentational argument for compulsory saving is that in order to gain support for 
cutting social insurance benefits it is necessary to show that retirement incomes will 
nonetheless be maintained. While in all probability voluntary saving will in any case 
increase to compensate for the loss of state benefits, this cannot be proven. Thus, the 
argument runs, for presentational reasons replacement pension provision must be made 
compulsory, in spite of the economic arguments for favouring a voluntary approach 
(see next section). However, this argument ignores the possibility that reductions in 
social insurance benefits might be accompanied by other, potentially more popular, 
policies. For instance, rather than obliging people to pay into a private pension, 
governments might instead promise to use future savings to improve/maintain health 
services (the cost of which also tends to grow as populations age; see Section 4.2), or to
189 This logical distinction between cutting social insurance benefits and the imposition of compulsory 
saving is well illustrated by the ‘personal security accounts’ option for reforming the US social security 
system, as described by Goss (1997, pp. 2-4). This proposes, first, that public benefits should become 
entirely flat-rate (allowing the sustainable contribution rate to fall), and, second, that everyone should be 
obliged to contribute 5%  of their earnings to a private pension.
190 As shown in Section 4.2, the prognosis in the UK is far more benign; despite population growth the 
cost of pension provision (as a proportion of GDP) is set to fall, though the cost of the NHS will rise to 
compensate for this. The estimates presented in Table 4.1 suggest that, overall, current tax revenues are 
sufficient to cover future changes in expenditure, i.e. policy is sustainable at present.
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reduce user charges (such as for long term care). Certainly New Zealand’s September 
1997 referendum on pension reform, where advocates of compulsory saving received 
just 8% of the vote (on an 80% tum-out), does not lend much support to the idea that 
such policies are voter-friendly191.
The macro-economic argument for funding pension provision (for instance, through
199compulsory saving) has already been discussed in Section 4.5 . Two conclusions
were reached. First, it is far from clear that a move to funding makes a large difference 
to macro-economic performance, and it may make none. Second, the debate about the 
economic impact of funding should not obscure the fact that what matters is growth; 
and for that latter purpose the entire menu of policies should be considered, whether or 
not this has anything to do with pensions. Again, therefore, the case for compulsory 
saving must be made in relation to alternative interventions, not in relation to the 
(alleged) adverse economic effects of social insurance.
Finally there is the fiscal argument for compulsory saving. As shown in Section 4.1, 
and by Barro (1979, p. 944) and Flemming (1987, pp. 380-384), in comparison with a 
policy of allowing tax rates to go up (or down) in response to spending pressures (such 
as those caused by demographic change), the economic distortions associated with 
taxation will be lower if tax rates are smoothed. Hence governments should seek to 
even out the tax burden at different points in time for efficiency reasons193. But, once 
again, this does not in itself constitute an argument for compulsory saving, or indeed 
for reducing public pension liabilities. While scaling-back social insurance is one way 
of reducing future spending pressures, and hence of flattening-out tax rates, other
191 The rejection of compulsory saving in New Zealand also tends to support the idea that electorates do 
not distinguish between taxation and compulsory pension contributions; both reduce take-home pay and 
are equally unpopular. The inclusion of rebates with other forms of public expenditure in Section 4.2 
therefore looks like the ‘correct’ assumption -  distinguishing between gross and net NICs is not helpful.
192 In practice most advocates of funded pensions tend to argue for the compulsory saving model for 
pension provision. However, there is no necessary connection between funding and compulsorily linking 
pension benefits to earnings. For instance, Frank Field has advocated a system where compulsory 
contributions would pay for flat-rate benefits financed out of a communal asset-based fund. Though 
rather different to most basic income schemes, this idea is best seen as a funded version of this ideal 
type.
193 As noted in Section 4.1, this assumes that the tax base and structure of taxation remain constant over 
time, so that evening out the average tax burden will result in stable tax rates. Demographic change in 
fact means that this is not the case in the UK (see Figure 4.5).
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policies are possible (see Chapter 4). Moreover, even if it is agreed that funding more 
pension provision is a sensible way of adapting to demographic change, this argument 
says nothing about whether the benefits provided by funded pensions should be 
eamings-related or flat-rate; tax-smoothing is achieved by reducing future expenditure 
on state pensions, and replacement provision need not mirror the benefit structure of 
social insurance.
7.5 The effect of compulsory earnings-related pensions on labour market 
efficiency
Two arguments against compulsory eamings-related pensions have already been 
mentioned: Section 7.3 suggested that the higher contribution rates associated with 
eamings-relation will be politically unpopular, while Section 7.2 set out the libertarian 
case for restricting the state’s role to ensuring a minimum income. However, yet to be 
mentioned is perhaps the most important argument against this form of pension 
provision - that it adversely affects labour market efficiency by distorting the choice 
between work and leisure. This section takes up this issue.
The argument that social insurance contributions reduce work incentives is well set out 
in Feldstein (1996, pp. 2-5). As part of a wider critique of social insurance, he suggests 
that contributions to such schemes are little different from taxation, in that both reduce 
the lifetime value of labour, thereby driving a wedge between workers’ net 
remuneration and their true productivity (to the detriment of labour market efficiency). 
This in turn reflects two features of social insurance. First, an element of ‘back-door’ 
redistribution is often built into the design of such schemes, so that better-paid workers 
receive a worse deal on their contributions than low earners. However, as Feldstein 
concedes, this does not affect the population-wide aggregate of benefits received to 
contributions paid; rather, it means poorer workers get a higher rate of return on their 
contributions, and hence have an increased incentive to work, while the reverse is true 
for high earners. Feldstein’s argument therefore hinges on the second feature of social 
insurance -  that under PAYG finance the rate of return on contributions cannot in the 
long run exceed the rate of growth of the contribution base (earnings plus population
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growth). As discussed in Section 4.5 Feldstein assumes that this long run real rate of 
return is 2.6% pa (the average annual increase in US salaries since 1960), which he 
contrasts with the 9.3% average real rate of return on corporate capital over the same 
period194. He concludes, therefore, that individuals would prefer to invest their social 
insurance contributions in the private sector -  where they can buy more retirement 
income for a given fall in consumption -  and that the difference between the public and 
private rates of return represents the effective tax imposed by social insurance.
However, even if Feldstein’s arguments against social insurance are accepted (contrary 
to the conclusions of Section 4.5 and Diamond, 1999, p. 18), it does not follow that 
forcing workers to contribute to private savings schemes will have zero effect on labour 
market incentives. Indeed, this will only be the case if the level of compulsory 
contributions is the same (or less) than individuals would have contributed to a pension 
voluntarily. This does not seem very probable (and, moreover, would obviate the need 
for any sort of intervention in the first place). In reality some workers are likely to be 
myopic (see Sections 7.2 and 1.1), preferring to consume more now and less later 
(despite the high rewards from saving), while others may favour a different portfolio of 
assets, with, say, greater investment in their own business or housing and less in the 
form of a pension. Instead of being forced to contribute part of their earnings to a 
pension scheme many workers would therefore prefer to receive a larger net wage, so 
that they can then make investment decisions themselves195. Hence, even when the 
return on compulsory saving is identical to that on voluntary saving, such compulsory 
contributions may share some of the properties of taxation, in that the balance of 
incentives (for instance between working in the formal and the shadow economy) will 
be altered. Therefore, though it is plausible that compulsory saving will affect labour 
market efficiency less than social insurance, if it has some effect on individuals’ saving 
behaviour it is also bound to affect their work incentives.
194 Feldstein also produces a number of slightly lower estimates for the rate of return to private capital, 
reflecting the effect o f taxes and the need to take into account the variability (i.e. riskiness) of returns.
195 This assumes that capital market constraints do not allow individuals to borrow against their 
compulsory pension savings. However, even when credit markets do allow such borrowing to take place, 
transaction costs mean not being forced to save in the first place would have been cheaper and therefore 
preferable.
216
Labour market considerations therefore favour a voluntary approach to pensioning, 
where people are free to decide for themselves how much to save from their (higher) 
take-home pay. However, this does not mean that governments can entirely abrogate 
their responsibilities in relation to older people; as noted in Section 1.1, all 
governments have a duty to ensure a minimum retirement income standard through 
providing either means- tested assistance or universal flat-rate benefits. Bearing in 
mind the problem of moral hazard mentioned earlier, it is likely that any move away 
from eamings-relation would be in favour of the latter model, and this would clearly 
require raising substantial amounts of revenue through taxation. This therefore suggests 
a potential flaw in the above analysis: as there would be no link whatsoever between 
contributions and benefits, a flat-rate scheme could reduce work incentives more than 
either kind of eamings-related scheme, despite the lower rates of contribution it 
requires.
However, this line of argument fails to take into account the need for supplemental 
assistance (or a floor to benefits) under eamings-related schemes. Though Feldstein’s 
analysis assumed a rate of return on compulsory pension contributions of 9.3% (or 
slightly lower after adjusting for taxes and risk), he ignores the fact that some workers 
will not accumulate benefits worth more than the minimum retirement income, and so 
will qualify for means-tested assistance196. The rate of return on their contributions will 
therefore be nil (just like a tax). Similarly, the rate of return to people who retire with 
an income just above the minimum should also be adjusted to take into account the 
existence of top-up benefits. Unless workers systematically fail to consider the 
existence of such benefits, the end result is that the flat-rate scheme will always have 
less of an effect on labour market incentives than either kind of eamings-related 
scheme.
196 In the example illustrated in Figure 7.1 earlier these are people whose lifetime earnings are under 
half average.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the arguments for the two compulsory eamings-related 
models for pension provision, social insurance and compulsory saving. The moral 
hazard and myopia arguments for this type of provision have been shown to be weak: 
eamings-related pensions per se do not reduce the moral hazard associated with means- 
tested benefits, and though myopia/paternalism may offer a justification for 
governments concerning themselves with accustomed (as well as minimum) living 
standards, this is a somewhat authoritarian path to tread. However, the willingness to 
pay argument is more convincing, at least in providing a political rationale for the 
introduction of eamings-related social insurance. The important point about this 
argument, however, is that it relies on social insurance being introduced prior to the 
widespread development of occupational pension schemes or other private 
pension/savings vehicles. In the UK this ‘window of opportunity’ was manifestly 
missed, with Beveridge’s (1942, paragraphs 302 and 304) rejection of compulsory 
eamings-relation being the last chance (see Chapter 5). The move to something like an 
eamings-related model for social insurance in 1975 was clearly too late.
On the other side, proponents of compulsory saving should consider what they are 
trying to achieve. As shown above, it is difficult to find an economic rationale for why 
governments should concern themselves with individuals’ accustomed living standards, 
hence the justification for schemes which force people to transfer resources to later life 
must be made on other grounds. In the case of compulsory saving these grounds are 
largely macro-economic. However, while it is probably the case that compulsory 
saving would have some economic benefits, it is much less clear that these are greater 
than those associated with alternative courses of action (see Section 4.5). At best, 
therefore, compulsory saving is a little like Keynes’ illustration of the merits of public 
spending in a depression -  paying people to dig holes is one solution, but it is probably 
not the best available policy response.
The question is then whether existing eamings-related pension schemes should be 
reformed, perhaps along the lines of the movement from SERPS to the S2P (see
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Chapter 6), or whether abolition of second tier provision is the more sensible path. In 
countries where first and second tier provision are unified in the form of a large social 
insurance scheme it is probable that parametric reform is optimal - the most 
straightforward way to reduce ‘excess’ benefits above the minimum is simply to 
change the benefit formula. But in the UK, where there is a clear division between first 
and second tier provision, there are strong arguments for a more radical approach. In 
particular, the abolition of second tier provision could pay for improvements in first tier 
benefits -  the cost of contracted-out rebates is substantial (over 1% of GDP) and could 
finance significant improvements in the basic pension (see Section 8.5). Given the 
failure of social insurance in the UK, as described in Chapter 5, the case for ‘starting 
over’ is simply that the current system is too far gone to make a gradual approach 
desirable.
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8. Targeting versus a basic income: ensuring a minimum retirement 
income
Ensuring a minimum retirement income is an objective of pension policy in all 
developed countries; in contrast to the working population, where there is at least one 
country (the US) which does not provide a safety net for people without children, there 
is a consensus that government has a moral duty to prevent destitution in old age. 
Whether the state should ensure that everyone has a minimum income in retirement is 
therefore not in question -  unlike the accustomed living standards objective discussed 
in the last chapter, there is little doubt that this objective makes sense197. Accordingly, 
the issue addressed in this chapter is the most appropriate way to secure such a 
minimum.
As set out in Section 1.3, there are two contrasting approaches to how governments can 
ensure a minimum income. At one extreme they can use targeted (i.e. means-tested) 
benefits to top-up the incomes of pensioners who would otherwise fall below the 
minimum standard, while at the other extreme they can provide universal benefits (set 
at the level of the minimum) to all pensioners irrespective of their income. These two 
ideal type polices are labelled in this thesis as ‘targeting’ and ‘basic income’, and 
estimates of the effect of each on future pensioner incomes and on the public finances 
were presented in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 4.3. In brief, the analysis showed that the basic 
income policy fares far better in terms of distributional outcomes (for instance, 
pensioner inequality and poverty are predicted to be lower than under targeting), but 
that it is much more expensive. This firmly accords with popular conceptions: the basic 
income policy is ‘fairer’ but this advantage comes at the expense of a hefty price-tag. 
There would therefore appear to be a simple policy trade-off between distributional 
outcomes (fairness) and cost (efficiency).
197 As noted in Section 1.1, some commentators have argued that people with low retirement incomes 
but reasonable earnings over their working lives should be excluded from eligibility to additional state 
assistance. However, the attempt to implement a thrift condition in 1908 when means-tested pensions 
were first introduced in the UK was not a success (Macnicol, 1998, pp. 158-161), and it is doubtful 
whether it would be any more successful today.
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However, the efficiency argument for targeting is not as clear-cut as might be 
supposed, and it is possible that the basic income policy will be more efficient in spite 
of its higher cost. As set out in Section 8.1, this reflects the fact that under targeting 
people with (or expecting to have) a retirement income below the poverty standard face 
a 100% effective marginal tax rate, and hence have no incentive to save. Therefore 
though the lower cost of targeting improves incentives for people above the minimum 
(as the required tax rate on labour income is lower), the overall effect of this policy is 
indeterminate, and economic theory cannot provide a definitive answer as to which 
type of intervention is preferable. Section 8.2 then moves on to look at three other 
arguments against a policy of relying on mean-tested benefits: its effect on horizontal 
equity, the problems of incomplete take-up and stigma, and the political problems it is 
associated with. Given these difficulties Sections 8.3 and 8.4 look at two alternative 
‘hybrid models’ which claim to avoid the problems of means testing while stopping 
short of a full basic income. Section 8.3 looks at the idea that second tier provision 
could be used in a limited way to deliver a minimum retirement income, while Section 
8.4 discusses the effects of a ‘pensioner credit’, where eligibility for Income Support 
would be tapered-off at less than the current 100% rate198. Section 8.5 concludes by 
reviewing the arguments against means testing and by suggesting that the abandonment 
of second tier provision could make moves towards a basic income both feasible and 
desirable.
8.1 Is targeting more efficient than a basic income?
The main claim made for targeting is that it is a more efficient means of delivering a 
minimum retirement income as it avoids the ‘waste’ of giving benefits to people who 
do not need them (i.e. to pensioners who already have an income worth more than the
198 As noted in Section 1A.1, the government announced in Budget 2000 that it plans to introduce a 
pensioner credit to “to reward low income pensioners who have made some pension provision for  
themselves and those who are currently just above MIG levels” (HMT, 2000, paragraph 5.45). More 
details of the proposal are to be announced in Autumn 2000, and at the time of writing the precise 
structure of the new scheme is unknown. The tapered means-test looked at in Section 8.4 is one way in 
which the government’s objective might be achieved, and this possibility is mentioned in the Budget 
documentation, hence the moniker ‘pensioner credit’ is used here as a short-hand description for the 
scheme. However, the analysis in Section 8.4 should be thought of only as illustrating the government’s 
plans; the pensioner credit which is eventually introduced (if the government follows through with its 
plans) may well be rather different.
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minimum). The proposition is therefore that targeting will have less of an effect on 
incentives, and hence on economic behaviour, because its lower costs will be reflected 
in lower tax rates. However, on its own this argument is clearly incorrect; as well as 
looking at the incentive effects of raising revenue to finance benefits (via taxes), the 
distortions created by benefits themselves must also be considered. In other words, 
analysis must look at the incentive effects of the tax-benefit system as a whole.
The effect of taxes and benefits on incentives can be analysed by looking at how a 
marginal increase in an individual’s gross income affects their net income, the 
difference between the two representing the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). Figure
8.1 illustrates for the basic income and targeting schemes used in Part A. It should be 
noted, however, that the Figure is highly schematic, and is intended to indicate only the 
broad properties of the two models. In particular it should be borne in mind that, 
though the Figure illustrates the relationship between gross and net income for 
pensioners, in reality the incentive effects of pension policies are felt most keenly by 
working-age people. The relationship between the EMTR schedule and incentives is 
therefore complex, as pensions affect decisions about both work and saving.
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Figure 8.1
Effective marginal tax rates under a basic income and targeting
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The Figure merits some explanation. The solid lines plot how individuals’ net income 
(shown on the vertical axis) alters in response to changes in their gross income (shown 
on the horizontal axis). The slope o f this net income line therefore shows the marginal 
benefit (i.e. additional net income) an individual receives from a marginal increase in 
their gross income. If there were no taxes and no benefits then an incremental increase 
in gross income would translate directly into the same increase in net income - the 
resultant 45 degree slope is plotted by the dashed line. The difference between the 
slope o f the dashed line and the slope o f  the solid line therefore represents the EMTR.
Under a basic income, everyone receives a benefit equal to the minimum income 
standard (£75 a week, by assumption) causing the net income line to intersect the 
vertical axis at the level o f the minimum. To pay for the basic income the government 
must levy income taxes equivalent to the difference in the slope o f the net income line 
and the dashed 45 degree line199. By assumption the required tax rate shown in the
199 To simplify analysis the Figure ignores the effect o f  graduated tax rates, i.e. it assumes that income 
tax is levied at a uniform rate on all non-benefit income.
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Figure is 50%. However, this is only for illustrative purposes, and it is useful to refer to 
this tax rate algebraically as a . The key point is therefore that under the basic income 
model all individuals face the same EMTR (a).
In contrast, under a targeted (i.e. means-tested) scheme the net income line is kinked 
i.e. individuals face different EMTRs depending on their gross income. This reflects 
the fact that under this system individuals at the bottom of the income distribution 
receive no additional benefit from increases in their gross income until they reach the 
minimum income standard. Below this amount additional benefits are provided which 
are just sufficient to bring incomes up to the minimum level, hence individuals face a 
100% EMTR (net income is invariant to changes in gross income), while above this 
amount individuals are taxed at the rate p (by assumption, 20% in the Figure200). 
Clearly, therefore, people with incomes below the minimum standard face much worse 
incentives under this system than under a basic income. However, incentives for people 
with gross incomes above the minimum are improved, as the cost of benefits is lower 
under the means-tested scheme (and hence tax rate p is lower than the tax rate a). 
Whether, overall, incentives are improved relative to the basic income therefore 
depends, firstly, on how many people are subject to the means test, secondly, how they 
react to this increase in their effective tax rate from a  to 100%, and, lastly, how 
everyone else reacts to the decrease in their tax rate from a  to p.
The incentive effects of different kinds of benefit system are therefore difficult to 
determine. However, economic analyses of ‘optimal taxation’ -  the best trade-off 
between incentives (which are affected by marginal tax rates) and redistribution 
(which reflects average tax rates) -  have tended to favour the linear tax schedule 
associated with the basic income model201. This said, recent work by Diamond (1998,
200 Note the Figure also assumes that the tax allowance is set equal to the minimum income (£75 a week 
or £3,900). In fact in 1999/2000 the tax allowance for pensioners was £100 a week (see Section 1A.1).
201 The connection between a basic income and linear (flat) taxation is recognised by Atkinson (1995c) 
in the title of his study of the issue. For an outline of the problem with which optimal taxation theory is 
concerned, and some initial results, see Mirrlees (1971). More detailed numerical estimates of a number 
of optimal tax schedules are in Tuomala (1990). Broadly, Mirrlees found that an optimal tax structure 
would be linear, while Tuomala (p l4) concludes that "it is difficult (if at all possible) to find a 
convincing argument fo r  a progressive marginal tax rate structure ”, and hence suggests that (optimally) 
effective marginal tax rates would gently decline as income increased. The policy implications of these 
findings are discussed in Heady (1996).
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p. 93) suggests this conclusion is sensitive to the assumed distribution of skills (earning 
power), the responsiveness (elasticity) of labour supply to changes in taxation, and to 
society’s redistributive preferences. Rather than a flat-tax being optimal, Diamond 
finds that under certain assumptions a U-shaped pattern for tax rates is preferable. The 
economic case for linear taxation, while perhaps stronger than many may have 
imagined, is therefore not incontrovertible.
Nevertheless, even if it is accepted that a linear schedule optimises incentives to work, 
it is not clear that this analysis crosses-over directly to pensions policy. This is because 
pensions affect incentives to save, as well as incentives to work (through the taxes on 
earned income needed to finance benefits). In the case of flat-rate benefits the saving 
effect reflects the fact that individuals now have less need to make provision for 
themselves, as they are guaranteed a certain level of income from the state. Means- 
tested benefits also have this income effect, but because the majority of pensioners are 
not eligible for such benefits it is rather less important in aggregate. However, unlike 
flat-rate benefits, means testing also imposes a 100% tax rate on savings below the 
minimum level, creating a severe problem of moral hazard (see Section 7.1). Therefore, 
despite their smaller reach, the overall effect of means-tested benefits on saving may be 
larger than those associated with flat-rate benefits.
The economic arguments for means testing are therefore indeterminate, depending on 
how individuals respond to changes in work and saving incentives. The low tax rates it 
imposes on earned income will encourage people to work more, as the ‘tax wedge’ 
between an individual’s marginal productivity and their remuneration is now smaller, 
but at the same time the policy creates a very large incentive not to save for people 
likely to be affected by the means test. Evaluating the optimal policy therefore requires 
an assessment of both labour-market effects and saving effects. This is an enormously 
difficult exercise. In particular, as Section 3.1 discussed in detail, it is very difficult to 
know the practical importance of the saving disincentive effects created by means 
testing -  the existence of tax reliefs and uncertainty about future income mean that in 
reality moral hazard may not be too important. However, even if it turns out that the 
efficiency arguments favour targeting (on balance), there are a number of other
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objections to means testing which tilt the scales heavily against this model for pension 
provision.
8.2 Other arguments against means testing
The main non-economic arguments against means testing relate to the ethical basis for 
this policy, its ability to ensure that all pensioners receive the assistance they are 
entitled to (i.e. the problems of incomplete take-up and, relatedly, stigma), and its 
political sustainability. These are discussed in turn below. However, arguments about 
administrative costs should first briefly be mentioned.
Undoubtedly it is the case that universal benefits are easier (and therefore cheaper) to 
administer than income-related (means-tested) benefits. However, most administrative 
costs are incurred when means-tested benefits are first claimed (i.e. when people enter 
the system), and after that the cost of administering such benefits is much the same as 
for universal benefits. For some groups of claimants, therefore, administrative costs are 
a significant element in total spending; for instance, people who are claiming benefits 
because they are unemployed are unlikely to claim for a long period (there is a high 
inflow and outflow of claimants), and hence administrative costs are a high proportion 
of expenditure. In contrast, eligible pensioners (and other groups such as disabled 
people) are likely to continue to receive means-tested benefits for a prolonged period 
(quite possibly until they die), and hence the initial cost of administering the claim is 
only a small fraction of the benefits they receive over the entire duration of the 
claim202. A shift towards means-tested benefits for pensioners will therefore incur 
higher administrative costs, but these are insubstantial relative to the savings on 
benefits. Accordingly, therefore, this can only be a supporting argument in favour of 
universal benefits, and the issues discussed below are more important.
202 DSS estimates for the cost of administering different benefits show that, excluding loans and grants 
from the social fund, the Jobseekers’ Allowance is the most expensive benefit to administer, with 
administrative costs amounting to over a tenth of benefit expenditure. By way of comparison, as a 
proportion of expenditure the administrative costs of the basic pension are under 1% and for Income 
Support are under 5%  (DSS, 2000, Table 42). However, this level of aggregation hides the fact that 
administrative costs for different claimant groups within Income Support vary significantly -  costs are 
front-loaded and hence are higher for shorter-claiming groups. Unfortunately, though, the DSS do not 
release estimates disaggregated by claimant group.
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Ethics
The ethical argument against means testing relates to the notion of desert and is well 
illustrated by the current transition towards a ‘minimum income guarantee’. As set out 
in Section 5.4, in the short term the policy of the Labour government is to rely more on 
means-tested benefits, through linking Income Support (the minimum income 
guarantee) to earnings while the basic pension remains tied to prices. The government’s 
argument is that, as the majority of pensioners have an income above the minimum, the 
state’s priority should be to protect the living standards of the poorest. However, this is 
widely perceived as being unfair to people who were prudent in the past, particularly as 
today’s pensioners spent their working lives in a period when the general presumption 
was that means-tested benefits for retirees would become extinct203. For instance, 
imagine the position of a pensioner who discovers during retirement that, because of 
the declining value of the basic pension relative to means-tested benefits, her savings 
leave her little or no better-off than if she had not saved. While not decrying the plight 
of those with very low lifetime incomes, who were never able to save, she might feel 
that she has been treated badly relative to her high-living peers who consumed more 
and saved less during their working lives. Looking backwards it may appear to her as if 
the government unilaterally, and (if she is ill-informed) apparently secretly, changed 
the rules of the game. Means testing is therefore ‘unfair’ to people who worked and 
saved in earlier life and hence who might expect a higher retirement income than more 
spendthrift peers.
The argument can be made more formally in terms of horizontal equity -  the idea that 
like should be treated as like and vice-versa. This principle suggests that if two people 
have the same lifetime earnings but one consumes more during their working life than 
the other they should be treated differently during retirement. The saver ‘deserves’ to 
have a higher income than the non-saver to compensate for their lower consumption in 
working years. Concern for distributional outcomes should therefore be tempered by a 
recognition that individuals' circumstances can reflect choices made earlier in life. To 
borrow a biblical analogy, if the prodigal son voluntarily and knowingly decided to
203 As described in Chapter 5, from 1925 until (at least) 1979 the main thrust of pension policy was to 
reduce reliance on means testing (though in practice the relationship between universal and targeted 
benefits was more delicately balanced; see Glennerster, 1995, p. 221).
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give today’s consumption priority over tomorrow’s he cannot complain when, as 
tomorrow dawns, he discovers his income is lower than his prudent brother’s.
However, should the state, or their father in this case, decide to disregard decisions 
taken earlier in life then the prodigal son’s brother may rightly feel aggrieved that his 
earlier prudence has been for nought (see also Hills, 1997, p. 29).
Take-up and stigma
There are also practical objections to means testing. One is that means-tested benefits 
are, in reality, incapable of achieving the government’s objective of relieving pensioner 
poverty. This is because no mechanism has yet been designed, or is in prospect, which 
ensures anything like complete take-up of such benefits. Moreover even if the problem 
of low take-up could be overcome, the problem of ‘stigma’ associated with means- 
tested benefits would, according to commentators such as Townsend and Walker 
(1995, p. 7), greatly reduce the effective value of benefits to recipients, again 
undermining the government’s objective of increasing the well-being of the poorest 
pensioners. These arguments are looked at in turn below.
The problem of low take-up has been widely and officially recognised. Following the 
pioneering work of Abel-Smith and Townsend (1965), successive governments have 
instituted their own studies of take-up, and annual estimates are now published. The 
most recent estimates (for 1997/8) show that around half a million pensioners are not 
taking up their entitlement (DSS, 1999a, Table 1.1; see also Section 1A.1)204. This is a 
substantial hole in the safety net. However, while all agree that this is a significant 
problem, opinion differs about the causes of the low take-up, and therefore the 
difficulty of designing a better system. Atkinson (1995a, pp. 296-198) and Townsend 
and Walker (1995 pp. 6-7) argue that low take-up is the inevitable result of the social 
stigma which, in the minds of potential recipients, is attached to means-tested benefits. 
However, empirical research is more equivocal about the reasons for low take-up; for 
instance, Costigan et aV s (1999, Ch.s 4 and 5) study of eligible non-recipients suggests
204 In terms of expenditure incomplete take-up is less marked, indicating that non-claimants have 
smaller entitlements on average. For instance, estimates for 1997/8 show that for single female 
pensioners take-up is between 62% and 74% by caseload but between 69% and 83% by expenditure 
(DSS, 1999a, Tables 1.3 and 1.4).
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that lack of information (the ‘process dimension’) is as important as claimant’s 
attitudes (the ‘stigma dimension’) in explaining low take-up.
It is therefore possible that better devices for giving information to, or collecting 
information from, pensioners could significantly increase take-up205. This said, it is 
doubtful whether complete take-up could ever be achieved using current administrative 
mechanisms; certainly, previous attempts to increase take-up through restructuring 
benefits, such as the move in the 1960s from National Assistance to Supplementary 
Benefit or the introduction in the 1980s of Income Support, give little reason for 
optimism on this front (Fry and Stark, 1993, p. 63). And, indeed, the government’s new 
campaign to persuade pensioners to claim their full entitlement only envisages 
increasing take-up to 85% (by caseload, DSS 1998b). Nevertheless, it is too early to 
judge whether the re-branding of Income Support as a ‘minimum income guarantee’ 
and other recent moves to popularise the benefit have been a success, and despite some 
justified scepticism from critics it remains possible that something closer to complete 
take-up could eventually be achieved.
However, even if the principal reason for low take-up of means-tested benefits is lack 
of information rather than unwillingness to claim, stigma may remain a valid basis for 
criticising means testing. Rothstein (1998, pp. 178-180) argues that recipients of 
means-tested benefits are, inevitably and always, labelled as ‘second class citizens’, 
and feel themselves to be such. The intangible psychological costs this stigma imposes 
is, he argues, part and parcel of the process of claiming and receiving non-universal 
benefits . Hence we should reject means testing on the grounds that, while it may be 
able to ensure a minimum income in retirement, it cannot ensure a minimum level of 
personal dignity and autonomy. In other words, the cost of hurt pride (or, more mildly, 
wasted time), may be a significant factor in reducing the well-being of recipients of 
means-tested benefits. In contrast, it seems safe to assume that a universal flat-rate
205 The government are currently experimenting with various administrative reforms such as using data- 
matching with other benefits to identify potential Income Support claimants, offering over-the-phone 
form filling, direct-mailing households who may be eligible for additional benefits, as well as a more 
traditional advertising campaign.
206 Rothstein does not consider the possibility that claimants of means-tested benefits may actually form 
a majority of the pensioner population (as is the case in Australia, for instance). In such circumstances it 
is possible that stigma will be greatly reduced, if not eradicated.
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benefit, which involves all individuals in an identical and simple claiming process, will 
not involve such costs. Comparing the two without taking into account the costs of 
claiming therefore presents a distorted picture of their relative efficacy (Besley, 1990,
p. 126).
Political
There are two main political arguments against means testing: that it undermines 
broader social values which the government wishes to encourage, and that it fails to 
deliver sufficient resources to capture pensioners’ votes. These arguments are 
examined in turn below.
The first issue is related to the saving disincentive created by means testing, though it 
applies even if relatively few people are affected by moral hazard. Excepting the recent 
example of Japan, governments rarely encourage workers to consume now rather than 
later. However, the prospect of being reliant on means-tested benefits in retirement has 
precisely the effect of discouraging people from putting money aside for the future (see 
Section 7.1). In the terminology of Le Grand (1997, p. 165), means testing therefore 
promotes ‘knavish’ behaviour which is, at once, rational for the individual and, from 
society’s point of view, irresponsible. Rather than conjoining social rights and 
responsibilities such a policy sets one against the other - greater ‘responsibility’ (in 
terms of higher saving) may lead to lower rights to benefit and vice-versa. Given this it 
would be disingenuous for the government to simultaneously exhort people to save 
while operating a policy which penalised them for so doing.
Such a situation would appear to arise under current policy due to the fact that Income 
Support is uprated with earnings while the basic pension is linked to prices. 
Nevertheless, the government claim that the introduction of the S2P means that this 
‘moral hazard’ problem does not affect today’s workers, and hence there is no sleight 
of hand in encouraging people to save. The validity of this claim was examined at 
length in Chapter 6, which found that though reliance on Income Support in the future 
will be lower under the S2P than under SERPS, it will still be quite substantial. Even 
so, it is probably the second political problem with means testing - that it fails to get 
pensioners’ votes - which is the more important factor.
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The most persistent criticism of the approach adopted by Labour since coming into 
office relates to their decision to increase the basic pension with prices. Though Income 
Support has and will increase in line with earnings, because only a minority of 
pensioners claim means-tested benefits the policy fails to deliver sufficient resources to 
a key group of voters. In particular, the policy is incapable of rewarding the so called 
‘median voter’: most pensioners have too high an income to benefit from increases in 
Income Support but too low an income to receive much (if any) advantage from the 
lower tax rates associated with means testing. By hollowing-out pensioners in the 
middle of the income distribution the policy therefore misses the ‘Middle England’ 
voters needed to win elections207.
In one sense this argument is simply a poor representation of what Labour has done 
since being elected. In fact, once various measures such as the introduction of winter 
fuel payments and free TV licences for people over 75 are taken into account, the 
government will spend around £2.5 billion more in their first term of office than would 
have been needed to uprate the basic pension with earnings (Darling, 2000, p.3). 
However, in another sense, the fact that despite this extra spending the government 
have lost more ground since 1997 on the issue of pensions than any other (see MORI, 
2000) illustrates precisely the political difficulties associated with means testing208. 
Even if one way or another state transfers to pensioners rise to compensate for the 
falling value of the basic pension, the way in which support is delivered may be 
important; as exploited by the Conservatives in their plans to roll-up winter fuel
207 This hollowing-out effect can be seen in the analysis in Section 3.2 using PENSIM, which showed 
that the effect of the targeting ideal type is to flatten-out a large portion of the income distribution.
These flat segments represent pensioner households claiming Income Support, and show that the policy 
prevents pensioners from falling below the minimum standard (bar those not taking up their entitlement). 
However, the key point is that while the policy prevents pensioners from falling too far, middle income 
pensioners will be worse-off than under baseline policy (see Figure 3.1). Only households who would in 
any case have been eligible for means-tested support will be no worse-off under this policy, and these 
are a minority.
208 MORI’s commentary on their August 2000 poll findings is instructive: “the opposition attack on the 
derisory pension rise announced in the Spring hit home; indeed, it may prove to be the biggest mistake 
the government has made this year. Quite apart from the overall swing, it angers a particularly 
dangerous portion o f the electorate, and has been accompanied by a swing to the Conservatives, against 
the general trend, among older voters. Although... Labour still retains a narrow lead on pensions among 
the whole population, among the third of the public who say it will be important to their vote the Tories 
have a tiny lead, 23% to 22% ” (Mortimore, 2000)
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payments and free TV licences into the basic pension, innovation in benefit delivery for 
older people may not reap (electoral) rewards.
8.3 Hybrid model 1: second tier provision to a minimum
In the long term the problems with means testing described above are likely to make a 
strategy of relying wholly on Income Support untenable. However, it may still be 
possible to overcome (some or all) of these problems while avoiding the ‘waste’ 
associated with providing universal benefits (i.e. with the basic income model), and in 
practice many pension reform proposals in the UK attempt to steer a passage between 
universal and targeted benefits. Accordingly, this section and the one following 
examine two ‘hybrid’ models for pension provision, this section analysing the proposal 
that second tier provision should be used to deliver a minimum income (as proposed by 
Jupp, 1998, pp. 8-10, and in a rather different way by Hills, 1997a, pp. 3-5), while 
Section 8.4 looks at the possibility of creating a ‘pensioner credit’ through tapering-off 
means-tested support.209.
As noted in section 7.1, an automatic knock-on effect of compulsory eamings-related 
provision is to ensure that people who can afford to make provision for themselves (the 
‘lifetime rich’) are not influenced by the availability of means-tested benefits. It is this 
observation which motivates many calls for second tier provision to be strengthened. 
However, this position begs the question as to the optimal level for such provision. The 
problem of moral hazard suggests that contributions to the second tier should be 
relatively high, so that most people automatically accumulate sufficient pension 
entitlements to avoid reliance on means-tested benefits. A recent inquiry into pension 
provision put the argument as follows:
“the minimum level o f contributions [to the second tier] should be 
sufficient, and its coverage should be sufficiently comprehensive, to 
ensure that in future generations the vast bulk o f the population will not 
require an income-related payment to achieve the minimum level o f 
income ...If, over time, the basic pension continues to wither in relation
209 A third possible strategy not considered here is to use the system of tax reliefs surrounding pensions 
to (in effect) bribe people to increase the amount they save in the form of a pension (see Agulnik and Le 
Grand, 1998a, pp. 413-415).
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to average earnings, this implies the level o f compulsory contributions to 
the second tier will need to rise ” (Anson, 1996, p30).
However, as shown in Section 7.1, this moral hazard argument for second tier provision 
is weak, as it fails to provide a rationale for the existence of eamings-related benefits 
above the minimum. Recognising this, Jupp (1998) suggests a variation on this theme, 
proposing that people should only be forced to contribute up to the point where they 
have accumulated sufficient entitlements to pay a pension above the level of means- 
tested benefits. Once this ‘minimum sum’ had been reached individuals would not be 
obliged to save additional amounts. Hence, under Jupp’s proposal, the role of second 
tier provision is limited to ensuring that people avoid reliance on means-tested benefits 
in retirement. It does not aim to, and does not, ensure that a particular eamings- 
replacement rate is achieved, and hence cannot be criticised as paternalistic.
Even so, there are considerable problems with Jupp’s proposal. First, there are transition 
difficulties: second tier pension entitlements only build-up slowly, and it would not be until 
people starting work today had died that the transition to the new system would be fully 
complete. Second, there is an inherent -  and obvious - tension between the rate of 
compulsory provision and the level of the minimum, making such a scheme prey to the 
kind of welfare retrenchment strategies described by Pierson (1994, Ch. 3). Third, Jupp’s 
system would not fit well with changes in need over the lifecycle -  people may find 
themselves forced to contribute when they have least spare resources (e.g. when they have 
young children) but then find themselves above the minimum sum when they are more able 
to pay. In particular, given the introduction of student loans and the culture of owner- 
occupation, the scheme would tend to exacerbate the ‘front-loading’ of lifecycle 
burdens210. Last, and most importantly, unless the level of the minimum income is 
extremely low, or the compulsory contribution rate extremely high, there will always be 
some people who do not automatically accumulate a minimum pension.
This last point is recognised by Jupp, who proposes that some people (principally carers) 
should receive second tier credits during years when they are not working. Such credits
210 Casarico (1998, p. 361) goes one step further, arguing that, if people cannot borrow against their 
savings due to capital market failure, compulsion will tend to reduce individuals’ ability to invest in 
education as financial resources will increasingly be directed towards retirement.
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would therefore act as reward for socially responsible activity outside the labour market, as 
well as reducing the number of people who failed to reach the minimum. However, as Jupp 
also recognises, such credits would not be very ‘target efficient’ -  a lot of money will go to 
people who could have reached the minimum without additional assistance. Moreover, 
they would not ensure that everyone reached the minimum, and there would be a residual 
problem of means-testing for low lifetime earners. A simpler solution might therefore be to 
automatically top-up the pension funds of people who do not reach the minimum, thereby 
creating what might be termed a ‘lifetime means-test’. It is this type of solution which, in 
rather different ways, is proposed by Atkinson (1995b, pp. 318-320), Hills (1997a, pp. 3-5) 
the National Association of Pension Funds (1995, pp. 70-72) and Falkingham and Johnson 
(1995, pp. 208-210). For convenience the following focuses on Hills’ ‘automatic pension 
top-up’ scheme.
The essence of Hills’ scheme is that rather than targeting additional benefits according to 
household income they should be provided to individuals on the basis of their income from 
the basic pension and second tier pensions. In other words, the individual should be the 
unit for assessment, and income from voluntary (third-tier) savings should be ignored in 
calculating top-up payments. The scheme would therefore work through providing 
automatic second-tier credits for low lifetime earners i.e. people who have not earned 
enough over their working life to have accumulated first and second tier entitlements 
which are worth more than the minimum. Assuming that the basic pension continues to be 
linked to prices while Income Support rises with earnings, entitlement to top-ups would 
need to be calculated annually, and the cut-off point for receiving extra support (i.e. the 
definition of a low lifetime earner) would vary by cohort. Nevertheless, the key point is 
that all the relevant information would already be known to the DSS and hence credits 
could be provided automatically, without any need for further income assessments during 
retirement211.
The advantage of such a lifetime means test is that, unlike Income Support, it would 
ensure that all pensioners actually receive the minimum income (as opposed to merely 
having an entitlement), while at the same state top-ups are focussed on the poorest.
211 Because of the existence of SERPS the DSS has full records of the earnings of all employees in 
every year since 1978. From 2027 it will therefore have full records of lifetime earnings (excluding 
periods of self-employment and time spent out of the country, see text).
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However, there are also (at least) two problems with this idea. For one, it might prove 
quite difficult to implement in practice. In particular, there are problems about whether 
current administrative records fully capture individuals’ lifetime earnings. If people 
spend time out of the country or in self employment they will have zero recorded 
earnings for the years in question, and hence will be more likely to qualify for a top-up 
when they retire. But this result is simply because their earnings for those years were 
not recorded, not necessarily because they did not have any. Annual credits, as used in 
the S2P, may therefore be the only practical means of providing top-ups -  measuring 
lifetime income accurately is, in reality, an extremely difficult task.
The second problem with a second tier plus top-ups system is more fundamental: in 
effect, it is simply a circuitous way of creating a basic income. Under both systems all 
retirees end up getting a benefit worth the same as the minimum income, the only 
difference being that in the basic income approach the nature of this transfer is explicit 
whereas the lifetime means-test cloaks redistributive transfers in the guise of credits to 
a pension scheme. If individuals recognise that their compulsory contributions merely 
serve to reduce eligibility to such credits then this strategy does not reduce effective tax 
rates (the reason for targeting benefits in the first place).
8.4 Hybrid model 2: a pensioner credit
The alternative strategy for ameliorating the problems with means testing is to taper off 
means-tested benefits at less than the current 100% withdrawal rate; this is one way in 
which the government’s plans for a ‘pensioner credit’ might be implemented (see 
HMT, 2000, paragraph 5.45)212. This section explores the cost and distributional effect 
of introducing a taper into Income Support, set either at 75 or 50%, and compares this 
with the effect of moving to a basic income.
212 Rather than tapering-off means-tested benefits it would also be possible to use refundable tax-credits 
to achieve a similar effect. For instance, if tax of 25% were charged on all income over £100 a week 
(which approximates the tax system facing pensioners in the UK today), and the minimum income was 
£75 a week, then making the tax allowance refundable would have exactly the same effect as putting a 
75% taper into means-tested benefits. This may be what some advocates of this type of reform have in 
mind, particularly when it is presented as a move towards ‘negative income taxation’. However, there are 
important issues to do with the time-period for payments and unit of assessment (the tax system works 
on an annual and individualised basis while the benefits system is on a weekly and household basis) 
which make tapering-off benefits the more attractive option administratively.
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As witnessed by Housing and Council Tax Benefits (and in a rather different way by 
the Working Families Tax Credit), there is no necessity for means-tested assistance to 
be withdrawn completely once the minimum income is reached. Rather than a single 
cut-off point a taper system could operate, with benefit entitlement being reduced on a 
less than £ for £ basis. The effect of such a tapered means-test is shown in Figure 8.2; 
as with Figure 8.1 earlier (with which it may be compared) the Figure is schematic -  it 
is intended only to indicate the broad properties of this kind of reform. Two 
possibilities are illustrated. Under one scheme the taper rate is set at 75% (i.e. for every 
extra £ of gross income benefits are reduced by 75p) and, by assumption, this is 
associated with a tax rate of 25%. Under the other scheme the taper rate is set at 50% 
with an income tax rate of 35% (by assumption). The Figure also assumes that the 
minimum income standard is £75 a week (the level of Income Support for a single 65- 
year-old in 1999/2000), hence for a single pensioner entitlement to benefit is 
extinguished at £100 a week under the 75% taper and at £150 a week under the 50%
213 The government appear to have in mind something more like the 75% taper scheme. In his Budget 
speech the Chancellor stated that: “the Secretary fo r Social Security is to launch a consultation on how, 
fo r the next Parliament, we can develop a new pensioners credit....under the framework on which we 
will consult, an older pensioner with income, fo r example, o f less than 100 pounds a week, or a couple 
with less than 150 pounds a week, would qualify fo r a pension credit to raise their income” (G. Brown, 
2000, p. 10).
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Figure 8.2
Effective marginal tax rates under a tapered means-test
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As with the comparison between a pure means test and a basic income, a number of 
factors need to be taken into account in thinking about how the taper schemes affect 
incentives. Relative to the basic income people with incomes below £100/£150 a week 
face worse incentives, while the incentives facing everyone else are improved (due to 
the lower tax rates required to finance benefit payments). A more complex picture 
emerges if the schemes are compared with a pure means test: incentives for people with 
incomes o f less than £75 a week are improved, worsened rather dramatically for people 
with incomes between £75 and £ 100/£ 150, and worsened slightly for everyone with 
incomes above this level. Whether, overall, introducing a taper improves incentives 
relative to the pure means test is therefore again difficult to establish, depending as it 
does on both the distribution o f income and how people react to different EMTRs. The 
conclusion of section 8.1 therefore also applies here. While there are good reasons for 
believing that effective marginal tax rates should be similar (or the same) throughout 
the income distribution, it is possible that in some circumstances a ‘U ’ shaped EMTR 
schedule (or some other shape) will be more efficient. The analysis below therefore
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concentrates on describing the effects of the various options rather than determining 
absolutely whether one is preferable to another.
Estimates from POLIMOD
The cost and distributional effects of the two options can be calculated using the static 
microsimulation model POLIMOD214. As noted in Section 1.4, because in all cases 
pension benefits are invariant to lifetime earnings there is no need to use dynamic 
simulation (PENSIM was used in Chapter 3 due to the need for comparability between 
all the options analysed). Assuming that a taper is introduced only for Income Support 
claimants over the age of 65 (i.e. excluding single women aged between 60 and 65), 
and that the structure of Housing and Council Tax benefits is left unchanged, 
POLIMOD calculates that the cost of a 75% taper would be around £1.4 billion (in 
1999/2000), rising to £3.6 billion under a 50% taper215. Note therefore that the cost of 
the taper increases more than proportionally with reductions in the taper rate. This 
reflects the fact that lowering the taper rate expands the number of Income Support 
recipients (from 1.4 to 2.0 million households under the 75% taper and to 2.5 million 
under the 50% taper), as well as increasing the amount going to existing claimants216.
The distributional effect of the two variants is shown in Figure 8.3. Note that unlike the 
distributional Figures in Chapters 2 and 3 the analysis here is based on the ‘benefit
214 The analysis in this section is based on the July 1999 version o f the model (poli0799). Distributional 
outputs are for families containing pensioners over state pension age (60/65) and the McClements 
equivalence scale is used throughout. The estimates were derived through running the model over both 
available years o f FES data (1994/5 and 1995/6).
215 It should be noted that these estimates would be much higher (by a factor o f about 2) if  Housing and 
Council Tax Benefits were adjusted so that eligible individuals receive the full gain from the introduction 
o f a taper in Income Support. Under the system modelled here households claiming housing-related 
benefits stand to lose 85% o f the extra income they receive through the taper. However, as well as being 
easier to model, the analysis o f a Citizen’s Pension discussed later also assumes that housing-related 
benefits are left unchanged (following the example of Sutherland, 1998, p.8), and hence this assumption 
aids comparability between the options looked at in this section.
216 Note that POLIMOD’s estimate for the number o f pensioner households currently claiming Income 
Support (1.4 million) is rather lower than the estimate used in Section 1A.1 (1.6 million; taken from 
DSS, 2000, Table 10). This reflects, first, the inclusion o f men aged 60-65 in the estimate taken from 
administrative data and, second, the fact that POLIMOD’s take-up assumption is a little on the low side 
(63% against the government’s estimate o f 63-73%; see DSS, 1999a, Table 1.1). For the record it is 
worth noting that if  take-up were 100% (i.e. if  everyone eligible made a claim) the cost o f the 75 and 
50% taper schemes would be £2.2 and £5.9 billion respectively, and the number o f claimants 
(equivalently, eligible households) would rise from 2.1 million at present to 3.1 million under the 75% 
taper and to 3.9 million (a slim majority o f pensioner households) under the 50% scheme.
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unit’ (household) income distribution, rather than the effect of the reform on singles 
and couples being illustrated separately. Note also that it shows the percentage gain in 
each decile -  the Figures in Chapters 2 and 3 showed the absolute gain (albeit using a 
log scale which emphasised differences at the bottom).
Figure 8.3
Distributional effects of tapering-off Income Support
20 n
75% taper
50%  taper
D ecile  o f  th e  p e n s io n e r  in c o m e  d is tr ib u tio n
Source: POLIMOD.
As can be seen, the benefits o f both schemes are concentrated on the bottom half o f the 
pensioner income distribution. However, it is also the case that some additional benefits 
would go to pensioners near the top o f the income distribution; this largely reflects the 
availability o f disability premia within Income Support, which can lift eligible 
households into middling income deciles. Particularly under the 50% taper scheme 
middle income pensioners would see quite reasonable gains.
The cost and distributional effects o f tapering off Income Support can usefully be 
compared with a basic income. As in Section 3.3, the scheme analysed is based on the 
Citizen’s Pension proposal set out in Sutherland (1998, pp. 6-15). In this instance 
though it is the ‘Age-related Citizen Pension’ variant which is looked at. This involves
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universalising the basic pension and increasing benefit rates to the same level (by age) 
as Income Support; in contrast Section 3.3 analysed the ‘Minimal Citizen’s Pension’ 
variant where the basic pension was made fully universal (and was uprated in line with 
earnings growth) but where the level and structure of the benefit were left unchanged. 
Taking into account consequential increases in tax revenue (because the level of the tax 
allowance for pensioners is unchanged and the basic pension is taxable some of the 
additional income provided by the scheme flows back to the Exchequer through income 
tax payments), POLIMOD estimates that the net cost of an Age-related Citizen’s 
Pension in 1999/2000 would be £8.2 billion217. A breakdown of how this estimate is 
arrived at is in Table 8.1, while a full discussion of the estimates is in Jordan at al 
(2000, pp. 85-87).
Table 8.1
Cost of an Age-related Citizen’s Pension
Measure Cost/Saving
(£,bn)
Gross cost of Citizen’s Pension payments 37.6
Savings on the basic pension -25.7
Savings on means-tested benefits -2.9
Additional tax revenue -0.8
Net cost 8.2
Source: POLIMOD.
POLIMOD’s estimates for the distributional effect of introducing an Age-related 
Citizen’s Pension are shown in Figure 8.4. As with Figure 8.3, it illustrates the 
proportional change in income experienced by each decile of the pensioner income 
distribution as a result of the reform. For ease of comparison the earlier estimates for 
the two taper schemes are also shown.
217 This estimate may be compared with Sutherland (1998, Table 3), who finds that a similar scheme 
would cost £4.6 billion. The higher cost o f  the scheme illustrated here is accounted for by a number o f  
factors. First, disability additions are included, so that the structure o f Income Support is replicated more 
precisely; this adds nearly £2 billion to the net cost o f the scheme. Second, the relative level o f Income 
Support was nearly £5 higher in the modelling here, due to the fact that Sutherland used benefit rates for 
1998/9 in her analysis rather than the 1999/2000 rates used throughout this thesis. Last, the tax system 
used here reflects the introduction o f the lOp starting rate, and hence revenue flow-backs are smaller.
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Figure 8.4
Distributional effects of an Age-related Citizen’s Pension and a tapered means-test
H 75%  taper
50% taper
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Source: POLIMOD
As can be seen, the effect o f a Citizen’s Pension is much larger than the effects of 
either taper scheme, reflecting its higher cost. Perhaps more surprising, however, is the 
fact that the scheme gives a larger boost to pensioners in the bottom decile than even 
the 50% taper in Income Support. This is largely accounted for by the (assumed) 
increase in take-up to 100% under the Citizen’s Pension (which by assumption
j a
remained at 63% under the taper schemes) . It should be noted though that for decile 
two the gains from a Citizen’s Pension and from a 50% taper are approximately the 
same, despite the fact that the taper schemes costs considerably less. More generally, 
gains fall more steeply as income rises under the taper schemes than under the Citizen’s 
Pension, indicating that benefits are better targeted on the those with lower incomes.
218 This effect is also shown in the analysis in Section 3.3 using PENS1M, which found that the basic 
income model successfully increases the incomes o f the very poorest pensioners (those failing to take-up 
their entitlement to Income Support).
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Against this, the estimates in the Figure take no account of the higher taxes which 
would be needed to finance a Citizen’s Pension.
8.5 Conclusion
On the surface the arguments in favour of focusing resources on means-tested rather 
than universal benefits are strong. At least in the short term such a policy meets the 
minimum income objective at far lower cost than a basic income, as it avoids the 
‘waste’ of giving money to people who don’t need it. Moreover, because resources are 
focussed on the poorest pensioners it can also be argued that, even after allowing for 
the lower taxes paid by the rich, targeting is more redistributive than alternative 
policies. In other words, such a policy ensures that the level of support provided to the 
poorest pensioners is not confined to that which can be afforded for all, and hence 
allows for a higher minimum standard than would otherwise be affordable/achievable.
However, there are a number of well-documented problems associated with means 
testing (see, amongst others, Field, 1996, pp. 8-12; Parker, 1989, pp. 53-55; Shaver, 
1998, pp. 251-252; Hills, 1997, pp. 22-29; or Borrie, 1994, pp. 245-251). This chapter 
has highlighted four main concerns: stigma and low take-up, moral hazard, ‘fairness’ 
between savers and non-savers and, potentially, political unsustainability.
The first of these may well become less significant in future years, though it is doubtful 
whether the take-up rate for Income Support for pensioners (the ‘minimum income 
guarantee’) will ever exceed the government’s target of 85%. Stigma may also be 
reduced by the fact that pensioners are likely to be more reliant on Income Support in 
the future (according to PENSIM), though it is likely that more significant 
administrative changes would be needed to get to the heart of this problem.
In contrast the problem of moral hazard is likely to worsen substantially under 
targeting. Indeed, the fact that the gap between the level of the basic pension and 
means-tested benefits is widening under current policy is already being felt. For
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instance, the Financial Services Authority, the regulator of private pension products, 
now advise that:
“if you are over 40, have little pension or other savings and cannot afford to 
save much, the little you are able to put into a stakeholder [pension, the new 
form of personal pension] may not be enough to bring your total income above 
the MIG [Income Support]. It would then be wasted” (Financial Services 
Authority, 2000, Annex A, p. 5).
However, perhaps of more immediate concern to the government than the effect of 
means testing on workers’ saving patterns is its effect on today’s pensioners. There is 
considerable antagonism towards means testing among pensioners due to the fact that, 
in effect, it penalises those who saved earlier in life. Hence it is widely perceived as
9 1 0being unfair . In addition, the fact that pensioners with incomes just above the level of 
Income Support do not benefit from increases in the level of the safety net means that 
an important group of ‘Middle England’ voters are effectively missed-out by policy 
(see Section 8.2). These ethical and political objections to means testing are therefore 
related, and are the main reason why Labour is now revising its pension strategy220.
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, an announcement on the introduction of a 
‘pensioner credit’ is expected in Autumn 2000, and it seems likely that the policy will 
resemble the tapered means test described in Section 2.4. The hope is that this new 
scheme will resolve both the ethical and political problems associated with means 
testing by providing additional help to pensioners with incomes just above the level of 
Income Support. Indeed, the government have described the pensioner credit as the 
‘missing link’ between the minimum income guarantee and the S2P (see, HoC 2000, 
paragraph 116). However, it is arguable whether this proposal will in fact make matters 
better.
219 This ethical objection to means testing is now accepted by the government. For instance, Social 
Security Secretary Alistair Darling has commented that “people with small occupational pensions or 
modest savings... ought to be rewarded fo r all their effort during the lifetime (sic) and not penalised 
because o f it" (Darling, 2000, p. 5). In a similar vein, the Chancellor stated in his Budget speech that the 
government want “to do more fo r those with modest occupational pensions and savings who should not 
be penalised fo r  having worked hard all their lives and saved fo r  their retirement" (G. Brown, 2000,
p.10).
220 For today’s pensioners Labour’s policy of increasing Income Support with earnings but the basic 
pension with prices may fairly be represented as a move in the direction of targeting though, as discussed 
in Part B, in the longer term, this is not a fair representation of the government’s strategy; see also Figure 
1.6 .
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In terms of the ethical objection to means testing, though it certainly makes the 
‘unfairness’ of the 100% withdrawal rate in Income Support less acute, it only does so 
by making this ‘savings trap’ wider; while people claiming Income Support should feel 
slightly less aggrieved -  they now get to keep 25p of every £ of additional income 
rather than none -  this advantage is only bought at the expense of a wider band of 
pensioners being affected. The ethical problem is therefore slightly different in nature, 
but is by no means resolved. Similarly, it is not clear that this policy will succeed in 
making all pensioners believe they are “share[ing] fairly in rising national prosperity”, 
the government’s overall aim for pension policy (see DSS, 1998, pl2), and the political 
problems with targeting support by household income are likely to continue. Holly 
Sutherland describes the issue as follows:
"there is a general problem with being worried about people who are just above 
whatever level we set at the moment, so worrying about people who are just 
above the MIG [Income Support] and doing something fo r  them will leave 
another set o f people who are just above the new credit and we may start 
worrying about them...I think the idea that there is always a group who feel 
neglected, who are just above the target group, does dictate that the group as a 
whole needs to be thought o f together" (HoC, 2000, paragraph 118)
In conclusion, the analysis in this chapter suggests the problems with means testing are 
fairly intractable, and that at best that the tapered means test ‘hybrid model’ only 
ameliorates them. Given this the other hybrid model, second tier pensions to a 
minimum sum, might appear attractive. However, as noted in Section 8.3, this policy is 
really just a circuitous way of creating a basic income -  the retirement benefits it 
produces are flat (or nearly so). It should therefore be compared with the basic income 
ideal type analysed in Sections 3.3 and 4.3. In some ways, though, this would be unfair, 
as the analysis in Part A assumed that second tier pension provision would remain the 
same as under current policy (i.e. SERPS is retained). In fact the introduction of a basic 
income for all pensioners might be accompanied by the abolition of second tier 
provision altogether, as there is no longer any problem of moral hazard. As well as 
future savings on benefit expenditure this would result in immediate gains of £8.3
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billion a year due to the abolition of contracted-out rebates (see HMT, 1999, Table 
7^221
The saving from abolishing contracting-out rebates is therefore almost exactly enough 
to pay for the immediate cost of the Age-related Citizen’s Pension scheme described 
above. However, it would not be sufficient to pay for such a policy in the long-term; as 
shown in Table 4.2, the less generous Minimal Citizen’s Pension modelled in Part A 
costs nearly this amount once its effects on future expenditure are taken into account 
(though note that in this instance second tier provision was retained, thus altering the 
spending profile considerably). Hence a less ambitious version of a basic income, such 
as the household retirement income described in Jordan et al (2000, pp. 86-87), would 
be needed if such a reform were to be fully self-financing (see Section 9.4).
221 In effect, abolishing SERPS would mean that all employers and employees paid NICs at the full 
contracted-in rate of, respectively, 12.2 and 10%, as against the contracted-out rates of 9.2 and 8.4%. 
Note also that the saving of £8.3 billion from abolishing rebates (taken from HMT, 2000, Table 7) 
ignores additional savings in the form of the reduced cost o f the tax relief on second tier pension 
contributions (see Section 1A.3).
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9. Summary and Conclusion
This thesis has looked at a number of aspects of pension policy. One focus has been on 
theory -  why does the state need to get involved in retirement income provision and 
what types of intervention make most sense? Another has been on numbers -  what are 
the effects of current and proposed policies on pensioner incomes and the public 
finances? A third, often implicit, focus has been on the politics of reform. This chapter 
attempts to bring these various threads together.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 9.1 begins by discussing the nature of 
the pension reform debate, arguing that while the four ‘ideal type’ systems outlined in 
Chapter 1 are a good starting point for thinking about the available options, in most 
developed countries political factors mean debate revolves around the social insurance 
and compulsory saving models, However, for the reasons discussed in Sections 9.2 and 
9.3, the UK is an exceptional case. First, unlike countries such as Germany or Italy, 
where rising contribution rates are a major problem and the prime motivation for 
reform, the cost of state pension provision in the UK is set to fall -  Section 9.2 explains 
why. Second, while the UK does not suffer from cost problems, it suffers from a 
number of other problems which do not affect other countries. Section 9.3 discusses 
some of these and looks at the reform strategy adopted by Labour to tackle them. 
Section 9.4 then examines whether alternative directions for reform, as represented by 
the four ‘ideal types’, would have been preferable. Finally, Section 9.5 concludes by 
discussing the legacy of the reforms introduced since 1997 and the challenges facing 
future governments.
The estimates for the effect of current and alternative policies presented in Part A and 
Chapter 6 are referred to throughout, and it is worth briefly reviewing how these should 
be interpreted. In one sense this thesis has served to show the benefits of analysing 
pension policy using the sophisticated tools made available through modem computing 
power. Indeed, if the quantitative analysis has successfully illuminated the choices 
facing policy makers it might lead to the conclusion that such tools are essential for 
understanding the impact of pension reform. Simultaneously, however, it must be
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conceded that both PENSIM and the NIESR generational accounting model are subject 
to very wide uncertainties. In one sense this is inevitable given that they attempt to 
forecast the distant future. But it should also be bome in mind that both models are 
essentially ‘first generation’ designs, and in different ways they both suffer from their 
novelty. In the case of the NIESR model the most important technical problem is its 
failure to include all elements of the public finances (such as, for instance, the 
foreseeable costs of nuclear decommissioning). In the case of PENSIM the technical 
problems are two-fold: first, the data currently used is rather old and, second, because 
the model is a ‘black box’ it is very difficult to be sure that it is genuinely functioning 
correctly (i.e. that it is bug-free).
In their current state of development the findings from such models therefore need to 
be handled with particular care. Nevertheless, if we are to understand pension reform 
options properly some attempt to compare the distributional and fiscal effects of 
alternative options is probably better than no attempt at all. The Cabinet Office report 
into modelling in government concluded as follows:
“modelling is in the best interests o f both Ministers and senior officials. They 
lead to better decisions and improved policy outcomes. Without soundly based 
analysis and modelling, those involved in the formulation o f policy and the 
delivery o f services will work in the dark” (PIU, 2000, p8)
In other words, for all its defects, modelling does at least hold out the prospect of 
better-informed (and hence, hopefully, better) policy making. The estimates produced 
by such models should, though, be treated as illustrations rather than as forecasts.
9.1 Key choices in pension reform
This thesis has used a typology of four ‘ideal type’ pension systems -  targeting, basic 
income, social insurance and compulsory saving -  to illustrate the main options for 
pension reform. As set out in Chapter 5 (and Section 1.3), the history of pension 
provision in the UK means that it contains elements of all four of these ideal types: 
Income Support is a targeted benefit, the basic pension is similar to a basic income, 
SERPS is an eamings-related social insurance scheme and contracted-out rebates are a
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form of compulsory saving. This diversity of provision is relatively unusual 
internationally, where one form of provision (most often social insurance) usually 
dominates. As such the UK can be seen as an early adherent to the ‘multi-pillar’ 
approach promulgated by the World Bank222. Though, admittedly, the composition of 
the pillars does not conform precisely to the World Bank model, the UK does at least 
have a multi-pillar system in place. Accordingly, it should be better placed than most 
countries to cope with demographic change, as the pension system does not rely (and 
never has relied) on a dominant public tier.
The World Bank analysis suggests that the trick for UK pension reformers is to find the 
best possible mix of the various elements of the current system, adding a little bit more 
of this or a little less of that until the right combination is found. Labour’s approach to 
pension reform might be described in something like these terms. However, while this 
‘pick and mix’ approach sounds attractive, it also has its dangers:
• it is likely to be complex to administer and to understand, with ‘cliff edges’ where 
one form of provision takes over from another;
• precisely because of its adaptability it may also be rather unstable, with reform 
coming in successive waves rather than step-changes;
• such an approach can rapidly lead to incoherence, with the objectives of the system 
becoming hard to identify beneath the mass of different interventions of one kind 
and another.
A better way of thinking about pension reform is not to see the four ideal types as 
ingredients in a recipe -  or as a smorgasbord from which the governments can select 
according to their taste -  but as separate meals in their own right. According to this 
view the typology of pension provision used in this thesis represents the four possible 
outcomes of the decision tree illustrated in Figure 9.1. The first decision is about policy 
objectives: is the government’s aim confined to ensuring a minimum retirement income 
or, in addition, does it believe it also has an obligation to protect individuals’ 
accustomed living standards? The second (and secondary) decision is then about the
222 See World Bank (1994, Ch. 7) for a full analysis of their approach. Holzmann (2000, pp. 23-29) 
provides an updated description of the policies adopted in World Bank reform programmes.
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mechanism used to achieve this objective: should universal benefits be provided by the 
state to everyone or should its role in provision be more residual?
Figure 9.1 
Decision tree for pension policy
Targeting
insurance
Social Basic
income
Compulsory
saving
Should state 
provision be 
universal or 
residual?
Should state 
provision be 
universal or 
residual?
Above a minimum, should 
benefits be related to earnings?
As the Figure demonstrates the primary issue in pension reform is whether the state 
should directly link retirement incomes to earnings in work though compulsory 
eamings-related pension provision. This question was considered in Chapter 7, which 
looked at various rationales for second tier provision. It concluded that in purely 
economic terms the case for this form of pensioning is weak. However, if non­
economic factors are brought into the equation the argument becomes less clear-cut.
One issue relates to ‘myopia’, the idea that people are more short-sighted than they 
should be and hence that governments should intervene to enforce long-termism. As a 
discipline economics tends to be sceptical about policies which assume the state knows 
what individuals want better than they do themselves. In the right conditions, 
economists generally argue, social welfare will be maximised by leaving people to 
pursue their own self-interest as they see fit. However it can also be argued that these
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conditions are not met in the case of pension provision due to the existence of 
‘individual failure’, which means people do not plan for the future in an optimal way 
and hence that government intervention is required (Le Grand, 1995, pp. 28-30). But as 
set out in Section 7.2, the implications of this concept are far reaching: it suggests, for 
instance, that permission to get an overdraft should come from the state, with 
repayments deducted from wage packets if necessary, and that re-mortgaging should be 
tightly controlled. Such developments do not seem very likely, nor very attractive. A 
better (and more honest) line of argument is therefore to question economists’ faith in 
individual choice and to accept that this type of intervention is paternalistic (but not 
necessarily worse because of it). In other words, in spite of the lack of any recognised 
market failure government intervention to protect individuals’ accustomed living 
standards is justified on the basis that, in this instance, the ‘man from the Ministry’ 
knows best223.
A belief in (or acceptance of) the need for paternalistic intervention is therefore one 
reason for second tier provision. However, the main arguments for social insurance and 
compulsory saving are more overtly political. In the case of social insurance the 
argument is that in the right circumstances it can institutionalise protection of 
retirement incomes and (some degree of) lifetime redistribution. Although benefits will 
clearly be less redistributive than if they bore no relation to earnings (they will tend to 
replicate rather than reduce labour market inequalities), the higher overall level of 
transfers made possible by this institutional structure will be the best guarantor of the 
living standards of the poorest. In other words a rising tide lifts all boats, and social 
insurance is the best way of ensuring that the tide of state pension payments comes in 
and stays in (see Section 7.3). Conversely, the political argument for compulsory 
saving is that this is the only way in which to hold-back the flood waters of social 
spending and limit (or even reverse) the increasing tax rates which would otherwise be 
necessary. In the absence of a political process capable of preventing governments
223 In addition it can be argued that, if the man in the street thinks that the man from the Ministry knows 
best (or at least knows more than he does), individuals might prefer to have the ‘burden’ of decision 
making taken away from them (through the government forcing them to accumulate an earnings-related 
pension). If this argument is persuasive then a relatively small degree of earnings-relation (as seen in the 
UK) may not seem too large an infringement of individual liberty -  after all, it simply involves people 
paying a bit more into the system and receiving back a few more benefits in retirement. Then again, 
governments are rarely so free with their tax and spending powers in other circumstances.
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from making overly generous pension promises - thereby placing an ‘unfair’ burden on 
future generations and damaging the economy - a switch from PAYG social insurance 
to funded compulsory saving is required.
The political economy of pension reform can therefore lead all sides of the argument to 
embrace the need for a second tier of compulsory earnings-related provision. The 
pension reform debate in the US illustrates this point. As discussed by Willmore (1998, 
p. 16), if the future contribution rates required to maintain social insurance provision 
are judged ‘too large’ (either economically or politically) then the most obvious path 
for reform is to reduce the benefits offered to future retirees. Such a strategy of 
‘parametric reform’ therefore puts the focus on how large cuts should be (equivalently, 
what level of contributions is acceptable) and whether cuts should fall on everyone 
(e.g. through raising the retirement age) or be focussed on the richest (e.g. through 
making benefits more flat-rate). However, the recent reform debate in the US has 
generally not been conducted in these terms. Rather than the shape of benefits being the 
primary issue, the focus has instead been on whether existing benefits could be 
financed at lower cost through moving from PAYG to funded provision (see Feldstein, 
1996, pp. 3-5, and Thompson, 1998, pp. 120-130, for opposing views). ‘Structural 
reform’, as Willmore calls this strategy, therefore largely ignores questions about the 
most appropriate shape for benefits and concentrates on issues of finance. Even so, this 
suits both sides of the argument. For conservatives structural reform holds out the 
prospect that state provision could be stopped in its tracks, preventing the need for a 
prolonged ‘guerrilla war’ against the expansionist tendencies of social insurance, while 
for liberals it represents a chance to emphasise the advantages of state provision and 
avoids the need for negotiation and (inevitably) compromise on benefit rules and rates.
In terms of the analysis in this thesis, the pension reform debate in the US therefore 
wrongly focuses on the secondary issue df provision (i.e. public PAYG versus private 
funded) rather than the primary issue of objective (i.e. earnings-related or not). Because 
both sides in the US debate are locked-in to an argument about whether social 
insurance should be replaced by compulsory saving, the options on the right-hand-side 
of Figure 9.1 (i.e. the bottom row of Figure 1.3) have been more or less ignored (at 
least to date). Nevertheless, it seems likely that at some point the debate will return to
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questions about the most appropriate shape for benefits (i.e. to a debate about 
parametric rather than structural reform), if only because arguments about the effect of 
funding are unlikely to be resolved decisively in favour of one side or another224. If the 
analysis in Chapter 7 is accepted the outcome would then be to flatten-out benefits 
completely, so that the eamings-replacement function is abandoned altogether. 
However, this is by no means inevitable, and will depend very much on the tactics 
adopted by each side.
The changes proposed by the Labour government in the UK similarly show the 
importance of politics in framing the pension reform debate. However, because pension 
provision in the UK is not dominated by earnings-related social insurance (as is the 
case in the US), the nature of the debate is rather different. First, rather than 
compulsory saving and social insurance being the focus of attention, all four ideal types 
have a constituency of supporters (see Figure 1.8). The arguments in Chapter 8, which 
compared the basic income and targeting models, therefore also come into play.
Second, and probably more important, the cost of state pension provision is set to fall, 
and more generally the outlook for the public finances is benign. The pension reform 
debate in the UK is different to that in other countries, therefore, because the problems 
facing the UK pension system are different.
9.2 Why is cost not an issue in the UK?
In most developed countries the outstanding pension problem is that contribution rates 
will need to rise substantially over coming decades if currently legislated benefits are to 
be maintained (see amongst others Roseveare et al, 1996, Section II, or Disney, 2000, 
pp. 6-8). This is emphatically not the case in the UK. As shown in Figure 4.2, in 
relation to national income the cost of state pension provision is now on a downward 
trend, albeit with a levelling-out between 2020 and 2030225. Bearing in mind the fact
224 Economists are divided over whether funded pensions are preferable to PAYG pension systems. 
However, for what it is worth Chapter 4 came down on the side of the sceptics, arguing that the idea that 
funding allows current benefits to be bought for lower contributions, either directly or because of knock- 
on effects on economic growth, is a chimera.
225 Note that Figure 4.2 was based on a higher assumption for GDP growth (roughly 1.75% a year) than 
used by the Government Actuary (1.5%). If the Government Actuary’s assumption for growth is used
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that there will be more pensioners in the future than today (see Figure 9.2 later), this is 
a fairly remarkable feat. This section sets out the reasons why the UK is so exceptional 
in this regard.
First it should be acknowledged that, although the number of pensioners will increase 
in coming decades, demographic trends in the UK are less alarming than in many 
countries. This reflects a number of factors:
• the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society occurred earlier in the UK 
than elsewhere, so that the period of very high fertility combined with low infant 
mortality has already long gone (Halsey, 1987, pp. 99-105);
• the post-war ‘baby-boom’ was less spectacular in the UK than in many other 
countries and, more importantly in relation to continental Europe and Japan, there 
has been less of a ‘baby bust’, i.e. though not at replacement levels, fertility rates 
have not fallen to very low levels (Falkingham, 1997, pp. 31-32);
• women’s pension age is set to increase from 60 to 65 between 2010 and 2020, so 
that the increase in the number of pensioners is rather lower than unadjusted 
demographic projections suggest.
The result is that the rise in the pensioner support ratio (that is, the number of 
pensioners divided by the number of people of working age) will not be that dramatic. 
Figure 9.2 illustrates, showing the Government Actuary’s mid-1996 projections for the 
size of the working-age and pensioner populations (taking into account the increase in 
women’s pension age).
then the fall in the cost of pension provision is less pronounced (see GAD, 2000, Table 2.2). In addition, 
the Government Actuary’s projections do not include the falling cost of rebates, and hence this is a 
further reason why official estimates show a slower decline in the cost o f provision. However, the effect 
of rebates is included in estimates of required contribution rates (see GAD, 2000, Table 3.3).
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Figure 9.2
Demographic trends in the UK
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The Figure shows that the number o f pensioners will increase by around 40% between 
2000 and 2035 (with the bulk of this increase after 2020), before declining gently 
towards the middle o f the century. At the same time the number o f working-age people 
will increase slightly before also gently declining. The result is that the pensioner 
support ratio is projected to rise from 0.3 in 2000 to 0.42 in 2050, i.e. by 2050 there 
will be 12 extra pensioners for every 100 workers (GAD, 1999, p. 30). By way of 
comparison, Germany and Japan expect to have respectively 18 and 30 extra 
pensioners per 100 workers by 2050 (Radaelli and Shea, 1996, p. 30). Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, spending pressures are less in the UK.
The second reason for the lack o f spending pressures in the UK is the preponderance of 
voluntary provision and, in particular, the high benefits (though not particularly high 
coverage) o f occupational schemes. As discussed in Section 1 A.3, the generous tax 
treatment afforded to occupational pensions means they are (or used to be prior to the 
change in ACT introduced in July 1997) an extremely efficient form o f remuneration, 
particularly if  contributions come from employers (as this also avoids National 
Insurance Contributions). This, combined with the fact that until 1978 state pensions
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were wholly flat-rate (i.e. there was no compulsory earnings-related provision, ignoring 
the minor graduated retirement benefit), led to rapid growth in occupational provision 
in the decades following the second world war. Although membership levelled-off 
from the mid-1970s, and is now a little below its peak of slightly over half the 
workforce (GAD, 2000a, pp. 5-8), occupational schemes are still maturing and will 
account for a large and growing proportion of pensioner incomes in the future (see 
Section 2.3). This means that pressures on state pension spending are lower in another 
sense as, on average, pensioner incomes are set to grow substantially despite the 
projected fall in the cost of state provision (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5).
Third is the fact that second tier provision in the UK is mostly funded and is relatively 
small. Both these features can be put down to the fact that compulsory earnings-related 
provision was not introduced until 1978 (again, ignoring the comparatively 
unimportant graduated retirement benefit), by which time occupational pensions were 
already well established. As discussed in Chapter 5, the fact that this tier of provision 
was introduced so late had a number of consequences. For one it meant that a wholly 
state provided scheme was a political non-starter, and hence SERPS was always 
partially-funded (through rebates paid to occupational schemes). But perhaps more 
importantly, this also meant that higher earners were generally opted-out, so that direct 
state provision was limited to lower earners (predominantly women). Hence a broad
0 0  f\constituency capable of defending state provision failed to emerge , and there was 
only muted opposition to the cut-backs implemented in the Conservative’s 1986 and 
1995 Pension Acts. The current SERPS scheme therefore provides lower benefits than 
originally envisaged (20% of lifetime earnings rather than 25% of an individual’s best 
20 years) and is predominantly funded (though rebates to personal pensions, as well as 
to occupational schemes).
The last reason for the declining cost of state pension provision is also connected to the 
late introduction of SERPS, albeit by a circuitous route. One of the main arguments 
advanced by proponents of earnings-related social insurance was that it would 
‘dynamise’ the basic pension through creating an automatic link to earnings. However,
226 i.e. Rather than supplanting private pensioning SERPS only ever existed to supplement such 
provision, and hence its constituency of supporters was always likely to be weak.
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because the scheme introduced in 1975 included contracting-out, which in turn 
reflected its late introduction, the two parts of the system were never integrated. It was 
therefore technically possible to switch to a policy of price-uprating without major 
legislation. Of course, the fact that this was in fact exactly what occurred (from 1980 
onwards) can partly be put down to historical accident -  the originators of the scheme 
were not to know that Thatcherism lay around the comer. Nevertheless, in terms of 
defending the value of the basic pension the introduction of SERPS can be seen as a 
major tactical mistake. Not only did it fail to dynamise benefit rates, it simultaneously 
managed to reduce net revenue (because of contracting-out) and raise future 
expenditure, thus strengthening the argument that pensions had to be cut to avoid a 
‘demographic timebomb’. The fact that the costs of SERPS were significantly under­
estimated at first (Hemming and Kay, 1982, pp. 312-313) only made matters worse.
The fact that the basic pension is now linked to prices, with the post-1997 Labour 
government continuing the policy of the Conservatives, is the central reason why the 
cost of public pension provision in the UK is set to decline. As the next section 
discusses, this also has important implications for the level and composition of 
pensioner incomes, and brings with it a new set of problems. However, before these are 
discussed it is important to put the outlook for pension spending into context by 
looking at wider spending pressures, in particular those connected with health-care.
The overall cost o f the demographic transition
As discussed in Chapter 4, in contrast to the falling burden of state pension provision 
spending on the NHS, the great success story of the UK welfare state, is expected to 
rise substantially in future decades. This principally reflects demography: the greying 
of the population increases the cost of health-care because average spending per capita 
rises with age (though the ‘compression of morbidity’ hypothesis suggests a less 
dramatic increase). Given that wages account for the bulk of NHS costs, and assuming 
that in the long term public sector earnings keep up with economy-wide earnings, this 
will directly translate into a higher proportion of GDP being devoted to health. 
However, there are a number of reasons why, in reality, we might expect spending to 
grow even faster than demography implies. First, technological improvements and new 
health-care interventions (such as heart transplants) mean that there is more the NHS
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can do to improve health. Second, health-care may be a luxury good which ‘naturally’ 
takes an increasing share of national income as society gets richer. Last there is the 
political dimension, most notably Tony Blair’s pledge to increase UK health spending 
to the European average.
The baseline estimate for spending set out in Section 4.2 only took account of 
demographic factors, and missed out these additional reasons why health costs may 
increase in the future. Even so it still predicted that NHS spending would rise from 6% 
of GDP in 2000 to around 10% of GDP by the middle of the century. As this is roughly 
the same as the predicted decrease in pension spending, the baseline generational
997accounts are approximately in balance . However, if ‘looser’ health spending is 
assumed (with health spending jumping to 8% by 2005 and thereafter growing at 
0.25% faster than earnings) the generational accounts go substantially into the red.
Nevertheless, the baseline generational accounts support the ‘Goldilocks hypothesis’ -  
that the UK’s current fiscal stance is ‘just right’. The estimates behind this conclusion 
are presented in Figure 9.3, which shows the key features of the baseline projection (as 
described in detail in Section 4.2). The top two lines show the NIESR generational 
accounting model’s projection for total spending and total revenue. There are three 
distinct periods. In the first period, until around 2020, spending and revenue are 
projected to be similar, so that public debt remains constant in cash terms and gently 
falls as a proportion of GDP. In period two, from roughly 2020 to 2060, spending 
exceeds revenue so that, for most of this period, public debt rises in cash terms and as a 
proportion of GDP. Finally, from 2060 onwards revenue exceeds spending, allowing 
debt to be reduced again to below its original level. Discounting these revenue and 
spending streams to their present value (at a discount rate of 5%) produces the baseline 
estimate for the ‘inter-temporal budget gap’ that there is a small fiscal surplus under 
current policy.
227 This conclusion is confirmed by the Treasury’s analysis of public spending pressures over the next 
30 years (see HMT, 2000, Annex A). It should be noted however that the estimates in CSK suggest the 
UK has a slight fiscal deficit; as discussed in Section 4.2, this in fact reflects the fact that a decline in 
NIC revenue is built into their baseline.
257
The lower three lines in the Figure then show the model’s projection for the cost of 
pensions and health. The bottom downward-sloping line shows the cost of state 
pensions, the middle upward-sloping line the cost of health, and the top line the 
combined cost of these two elements. They demonstrate that the shape of the total 
spending line is largely determined by changes in the cost of pensions and health, with 
the dominant factor until about 2040 being the rising cost of health, after which time 
the declining cost of pensions dominates228. However on their own these two areas 
suggest that spending will only return to its current level at the very end of the century, 
while the total spending line in fact falls below its 2000 level in around 2075. This 
reflects the fact that the baseline assumes benefits for working-age people will be 
uprated in line with prices throughout the projection period (as they have been for the 
past twenty years), causing a trend decline in social security spending as the value of 
such transfers falls steadily in relation to earnings/GDP.
228 A different way of thinking about this conclusion is that the savings from price-uprating the basic 
pension are just about sufficient to offset the upward pressure on spending exerted by demographic 
change. It should also be noted that this conclusion springs in part from the way the model works. As set 
out in Section 4.2, the model’s projections reflect an assumed rate for per capita spending growth and a 
profile for spending by age. As pensions and health are far more tilted to older age-groups than other 
areas of spending it is perhaps unsurprising that they are particularly important in determining the 
projection for total public spending.
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Figure 9.3
Total spending and revenue, and spending by component, under baseline policy
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9.3 What is the UK’s pension problem and how is Labour tackling it?
One way o f interpreting the changes in public expenditure described above is simply 
that increasingly in the future state transfers will come in the form of care rather than 
cash. The policy o f price-linking the basic pension, the main reason for the falling cost 
o f state pensions, is compensated for by higher in-kind benefits for older people via the 
NHS. In this sense, therefore, allowing the basic pension to wither on the vine and 
helping the poorest pensioners through Income Support is a sensible solution to the 
problem o f population ageing. However, while it means that cost problems are non­
existent, this strategy brings with it two distributional problems.
The first distributional problem facing the UK is pensioner poverty. As documented in 
the Households Below Average Income survey (DSS, 1995 and 2000b), the number of 
pensioners with incomes below half the population-wide mean (i.e. the number of 
pensioners living ‘in poverty’) has grown over the last two decades, for single
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households from 16% in 1979 to 26% in 1998/9 and for couples from 16% to 25% 
(Table FI BHC, including the self-employed). This reverses the trend of the previous 
two decades (Johnson and Stears, 1995, pp. 79-81), and comes in spite of the fact that 
aggregate pensioner incomes have grown more quickly than earnings since 1979 (see 
Section 5.3 for a fuller discussion of the position of current pensioners). The estimates 
from PENSIM presented in Chapter 2 suggest that under current policies this trend 
increase in poverty will continue, though the rate at which pensioner poverty worsens 
will slow-down somewhat229. Adjusting for the fact that PENSIM substantially 
overestimates the incidence of poverty among today’s pensioners (see Table 2.7), the 
model suggests that by 2066 the HB AI figures might grow to around 30% for both 
single and couple households.
However, it might be objected that although the number of pensioner households below 
half mean income will increase, the vast majority of these will have an income which is 
only marginally below this poverty standard due to the existence of ‘safety net’ benefits 
such as Income Support230. If half median income is used as a measure then the 
proportion of pensioners living in poverty in 2066 will be only 14% for single 
households and 20% for couples (using PENSIM’s unadjusted estimates, which as 
noted above are probably on the high side). If the poverty gap - the amount by which 
people fall below the poverty standard - is the real concern there is less reason to be 
worried, as this measure will not worsen so significantly (though the fact that there are 
any pensioners living on such low incomes may itself be unacceptable). This is a strong 
argument; the half mean income line is essentially arbitrary, and if the income 
distribution is concentrated around this area (as is the case for pensioners) it will be 
overly-sensitive to small changes in incomes.
229 Note that the decision to link the value of Income Support to earnings, first announced in the March 
1998 Budget, is included in baseline policy. It should be borne in mind that this was not policy under the 
Conservatives, when all benefits were price-linked, and hence the analysis in Chapter 2 understates 
Labour’s achievements by assigning this important reform to the baseline. For the reasons set out in 
Section 3.1, in order to meaningfully compare policy options the minimum income must be held 
constant, and hence Income Support is assumed to rise in line with earnings throughout this thesis.
230 This feature of the projected income distribution reflects the fact that the baseline assumes Income 
Support will remain at its current level but be uprated in line with earnings in the future. This will 
prevent pensioners from falling into extreme poverty but, because Income Support (for 65-74 year olds) 
is currently worth 39% of average income for singles and 37% for couples, it does not affect the numbers 
with incomes below half average (though disability additions may have some effect).
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The problem of incomplete take-up should not, though, be ignored. In reality the very 
poorest pensioners are eligible non-claimants of Income Support, and this group will 
continue to be significant unless take-up is increased to something closer to 100%.
More generally, the fact that PENSIM’s projection for 2066 suggests 34% of single 
pensioners (though only 13% of couples) will be claiming Income Support should be of 
concern. As set out in Sections 8.1 and 8.2, there are a number of problems with relying 
on means-tested benefits to ensure a minimum retirement income: for recipients the 
value of the benefit may be reduced by the perceived social stigma of claiming, for 
pensioners with incomes just above the level of the means test there is the problem of 
penalising those who saved voluntarily during their working life, and for working-age 
people there is the problem of moral hazard (the ‘savings trap’ created by means 
testing; see also Sections 3.2 and 7.1). In many ways reliance on Income Support can 
therefore be thought of as a problem in its own right.
The second distributional problem facing the UK is that current polices will lead to a 
significant widening in inequality amongst pensioners. As shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, 
PENSIM’s baseline projection suggests that in real earning terms the poorest 
pensioners will be relatively worse-off in 2066 than in 1997, while the richest 
pensioners will be relatively better-off. As measured by the Gini coefficient PENSIM’s 
projection is for inequality among pensioners to rise from .24 in 2000 to .35 in 2066 for 
single households, and from .28 to .36 for couples. If the 90/10 ratio is used as the 
measure of inequality then the increase over the period is from 1.8 to 2.2 for singles 
and from 3.0 to 3.7 for couples.
At root this growth in inequality reflects the increasing proportion of pensioner 
incomes coming from occupational pensions, and the fact that income from this source 
is heavily skewed towards richer pensioners (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). This therefore 
creates a policy dilemma. The fact that aggregate pensioner incomes will rise more 
quickly than earnings (according to PENSIM) is largely due to the high level of saving 
currently being made through occupational pensions. However, the growth in 
occupational pension payments is also the reason why inequality is rising231. Hence any
231 In other words, occupational pensions increase mean pensioner income by ‘dragging-up’ the average 
-  benefits go predominantly to richer pensioners. It is worth noting that this analysis also applies to 
changes in the pensioner income distribution over the past 20 years. In aggregate income from
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serious attempt to reduce inequality would involve scaling back occupational provision, 
for instance through making its tax and/or National Insurance treatment less generous 
(see Section 1 A.3), but in doing so would simultaneously risk reducing income growth 
to such an extent that pensioners (as a group) would fall behind the working 
population. Moreover, such a policy would also mean a substantial change in rhetoric -  
occupational pensions are widely proclaimed as the great success story of the UK 
pension system (see for instance DSS, 1998, p65).
Labour's response
In the short term Labour’s response to the problem of pensioner poverty takes the form 
of the ‘minimum income guarantee’ - though the level of the basic pension will remain 
tied to prices (as under the Conservative’s), Income Support will in future rise in line 
with earnings (see Section 5.4). Because the level of the safety net will keep pace with 
increases in general prosperity this policy should keep most pensioners out of extreme 
poverty. However, by increasing the gap between the basic pension and Income 
Support it also extends means testing and, as discussed in Chapter 8, this brings with it 
a number of fairly intractable problems. In the long term, therefore, the government’s 
strategy is to reduce future reliance on Income Support by increasing the automatic (i.e. 
compulsory) pension entitlements of low and moderate earners through the new State 
Second Pension (S2P).
The effect of the S2P on future pensioner incomes was described in Section 6.3. As set 
out there, PENSIM predicts that relative to baseline policy (where Income Support 
rises with earnings but SERPS is still in place) the S2P will slightly reduce the number 
of pensioners below half mean income and (to a rather larger extent) the number of 
pensioners reliant on Income Support (though a quarter of single pensioners are still 
predicted to be claiming in 2066). The S2P will therefore go some way towards 
reducing the role of means-tested benefits, and will also modestly reduce the number of 
pensioners living in poverty (as measured by the half mean income standard). In
occupational pensions grew by 162% in real terms between 1979 and 1996/7, by some way the fastest 
rate of growth of any component of pensioner incomes (see DSS, 1999c, Table 1). However, most of this 
income went to richer pensioners - even in 1996/7 the top fifth of pensioner households received more 
income from occupational pensions than the other four fifths of pensioner households put together (see 
DSS, 2000a, Chart 3.2).
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contrast, PENSIM predicts that the S2P will have little effect on inequality amongst 
pensioners (though it must be conceded that none of the options looked at in Chapter 3 
greatly affect inequality -  see Table 3.11).
The reasons why the S2P is likely to be only partially successful in reducing reliance 
on Income Support were set out in Section 6.2.
• The fact that under current plans S2P benefits will be price-uprated after retirement, 
while Income Support rises with earnings, means that even people with full 
entitlement can fall below the level of the means test during retirement (if they have 
no voluntary savings).
• At some point after 2051 (the year when the scheme will first provide full benefits) 
the combination of the basic pension and full S2P rights will be insufficient to 
provide an income above the level of Income Support (because the S2P’s value 
does not rise enough to compensate for the fall in the value of the basic pension).
• Most importantly, many (if not most) people will miss out on full entitlement due to 
having periods when they are not in work but do not qualify for credits.
These criticisms of the S2P are well-established, and have been set out elsewhere (in 
particular in Rake, Falkingham and Evans, 1999, pp. 3-9). What the analysis in this 
thesis has added to the debate is numbers -  PENSIM gives some idea of how important 
these effects will be in aggregate (though note that the middle effect is not really 
included). However, perhaps more noteworthy is PENSIM’s projection that the S2P 
will not reduce pensioner inequality (relative to baseline policy). This is not obvious 
from a priori reasoning: given that the S2P provides a much larger increase in benefits 
for low earners than high earners, i.e. rather than replicating lifetime earnings (and 
hence labour market inequalities) as SERPS does it redresses them, the reform might 
have been expected to reduce pensioner inequality. PENSIM’s analysis suggests this is 
not the case and, on reflection, there are a number of factors which point in this 
direction. First and foremost is the ‘ceiling’ effect created by means-tested benefits -  
for pensioners at the bottom of the income distribution a lot of the increase in income 
from the S2P is absorbed by decreases in entitlement to Income Support. Hence gross 
incomes at the bottom do not rise as much as might be expected from looking purely at
263
the distribution of S2P benefits. Second, all workers receive higher benefits under the 
S2P, so it has some effect on incomes further up the distribution. Third, only a limited 
number of non-workers will receive S2P credits, and people with a weak attachment to 
the labour market (who generally end up being the poorest pensioners) will get little 
benefit from the new scheme.
Finally, the effect of Labour’s pension policies on the public finances should be noted. 
As set out in Section 6.4, the S2P increases the sustainable tax burden by around £1.5 
billion232. This is equivalent to an increase in the basic rate of income tax of a little 
under two-thirds of a penny. However, under the current framework for financing 
benefits the effect of the S2P will be felt by NICs rather than income tax (indeed, if 
anything the S2P will reduce income tax by cutting the cost of Income Support). Using 
Government Actuary spending projections, and assuming GDP grows at roughly 1.75% 
pa, the S2P will cause revenue from NICs to be a little over 1% of GDP higher in 2060 
than would have been the case under SERPS. But because the cost of National 
Insurance benefit payments (and hence NIC revenue) was projected to decline very 
substantially under baseline policy, the S2P in effect acts to stem the fall in NICs which 
would otherwise have taken place. As shown in Table 6.6, even after the S2P is 
introduced revenue from NICs will still gently decline as a proportion of GDP.
9.4 Would alternative directions for reform have been better?
Labour’s strategy can usefully be contrasted with the four ‘ideal type’ policies, which 
have been used throughout this thesis to exemplify the range of alternative directions 
for pension reform (see Sections 1.3 and 9.1). This section therefore briefly sets out the 
effects of each model, summarising the analysis in Chapter 3 and Section 4.3, and 
looks at the reasons why each model might be favoured or rejected (as discussed 
mainly in Chapters 7 and 8).
232 Again, because the move to link Income Support for pensioners to earnings is included in baseline 
policy, this costing excludes this part of Labour’s policies. Note, though, that a different stance is taken 
in Agulnik, Cardarelli and Sefton (2000, pp. 600-604), who provide costings for both the introduction of 
the minimum income guarantee (i.e. eamings-uprating of Income Support) and the introduction of the 
S2P.
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Targeting
In common with the basic income ideal type, the objective of targeted pension systems 
is limited to ensuring a minimum retirement income. However, unlike a basic income, 
targeting does this through providing support selectively to pensioners with an income 
below the minimum standard; benefits are means-tested rather than universal.
As set out above, in the short term Labour’s pension strategy might be assigned to this 
model. However, as well as its long term plans to bolster second tier provision through 
the S2P, current policy is only evolving slowly in the direction of means testing -  the 
gap between the basic pension and Income Support for pensioners is increasing at the 
relatively slow rate of 1.5% per year (according to the Government Actuary’s main 
assumption). Section 3.2 therefore looked at the effect of targeting through holding the 
basic pension constant in cash terms, so that by 2066 it is worth £2 a week in 1999 
earning terms (on the basis of PENSIM’s assumption that prices will grow by 3.8% a 
year on average). Note also that, as modelled in Section 3.2, second tier provision is 
retained in its current form; a truly targeted system would rely wholly on means-tested 
benefits without the support of the second tier.
In terms of the distributional problems set out in the last section targeting clearly comes 
out as the worst option of the four (see Table 3.11). Using the extended version of 
PENSIM to look at its effect on pensioner incomes in 2066, the analysis in Section 3.2 
suggests that targeting increases pensioner poverty and widens inequality relative to the 
baseline (and, indeed, relative to the other options examined). Unsurprisingly reliance 
on means-tested benefits also goes up, with the 44% of single households now being 
modelled as claiming Income Support. In distributional terms, therefore, targeting 
would appear to be the least attractive option. However, very importantly, it should be 
noted that this conclusion only holds under the assumption of a fixed poverty line 
(relative to earnings). In fact, one of the main arguments for targeting is that it allows a 
higher minimum standard than would otherwise be achievable (economically or 
politically) - it means the level of support provided to the poorest pensioners is not 
limited to that which can be afforded for all.
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The effect of targeting on the public finances was calculated in Section 4.3, which 
showed that this policy would reduce the sustainable tax burden by around £8 billion 
relative to baseline policy (or by £9.5 billion relative to the S2P). Given that under 
baseline policy there was already projected to be a small surplus (see Section 4.2), this 
money could then be used to finance lower taxes or higher (current or future) spending. 
In some ways it is this choice about how savings will be spent which is the key issue in 
relation to targeting. If savings from eliminating ‘wasteful’ expenditure on the non­
poor are used to cut tax rates then this is clearly a right-wing policy. In contrast, if 
savings are used to improve public services (such as health), or raise the value of 
benefits for the poorest (i.e. the minimum income standard), then targeting could just as 
easily be seen as a policy of the left. In particular, if the view is taken that politicians 
face a binding tax constraint, so that tax revenue can not be more than (say) 40% of 
GDP, concentrating pension benefits on the poorest may be the only way of creating 
room for growth in universal public services (such as the NHS) where, for 
administrative or political reasons, equality of treatment between all citizens is judged 
to be an over-riding necessity.
However, whatever view is taken as to how savings will be spent, the very severe 
political, economic and practical problems with operating a means-tested system 
should be appreciated. Though writing about the whole benefits system, the conclusion 
of the Social Security Select Committee apply with particular force to pension policy:
“...a wholly means-tested benefits system would be cheaper, but would have an 
unacceptably large number o f losers, would have severe consequences on work 
and savings incentives, and would be a bureaucratic nightmare leading to high 
error rates and fraud” (HoC, 2000a, conclusion f).
Basic income
The basic income model is the other method for achieving a minimum retirement 
income. Rather than restricting benefits to the poorest, this strategy meets the minimum 
income objective through giving all pensioners benefits equal to the desired minimum. 
It was modelled by looking at the effects of the Minimal Citizen’s Pension outlined in 
Sutherland (1998, pp. 15-17), with second tier provision retained in its current form (as 
under targeting). Although there are minor differences in terms of eligibility, one way
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of thinking about this model is to equate it with linking the value of the basic pension 
to earnings.
The distributional effects of a basic income were impressive (see Table 3.11). Looking 
at pensioner incomes in 2066, the policy more than halves poverty rates relative to the 
baseline (under both the half mean and half median income standards), practically 
eliminates reliance on Income Support, and reduces inequality among pensioners more 
than any of the other options. The problem, however, is that these distributional 
advantages come at considerable cost. Rather than the small surplus in the inter­
temporal budget gap projected under baseline policy, under a basic income there is a 
deficit equivalent (in present value terms) to around 40% of GDP. Moving to the 
sustainable tax burden under this policy would therefore require tax revenue to be 
increased by around £8 billion a year relative to the baseline.
There are a number of possible responses to the cost implications of this model. One is 
simply to accept the required rise in tax revenues as the price of having a pension 
system which secures reasonable distributional outcomes and avoids the problems 
associated with means testing. Another is to look to save money on benefit payments, 
for instance through introducing a household-based scheme rather than an 
individualised system (see Jordan et al, 2000, pp. 86-87). A third would be to co- 
finance the increase in the cost of benefits for pensioners by removing some of their tax 
privileges (such as the age-related tax allowance and, more radically, the exemption of 
unearned income from National Insurance Contributions). Last, resources could be 
found from within the pension system through abolishing second tier pension provision 
(see Section 8.5). In all instances the key insight is that the severe incentive (and other) 
problems associated with means testing can be eliminated through a relatively small 
change in the incentives facing workers or richer pensioners. In economic terms there is 
considerable force in the argument that equalising incentives optimises the trade-off 
between redistribution and efficiency (though this is very hard to prove conclusively; 
see Section 8.1), but the more important argument is probably that such a system is 
‘fairer’ than one where effective tax rates are much higher for poorer than for richer 
pensioners.
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Despite these attractive features, the government appears to have set its cap against this 
model for pension provision by its refusal to re-link the value of the basic pension with 
earnings. The reasons why were spelt out in a recent speech by Social Security 
Secretary Alistair Darling:
“An across-the-board earnings related increase in pensions doesn ’t tackle the 
problem we face. By 2020, restoring the earnings link would cost an additional 
£20 billion a year. That's a 50% increase in the current pensions budget. But 
crucially it wouldn’t solve the problem o f those on low and modest incomes.
And it wouldn ’t do nearly enough to help those with small savings and little 
growth in their incomes when they retire ” (Darling, 2000a, p5).
Instead of restoring the earnings link the government have therefore decided to 
introduce a ‘pensioner credit’ to provide targeted support to pensioners with incomes 
just above the level of Income Support. As discussed in Chapter 8, this is likely to take 
the form of a taper in Income Support, with benefits being withdrawn at a rate of 75% 
or 50% rather than the pound-for-pound currently used. The aim is therefore to 
ameliorate the effects of the means test, so that there is less of a sense of unfairness for 
pensioners who fail to qualify for extra benefits because of past savings. Equally, 
however, the new system could be seen as exacerbating means testing, in that more 
pensioners will now be affected.
In particular, even if the policy reduces the ethical and political objections to targeting, 
it is likely to bring to the fore the saving disincentives associated with this type of 
provision. The flip-side to more pensioners now being eligible for top-up support is that 
more workers will have good reason to factor entitlement to means-tested benefits into 
their saving decisions. Rather than means testing being confined predominantly to older 
single pensioners, under the pensioner credit there is a much greater chance of 
households being eligible for support at the point of retirement. There will therefore be 
a strong incentive to maximise benefit entitlement by reducing voluntary savings (i.e. 
consuming more now), or, more likely, to save in ways which escape the means test 
(such as owner-occupied housing). The only way out of this predicament would then be 
for the government to reduce the taper rate even further. However, as the taper becomes 
shallower (i.e. as incentives become more-or-less equalised) it will become
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increasingly apparent that a similar effect could be achieved more efficiently through a 
basic income (Jordan et al, 2000)
Social insurance
In contrast to the previous two ‘ideal types’, the objective of the social insurance and 
compulsory saving models is to protect individuals’ accustomed living standards, as 
well as to ensure a minimum retirement income (through a safety net of means-tested 
benefits). Both models therefore force individuals to have a retirement income which is 
related to their previous earnings. However, they differ sharply as to how such 
eamings-related benefits should be achieved. Under social insurance the state is 
directly involved in finance and provision, while under compulsory saving the state’s 
role is restricted to mandating contributions (though arguably this constitutes ‘finance’, 
and is interpreted in this way in this thesis). It follows that social insurance is run on a 
PAYG basis while compulsory saving is funded.
In many countries the distinction between social insurance and compulsory saving 
relates solely to the method of provision (public versus private) and finance (PAYG 
versus funded). This reflects the fact that in countries which currently have large social 
insurance systems proposals for compulsory saving are most often designed with the 
explicit intention of replicating existing benefits (see, for instance, Feldstein and 
Samwick, 2000, pp. 3-5). However, in the UK pension reform debate the equivalence 
between the two systems (in terms of the benefits produced) is barely recognised. For 
adherents of social insurance improvements in publicly-provided eamings-related 
benefits would be part-and-parcel of a more general expansion of state benefits, with 
the level of the basic pension also being imporoved via a return to eamings-uprating. In 
contrast, proposals for compulsory saving (such as the Basic Pension Plus; see below) 
invariably envisage that the value of the basic pension will continue to fall relative to 
earnings, as has occurred over the last twenty years under price-uprating. It is this 
factor which is principally responsible for the very different effects of the schemes 
looked at in Part A on pensioner incomes and the public finances.
The social insurance model was exemplified in Part A by looking at the effects of 
returning to the 1975 legislation which first introduced SERPS (and which also
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legislated for eamings-uprating of the basic pension). In terms of pensioner incomes, 
PENSIM’s analysis showed that the effects of this model were very similar to a basic 
income, albeit with a rather smaller reduction in inequality. The main difference 
between the two models therefore relates to cost. As noted above, a substantial increase 
in tax revenue would already be required under the basic income model in order for 
policy to be fiscally sustainable (i.e. so that increases in the cost of benefit payments in 
the future could be met out of constant revenues). Social insurance would increase 
these costs by around 50%. Moreover, it would also close-off potential routes for 
meeting this cost. In particular, the option of paying for the increased cost of first tier 
benefits through abolishing (or reducing) second tier benefits would no longer be 
available.
Given this analysis, the popularity of social insurance amongst commentators on the 
left is puzzling. If distributional outcomes are the main criteria for success then the 
basic income model is preferable (as well as being cheaper). However, as was also 
noted above in relation to targeting, this conclusion reflects the fact that this thesis has 
assumed that the minimum income standard is fixed under all options. If this 
assumption is dropped, and allowance made for the interplay between benefit levels 
and institutional structures, then social insurance may well come out more favourably. 
In particular, it can be argued that social insurance is to be preferred over a basic 
income because it creates a ‘contract’ between workers and the state (and consequently 
between generations) which will result in high benefit levels. By ensuring protection of 
retirement incomes for everyone, and by initially disguising how much such protection 
costs through its PAYG financing mechanism, social insurance can end up being the 
best way of helping poorer pensioners (see Sections 7.3 and 9.1).
This institutional argument for social insurance may well be true in many countries. 
However, it is far from clear that it holds in the UK (or, at least, in the UK at the 
beginning of the 21st century). Had Beveridge and the post-war Labour government 
opted to introduce an eamings-related scheme then it is quite possible that the 
distributional problems currently facing the UK pension system would have been 
avoided (albeit at the expense of higher and growing contribution rates). But history 
cannot be re-written. The absence of any second tier (alongside the generous tax reliefs
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available for third tier provision) meant that the kind of comprehensive social insurance 
scheme seen in other countries, with the state providing eamings-related benefits to all, 
was no longer a possibility by the time SERPS was introduced. Even by the late 1950s 
contracting-out had become a political necessity, and hence the system was never 
capable of ‘dynamising’ the basic pension (through integrating first and second tier 
provision) in the way its originators intended.
The failure of SERPS should therefore not be put down to the various cuts made under 
the 1979-1997 Conservative administration. In political terms the scheme never made a 
great deal of sense from the outset. Equally, the argument that (as originally envisaged) 
SERPS was needed to improve the pension entitlements of low earners and women is 
incorrect: using resources to increase flat-rate benefits would have been more 
redistributive (Creedy, Disney and Whitehouse, 1993, p. 166). And the notion that 
SERPS would help to avoid the ‘two nations in old age’ which Titmuss (1955, p. 74) 
envisaged is fanciful; if anything the scheme has served to reinforce inequalities in later 
life through protecting the privileged status of occupational pension schemes. The 
enduring support for SERPS from a dwindling band of politicians and academics can, 
therefore, only be put down to misplaced nostalgia.
Compulsory saving
This ideal type is represented by the Basic Pension Plus proposals (or that part which 
relates to second tier pensions) put forward by the Conservative Party in the run-up to 
the May 1997 general election (see Lilley, 1997)233. It involves, first, extending 
contracting-out to everyone, so that the second tier becomes fully funded and, second, 
increasing the compulsory contribution rate to 5%.
The effects of this reform on pensioner incomes and the public finances were set out in 
Section 3.5 and 4.3. In terms of distributional effects PENSIM’s analysis suggests there 
is very little difference between baseline policy and compulsory saving: mean and 
median income go up slightly while the proportion of pensioners claiming Income
233 It should be noted these proposals are rather different to the ideas put forward by the Conservative 
Party in September 2000, in that the new scheme would only affect the basic pension and would be 
voluntary, while the Basic Pension Plus envisaged everyone below a certain age being forced to contract- 
out of both SERPS and the basic pension.
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Support falls slightly, as does the proportion living below half mean and median 
income, while inequality is unaffected. The conclusion, therefore, was that this kind of 
reform is more concerned with altering the timing of public expenditure, bringing 
forward spending through ensuring that everyone is contracted out, than with altering 
pensioner incomes (see Section 4.3). However, it should be noted that this was under 
the assumption of a compulsory saving rate of 5% - as this is only slightly higher than 
the effective rate under SERPS (4.6% at present) it is not surprising that the policy has 
little effect on pensioner incomes. If instead a higher rate were implemented, such as 
10% for instance, then the distributional effects of this policy would be much larger. In 
particular, increasing the compulsory contribution rate to such a level would 
significantly reduce reliance on Income Support in the future (Jupp, 1998, p. 17).
Nevertheless, there are good reasons for rejecting this argument for higher compulsory 
saving, and the analysis in this thesis concurs with the conclusion reached in the 
pension reform Green Paper:
“We have considered increasing the rate o f compulsory saving.... increasing 
the compulsory rate fo r  low earners leads to little extra pension, although 
affording the extra compulsory contributions could be difficult fo r them. But 
higher earners would be forced to have a significantly larger pension. These 
people's compulsory pensions are already likely to be high enough to take them 
clear o f relying on state benefits in retirement. Two-thirds o f those who earn 
more than £15,000 a year already save about an extra 5 per cent o f their 
earnings voluntarily. Extra compulsion for these people would not reduce 
dependency on the State. Therefore, we do not believe higher compulsory 
saving is justified” (DSS, 1998, p81).
Setting to one side this argument for higher compulsion, a number of other rationales 
for moving towards funded compulsory saving schemes have been put forward:
• funding more pension provision helps to diffuse the ‘demographic timebomb’ of 
population ageing;
• privatising provision allows individuals to plan for the future with more certainty, 
as their pension rights are more secure in the private sector;
• increased private saving will lead to more investment and higher growth;
• individuals would be seen to be taking more responsibility for their own retirement 
income, and would no longer have to rely on state transfers.
As set out in Section 4.5, the first three of these rationales are highly questionable, and 
the last is an ideological (rather than a normative) position. However, the more 
important point is that these arguments for funding say nothing about the shape of 
benefits, and they would apply equally to funding flat-rate benefits.
9.5 Looking to the future
This thesis’ central criticism of the approach to pension reform taken by Labour is that, 
by spreading its interventions across a range of ideal types, presumably in an attempt to 
get the best of all worlds, the government has ended up with a set of mutually 
inconsistent policies. In other words, though it has announced numerous pension 
policies since its election, the government has no clearly defined overall strategy.
As shown in Figure 1.6, Labour’s reforms (up to and including the Green Paper) have 
moved policy in three directions simultaneously: targeting is represented by the 
introduction of the ‘minimum income guarantee’, basic income by the move to make 
the S2P flat-rate for people earning less than the lower threshold, and compulsory 
saving by restricting eamings-related second tier benefits to private, funded schemes 
(via contracted-out rebates). In itself this diversity might be thought a little 
inconsistent; for instance, Ross (1999, p. 15) characterises the S2P as a substitute for 
the basic pension, and questions why it was felt necessary to allow the latter to wither 
while planting the seeds of the former. But more importantly, as argued in Section 9.1, 
the lack of a clear strategy can lead to inconsistency. One of such inconsistency was 
highlighted in Chapter 6, where it was argued that the policy of limiting S2P credits to 
a narrowly-defined group of ‘participants’ is in conflict with the scheme’s main goal of 
keeping future pensioners off reliance on Income Support (i.e. if benefits are 
conditional there will always be some people who end up requiring means-tested 
support)234. However, a more important example of inconsistency has emerged more
234 Even if it is accepted that ‘responsibilities’ should take precedence over ‘rights’, despite the holes in 
provision which this inevitably causes, an additional argument for universalism in pension benefits is 
that if the government wants to change non-participants’ behaviour it is better to impose 
penalties/provide rewards immediately rather than delaying sanctions until retirement. For instance, it 
seems likely that the job-search behaviour of people with school-age children will be more affected by
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recently with the announcement in March 2000 that the government intends to 
introduce a ‘pensioner credit’ (see HMT, 2000, paragraph 5.45).
If not quite in conflict, it is clear that the pensioner credit and the S2P will not make 
easy bed fellows. As discussed in the last section and in Section 8.5, if the credit takes 
the form of a taper in Income Support its effect will be to make the means test 
shallower but broader, raising the point where entitlement ends. But as well as affecting 
pensioners’ income this also affects saving incentives for working-age people -  for 
them the credit acts as a tax on saving. In policy terms the introduction of a pensioner 
credit will therefore have the effect of undermining the strategy set out in the Green 
Paper (DSS, 1998, Ch.s 4-6), as it means the S2P will now not only have to be higher 
than the level of Income Support but also higher than the credit if saving dis-incentive 
effects are to be avoided.
This combination of policies therefore creates a distinct dilemma for future 
governments. Once given, the pensioner credit is likely to prove hard to take away from 
individuals, yet while it remains there will always be an extensive number of working 
people with little incentive to save. Moreover, there will also be a new group of 
pensioners just above the credit who will now have a reason to feel aggrieved (see 
Section 8.5). The pressures on the government will therefore lead in diametrically 
opposing directions: to reduce moral hazard resources should be concentrated on 
improving the S2P, while in order to help pensioners the taper rate must be reduced or 
Income Support increased (both of which will worsen saving incentives). However, 
there is also a more basic inconsistency between the two policies. The pensioner credit 
marks a move in the direction of tax/benefit integration while the S2P, in contrast, is 
based on the contributory principle. This is a fundamental, and possibly unbridgeable, 
divide. The former sees the state’s job as being to provide citizens with basic rights, 
including to a minimum income, while the latter sees the state’s role as providing 
collective insurance. This thesis’ contention is that, though the government’s chosen 
route for tax-benefit integration is somewhat tortuous, and that rather than putting a 
taper into Income Support it would be easiest to move straight towards a basic income,
immediate changes in benefit rules and incentives than by arcane adjustments in their second tier pension 
rights.
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nevertheless the pensioner credit is at least starting from a sensible principle. 
Equivalently, this thesis has argued strongly against the idea that state pension 
provision should be viewed as a form of insurance.
Of course, over the lifecycle the ‘welfare state’ will always act as a kind of savings 
bank, in that generally people will take more money out (in kind or in cash) towards the 
end of their life than in the middle (when they pay most in). But this does not mean the 
state need necessarily act like an insurer. The problems with linking benefits to 
contributions, either through compulsory eamings-related provision or (more mildly) 
through contribution conditions for flat-rate benefits, have been discussed extensively 
in this thesis. As set out in Chapter 7, it is difficult to find a rationale for the state 
forcing people to have a retirement income which is linked to their earnings in work, 
while contribution conditions for flat-rate benefits are self defeating (see above and 
Section 6.5). However, there is also a wider point: unlike an insurer the state is not 
bound simply to respond to lifecycle events, it can also shape them (see Laczko and 
Phillipson, 1991, Ch. 8, or from a rather different perspective, Leisering and Walker, 
1998, pp. 6-11).
Pensions in the lifecycle
Starting with Rowntree’s (1902, p. 137) cycles of poverty (or, some might say, 
f Shakespeare’s seven ages of man), the temptation to connect particular ages with 
particular activities or circumstances has proved irresistible. Nevertheless, while a 
useful tool for thinking about social policy, the limitations, and even dangers, of such 
an approach should be recognised. Though clearly certain parts of the lifecycle are 
biologically determined, we should not underestimate the extent to which age 
classifications are social phenomena which have been made and unmade over the 
centuries (Young and Schuller, 1991, pp. 152-154). Therefore, rather than viewing the 
lifecycle as pre-determined, with public policy simply responding to inevitable changes 
in status and circumstances as people age, the characteristics of different parts of life 
should be seen as a product of society’s organisation. Leslie Hannah’s ‘Inventing 
Retirement’ sums up this view in its title (Hannah, 1986)235.
235 This view is by no means universally accepted. If the marginalisation of older workers is an 
inevitable feature of advanced capitalism (i.e. there is ‘structured dependency’; Macnicol, 1990, p. 34), 
then policies towards income maintenance in later life should be quite distinct from those for younger
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Pensions can therefore be seen both as a cause of and response to declining earnings in 
later life. In other words, the policy response to income needs in old age may, in effect, 
have exacerbated the marginalisation of older workers. In one way this simply reflects 
the fact that, by providing an alternative source of income, pensions reduce the amount 
individuals need to work to maintain their consumption. But more subtly, the fact of 
pension provision -  and in particular tax incentives for private pensions - may also 
make it more difficult for older people to succeed in the labour market even before they 
reach retirement age . In particular, as discussed in PIU (2000a, pp. 35-36) and 
Agulnik, Burchardt and Evans (forthcoming), occupational pensions make it more 
likely that older workers are the first to go in periods of economic restructuring (or are 
offered the biggest incentive to make themselves voluntarily redundant), and increase 
the probability that unemployment in late middle-age will cause permanent withdrawal 
from the labour market. Indeed, by helping to reduce the effective length of working 
life occupational pensions may exacerbate problems of poverty in retirement.
This brings us full circle to the assumption made at the start of this thesis that, for the 
majority, death will be preceded by a period of worklessness. Why should this be the 
case? Given that a century ago most people worked ‘until they dropped’, and hence 
retirement was the exception rather than the rule, we cannot view the growth of 
retirement as some kind of natural phenomenon237. Therefore, in looking at what 
retirement means, and how governments should intervene in this part of the lifecycle, 
we should be aware of the diversity of individual experience. For some the cessation of 
work represents a lifestyle choice, a reward earned through a lifetime’s work. For 
others retirement is an unwanted condition, forced on them by employment legislation 
and labour market practices rather than as the result of individual choice. And for an
(less marginalised) people.
236 Note that, in contrast to state pensions, Inland Revenue rules currently allow private pensions to be 
taken from age 50. In practice this is about the age when labour force participation rates begin to decline, 
particularly amongst men (Campbell 1999, pp. 8-13). In recognition of this connection a recent Cabinet 
Office report into non-employment among older workers recommended increasing the minimum age to 
55 (see PIU, 2000a), and at the time of writing the government are still consulting on this proposal.
237 See Macnicol (1998, Table 2.1), PIU (2000a, pp. 13-17) or Campbell (1999, pp. 14-16) for historical 
data on employment patterns among older people in the UK. Thane (1984, pp. 4-9) discusses more 
generally how the concept of ‘retirement’ came to be a norm over the course of the twentieth century.
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unfortunate minority the onset of disability makes retirement from work inevitable, 
whether it is sought for or not. Creating policies which allow for this diversity, and help 
individuals to shape their own life courses as best they are able, is the real challenge for 
pension reform.
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.. it may well be that this bright day of summer which is now dawning 
upon us is no image of the beginning of the day that shall be; but rather 
shall that day-dawn be cold and grey and surly; and yet by its light shall 
men see things as they verily are, and no longer enchanted by the gleam 
of the moon and the glamour of the dreamtide. By such grey light shall 
wise men and valiant souls see the remedy, and deal with it, a real thing 
that may be touched and handled, and no glory of the heavens to be 
worshipped from afar off. And what shall it be, as I told thee before, 
save that men shall be determined to be free; yea, free as thou wouldst 
have them, when thine hope rises the highest, and thou art thinking not 
of the king’s uncles, and poll-groat bailiffs, and the villeinage of Essex, 
but of the end of all, when men shall have the fruits of the earth and the 
fruits of their toil thereon, without money and without price. The time 
shall come, John Ball, when that dream of thine that this shall one day 
be, shall be a thing that men shall talk of soberly, and as a thing soon to 
come about...”
From A Dream o f John Ball by William Morris.
297
